#H 


f*   -X 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 


THE 


DIPLOMATIC   HISTORY 


OF   THE 


ADMINISTRATIONS 


OF 


WASHINGTON    AND   ADAMS 


1789-1801. 


BY 


WILLIAM  HENRY  TRESCOT. 


BOSTON: 
LITTLE,    BROWN    AND    COMPANY. 

1857. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress  in  the  year  1857,  by 

WILLIAM  HENRY  TRESCOT, 
in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  District  of  South  Carolina. 


CAMBRIDGE: 

ALLEN    AND    FAKNHAM,    PRINTERS 


TO 


HON.    EDWARD    EVERETT. 


DEAR  SIR, — 

SINCE  the  time  when  Massachusetts  and  South  Carolina,  Virginia 
and  New  York,  gave  to  the  public  service  of  a  common  country 
such  men  as  Washington  and  Adams,  Jay  and  Pinckney,  that 
country  has  travelled  fast  and  far.  Its  territory  has  expanded,  its 
influence  extended,  its  character  matured,  and  its  place  in  the  world 
has  become  proudly  assured. 

But  the  spirit  which  informed  their  counsels  has  departed,  and 
the  language  of  their  unselfish  patriotism  would  be  profaned  in  the 
party  controversies  of  the  day.  What  is  to  be  the  issue  of  this  mis 
erable  dissension,  God  only  knows.  But  whether  this  great  empire 
is  to  outlive  its  angry  disputes,  and  again  move  onwards  in  the  unity 
of  the  spirit  and  the  bond  of  peace,  or  whether  the  grand  fabric  is  to 
be  resolved  into  separate  republics,  each  carrying  out  God's  purpose 
in  its  special  civilization,  it  cannot  be  amiss,  in  this  day  of  hard 
thoughts  and  bitter  words,  to  go  back  to  our  old  days  and  to  our 
ancient  rulers  for  that  sober  wisdom,  which,  united  or  separate,  can 
alone  secure  our  prosperity. 

It  ought  not  to  surprise  you,  and  I  am  sure  it  will  surprise  nobody 
else,  that,  fresh  from  the  contemplation  of  the  temperance,  judgment, 
and  patriotism  of  those  great  rulers,  I  should  find  a  natural  associa 
tion  between  your  character  and  that  of  the  wise  and  virtuous  men 
who  created  and  adorned  our  early  history. 


583753 


VI  DEDICATION. 

It  has  been,  sir,  your  good  fortune  to  have  filled  the  same  high 
office  which  has  been  illustrated  by  the  names  of  Jay  and  Jefferson, 
•  Marshall  and  Madison,  Clay  and  Webster  and  Calhoun.  It  was  the 
good  fortune  of  your  country,  that,  during  your  official  life,  you  were 
called  upon  to  justify  the  history  of  her  past  growth,  and  vindicate 
the  strength  and  justice  of  her  position  towards  the  world.  You 
did  both  in  language  which  has  become  history.  You  linked  the 
eager  present  with  the  venerable  past,  and  developed  the  policy  of 
to-day  from  the  principles  and  practice  of  our  earliest  statesmanship. 
To  whom,  then,  could  I  dedicate  these  pages  with  more  propriety 
than  to  him  who  has  so  thoroughly  represented  the  traditionary 
policy  of  our  wisest  and  greatest  statesmen  ?  And  I  venture  to  hope 
that  it  will  not  diminish  the  slight  value  of  this  honest  tribute  to  your 
public  character,  that,  justified  by  circumstances  which  I  at  least 
can  never  forget,  I  can  subscribe  myself,  in  a  spirit  of  sincere  and 
and  respectful  affection, 

Your  friend, 

WM.   HENRY   TRESCOT. 
BARNWELL  ISLAND,  S.  C.,  ) 
Nov.  10,  1857.  ) 


PREFACE. 


THIS  volume  is  the  sequel  to  one  which  I  ventured  to 
publish  in  1852,  under  the  title  of  "  The  Diplomacy  of 
the  Revolution,"  and  I  hope  soon  to  complete  the 
series  by  a  similar  one,  in  reference  to  the  remaining 
periods  of  our  diplomatic  history,  in  accordance  with 
the  division  suggested  in  the  first  chapter  of  this  book. 

An  attempt  to  appreciate  the  progress  of  interna 
tional  law,  as  illustrated  in  the  diplomatic  history  of 
the  world  from  the  peace  of  Westphalia,  undertaken 
with  no  view  to  publication,  required  the  study  of  the 
special  diplomatic  history  of  each  of  the  great  Euro 
pean  powers,  and  of  the  United  States.  The  diplo 
matic  history  of  almost  every  European  state  has  been 
written,  whether  well  or  ill,  by  some  one  of  that  great 
body  of  historical  students  in  the  Old  World  to  whom 
the  materials  have  been  accessible ;  and  outside  of  their 
labors,  and  in  illustration  of  them,  there  exists  an 


Vlll  PREFACE. 

immense  mass  of  memoirs,  state  papers,  and  negotia 
tions,  bearing  on  the  same  subject.  But  there  was  no 
corresponding  summary  of  our  own  diplomatic  history. 
The  only  work  of  the  kind,  "  The  Diplomacy  of  the 
United  States,"  by  Theodore  Lyman,  Boston,  1828, 
although  an  accurate,  laborious,  and  useful  book,  is  not 
written  from  the  point  of  view  which  I  wished  to 
occupy ;  and  I  therefore  found  it  necessary  to  study  the 
diplomatic  history  of  the  United  States  for  myself,  as 
thoroughly  as  the  materials  would  permit.  Finding  the 
study  one  of  great  interest  to  myself,  I  have  thought  its 
results  might  not  be  without  interest  for  others. 

I  have  published  this  volume  separately,  because  the 
twelve  years  which  it  includes  have  a  character  of  their 
own,  and  the  accession  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  reversing  that 
policy,  makes  the  commencement  of  his  administration 
a  proper  starting-point  for  the  next  period  of  our 
history. 

The  materials  which  I  have  used  are  the  official  col 
lections  of  state  papers  relating  to  our  diplomatic  his 
tory,  in  Sparks's  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  from  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  to  the  Treaty  of  Peace; 
The  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  from  1783  to  1789, 
published  by  Congress,  in  7  vols.  8vo. ;  The  Secret  Jour 
nals  of  Congress,  Foreign  Affairs,  from  the  Meeting 


PREFACE.  ix 

thereof  to  the  Dissolution  of  the  Confederation  by  the 
Adoption  of  the  Constitution;  The  American  State 
Papers,  Foreign  Affairs,  4  vols.  folio,  from  the  Adop 
tion  of  the  Constitution  to  the  Treaty  of  Ghent ;  and 
the  Lives  and  Letters  of  such  of  the  distinguished 
actors  in  our  political  history  as  have  been  published. 
Among  these  I  feel  bound  to  refer  specially  to  the  large 
and  valuable  publication  of  the  Letters  and  Works  of 
John  Adams,  prefaced  by  a  biography  of  great  inter 
est  and  value,  and,  considering  the  relation  of  the 
author  and  the  subject,  of  singular  and  honorable  im 
partiality.  Besides  these,  I  have  had  the  MSS.  col 
lections  of  General  Thomas  Pinckney  and  General 
Charles  Cotesworth  Pinckney,  the  one  minister  to  Eng 
land  and  Spain,  and  the  other  minister  to  France. 

As  there  were  no  discoveries  to  make  in  our  diplo 
matic  history,  I  have  made  none,  and  whatever  value 
these  pages  may  have  must  attach  to  the  connected 
and  impartial  narrative  which  I  have  endeavored  to 
construct. 

Whenever  I  have  quoted  a  public  state  paper  with 
out  a  special  reference,  it  will  be  found  under  its  proper 
date  in  one  of  the  above  published  collections ;  and 
for  the  facts  of  our  general  history,  a  knowledge  of 
which  I  have  assumed  in  the  reader,  the  authority  will 


X  PREFACE. 

be  found  in  any  of  the  general  histories  of  the  United 

States. 

I  cannot  conclude  this  preface  without  acknowledg 
ing  my  sense  of  grateful  obligation  to  Professor  Bowen, 
of  Harvard  University,  for  the  kindness  with  which  he 
undertook,  and  the  care  with  which  he  has  accom 
plished,  the  troublesome  task  of  correcting  the  proofs  of 
this  volume  as  they  came  from  the  press. 

In  the  body  of  this  work,  by  inadvertence,  a  reference 
to  the  Life  of  Gouverneur  Morris,  by  Dr.  Sparks,  as 
authority  for  certain  facts  in  Mr.  Morris's  ambassa 
dorial  career,  was  omitted.  The  reference  belongs  to 
the  chapter  on  the  French  negotiations. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER    I. 

PAGE 
INTRODUCTION.      FROM    1783    TO    1789       ....  1 


CHAPTER    II. 

NEGOTIATIONS    AND    TREATY   WITH    ENGLAND  .  .  .63 

CHAPTER    III. 

NEGOTIATIONS  AND  TREATY  WITH  FRANCE  .     .     .     .129 


CHAPTER    IV. 

NEGOTIATIONS    AND    TREATY   WITH    SPAIN   AND    ALGIERS 

CHAPTER    V. 

CONCLUSION         ..........    275 


ERRATA. 

Page  112,  3d  line  from  bottom,  for  included  read  excluded. 
Page  127,  line  17,  for  a  contemporary  statesman,  read  contemporary  statesmen. 
Page  171,  3d  line  of  note,  for  creditable  to  Mr.  Pinckney,   read  creditable  to  Mr. 
Pickering. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 


CHAPTER    I. 

FROM  THE   TREATY  OF  PEACE,  1783,  TO  THE  ADOPTION  OF   THE 
CONSTITUTION,  1788. 

THE  Diplomatic  History  of  the  United  States  may  be 
divided  into  three  periods,  —  from  Washington  to  Jeffer 
son,  from  Jefferson  to  the  Declaration  of  Mr.  Monroe, 
and  from  that  Declaration  to  the  present  day.*  This 
division  is,  of  course,  to  some  extent  arbitrary,  but  still 
correct  enough  for  the  purposes  of  a  continuous  and 
general  narrative ;  and  each  of  these  periods  may  be 
fairly  considered  as  the  illustration  of  a  special  condi 
tion  of  public  necessities,  and  as  the  natural  manifesta 
tion  of  an  independent  principle  of  our  foreign  policy. 

*  The  character  and  circumstances  of  this  famous  Declaration  will 
be  discussed  in  its  proper  place  in  the  history  of  the  period  to  which 
it  belongs.  I  use  the  term  here  simply  as  a  convenient  description 
of  that  period,  when  the  consequences  of  our  foreign  policy,  from  the 
accession  of  Mr.  Jefferson  to  the  Treaty  of  Ghent,  were,  to  borrow  a 
compact  and  comprehensive  French  phrase,  resume,  in  the  official 
acts  of  the  government. 

1 


X  DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY. 

The  condition  of  the  country  at  the  inauguration  of 
General  Washington's  administration  was,  in  many 
respects,  anomalous.  It  was  a  transition  leading  to  a 
great  change,  and  required  an  activity  of  diplomatic  life 
that  has  not  since  been  either  necessary  or  possible. 

In  the  first  place,  the  independence  of  the  colonies 
had  not  abruptly  cut  all  connection  with  Europe ;  and 
as  the  colonial  policy  of  the  great  maritime  states  had 
always  been  considered  questions  of  European  concern, 
the  powers  of  the  old  world  did  not  at  first  recognize 
the  extent  of  that  independence.  They  still  fancied 
themselves  directly  interested  in  the  politics  of  the 
"United  States.  And  it  is  safe  to  say,  that  the  admis 
sion  of  an  American  minister  into  an  European  con 
gress  would  have  appeared  a  more  natural  diplomatic 
proceeding  in  1788  than  at  any  later  period  of  our 
history. 

Again :  there  existed  at  that  time,  in  Europe,  an  ex 
aggerated  idea  of  the  immediate  importance  of  Amer 
ican  commerce.  It  was  a  time  when  great  interests 
,were  about  to  take  the  place  of  great  men,  but  while 
they  were  still  felt  through  the  action  of  governments, 
rather  than  in  their  own  strength.  Governments,  there 
fore,  everywhere  strove  by  treaties  to  secure  commercial 
advantages ;  and  the  correspondence  of  Franklin,  Adams, 
and  Jefferson,  who  represented  the  country  abroad  from 
the  peace  of  1783  to  the  adoption  of  the  constitution, 
bears  testimony  to  the  anxiety  of  many  maritime 
powers  to  conciliate  and  secure  these  supposed  advan- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  3 

tages.  The  indissoluble  commercial  connection  be 
tween  England  and  the  United  States  had  not  then 
established  itself;  and  the  general  idea  was,  that  the 
independence  of  the  colonies  had  broken  up  an  old  and 
rich  commerce,  the  fragments  of  which  were  to  be 
obtained  by  early  and  liberal  conventions. 

In  the  third  place,  the  treaty  with  France  was  one  of 
mutual  guarantees,  and  many  of  its  clauses  were  open 
to  interpretations  involving  the  United  States  in  the 
stormy  and  changeful  politics  of  that  unhappy  empire. 
The  circumstances  of  France  soon,  indeed,  compelled 
her  to  insist  upon  that  construction  of  the  treaty  most 
favorable  to  her  belligerent  rights,  and  the  government 
was  plunged  into  an  harassing  controversy  both  with 
England  and  France.  The  task  of  the  administration 
was,  in  negotiating  such  treaties  as  were  absolutely 
necessary  for  the  interests  of  the  country,  to  avoid  all 
political  engagements ;  and,  in  carrying  out  faithfully 
such  treaties  as  had  already  been  negotiated,  to  shun 
all  action  that  might  compromise  the  neutrality  of  the 
country.  In  other  words,  its  object  was  to  establish ' 
by  diplomacy  what  had  already  been  achieved  by  arms, 
—  the  perfect  independence  of  the  United  States ;  not 
their  isolation  from  the  great  affairs  of  the  world,  but 
the  right  to  determine  for  themselves  how  far  their 
interests  were  implicated  in  European  politics,  and  how 
far  they  would  permit  themselves  to  be  made  parties  to 
any  European  agitation.  Situated  as  were  the  Euro 
pean  states,  they  were  not  always  arbiters  of  their  own 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

interests ;  and  there  existed  on  their  part  a  strong  dis 
position  to  apply  the  rule  of  their  own  conduct  to  the 
new  republic,  and  compel  a  participation  in  a  common 
fate.  To  resist  this  pretension,  and  thus  perfect  the 
work  of  the  Revolution,  was  neither  an  easy  nor  a  safe 
achievement ;  and  it  was  accomplished  only  after  many 
disheartening  trials,  and  through  the  long,  patient,  and 
painful  negotiations  which  gave  character  to  this  period 
by  the  treaties  with  England,  Spain,  and  France. 

With  the  accession  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  opened  a  new 
state  of  affairs.  The  commerce  of  the  country,  in  its 
gradual  increase,  had  demonstrated  that  its  natural 
channels  could  neither  be  created  nor  changed  by  treaty 
stipulations,  and  the  idea  of  the  importance  of  treaty 
connections  with  America  had  lost  much  of  its  original 
force.  The  progress,  too,  of  the  great  revolution  which 
convulsed  the  old  world  until  1815,  was  fast  absorbing 
the  attention  of  the  European  powers.  And  during 
this  period  of  unequalled  importance  and  excitement, 
it  became  very  clear  that  the  interests  of  the  new 
republic  were,  and  for  some  time  must  be,  entirely  dis 
connected  from  the  ruling  interests  of  the  European 
confederacy.  The  Revolution  having  given  us  an  inde 
pendent  national  existence,  and  the  administrations  of 
Washington  and  Adams  having  vindicated  our  perfect 
independence  of  national  action,  it  remained  for  Mr. 
Jefferson  and  his  successors  to  complete  this  work. 
So  long  as  the  United  States  wrere  bounded  by  terri 
tories  belonging  to  European  powers,  they  were  at  any 


I/ 

J 


DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY.  5 

time  subject  to  foreign  and  extrinsic  influences,  and 
liable  to  be  drawn  into  the  consequences  of  political 
action  not  always  proceeding  from  their  own  interests; 
and  the  full  independence  of  no  maritime  country  could 
be  considered  established  in  face  of  the  belligerent  pre 
tensions  of  the  European  nations,  during  this  period 
most  extravagantly  pressed,  and,  so  far  as  force  went, 
most  powerfully  supported.  The  two  leading  ideas, 
therefore,  of  this  second  stage  of  our  foreign  policy 
were  :  first,  the  necessary  territorial  extension  of  the 
United  States,  which  would  leave  their  independence 
of  action  uninfluenced  by  the  neighborhood  of  Euro 
pean  colonies ;  and  next,  the  recognition  of  their  equal 
right  to  the  great  maritime  prerogatives  of  an  independ 
ent  and  commercial  people.  As  far  as  circumstances 
permitted,  the  first  was  carried  out  in  the  purchase  of 
Louisiana  and  Florida;  and  the  second  developed  in 
the  long  controversy  terminating  in  the  war  of  1812. 
And,  though  this  war  did  not  effect  a  technical  solution 
of  the  vexed  question  of  neutral  rights,  yet  it  was  a 
declaration  that  no  infringement  upon  our  full  equality 
of  maritime  privileges  could  be  ventured  without 
instant  war  with  a  nation,  who,  by  a  brilliant  series  of 
naval  achievements,  had  manifested  at  least  its  ability 
to  hold  its  own. 

With  this  period,  the  minority  of  the  United  States 

terminated.     The  necessary  conditions  of  an  active  and 

healthy  life  were  fulfilled,  and  the  United  States  stood 

before  the  world  with   their  territories   compact,  their 

1* 


6  DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY. 

national  interests  clearly  defined,  and  their  political 
intelligence  alert,  practised,  and  ready  for  the  exigency 
of  any  future  question. 

With  this  period,  also,  the  founders  of  the  republic 
withdrew  from  participation  in  the  daily  life  of  the 
nation.  They  had  labored  fearlessly  and  faithfully 
through  the  dangers  of  the  war,  —  through  the  darkness 
and  despondency  of  the  Confederation,  —  through  the 
perplexed  and  hazardous  discussions  of  the  Convention. 
With  rare  courage  and  temper  and  wisdom,  they  had 
laid  broad  the  foundations  of  a  great  country ;  and,  with 
singular  good  fortune,  had  been  permitted  to  perfect 
the  government  which  they  had  initiated.  For  more 
than  a  quarter  of  a  century,  the  men  who  framed  the 
constitution  were  allowed  to  administer  it ;  and,  having 
thus  formed  it  in  infancy  and  moulded  its  youth,  they 
retired,  one  after  another,  from  the  scenes  of  their  great 
achievements,  leaving  to  a  new  generation  the  respon 
sibility  of  its  mature  manhood.  But,  as  if  to  conse 
crate  with  the  grace  of  their  final  benediction  its  fore 
most  step,  it  was  granted  to  Mr.  Monroe,  the  last  of 
the  venerable  company,  to  inaugurate,  by  his  famous 
Declaration,  the  vigorous  commencement  of  our  national 
life.  From  the  date  of  this  Declaration,  our  foreign 
policy,  if  it  has  not  taken  a  higher  tone,  has  at  least 
expressed  itself  in  a  more  systematic  development.  To 
this  period  belong  the  settlement  of  the  French  claims, 
so  ably  conducted  by  Mr.  Rives ;  the  Treaty  of  Wash 
ington,  so  admirably  negotiated  by  Mr.  Webster ;  the 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  7 

Oregon  Question,  adjusted  by  Mr.  McLane ;  the  An 
nexation  of  Texas,  in  great  measure  due  to  the  active 
resolution  of  Mr.  Calhoun  ;  and  those  masterly  discus 
sions  of  national  interests  and  international  law  which 
have  made  the  state  papers  of  Mr.  Everett  and  Mr. 
Marcy  proud  and  perpetual  records  in  our  national  his 
tory. 

I  propose,  in  the  present  volume,  to  write  the  history 
of  the  first  of  these  three  periods.*  It  was  a  time  of 
trial  and  trouble,  but  it  was  illustrated  by  great  names 
and  honorable  labors ;  and  the  whole  superstructure  of 
our  after  history  rests  upon  the  foundation  of  its  calm 

and  patient  sagacity,  its  simple  and  unfaltering  truth- 

•-p 
fulness. 

To  comprehend  fully,  however,  the  position  of  the 
country  at  the  inauguration  of  General  Washington,  it 
will  be  necessary  briefly  to  review  the  condition  of  our 
foreign  relations  during  the  five  years  which  elapsed 
between  the  treaty  of  peace  of  1783  and  the  adoption 
of  the  constitution  in  1788. 

It  would  be  almost  as  easy  for  a  man  in  the  vigorous 
and  varied  activity  of  his  matured  life  to  realize  faith 
fully  to  himself  the  uncertainty  and  weakness  of  his 
infancy,  as  for  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  at  the 
present  day  to  reproduce  the  condition  of  his  country 

*  For  that  period,  which,  commencing  with  the  Declaration  of  In 
dependence,  terminated  at  the  treaty  of  peace,  1783,  I  may  be 
permitted  to  refer  to  "  The  Diplomacy  of  the  Revolution,"  by  the 
author  of  this  volume.  Appleton,  1852. 


8  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

at  the  date  of  that  treaty  which  secured  its  independ 
ence.  In  every  element  which  contributes  to  the  glory 
and  strength  of  national  existence,  —  an  efficient  govern 
ment,  compact  territory,  flourishing  finances,  a  pros 
perous  commerce,  dense  population,  and  an  effective 
military  and  naval  force,  —  the  United  States  of  America 
were,  in  1783,  singularly  deficient.  They  had,  indeed, 
unparalleled  resources;  a  soil  whose  prodigal  bounty 
was  fed  by  the  inexhaustible  mines  and  lavish  valleys 
and  fruitful  hills  of  an  untouched  continent;  majestic 
rivers  whose  currents  rolled  in  proud  anticipation  of  a 
priceless  commerce,  and  broad  bays  whose  arms  spread 
wide  to  welcome  the  freighted  argosies  of  the  world. 
The  spirit  of  their  people  was  free,  bold,  and  venture 
some  ;  shrewd  in  enterprise,  quick  in  resolution,  and 
possessing  unbounded  faith  in  themselves  and  their  fu 
ture.  Above  all,  they  had,  and  honored  in  their  coun 
cils,  not  a  few  of  those  "  kingly  spirits  of  history,"  who, 
when  they  receive  full  and  obedient  recognition  from 
the  people,  are  the  highest  manifestation  of  national 
life,  and  the  surest  guarantee  of  national  character. 
But  this  rich  soil,  with  its  treasures  of  corn  and  coal 
and  cotton  and  gold  and  lead,  was  to  be  won  and 
worked.  Forests  were  to  be  felled  and  cities  to  be 
builded,  harbors  to  be  created  and  rivers  to  be  rendered 
navigable.  The  spirit  of  the  people  was  to  be  devel 
oped  by  labor,  and  even  the  great  men  who  had  by 
seven  years  of  suffering  achieved  independence,  were  to 
be  perfected  by  a  wider  and  more  difficult  experience. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  9 

For  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  treaty  of  peace 
secured  the  national  life.  Indeed,  it  would  be  more 
correct  to  say,  that  the  most  critical  period  of  the  coun 
try's  history  embraced  the  time  between  the  peace  of 
1783  and  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  in  1788. 

It  is  now  almost  impossible  to  understand  how  the 
Articles  of  the  Confederation,  which  constituted  the  rev 
olutionary  government,  lasted  through  the  struggles  of 
that  difficult  time.*  The  central  power  was  clumsy  in 
its  construction,  uncertain  in  its  action,  and  very  feeble 
in  its  execution.  It  certainly  did  not  either  lead  popu 
lar  sentiment,  or  develop  a  consistent  scheme  of  na 
tional  policy.  The  indomitable  spirit  of  the  people 

*  For  the  history  of  the  Confederation,  the  only  authority  with 
which  I  am  acquainted  is  "  The  History  of  the  Formation  and  Adop 
tion  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,"  by  Mr.  George  T. 
Curtis,  of  Boston.  The  first  volume  of  this  work  only  has  been  pub 
lished,  including  the  period  of  the  Confederation.  As  the  great 
party  divisions  of  our  political  history  have  taken  their  rise  in  differ 
ent  constructions  of  the  constitution,  and  as  every  one  brings  to  the 
study  of  that  instrument  a  mind  more  or  less  biased  by  early,  and,  of 
necessity,  prejudiced  convictions,  it  is  of  course  impossible  to  pro 
nounce  an  opinion  on  this  work  until  it  is  completed.  Inferring 
some  of  Mr.  Curtis's  opinions  from  his  argument  in  the  Dred  Scott 
case,  I  can  anticipate  a  wide  difference  on  many  important  points. 
I  can  say,  however,  with  truth  and  great  pleasure,  that  so  far  the 
work  is  a  credit  to  the  graver  literature  of  the  country.  It  is  con 
ceived  in  a  spirit  of  candid,  philosophical  inquiry,  and  executed 
in  a  manner  honorable  to  the  taste,  learning,  and  honesty  of  its 
accomplished  author. 


10  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

conquered  by  endurance  the  chief  obstacles  to  success, 
while  the  necessary  unanimity  of  action  and  opinion 
was  preserved  by  the  individual  influence  of  the  great 
men  who  appeared  together  in  the  different  colonies, 
and  commanded,  each  in  his  sphere,  the  confidence  of 
his  immediate  section.  The  subordination  of  the  gov 
ernment  to  the  individual  ability  of  its  instruments  was 
most  striking  in  the  foreign  relations  of  the  country,  and 
the  diplomacy  of  the  Revolution  was  the  result  rather  of 
the  wisdom  of  Franklin,  Adams,  and  Jay,  than  of  the 
prolonged  and  perplexed  deliberation  of  the  Conti 
nental  Congress.  Efficient  and  sufficient,  however,  as 
might  be  the  articles  of  the  confederation  for  the  pur 
pose  of  giving  validity  to  the  diplomatic  transactions 
which  resulted  in  the  treaty  of  peace,  the  provisions  of 
those  articles  rendered  the  government  absolutely  im 
potent  for  the  continued  administration  of  the  foreign 
affairs  of  the  new  commonwealth.  And  the  inquiry 
made  by  the  Duke  of  Dorset,  in  reply  to  the  advances 
of  the  American  commissioners  towards  the  negotia 
tion  of  a  commercial  treaty  with  Great  Britain,  sug 
gested  insuperable  difficulties. 

"  Having  communicated,"  says  his  Grace,  in  a  letter 
dated  March  26,  1785,  "  to  my  court  the  readiness  you 
expressed  in  your  letter  to  me  of  the  9th  December,  to 
remove  to  London  for  the  purpose  of  treating  upon 
such  points  as  may  materially  concern  the  interests, 
both  political  and  commercial,  of  Great  Britain  and 
America,  and  having  at  the  same  time  represented  that 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  11 

you  declared  yourselves  to  be  fully  authorized  and  em 
powered  to  negotiate  ;  I  have  been,  in  answer  thereto, 
instructed  to  learn  from  you,  gentlemen,  what  is  the 
real  nature  of  the  powers  with  which  you  are  invested, 
whether  you  are  merely  commissioned  by  Congress,  or 
whether  you  have  received  separate  powers  from  the 

respective  States The  apparent  determination  of 

the  respective  States  to  regulate  their  own  separate 
interests,  renders  it  absolutely  necessary,  towards  form 
ing  a  permanent  system  of  commerce,  that  my  court 
should  be  informed  how  far  the  commissioners  can  be 
duly  authorized  to  enter  into  any  engagements  with 
Great  Britain  which  it  may  not  be  in  the  power  of  any 
one  of  the  States  to  render  totally  useless  and  ineffi 
cient."  * 

Now  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  after  providing  in 
Art.  2,  that  "  each  State  retains  its  sovereignty,  free 
dom,  and  independence,  and  every  power,  jurisdiction, 
and  right,  which  is  not  by  this  Confederation  expressly 
delegated  to  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled," 
provided  in  Art.  9,  that  "  the  United  States,  in  Congress 
assembled,  shall  have  the  sole  and  exclusive  right  and 
power  of  determining  on  peace  and  war,  ....  of  send 
ing  and  receiving  ambassadors,  entering  into  treaties 
and  alliances  ;  provided,  that  no  treaty  of  commerce 
shall  be  made  whereby  the  legislative  power  of  the 
respective  States  shall  be  restrained  from  imposing 

*  Dip.  Corres.  1783-1789,  Vol.  II,  p.  297. 


12  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

such  imposts  and  duties  on  foreigners  as  their  own  peo 
ple  are  subjected  to,  or  from  prohibiting  the  exportation 
or  importation  of  any  species  of  goods  or  commodities 
whatsoever."  And  it  also  provided,  in  the  same  article, 
that  the  consent  of  nine  States  should  be  necessary  to 
the  exercise  of  even  this  limited  power.  Such  a  pro 
vision,  in  the  presence  of  thirteen  States,  differing 
widely  in  the  character  of  their  production  and  the 
interests  of  their  commerce,  was  an  absolute  negative 
upon  any  permanent  or  concerted  action. 

In  addition  to  this,  there  was  no  efficiently  con 
structed  Department  of  State.  Congress  itself  was 
gradually  subsiding  into  a  political  inanity ;  the  States 
were  absorbed  in  their  local  affairs ;  their  most  distin 
guished  men  were  employed  at  home;  a  quorum  of 
members  was  tardily  and  with  great  difficulty  convened 
at  the  seat  of  government ;  the  federal  and  state 
finances  were  in  a  condition  of  almost  hopeless  embar 
rassment  ;  the  military  force  of  the  country  nearly  dis 
banded  ;  and  the  executive  government  itself,  at  the 
very  time  it  was  offering  to  negotiate  with  the  most 
powerful  nation  of  the  world,  was  driven  from  the  capi 
tal  by  a  military  insurrection  which  lacked  principle  to 
be  called  a  rebellion,  and  had  scarcely  strength  enough 
to  be  termed  a  riot.  The  questions,  too,  which  were 
of  first  importance  to  the  United  States,  were  precisely 
those  commercial  and  territorial  questions  which  needed 
prompt  action,  a  vigorous  government,  and  competent 
military  force :  such  questions,  for  example,  as  the 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  13 

boundaries  between  Spain  and  themselves ;  the  restora 
tion  of  the  frontier  posts  by  the  English  ;  the  commerce 
with  the  West  Indies,  and  the  navigation  of  the  Mis 
sissippi.  And  yet,  unfortunately,  these  were  just  the 
questions  most  calculated  to  excite  sectional  feeling,  to 
develop  mischievously  local  differences,  and  consequent 
ly,  under  the  limitation  of  the  Confederation,  the  most 
unlikely  to  be  settled.  All  therefore  which  could  be 
expected  at  this  period  of  our  history  was,  that  the  gov 
ernment  should  give  up  nothing,  and,  if  it  pressed  no 
claims,  that  at  least  it  should  abandon  none.  And  this 
is  just  what  the  government  did.  It  held  every  thing  in 
statu  quo  between  the  treaty  of  independence  and  the 
adoption  of  the  constitution ;  and  therefore  it  is  that 
from  the  transactions  of  these  five  years  can  best  be 
learned  the  position  of  the  United  States  upon  the  open 
ing  of  General  Washington's  administration. 

In  1781,  the  Continental  Congress,  which  had  in  the 
first  years  of  the  war  neglected  the  organization  of  any 
department  of  foreign  affairs,  was  compelled,  by  the 
growing  necessities  of  its  diplomatic  relations,  to  estab 
lish  some  orderly  arrangement  in  this  branch  of  admin 
istration. 

They  resolved,  "  That  the  extent  and  the  rising  im 
portance  of  these  United  States  entitle  them  to  a  place 
among  the  great  potentates  of  Europe,  while  our  polit 
ical  and  commercial  interests  point  out  the  propriety  of 
cultivating  with  them  a  friendly  correspondence  and 
connection. 

2 


14  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

"  That  to  render  such  an  intercourse  advantageous, 
the  necessity  of  a  competent  knowledge  of  the  interests, 
views,  relations,  and  systems  of  those  potentates,  is 
obvious. 

"  That  a  knowledge,  in  its  nature  so  comprehensive, 
is  only  to  be  acquired  by  a  constant  attention  to  the 
state  of  Europe,  and  an  unremitted  application  to  the 
means  of  acquiring  wellgrounded  information.  .  .  . 

"  That  to  answer  these  essential  purposes,  the  com 
mittee  are  of  opinion  that  a  fixed  and  permanent  office 
for  the  department  of  foreign  affairs  ought  forthwith 
to  be  established,  as  a  remedy  against  the  fluctuation, 
the  delay,  and  indecision  to  which  the  present  mode 
of  managing  our  foreign  affairs  must  be  exposed." 

Under  this  new  and  better  arrangement,  Robert  R. 
Livingston,  of  New  York,  was  elected  "  Secretary  of 
Foreign  Affairs."  After  filling  this  responsible  post  with 
eminent  ability  from  the  20th  of  October,  1781,  until 
June,  1783,  Mr.  Livingston  resigned.  Congress  post 
poned  the  election  of  his  successor  until  they  had  deter 
mined  upon  a  place  of  permanent  session ;  and,  in  the 
mean  time,  conducted  the  correspondence  with  their 
foreign  ministers  through  the  successive  presidents  of 
their  own  body,  Boudinot,  Mifflin,  and  Lee.  On  the  7th 
of  May,  1784,  Mr.  Jay  was  elected  to  the  vacant  post. 
A  happier  selection  could  not  have  been  made.  Mr. 
Jay,  after  filling  high  and  responsible  office  at  home,  had 
been  Minister  to  Spain,  and  one  of  the  plenipotentiaries 
in  Paris  who  negotiated  the  treaty  of  peace.  The 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  15 

grave  truthfulness  of  his  character,  the  sobriety  of  his 
judgment,  and  his  inflexible  resolution,  all  abundantly 
illustrated  in  long  public  service,  secured  him  the  con 
fidence  of  the  country,  while  his  diplomatic  experience 
gave   him  precisely  that   knowledge    of   national   and 
European  interests  and  influences  most  needed  in  those 
questions  which  the  varied  policies  of  England,  France, 
and    Spain   were   anxious   to   settle,    each  to  its  own 
special  advantage.     Of  all  men  in  the  country,  Mr.  Jay 
was  thus  the  best  fitted  to  comprehend  the  position  of 
our  ministers  abroad,  to  appreciate  their  despatches,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  to  guide  the  deliberations  of  Congress 
in  harmony  with  the  policy  of   the  department.     Be 
tween  Mr.  Livingston's  resignation  and  Mr.  Jay's  entry 
into    office,   Congress  received  and   replied   to   several 
diplomatic  communications,  which,  possessing  perhaps 
no  political  value,  were  yet  interesting  as  reflections  and 
indications  of  European  opinion.     In  March,  1783,  the 
Burgomasters  and    Senate  of  the   Free  City  of  Ham 
burg  addressed,   through  John   Abraham  de    Boor,  to 
Congress,  whom  they  style  "  right  noble,  high,  mighty, 
most  honorable  Lords,"  a  "  most  obsequious  missive," 
in  which,  referring  to  the  treaty  of  peace  with  England, 
they  say :   "  We,  impressed  with  the  most  lively  sensa 
tions  on  the  illustrious  event,  the  wonder  of  this  and 
the  most  remote  future  ages,  and  desirous  fully  to  tes 
tify  the  part  we  take  therein,  do  hereby  offer  your  High 
Mightinesses  our  service  and  attachment  to  the  cause ; " 
and  then,  stating  the  advantages  of  a  reciprocal  trade, 


16  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

proceed,  "  intercessionally  and  most  obsequiously  to 
request  your  High  Mightinesses  to  favor  and  counte 
nance  the  trade  of  our  merchants,  and  to  suffer  them 
to  enjoy  all  such  rights  and  liberties  as  you  allow  to 
merchants  of  nations  in  amity,  which,  in  gratitude  and 
with  zeal,  we  will  in  our  place  endeavor  to  retribute,  etc., 
etc."  To  all  which,  Congress  replied  briefly  but  prop 
erly,  and,  as  was  fitting  in  return  for  so  much  friend 
ship,  prayed  "  God  Almighty  to  keep  the  Honorable 
Burgomasters  and  Senate  of  the  Imperial  Free  City 
of  Hamburg  in  his  holy  protection."  * 

In  July,  1783,  the  Apostolical  Nuncio  in  Paris  sent 
to  Franklin,  to  be  transmitted  to  Congress,  a  note,  in 
which  he  stated  :  "  Before  the  Revolution,  which  has 
just  been  completed  in  North  America,  the  Catholics 
and  Missionaries  of  those  provinces  depended,  as  to 
their  spiritual  concerns,  on  the  Apostolical  Vicar  resi 
dent  in  London.  It  is  well  known  that  this  arrange 
ment  can  no  longer  exist;  but  as  it  is  essential  that 
the  Catholic  subjects  of  the  United  States  should  have 
an  ecclesiastic  to  govern  them  in  their  religious  con 
cerns,  the  Congregation  de  Propaganda  Fide  existing 
at  Rome  for  the  establishment  and  conservation  of  Mis 
sions  has  come  to  the  determination  of  proposing  to 
Congress  to  establish,  in  some  city  of  the  United  States 
of  North  America,  one  of  their  Catholic  subjects,  with 
the  powers  of  Apostolical  Vicar,  and  in  the  character  of 

*  Dip.  Corres.  1783-1789,  Vol.  I.  p.  62  and  67. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  17 

Bishop,  or  simply  in  quality  of  Apostolical  Prefect.  .  .  . 
And  as  it  might  sometimes  happen  that  among  the 
subjects  of  the  United  States,  there  might  be  no  per 
son  in  a  situation  to  be  charged  with  the  spiritual 
government,  either  as  Bishop  or  Apostolical  Prefect,  it 
would  be  necessary,  in  such  circumstances,  that  Con 
gress  should  consent  to  choose  him  from  among  the 
subjects  of  a  foreign  nation  the  most  friendly  with  the 
United  States."  * 

It  is  unnecessary  to  examine  the  scope  and  conse 
quence  of  this  proposition,  which  was  not,  it  must  be  re 
marked,  the  opening  of  diplomatic  intercourse  between 
the  Pope  as  a  prince  and  the  United  States  as  a  nation, 
but  a  scheme  by  which  Congress,  exercising  the  right  to 
choose  the  Apostolical  Prefect,  would,  by  the  act  of 
choice,  recognize  and  strengthen  his  position  as  an  offi 
cial  of  the  national  government.  For  on  the  llth  of 
May,  1784,  Congress  resolved :  "  That  Dr.  Franklin  be 
desired  to  notify  to  the  Apostolical  Nuncio  at  Versailles, 
that  Congress  will  be  pleased  to  testify  their  respect 
to  his  sovereign  and  state  ;  but  that,  the  subject  of  his 
application  to  Dr.  Franklin  being  purely  spiritual,  it  is 
without  the  jurisdiction  and  powers  of  Congress,  who 
have  no  authority  to  permit  or  refuse  it,  these  powers 
being  reserved  to  the  several  States  individually."  f 

On  the  17th  of  May,  1784,  the  same  day  on  which 
Mr.  Jay  was  elected  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and 

*  Sparks's  Dip.  Corres.  Vol.  IV.  156. 
f  Dip.  Corres.  1783-1789,  Vol.  I.  117. 

2* 


18  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

Mr.  Jefferson  appointed  to  supply  his  place  in  the  com 
mission  at  Paris,  Congress  passed  a  series  of  resolu 
tions,  intended  for  the  instruction  of  their  foreign  min 
isters,  and  tracing  a  general  outline  of  what  they  con 
sidered  a  complete  system  of  foreign  policy.  The  field 
in  which  they  proposed  to  negotiate  was  certainly  wide 
enough ;  for  their  first  resolution  declared,  that  it  would 
be  advantageous  for  the  United  States  to  conclude  trea 
ties  of  amity  and  commerce  with  Russia,  Austria,  Prus 
sia,  Denmark,  Saxony,  Hamburg,  Great  Britain,  Spain, 
Portugal,  Genoa,  Tuscany,  Rome,  Naples,  Venice,  Sar 
dinia,  and  the  Ottoman  Porte;  and  they  then  proceeded 
to  declare  the  principles  on  which  such  treaties  should 
be  negotiated.  These  principles,  considered  simply  as 
political  sentiments,  were  highly  honorable  to  those  who 
announced  them ;  but  it  must  always  be  impossible  to 
establish,  by  a  system  of  treaties,  a  theory  of  abstract 
right.  Treaties  are,  in  fact,  simply  the  expression  of  im 
mediate  interests,  and  depend  in  their  negotiation  so 
much  upon  circumstances  of  adventitious  strength  and 
the  constantly  changing  contingencies  of  national  neces 
sity,  that  it  is  difficult  to  say  in  advance  how  far  they 
are  or  can  be  made  the  expression  of  general  principles. 
Besides  which,  the  United  States  were  scarcely  in  posi 
tion  to  introduce  either  new  principles  of  national 
action,  or  even  to  enforce  the  application  of  many 
recognized  political  truths.  These  instructions,  how 
ever,  evidenced  no  presumptuous  desire  to  alter  the  old 
and  well-established  relations  of  national  community, 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  19 

nor  claimed  any  special  mission  for  the  diplomacy  of 
the  new  Republic.  They  declared,  that,  in  all  treaties, 
three  points  should  be  carefully  stipulated  :  — 

"  1.  That  each  party  shall  have  the  right  to  carry 
their  own  produce,  manufactures,  and  merchandise,  in 
their  own  bottoms,  to  the  ports  of  the  other,  and  thence 
the  produce  and  merchandise  of  the  other,  paying  in 
both  cases  such  duties  only  as  are  paid  by  the  most 
favored  nations,  freely  where  it  is  granted  to  such  na 
tion,  or  paying  the  compensation  when  such  nation 
does  the  same. 

"  2.  That  with  the  nations  holding  territorial  posses 
sions  in  America,  a  direct  and  similar  intercourse  be 
admitted  between  the  United  States  and  such  posses 
sions  ;  or,  if  this  cannot  be  obtained,  then  a  direct  and 
similar  intercourse  between  the  United  States  and  cer 
tain  free  ports  within  such  possessions ;  that  if  this, 
neither,  can  be  obtained,  permission  be  stipulated  to 
bring  from  such  possessions,  in  their  own  bottoms,  the 
produce  thereof  to  their  States  directly,  and  for  these 
States  to  carry,  in  their  own  bottoms,  the  produce  and 
merchandise  to  such  possessions  directly. 

"  3.  That  these  United  States  be  considered,  in  all 
such  treaties  and  in  every  case  arising  under  them,  as 
one  nation,  upon  the  principles  of  the  Federal  Consti 
tution." 

If  the  first  and  second  of  these  points  could  have 
been  established  in  the  treaties  of  the  United  States, 
there  would  have  been  achieved,  doubtless,  a  great  and 


20  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

wholesome  reform  in  the  commercial  system  of  the  age. 
But  they  were  just  the  points  which  it  was  hopeless  to 
ask ;  for  they  were  in  direct  contravention  of  the  essen 
tial  principles  of  both  British  and  Spanish  trade.  And 
even  France,  in  the  character  of  our  nearest  ally,  only 
admitted  them  in  a  modified  and  exceptional  fashion. 
The  close  of  the  last  century  was  emphatically  an  age 
of  commercial  alliances,  but  alliances  negotiated  on  the 
principles  of  the  strictest  monopoly,  and  based  entirely 
upon  an  exchange  of  mutual  privileges. 

As  to  the  third  point,  the  independence  of  each  State 
in  the  matter  of  import  and  export,  expressly  guaran 
teed  by  the  Federal  Constitution,  would  seem  to  have 
rendered  it  an  impossible  condition  in  the  most  impor 
tant,  that  is,  the  commercial,  negotiations  of  the  com 
monwealth.  Indeed,  Congress  had,  shortly  before  the 
adoption  of  these  very  resolutions,  declared  that,  "  unless 
the  United  States,  in  Congress  assembled,  shall  be 
vested  with  powers  competent  to  the  protection  of 
commerce,  they  never  can  command  reciprocal  advan 
tages  in  trade ;  and  without  these,  our  foreign  commerce 
must  decline,  and  eventually  be  annihilated.  Hence 
it  is  necessary  that  the  States  be  explicit,  and  fix  on 
some  effectual  mode  by  which  foreign  commerce  not 
founded  on  principles  of  equality  may  be  restrained."  * 
And  they  resolved  to  ask  from  the  States  a  power 
for  fifteen  years,  which  should  control  State  action 

*  Dip.  Corres.  1783-1789,  Vol.  I.  p.  106. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  21 

both  as  to  imports  and  exports.  Without  this  power, 
which  they  never  obtained,  it  is  impossible  to  see  how 
the  United  States  could  have  negotiated  a  treaty  of 
commerce  "  as  one  nation,  upon  the  principles  of  the 
Federal  Constitution." 

The  instructions  further  required  the  foreign  min 
isters  to  negotiate,  if  possible,  the  principles  of  "free 
ships,  free  goods,"  the  abolition  of  any  confiscation  for 
contraband,  the  repeal  of  the  old  system  of  marque 
and  reprisal,  and  the  exemption  in  war  from  armed 
interference  of  "  all  fishermen,  all  cultivators  of  the 
earth,  and  all  artisans  or  manufacturers,  unarmed  or 
inhabiting  unfortified  towns,  villages,  or  places,  and 
all  merchants  and  traders  exchanging  the  produce  of 
different  places,  and  thereby  rendering  the  necessaries, 
conveniences,  and  comforts  of  human  life  more  easy 
to  obtain  and  more  general." 

This  anomalous  system  of  peaceful  war,  it  may  safely 
be  said,  can  never  be  realized.  For  those  not  actually 
engaged  in  the  field,  it  might  deprive  war  of  some 
of  its  discomfort,  but  would  relieve  none  of  its  real 
horrors  ;  less  money  might  be  lost,  but  less  blood 
would  scarcely  be  spilt.  And  its  false  philosophy 
ought  rather  to  have  sprung  from  the  selfishness  of 
an  absolute  monarchy  supported  by  a  hired  and  un- 
sympathizing  army,  than  from  the  rulers  of  a  people 
whose  every  citizen  was  a  soldier,  and  whose  character 
and  safety  depended  upon  the  identity,  in  honor, 
strength,  and  interest,  of  every  class  of  its  community. 


22  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

No  nation  should  be  taught  to  believe  war  the  worst  of 
evils;  and  when  it  does  come,  in  stern  justice  or  awful 
retribution,  the  national  heart  should  not  sink  at  its 
coming.  Neither  artisan,  nor  manufacturer,  nor  mer 
chant,  busy  in  rendering  the  comforts  of  life  more  gen 
eral,  should  be  exempt  from  the  nation's  grief  or  the 
nation's  glory.  If  a  country  must  peril  her  all,  let  her 
all  be  freely  perilled ;  but  let  every  citizen  feel  that  he 
is  part  and  parcel  of  his  country's  life,  —  that  she  can 
not  be  struck  and  he  not  bleed,  —  and  that,  when  she 
calls  her  armies  into  battle,  it  is  time  for  the  reaping- 
hook  to  be  reconverted  into  the  sword. 

It  is  indeed  singular,  that  men  of  such  wonderful 
practical  sagacity  as  were  the  statesmen  of  our  early 
history,  should  have  incorporated  into  an  instrument  of 
so  business-like  a  character  the  sentimentality  of  these 
latter  propositions.  From  these  instructions,  it  is  clear 
that  the  policy  of  the  United  States  was  meant  to  be 
distinctly  commercial,  and  that  their  alliances  were  to 
be  controlled  simply  by  the  advantages  of  trade  that 
could  be  negotiated.  And  this  was  even  more  strongly 
indicated  by  a  resolution  of  the  19th  of  October,  1793, 
to  which  these  instructions  were  intended  to  be  supple 
mentary.  "  Resolved,  The  acquisition  of  support  to  the 
Independence  of  the  United  States  having  been  the 
primary  object  of  the  instructions  to  our  ministers 
respecting  the  convention  of  the  neutral  maritime  pow 
ers  for  maintaining  the  freedom  of  commerce,  you  will 
observe  that  the  necessity  of  such  support  is  super- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  23 

seded  by  the  treaties  lately  entered  into  for  restoring 
peace.  And,  although  Congress  approve  of  the  prin 
ciples  of  that  convention,  as  it  was  founded  on  the 
liberal  basis  of  the  maintenance  of  the  rights  of  neu 
tral  nations  and  of  the  privileges  of  commerce,  yet 
they  are  unwilling,  at  this  juncture,  to  become  a  party  to 
a  confederacy  which  may  hereafter  too  far  complicate 
the  interests  of  the  United  States  with  the  politics  of 
Europe ;  and,  therefore,  if  such  a  progress  is  not  already 
made  in  this  business  as  may  render  it  dishonorable  to 
recede,  it  is  the  desire  of  Congress,  and  their  instruction 
to  each  of  the  ministers  of  the  United  States  at  the 
respective  courts  in  Europe,  that  no  further  measures 
be  taken  at  present  towards  the  admission  of  the  United 
States  into  that  confederacy." 

Upon  Mr.  Jay's  accession  to  office,  the  treaty  relations 
of  the  United  States  were  confined  to  France,  England, 
Holland,  and  Sweden ;  *  and,  during  his  term  of  office, 
treaties  were  negotiated  with  Prussia  and  Morocco ; 
but  the  only  nations  whose  relation  with  and  position 
towards  the  United  States  it  is  important  to  determine 
at  this  time  were  France,  England,  and  Spain. 

The  relations  of  France  with  the  United  States 
present,  during  this  period,  very  little  of  general  interest. 
Franklin,  at  that  time  Minister  Plenipotentiary  in  Paris, 

*  Treaty  with  France,  6th  February,  1778;  with  Holland,  8th 
October,  1782  ;  with  England,  peace,  30th  November,  1782,  and  llth 
April,  1 783  ;  with  Sweden,  3d  April,  1 783  ;  with  Prussia,  1 785  ; 
with  Morocco,  1786. 


24  DIPLOMATIC    HISTOKY. 

retired  from  active  service,  to  wear,  without  further 
responsibility,  the  accumulated  honors  of  laborious 
years,  and  his  place  was  ably  and  amply  filled  by 
Thomas  Jefferson.  The  chief  object  of  Mr.  Jefferson's 
efforts  was  to  obtain  a  broad  and  permanent  commer 
cial  arrangement,  by  which  the  trade  between  the  two 
countries  might  be  as  free  as  the  interests  of  both 
manifestly  required.  The  French  government  was  ex 
tremely  dissatisfied  with  the  slow  growth  of  its  Ameri 
can  commerce.  It  had  expected,  that,  upon  the  close 
of  the  war,  a  natural  feeling  of  gratitude,  and  the  bitter 
animosity  between  the  late  belligerents,  would  have 
diverted  trade  from  its  old  colonial  channels,  and  had 
made  what,  under  its  old  system,  must  be  considered 
very  liberal  provisions  for  the  encouragement  of  this 
commercial  connection.  But  in  two  very  important 
articles,  tobacco  and  whale  oils,  the  French  system  of 
farming  the  revenue,  and  its  policy  in  view  of  the  crea 
tion  of  a  powerful  marine,  did  not  allow  the  adoption 
of  that  perfect  freedom  of  trade  which  could  alone 
counteract  the  old  commercial  influence  of  Great 
Britain,  and  compensate  for  the  liberal  credits  which 
recommended  the  British  merchants,  and  were  pecu 
liarly  needed  by  the  trading  community  of  the  new 
Republic  at  this  time.  Mr.  Jefferson  spared  no  labor 
to  convince  the  French  court  of  the  necessity  for  a 
broader  policy  than  had  been  adopted ;  his  views  seem 
to  have  attracted  considerable  attention  in  the  highest 
quarters,  and  he  was  seconded  earnestly  and  usefully 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  25 

by  Lafayette.  But  even  before  his  mission  terminated, 
the  difficulties  had  become  insuperable^  The  death  of 
Vergennes,  the  changes  in  the  administration  of  the 
finances,  indeed  the  state  of  the  French  finances  them 
selves,  rendered  any  radical  change  in  their  system  of 
imports  and  exports  impossible.  Besides,  the  treaty 
lately  negotiated  between  England  and  France,  and 
the  well  known  ambition  of  Louis  XVI.  to  extend  his 
colonial  power  and  develop  the  maritime  capabilities 
of  his  empire,  indicated  a  disposition  to  imitate  the 
English  system  of  colonial  monopoly.  But  it  is  hardly 
probable,  that,  even  with  more  liberal  allies,  Mr.  Jefferson 
could  have  established  a  freer  and  permanent  system  of 
commerce.  For  his  letters  and  despatches  from  home 
abound  in  constant  complaint  of  the  lack  of  all  unity 
of  opinion  in  the  States,  and  the  utter  inefficiency  of 
Congress ;  while  France,  on  more  than  one  occasion, 
and  especially  in  relation  to  Massachusetts  and  New 
Hampshire,  made  serious,  and,  as  Mr.  Jay  admitted, 
well  founded  reclamations  against  the  commercial  reg 
ulations  of  the  several  States. 

The  political  relations  of  the  two  countries  remained, 
during  this  period,  undisturbed,  although  the  treaty  obli 
gations  between  them  might,  under  certain  circum 
stances,  have  seriously  embarrassed  the  United  States. 
For  while,  under  the  treaty,  France  guaranteed  the  boun 
daries  of  the  United  States,  they  reciprocally  guaran 
teed  the  Frencli  possessions  in  America ;  and  had  war 
resulted  in  Europe,  either  from  the  disturbances  in  Hol- 

3 


26  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

land  or  the  disputes  as  to  the  Bavarian  succession,  the 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  France  might 
have  gravely  compromised  the  peace  and  safety  of  the 
former.  Fortunately,  France  was  able  to  solve  the  dif 
ficulties  of  both  these  questions  without  an  appeal  to 
arms ;  and,  still  more  fortunately,  the  question  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  as  to  the  surren 
der  of  the  frontier  posts  was  protracted  in  its  settlement, 
until  the  impolicy  of  requiring  France  to  substantiate 
her  part  of  the  guarantee  was  evident  to  the  nation. 
In  1786,  Mr.  Jay  instructed  Mr.  Jefferson  to  sound  the 
French  government  as  to  its  readiness  to  intervene  in 
this  matter ;  and  in  reply,  after  referring  to  its  possible 
consequences,  Mr.  Jefferson  says  :  "  However,  if  this  me 
diation  should  be  finally  needed,  I  see  no  reason  to 
doubt  our  finally  obtaining  it,  and  still  less  to  question 
its  omnipotent  influence  on  the  British  court."  Now, 
difficult  as  it  proved  for  the  United  States  to  maintain 
their  neutrality  in  the  war  which  soon  after  broke  out  in 
Europe,  it  is  easy  to  see  how  much  more  difficult  that 
policy  would  have  been,  if  the  country  had  been  indebt 
ed  for  its  boundary  to  the  diplomatic  intervention  of 
France.  And  both  the  difficulty  and  wisdom  of  this 
neutral  policy  were  fully  comprehended  by  Mr.  Jefferson 
at  this  time  ;  for  writing,  in  October,  1787,  to  Mr.  Jay, 
on  the  critical  state  of  the  difficulty  between  Prussia 
and  Holland,  which  at  one  time  threatened  an  Euro 
pean  war,  he  says :  "  Should  this  war  take  place,  as  is 
quite  probable,  and  should  it  be  as  general  as  it  threat- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  27 

ens  to  be,  our  neutrality  must  be  attended  with  great 
advantages  ;  whether  of  a  nature  to  improve  our  morals 
or  our  happiness  is  another  question.  But  is  it  sure 
that  Great  Britain,  by  her  searches,  her  seizures,  and 
other  measures  for  harassing  us,  will  preserve  our  neu 
trality  ?  "  and  then,  stating  his  reasons  for  his  opinion, 
he  adds,  referring  to  the  King  of  Great  Britain :  "  When 
I  review  this  disposition,  and  review  his  conduct,  I  have 
little  hope  of  his  permitting  our  neutrality.  He  will 
find  subjects  of  provocation  in  various  articles  of  our 
treaty  with  France,  which  will  now  come  in  view  in  ah1 
their  consequences,  and  in  consequences  very  advanta 
geous  to  the  one  and  the  other  country." 

A  few  questions  occurred  for  the  solution  of  the  two 
countries  at  this  time,  which  are  chiefly  interesting  as 
showing  with  what  manly  independence  the  United 
States  then  acted,  even  in  the  presence  of  an  ally  whose 
past  services  they  gratefully  acknowledged,  and  whose 
future  friendship  they  anxiously  sought.  Just  before 
the  departure  of  the  Chevalier  de  la  Luzerne,  the 
French  Minister,  from  Philadelphia,  Mons.  de^fe,  Mar- 
bois,  the  Secretary  of  Legation,  was  assaulted  in  the 
streets  of  that  city  by  a  French  resident,  named  Long- 
champs.  Longchamps  was  prosecuted  before  the  crim 
inal  courts  of  Pennsylvania,  and  sentenced  to  fine  and 
imprisonment.  While  undergoing  his  punishment,  the 
French  government  demanded  that  he  should  be  deliv 
ered  up  to  it,  as  a  French  subject,  guilty  of  a  grave  mis 
demeanor  against  French  law.  The  demand  was 


28  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

warmly  pressed  by  Mons.  de  Marbois,  who  had  become 
Charge  d' Affaires.  Such  an  extradition  involved  some 
of  the  most  difficult  and  delicate  questions  of  interna 
tional  law,  and  the  rights  as  well  as  the  pride  of  both 
countries  would  be  affected  by  the  result.  The  outrage 
was  scandalous  and  indefensible ;  and  there  was,  on  the 
part  of  Congress,  every  desire  to  soothe  the  susceptibil 
ity  of  the  monarch  to  whom  they  were  under  the  high 
est  obligations  of  human  gratitude.  It  was,  too,  one  of 
those  questions  on  which  the  court  of  France  had 
always  shown  itself  particularly  sensitive  ;  and  in  the 
French  archives,  there  was  more  than  one  case  not  dis 
similar,  in  which  France  had  asserted  and  obtained  the 
amplest  apology  and  fullest  redress  from  some  of  the 
oldest  and  most  powerful  of  the  European  states. 
Congress  referred  the  correspondence  to  Mr.  Jay  for  his 
opinion ;  and  his  report  is  a  most  admirable  specimen 
of  the  firm,  judicious,  and  just  character  of  his  diplo 
macy. 

"  Your  Secretary,"  said  Mr.  Jay,  "  considers  the  fol 
lowing  principles  to  be  unquestionably  true :  namely,  — 

"  That  every  friendly  foreigner,  coming  to  any  coun 
try  on  lawful  business,  is  entitled  to  the  protection  of 
the  laws  of  that  country,  on  the  one  hand,  and  owes 
obedience  to  them  during  his  residence,  on  the  other. 

"  That  whenever  such  foreigner  breaks  the  peace,  or 
otherwise  violates  the  laws  of  the  land,  he  is  as  amena 
ble  to  them  as  any  other  person  ;  and  that  the  sovereign 
power  of  the  State  has  undoubted  right  to  punish  him  in 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  29 

the  manner  and  degree  prescribed  by  the  laws  of  the 
State. 

"  That  where  the  said  laws  sentence  such  offending 
foreigner  to  imprisonment  for  a  limited  time,  the  State 
has  a  clear  right  to  hold  and  detain  him  in  prison  ac 
cordingly,  and  are  not  bound  to  release  or  deliver  him 
up  to  his  prince  for  any  purpose  whatever,  before  he 
shall  have  satisfied  the  laws  of  the  land  which  he  has 
violated,  by  undergoing  the  punishment  decreed  thereby 
for  his  offence. 

"  Your  Secretary  is  therefore  of  opinion,  that  the 
requisition  is  premature ;  for,  admitting  Charles  Julien 
de  Longchamps  to  be  a  Frenchman ;  admitting  that  he 
has  offended  his  prince,  either  here  or  elsewhere ;  admit 
ting,  further,  that  his  prince  has  a  right  to  demand  him, 
and  that  the  United  States  were  bound  by  treaty  or 
otherwise  to  deliver  him  up  ;  yet  it  is  not  to  be  denied 
that  he  has  broken  the  peace  and  violated  the  laws  of 
this  country  ;  and  having  been  legally  condemned  to 
imprisonment  for  the  same,  a  compliance  with  the  said 
requisition  at  present  cannot  possibly  be  required  by 
the  law  of  nations. 

"  How  far  it  would  be  right  and  proper  for  the  Uni 
ted  States  afterwards  to  demand  of  the  State  of  Penn 
sylvania  to  deliver  the  said  Charles  Julien  de  Long- 
champs  to  be  tried  and  judged  in  France  for  that  part 
of  the  aforesaid  offence  against  the  peace,  government, 
and  dignity  of  that  commonwealth,  which  consisted  in 
his  having  there  violated  the  rights  and  privileges  of  His 


30  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

Most  Christian  Majesty's  Legation,  and  how  far  such 
demand  would  be  warranted  by  the  law  of  nations  and 
the  federal  compact  between  the  States,  are  questions 
so  new,  so  deeply  and  intimately  connected  with  the 
nature  of  our  constitutions  and  confederation,  and  so 
extensive  in  their  consequences,  as  to  require  very  ample 
discussion,  much  reflection,  and  serious  consideration. 
Your  Secretary  is  further  of  opinion,  that  the  Minister 
Plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States  at  the  court  of 
Versailles  should  be  instructed  to  submit  the  above  facts 
and  reasons  to  the  candid  consideration  of  his  Most 
Christian  Majesty,  to  assure  him  that  it  would  give 
them  great  pain  to  have  their  conduct  viewed  by  him  in 
an  unfavorable  point  of  view,  and  that  they  flatter 
themselves  the  reasons  which  render  it  impossible  for 
them  at  present  to  comply  with  his  requisition  will  ap 
pear  to  him  as  conclusive  as  they  do  to  Congress.  That 
they  will  maturely,  candidly,  and  earnestly  consider  how 
far  a  compliance  with  it,  when  the  prisoner  shall  be 
legally  released,  may  be  free  from  objections,  and  will 
endeavor,  in  the  mean  time,  to  make  that  very  important 
question  the  subject  of  mutual  and  friendly  discussions ; 
that  as  the  man  himself  can  be  no  object  with  the 
States,  and  as  neither  their  interests  nor  their  inclina 
tions  can  lead  them  to  give  cause  of  umbrage  to  their 
first  and  best  friend  and  ally,  they  hope  he  will  have 
perfect  confidence  in  their  sincerity  when  they  declare 
that  obstacles  to  their  complying  with  his  requests  will 
always  give  them  as  much  concern  and  regret  as  oppor- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  31 

tunities  of  manifesting  their  respect,  their  regard,  their 
gratitude,  and  their  attachment  to  him  will  always  give 
them  pleasure  and  satisfaction." 

Fortunately,  some  months  after,  and  before  the  dis 
cussion  was  renewed,  Mons.  de  Marbois  formally  with 
drew  the  demand  on  the  part  of  his  government. 

Another  case,  involving  questions  of  a  very  similar 
character,  occurred  in  1788,  soon  after  the  arrival  of  the 
Count  de  Moustier,  who  succeeded  the  Chevalier  de  la 
Luzerne.  Ferrier,  a  native  of  Languedoc,  commanding 
the  brig  David,  was  despatched  from  the  island  of  St. 
Domingo  for  Nantz  with  a  valuable  cargo  of  coffee. 
Under  pretence  of  leaks  in  the  vessel,  he  came  to  Nor 
folk,  Virginia.  Satisfied,  from  depositions  taken  on 
board,  that  Ferrier  intended  fraudulently  to  convert  the 
ship  and  cargo  into  his  own  possession,  the  French  con 
sul,  with  the  consent  of  the  mayor,  arrested  Ferrier,  who, 
upon  the  investigation,  had  deserted,  and  sent  him  pris 
oner  on  board  of  the  French  ship  Jason,  then  lying  in 
the  same  harbor.  There  the  culprit  underwent  an  ex 
amination,  and  confessed  his  crime  ;  upon  which  the 
consul  called  an  assembly  of  the  merchants  belonging 
to  his  nation,  who  resolved  to  send  Ferrier  to  Nantz, 
there  to  be  tried  by  the  officers  of  the  French  Admi 
ralty. 

At  the  same  time,  the  consul  wrote  to  the  Governor 
of  the  State,  declaring  the  facts  of  the  case,  and  request 
ing  the  consent  of  the  Executive  Council  to  send  Ferrier 
to  France,  in  the  vessel  which  he  had  commanded.  To 


32  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

this  letter  no  answer  was  received ;  but  shortly  after,  a 
sheriff  went  on  board  the  French  ship  and  arrested 
Ferrier,  as  a  debtor  in  the  sum  of  <£50  to  a  French 
resident  of  Norfolk.  Ferrier  was  carried  on  shore,  gave 
the  necessary  bail,  and  vanished.  Under  these  circum 
stances,  the  French  government  demanded  his  de 
livery. 

The  consular  convention  which  was  afterwards 
adopted  being  then  only  under  negotiation,  Mr.  Jay 
held  very  properly,  that  "  The  foreign  consuls  here  have 
no  authority  than  that  which  they  may  derive  from  the 
law  of  nations  and  the  acts  of  particular  States;"  and 
the  whole  matter  was  referred  to  Virginia.  Governor 
Randolph,  at  that  time  executive  officer  of  the  State, 
held,  that  as  consular  powers  must  be  measured  by  the 
legislative  acts  of  the  State,  so  must  his,  and  declared 
that  he  could  find  no  warrant  to  justify  any  such  action 
on  his  part,  adding :  "  That  if  the  act  of  the  public  officer 
in  withdrawing  Ferrier  from  the  Jason  was  unlawful, 
it  belonged  to  the  judiciary,  not  the  executive,  to  declare 
it  so ;  that  if  it  was  lawful,  the  executive  could  not 
wrest  him  from  the  hands  of  that  officer,  especially  as 
Mr.  Oster  (the  consul)  might  have  reclaimed  him  after 
his  discharge,  and  caused  a  mulct  to  be  imposed  on  the 
sheriff,  if  that  discharge  was  improper."  As  the  gov 
ernment  was  just  about  passing  from  its  old  federal 
condition  into  its  present  constitutional  organization, 
Count  de  Moustier  did  not  press  the  reclamation.  But 
in  his  last  letter  on  the  subject,  he  said :  "  If  circum- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  33 

stances  did  not  promise  a  happy  revolution  in  the  actual 
organization  of  the  United  States,  and  if  the  princi 
ples  that  have  been  adopted  in  Virginia,  with  respect  to 
Captain  Ferrier,  should  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  com 
mercial  policies  of  the  other  States,  which  have  hitherto 
followed  very  different  maxims,  the  consequences  would 
be,  that  no  nation  could  safely  navigate  and  trade  in 
their  ports,  and  that  foreign  captains  might,  under  the 
protection  of  the  laws,  dispose  of  cargoes  which  have 
been  intrusted  to  them,  and  might  enjoy  with  impunity 
the  fruit  of  their  crimes,  in  spite  of  the  claim  of  their 
owners,  and  notwithstanding  the  demands  of  the  minis 
ter  plenipotentiary  of  a  power  closely  connected  with 
the  United  States." 

These  cases  not  only  exhibit  the  caution  with  which 
the  government  acted  wherever  the  national  rights  or 
the  national  character  were  concerned,  but  they  illus 
trate  strongly  how  absolutely  necessary  a  more  efficient 
and  simpler  executive  authority  was,  for  the  adminis 
tration  of  the  foreign  affairs  of  the  country.  For  in  all 
doubtful  questions  of  right,  this  reference  backwards 
and  forwards  from  the  States  to  Congress  was  only  too 
well  calculated,  by  its  delay,  to  provoke  difficulty  and 
create  unnecessary  irritation.  Not  only,  however,  was 
the  government  stringent  in  the  measure  of  its  justice, 
even  to  such  an  ally,  but  it  manifested  a  most  sensitive 
susceptibility  as  to  the  style  in  which  that  ally  should 
address  it ;  and  of  this,  one  of  the  last  of  Mr.  Jefferson's 


34  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

despatches  affords  a  very  striking  example.    Writing  to 
Mr.  Jay  on  the  4th  of  February,  1789,  he  said :  — 

"  We  had  before  understood,  through  different  chan 
nels,  that  the  conduct  of  the  Count  de  Moustier  was 
politically  and  morally  offensive.  It  was  delicate  for 
me  to  speak  on  the  subject  to  the  Count  de  Montmorin. 
The  invaluable  mediation  of  our  friend  the  Marquis  de 
Lafayette  was  therefore  resorted  to,  and  the  subject 
explained,  though  not  pressed.  Later  intelligence  show 
ing  the  necessity  of  pressing  it,  it  was  yesterday  resumed, 
and  represented  through  the  same  medium  to  the 
Count  de  Montmorin,  that  recent  information  proved  to 
us  that  his  minister's  conduct  had  rendered  him  per 
sonally  odious  in  America,  and  might  even  influence 
the  dispositions  of  the  two  nations  ;  that  his  recall  was 
become  a  matter  of  mutual  concern  ;  that  we  had  un 
derstood  he  was  instructed  to  remind  the  new  govern 
ment  of  their  debt  to  this  country,  and  that  he  was  in 
the  purpose  of  doing  it  in  very  harsh  terms ;  that  this 
could  not  increase  their  desire  of  hastening  payment, 
and  might  wound  their  affections  ;  that  therefore  it  was 
much  to  be  desired  that  his  discretion  should  not  be 
trusted  to  as  to  the  form  in  which  the  demand  should 
be  made,  but  that  the  letter  should  be  written  here  and 
he  instructed  to  add  nothing ;  nor  was  his  private  con 
duct  omitted.  The  Count  de  Montmorin  was  sensibly 
impressed,"  etc.,  etc.  And  the  result  was,  as  Mr.  Jeffer 
son  proceeds  to  state  in  detail,  that  the  Count  de  Mous- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  35 

tier  was  allowed  to  ask  his  conge,  and  his  place  sup 
plied  by  Monsieur  de  Ternant. 

But  that  which  indicated  a  radical  difference  of 
opinion  between  the  two  governments,  as  to  their  politi 
cal  relations,  was  the  consular  convention,  the  negotia 
tions  for  which,  commencing  in  1782,  were  not  termi 
nated  by  ratification  until  1789.  As  the  treaty  of 
amity  and  commerce  made  between  France  and  the 
United  States,  in  1778,  granted  mutual  liberty  for  the 
establishment  of  consulates  and  vice- consulates,  Con 
gress  in  1782,  by  a  committee  consisting  of  Randolph, 
Sherman,  and  Clymer,  reported  the  scheme  of  a  con 
sular  convention.  This  convention  was  sent  to  Dr. 
Franklin,  with  the  following  special  and  stringent  in 
structions  :  "  That  the  said  minister  plenipotentiary  use 
his  discretion  as  to  the  words  or  arrangement  of  the 
convention,  conforming'  himself  to  the  matter  thereof  in 
all  respects,  except  as  to  so  much  of  the  sixth  article  as 
relates  to  the  erection  of  a  chapel,  taking  care  that 
reciprocal  provisions  be  made  for  the  recognition  of  the 
consuls  and  vice-consuls  of  the  United  States,  and  for 
the  admission  of  persons  attached  to  the  consulate  to 
the  privileges  stipulated  in  the  fifth  article  in  a  manner 
most  conducive  to  expedition  and  freest  from  difficulty." 
In  December,  1784,  on  motion  of  Mr.  Jay,  Congress 
unanimously  "  Resolved,  That  His  Excellency  the  Presi 
dent  inform  the  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the  United 
States  at  the  Court  of  France,  that  it  is  the  desire 
of  Congress,  in  case  the  convention  proposed  for  reg- 


36  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

ulating  and  ascertaining  the  powers  and  privileges  of 
consuls  should  not  already  be  signed,  that  he  delay  sign 
ing  it  until  he  receive  further  instructions  on  the  subject 
from  Congress."  To  which  Dr.  Franklin  replied,  that 
he  received  the  resolution  too  late,  as  the  convention 
had  been  signed  in  July.  The  convention  as  signed 
came  accordingly  before  Congress  for  ratification.  The 
original  scheme  proposed  by  Congress  was  injudicious 
and  extravagant  enough,  and  it  is  difficult  to  understand 
how,  in  their  usual  cautious  temper,  they  could  ever 
have  consented  to  a  system  of  consular  jurisdiction  as 
wide,  dangerous,  and  unusual  as  their  scheme  com 
prised.  But  objectionable  as  was  the  original  scheme, 
and  evident  as  it  was  that  Congress  had  changed  their 
opinion  as  to  its  policy,  when  the  convention  was  sub 
mitted  for  ratification,  it  was  discovered  that  Dr.  Frank 
lin  had  disregarded  his  special  instructions  to  conform 
himself  to  the  matter  thereof  in  all  respects,  and  had 
allowed  Mons.  de  Rayneval,  the  French  negotiator,  to 
make  sundry  and  important  changes  in  the  scheme,  — 
all  of  which  tended  rather  to  exaggerate  than  diminish 
its  original  imperfections.  The  convention  as  signed 
was  referred  to  Mr.  Jay  for  a  report,  and  an  analysis 
of  that  report  is  the  best  statement  of  the  faults  of  the 
original  scheme,  and  its  objectionable  modifications  in 
the  hands  of  the  American  minister.  Both  conven 
tions  conferred  upon  consuls,  their  retinues,  and  houses, 
almost  ambassadorial  privileges,  gave  them  such  exten 
sive  judicial  powers  in  relation  to  all  disputes  between 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  37 

individuals  of  the  respective  nations  as  to  create  an 
independent  tribunal  in  many  cases  which  good  policy 
required  should  be  settled  by  the  national  courts,  and 
in  fact  organized  a  quasi  diplomatic  surveillance  over 
the  whole  country.  They  were  also  wanting  in  recip 
rocity  in  one  important  particular,  inasmuch  as  while 
consuls  were  admitted  into  all  the  ports  of  the  United 
States  from  France,  provision  was  made  for  their 
admission  only  into  the  French  continental  ports  from 
the  United  States. 

Mr.  Jay  first  stated  his  objections  to  an  error  in  the 
style  of  the  preamble  in  reference  to  the  United  States. 
The  error  was  a  singular  one,  and  the  objection  not 
insignificant.  Instead  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
the  style  applied  to  the  Republic  was,  "  The  Thirteen 
United  States  of  North  America."  Mr.  Jay's  objection 
was,  "  the  style  of  the  Confederacy  being  '  The  United 
States  of  America.'  The  scheme  and  the  convention 
are  both  erroneous,  so  far  as  they  both  add  the  word 
'  North.'  But  the  title  of  the  convention  departs  essen 
tially  from  that  of  the  scheme,  inasmuch  as  it  limits  the 
compact  to  thirteen  United  States  of  America,  and  con 
sequently  excludes  from  it  all  such  other  States  as 
might,  before  the  ratification  of  it,  or  in  future,  be  cre 
ated  by,  or  become  parties  to,  the  Confederacy."  It 
would  be  interesting  to  know  whether  the  alteration 
was  suggested  by  the  French  negotiator,  and  for  what 
reason  Dr.  Franklin  consented  to  the  change.  Placing 
the  variations  of  the  scheme  and  the  convention  in  long 

4 


38  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

and  careful  comparison,  Mr.  Jay  summed  up  his  objec 
tions  to  their  principle  in  the  following  brief  and  forci 
ble  statement. 

"  The  convention  appears  well  calculated  to  answer 
several  purposes ;  but  the  most  important  of  them  are 
such  as  America  has  no  interest  in  promoting.  They 
are  three  :  — 

"  1.  To  provide  against  infractions  of  the  French  and 
American  laws  of  trade. 

"  2.  To  prevent  the  people  of  one  country  from  emi 
grating  to  the  other. 

"  3.  To  establish  in  each  other's  country  an  influential 
corps  of  officers,  under  one  chief,  to  promote  mercantile 
and  political  views. 

"  The  first  of  these  objects  is  clearly  evinced  by  the 
tenth  article. 

"  The  second  of  these  objects,  though  less  explicitly, 
is  still  sufficiently,  evinced  from  the  fourteenth  article. 

"  The  third  of  these  objects,  as  it  respects  mercantile 
views,  is  apparent  from  the  general  tenor  of  the  con 
vention  ;  and  it  appears  plain  to  your  Secretary,  that  a 
minister  near  Congress,  consuls  so  placed  as  to  include 
every  part  of  the  country  in  one  consulate  or  the  other, 
vice-consuls  in  the  principal  cities  and  agents  in  the 
less  important  ones,  constitute  a  corps  so  coherent,  so 
capable  of  acting  jointly  and  secretly,  and  so  ready  to 
obey  the  orders  of  their  chief,  that  it  cannot  fail  of 
being  influential  in  two  very  important  political  re 
spects  :  first,  in  acquiring  and  communicating  intelli- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  39 

gence;  and  secondly,  in  acquiring  and  impressing  such 
advices,  sentiments,  and  opinions  of  men  and  measures 
as  it  may  be  deemed  expedient  to  diffuse  and  encour 
age.  These  being  the  three  great  purposes  which  the 
convention  is  calculated  to  answer,  the  next  question 
which  naturally  occurs  is,  whether  the  United  States 
have  any  such  purposes  to  answer  by  establishing  such 
a  corps  in  France.  As  to  the  first,  we  have  no  laws 
for  the  regulation  of  our  commerce  with  France  or  any 
of  her  dominions  ;  and,  consequently,  we  want  no  pro 
visions  or  guards  against  the  infraction  of  such  laws. 
As  to  the  second,  we  have  not  the  most  distant  reason 
to  apprehend  or  fear  that  our  people  will  leave  us  to 
migrate  either  to  the  kingdom  of  France  or  to  any  of 
its  territories ;  and,  consequently,  every  restriction  or 
guard  against  it  must  be  superfluous  and  useless.  As 
to  the  third,  France  being  a  country  in  wrhose  govern 
ment  the  people  do  not  participate,  where  nothing  can 
be  printed  without  previous  license,  or  said  without 
being  known,  and,  if  disliked,  followed  with  inconven- 
iencies,  such  a  corps  would  there  be  very  inefficient 
for  political  purposes.  Where  the  people  are  perfectly 
unimportant,  every  measure  to  influence  their  opinions 
must  be  equally  so.  For  political  purposes,  therefore, 
we  do  not  want  any  such  corps  in  France.  As  to 
assisting  our  merchants,  and  such  other  matters  as 
properly  belong  to  consuls,  they  would  answer  all  those 
purposes  just  as  well  without  these  extraordinary  powers 
as  with  them." 


40  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

To  comprehend  the  force  of  the  second  objection  in 
this  report,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind,  that  both  scheme 
and  convention  conferred  upon  consuls  the  right  to 
arrest,  not  only  deserters  of  the  crew,  but  the  captain, 
officers,  and  passengers,  of  any  ship  of  the  one  nation 
arriving  in  the  ports  of  the  other.  But  the  convention, 
in  one  of  its  articles,  added  to  the  scheme  the  follow 
ing  provision  :  "  They  who  shall  prove  they  belong  to 
the  body  of  their  respective  nations  by  the  certificate 
of  the  consuls  or  vice-consuls  of  the  district,  mention 
ing  their  names,  surnames,  and  places  of  their  settle 
ment  as  inscribed  on  the  registers  of  the  consulate, 
shall  not  lose,  for  any  cause  whatever ',  in  the  respective 
States  and  domains,  the  quality  of  subjects  of  the 
country  of  which  they  originally  were."  Comparing  the 
two  clauses,  and  considering  the  plenary  power  of  the 
French  crown  as  to  its  emigration  laws,  Mr.  Jay  cor 
rectly  argued,  that  the  King  had  only  to  require  every 
French  passenger  in  a  French  ship  to  register  himself 
on  his  arrival  at  the  consulate,  and  he  would  then  be 
for  ever  incapacitated  for  naturalization,  while  the 
power  of  arrest  in  the  hands  of  the  consul  would  be 
the  means  of  enforcing  this  regulation  or  punishing  its 
infraction,  —  a  right,  which,  he  contended,  went  far 
beyond  the  provision  of  the  treaty  of  1778,  on  which 
it  was  expressly  based. 

The  report  concluded  with  the  following  recommen 
dation  :  "  Although  the  true  policy  of  America  does 
not  require,  but  on  the  contrary  militates  against,  such 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  41 

conventions  ;  and  although  your  Secretary  is  of  opinion 
that  the  convention  as  it  now  stands  ought  not  to  be 
ratified,  yet  as  Congress  have  proceeded  so  far  in  the 
present  instance,  he  thinks  that  instructions  should  be 
sent  to  their  minister  at  Versailles  to  state  the  objec 
tions  to  the  present  form,  and  to  assure  the  King  of  the 
readiness  of  Congress  to  ratify  a  convention  made 
agreeable  to  the  scheme  before  mentioned,  provided 
an  article  be  added  to  limit  its  duration  to  eight  or  ten 
years,  in  order  that  practice  and  experience  may  enable 
them  to  judge  more  accurately  of  its  merits  than  can 
ever  be  done  of  mere  theoretical  establishments,  how 
ever  apparently  expedient." 

This  advice  was  followed,  and  one  of  the  last  acts  of 
Mr.  Jefferson's  mission  was  to  sign  this  convention  with 
the  modifications  and  limitations  required.  It  is  much 
to  be  regretted  that  Congress  did  not  take  advantage  of 
the  variations  between  the  scheme  and  the  convention 
as  negotiated  by  Dr.  Franklin,  to  change  the  whole 
basis  of  their  consular  arrangement  with  France.  For 
the  scheme  itself  was  little  better  than  the  convention, 
and  they  would  have  been  exercising  only  a  recognized 
right  in  insisting  upon  a  renewal  of  negotiation  on  an 
altered  basis.  As  it  was,  the  practical  working  of  the 
convention  during  Washington's  administration  afford 
ed  ample  proof  of  the  wisdom  and  practical  foresight 
of  Mr.  Jay's  objections. 

This  convention  was  in  perfect  keeping  with  the 
spirit  of  the  old  French  diplomacy,  and  serves  as  a  fair 


42  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

illustration  of  the  light  in  which  France  regarded  the 
American  alliance.  Firm  and  generous  in  its  support 
of  the  United  States,  liberal  in  its  commercial  arrange 
ments,  and  forbearing  in  its  claims  upon  the  treasury  of 
the  young  Republic,  the  government  of  France  never 
theless  manifested  a  constant  desire  to  exercise  a  pro 
tectorate,  as  it  were,  over  the  country.  The  principle  of 
French  diplomacy  in  Europe  had  been  to  maintain  the 
closest  and  kindest  relations  with  the  secondary  powers, 
asking  and  obtaining  in  return  that  degree  of  influence 
which  enabled  her  to  combine  them  against  any  rival 
power.  Influence  with  Sweden,  Switzerland,  and  the 
smaller  German  States,  was  thus  a  principle  with 
French  statesmen,  from  Richelieu  to  Vergennes ;  and 
they  proposed  to  place  the  United  States  in  a  similar 
position,  —  to  make  them  the  means  of  French  strength 
and  influence  in  the  colonial  system,  just  as  these  States 
were  in  the  continental.  It  was  a  perfectly  fair  policy, 
if  the  United  States  were  indeed  a  second-rate  power 
in  a  subordinate  political  system;  and  it  cannot  cer 
tainly  be  urged  against  the  French  statesmen  of  that 
day  as  a  want  of  political  sagacity,  that  they  did  so  con 
sider  the  United  States.  But  it  is  one  of  the  highest 
and  worthiest  of  the  countless  claims  of  the  early  Amer 
ican  statesmen  upon  the  reverence  of  their  countrymen, 
that  they  realized  from  the  beginning  the  noblest  of 
futures  for  their  country,  and  laid  the  foundations  of 
their  policy  so  deep  and  broad  that  the  fortunes  of  a 
continent  rest  secure  upon  its  massive  base. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  43 

The  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Spain, 
during  this  period,  were  both  uncertain  and  unpleasant. 
In  1785,  Don  Diego  de  Gardoqui  arrived  in  the  United 
States,  commissioned  as  Charge  d' Affaires  from  the 
Spanish  court.  The  relations  between  the  two  coun 
tries  had  never  been  cordial.  They  had,  during  the  war, 
occasionally  acted  together,  and  maintained  throughout 
its  progress  a  continued  diplomatic  correspondence, 
which  came  to  nothing ;  for  both  parties  anticipated 
the  future  consequences  of  independence  of  the  Colo 
nies,  and  were  unwilling  to  make  concessions,  to  which 
circumstances  might  give  unforeseen  importance ;  be 
sides  which,  there  was  open  between  them  one  question, 
at  least,  • —  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  —  upon 
which  they  disagreed  widely  and  hopelessly.  Upon  the 
establishment  of  their  independence,  the  United  States, 
as  well  as  Spain,  were  anxious  to  settle  this  question. 
The  increasing  trade  and  emigration  westwardly  and 
south-westwardly  were  fast  multiplying  the  causes  and 
occasions  of  difficulty,  and  more  than  one  serious  mis 
understanding  between  th,e  western  settlers  and  the 
Spanish  authorities  proved  the  necessity  not  only  of  a 
positive,  but  of  a  very  prompt,  settlement  of  all  disputed 
points.  Congress,  therefore,  in  July,  1785,  commis 
sioned  Mr.  Jay  to  open  negotiations  with  Gardoqui. 
As  minister  in  Spain,  Mr.  Jay  had  gone  over  all  this 
ground  with  Gardoqui,  then  as  now  the  representative 
of  Spain  in  the  discussion ;  and  they,  in  fact,  only  re 
sumed  a  former  negotiation,  the  United  States,  in  the 


44  DIPLOMATICIIISTOKY. 

mean  time,  having  gained  both  in  strength  and  consist 
ency,  and  thus  coming  upon  the  old  ground  with 
greater  advantages. 

Spain,  on  her  part,  claimed,  —  1.  The  relinquishment 
by  the  United  States  of  their  claim  to  navigate  the  Mis 
sissippi  beyond  their  own  boundary ;  and  2.  The  accom 
modation  of  the  boundaries  between  the  two  countries 
to  the  claim  of  Spain  on  certain  lands  lying  between 
the  boundaries  of  Florida  and  the  eastern  bank  of  the 
Mississippi,  which  claim  the  United  States  had  hitherto 
refused  to  admit.  In  exchange  for  these  concessions, 
she  offered  a  commercial  treaty  of  singular  liberality, 
and  affording  to  the  United  States  opportunities  and 
advantages  offered  by  no  other  maritime  and  colonial 
power ;  and  the  Spanish  Minister  intimated,  that  if  the 
first  demand  were  complied  with,  the  second  might  be 
easily  modified  to  meet  the  territorial  convenience  of 
the  United  States.  In  short,  the  language  of  Spain 
was,  "  Give  up  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  and 
we  will  be  friends  ;  even  the  stringency  of  my  commer 
cial  system  shall  be  relaxed  in  your  favor,  and  none  bet 
ter  than  yourself  know  the  value  of  my  offer.  Refuse, 
and  we  are  enemies."  Mr.  Jay  felt  the  full  force  of  this 
reasoning.  To  refuse  was,  first,  to  forfeit  the  advan 
tages  of  a  commerce,  the  value  of  which  could  not  be 
exaggerated ;  and,  secondly,  to  incur  the  risk  of  a  war, 
and  the  certainty  of  the  active  political  hostility  of  a 
power  which  could  and  would  work  the  United  States 
serious  damage.  For  if  the  United  States  brought  on 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  45 

a  rupture  with  Spain,  France  was  pledged  to  their  ene 
my.  Already,  and  more  than  once,  the  French  minis 
ters  to  Congress  had  declared  the  position  of  the  United 
States  untenable ;  and  the  family  alliance  was  too  close 
to  permit  arbitration  on  behalf  of  the  United  States,  or 
neutrality  in  regard  to  Spain.  Portugal,  with  whom 
the  United  States  had  manifested  an  early  and  steady 
desire  to  form  an  alliance,  was  under  the  influence  of 
Spain;  and  the  Barbary  Powers,  who  had  given  the 
young  Republic  great  anxiety,  and  with  whom  they 
were  even  then  negotiating  under  the  patronage  of 
Spain,  would  need  but  the  slightest  encouragement 
from  that  power  to  break  off  all  discussion,  and  renew 
with  fiercer  vigor  their  war  of  depredation,  while  Eng 
land  would  gladly  aid  in  the  destruction  of  our  commer 
cial  hopes,  and  purchase,  even  at  a  sacrifice,  the  transfer 
of  those  commercial  advantages  that  Spain  so  liberally 
offered.  Knowing  all  this, — believing  that  Spain  was  in 
earnest  in  her  anxiety  to  conclude  a  negotiation,  the 
progress  of  which  only  multiplied  its  difficulties,  —  think 
ing  that  it  would  be  at  least  twenty  years  before  the 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  would  develop  into  an 
absolute  national  necessity,  and  feeling  the  utter  impo 
tence  of  the  country  for  war,  Mr.  Jay  endeavored  to 
effect  a  compromise.  He  suggested,  first,  the  relinquish- 
ment  of  the  right  for  a  limited  period,  about  twenty- 
five  years  :  it  was  refused.  Then  he  proposed  to  relin 
quish  the  exercise  of  the  right  explicitly,  retaining  the 
right  by  implication.  This  too  failed,  after  one  or  two 


46  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

attempts  at  the  construction  of  a  clause  sufficiently 
subtle.  Finally,  Mr.  Jay  drafted  a  clause,  in  which  all 
reference  to  the  right  was  omitted,  and  the  United 
States,  for  certain  reasons  therein  stated,  consented  not 
to  use  the  river  below  their  own  boundaries.  This 
clause  would  of  course  expire  with  the  term  of  the 
treaty,  and  as  the  reasons  alleged  were  temporary,  the 
rights  of  the  United  States  would  then  revive  in  undi- 
minished  force.  No  settlement,  however,  would  be  ad 
mitted  by  Spain  short  of  an  absolute  relinquishment. 
But  Mr.  Jay  had,  when  in  Spain,  put  on  record  his 
opinion,  that  such  an  absolute  relinquishment  was  im 
possible,  and  that  any  treaty  which  included  it  was  a 
declaration  in  advance  of  a  future  war ;  and  that  opinion 
he  still  held;  and  Congress  itself  neither  could  nor 
would  consent  to  such  an  abandonment  of  the  clearest 
and  most  important  national  rights.  In  the  mean  time, 
the  collisions  between  the  citizens  and  authorities  of  the 
two  nations  were  becoming  more  frequent  and  more 
difficult  of  settlement.  Congress,  it  is  true,  in  good 
faith  condemned,  every  instance  of  individual  invasion 
of  Spanish  rights,  even  where  those  rights  were  doubt 
ful  ;  declaring,  very  justly,  that  as  they  were  actually  in 
negotiation  upon  the  whole  matter,  it  was  but  proper 
that  the  country  should  wait  that  decision,  and  abide  it. 
But  their  power  was  not  always  equal  to  their  will ;  and 
in  April,  1787,  Mr.  Jay  reported  the  alternative  before 
the  United  States  strongly  and  briefly. 

"  Your  Secretary  is  convinced  that  the  United  States 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  47 

have  good  right  to  navigate  the  river  from  its  source  to 
and  through  its  mouth ;  and  unless  an  accommodation 
should  take  place,  that  the  dignity  of  the  United  States, 
and  their  duty  to  assert  and  maintain  their  rights,  will 
render  it  proper  for  them  to  present  a  memorial  and 
remonstrance  to  his  Catholic  Majesty,  insisting  on  their 
right,  complaining  of  its  being  violated,  and  demanding, 
in  a  temperate,  inoffensive,  but  at  the  same  time  in  a 
firm  and  decided  manner,  that  his  Majesty  do  cease  in 
future  to  hinder  their  citizens  from  freely  navigating  the 
river  through  the  part  of  its  course  in  question.  Your 
Secretary  is  further  of  opinion,  that,  in  case  of  refusal, 
it  will  be  proper  for  the  United  States  then  to  declare 
war  against  Spain.  There  being  no  respectable  middle 
way  between  peace  and  war,  it  will  be  expedient  to 
prepare  without  delay  for  the  one  or  the  other ;  for  cir 
cumstances  which  call  for  decision  seem  daily  to  accu 
mulate. 

"  If  Congress  conceive  that  a  treaty  with  Spain  on 
the  terms  proposed  is  eligible,  the  sooner  such  senti 
ments  are  communicated  to  your  Secretary,  the  better. 
If  an  idea  of  obtaining  better  terms  should  be  enter 
tained,  the  sooner  the  question  can  be  decided,  the  bet 
ter  ;  and  for  that  purpose,  your  Secretary  thinks  it  would 
be  well  either  to  place  some  other  negotiator  in  his  stead, 
or  to  associate  one  or  more  persons  with  him  in  the 
business.  Any  manner  of  conducting  it  most  advan 
tageous  and  most  satisfactory  to  his  country  will  always 
be  the  manner  most  pleasing  and  agreeable  to  him. 


48  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

"  With  respect  to  prescribing  a  line  of  conduct  to  our 
citizens  on  the  banks  of  the  river,  your  Secretary  is 
embarrassed.  If  war  is  in  expectation,  then  their  ardor 
should  not  be  discouraged  nor  their  indignation  dimin 
ished  ;  but  if  a  treaty  is  wished  and  contemplated,  then 
those  people  should  be  so  advised  and  so  restrained  as 
that  their  sentiments  and  conduct  may,  as  much  as  pos 
sible,  be  made  to  quadrate  with  the  terms  of  articles  of 
it.  Your  Secretary  cannot  forbear  to  express  his  solici 
tude  that  this  very  important  and  consequential  business 
may  not  be  left  in  its  present  situation.  The  objects 
involved  in  it  are  of  great  magnitude,  and  effects  must 
and  will  result  from  it,  by  which  the  prosperity  of  Amer 
ica  will  be  either  greatly  advanced  or  greatly  retarded. 
He  also  takes  the  liberty  of  observing,  that  a  treaty  dis 
agreeable  to  one  half  of  the  nation  had  better  not  be 
made,  for  it  would  be  violated ;  and  that  a  war,  disliked 
by  the  other  half,  would  promise  but  little  success,  espe 
cially  under  a  government  so  greatly  affected  by  popular 
opinion." 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  negotiations  having 
been  prolonged  without  approaching  any  satisfactory 
conclusion,  public  opinion  began  to  be  disturbed  by 
rumors  of  intended  cessions.  Congress,  therefore,  took 
occasion,  on  motion  of  the  delegates  from  North  Caro 
lina,  stating  the  uneasiness  produced  by  a  report 
"  that  Congress  are  disposed  to  treat  with  Spain  for  the 
surrender  of  their  claim  to  the  navigation  of  the  river 
Mississippi,"  to  refer  the  matter  to  a  committee,  upon 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  49 

whose  recommendation  the  following  resolutions  were 
adopted :  — 

"Resolved,  That  the  said  report  not  being  founded  in 
fact,  the  delegates  be  at  liberty  to  communicate  all  such 
circumstances  as  may  be  necessary  to  contradict  the 
same,  and  to  remove  misconceptions. 

"Resolved,  That  the  free  navigation  of  the  river  Mis 
sissippi  is  a  clear  and  essential  right  of  the  United 
States,  and  that  the  same  ought  to  be  considered  and 
supported  as  such. 

"Resolved,  That  no  further  progress  be  made  in  the 
negotiations  with  Spain  by  the  Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs ;  but  that  the  subject  to  which  they  relate  be 
referred  to  the  federal  government,  which  is  to  assemble 
in  March  next." 

There  were  some  minor  subjects  of  disagreement  be 
tween  the  two  countries ;  complaint  by  citizens  of  the 
United  States  of  cruel  and  unjust  treatment  in  Havana ; 
and,  on  the  part  of  Spain,  of  irregular  invasion  of  her 
territory  by  adventurous  individuals  from  the  United 
States  ;  but  they  were  subordinated  to  the  general  inter 
ests  of  the  main  negotiation.  On  one  subject,  however, 
Congress  took  decided  action,  and,  upon  a  report  from 
Mr.  Jay  submitting  the  facts  of  the  complaint,  on  the 
26th  of  August,  1788,  thus  - 

"Resolved,  That  the  Secretary  for  the  Department  of 
Foreign  Affairs  be  directed  to  transmit  copies  of  the 
papers  referred  to  in  his  said  report,  to  the  Charge  d' Af 
faires  of  the  United  States  at  Madrid,  and  to  instruct 
5 


50  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

him  to  represent  to  his  Catholic  Majesty  the  inconven 
iences  which  the  States  bordering  on  his  dominions 
experience  from  the  asylum  afforded  to  fugitive  negroes 
belonging  to  the  citizens  of  the  said  States ;  and  that 
Congress  have  full  confidence  that  orders  will  be  given 
to  his  Governors  to  permit  and  facilitate  their  being 
apprehended  and  delivered  to  persons  authorized  to 
receive  them,  assuring  his  Majesty  that  the  said  States 
will  observe  the  like  conduct  respecting  all  such  negroes 
belonging  to  his  subjects  as  may  be  found  therein. 

"Resolved,  That  the  said  Secretary  be  also  directed 
to  communicate  the  said  papers  to  the  Encargado  de 
Negocios  of  Spain,  and  to  signify  to  him  that  his  inter 
position  to  obtain  proper  regulations  to  be  made  on  the 
subject  would  be  very  agreeable  to  Congress." 

IT  is  but  justice,  however,  to  Spain  to  state,  that  the 
Governor  of  East  Florida  had  permitted  the  fugitives 
to  be  apprehended  and  put  in  keeping  of  persons  named 
by  their  masters,  but  declined  to  deliver  them  up,  on 
the  ground  that  Georgia,  while  under  the  British  gov 
ernment,  had  refused  to  observe  a  reciprocal  conduct  as 
to  their  capture  and  delivery.  This  subject,  along  with 
the  others,  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  new  government. 

The  treaty  of  1783,  with  England,  went  no  further 
than  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  United 
States.  The  numerous  and  important  questions  which 
their  altered  relations  forced  upon  both  governments 
were  postponed  to  a  more  convenient  season,  and,  as  in 
most  postponements,  national  interests  were  daily  more 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  51 

entangled,  and  national  sentiment  more  irritated.  The 
commercial  questions  which  sprang  naturally  from  the 
recognition  of  American  Independence  were  of  the  first 
importance  to  the  people  of  the  United  States.  As 
subjects  of  the  Crown,  they  had,  under  the  British  sys 
tem,  enjoyed  certain  privileges  and  immunities,  which 
had  given  the  character  and  current  to  their  commerce. 
As  aliens,  the  navigation  laws  of  England  unsparingly 
cut  them  off  from  old  immunities,  closed  the  West 
Indies,  and  imposed  heavy  and,  to  them,  unwonted 
duties  on  their  productions.  The  American  statesmen 
were  anxious  that  the  commercial  arrangements  between 
the  two  countries  should  be  adjusted  on  the  freest  basis. 
They  wished  the  relation  between  the  new  Republic 
and  their  ancient  sovereign  to  be  sui  generis,  and 
thought  that  their  independence  need  not  make  them 
aliens.  They  argued,  with  great  force,  that  the  natural 
tendency  of  their  commerce  was  towards  England ;  that 
the  British  West  Indian  Colonies  depended  upon  them 
for  cheap  and  prompt  supplies ;  that  trade  between  the 
two  countries,  on  equal  and  liberal  terms,  would  soon 
efface  the  angry  recollections  of  a  seven  years'  war,  and 
that  the  prosperity  resulting  from  such  a  commerce 
would  enable  American  debtors,  in  the  pleasantest  and 
speediest  manner,  to  pay  their  English  creditors,  and 
thus  remove  a  source  of  perpetual  and  bitter  contro 
versy.  The  English  politicians,  on  the  other  hand, 
maintained,  with  equal  force,  that  such  a  relation  was 
impossible ;  that  the  United  States  became,  as  the  nat- 


52  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

ural  consequence  of  their  own  act,  a  foreign  power; 
that,  even  admitting  the  wisdom  and  expediency  of 
such  a  liberal  policy  as  was  suggested,  there  was  this 
insuperable  difficulty  in  the  way :  England  was  bound 
by  her  commercial  treaties  with  other  nations  to  allow 
them  any  privileges  granted  to  the  most  favored  nations ; 
that  these  nations  would  insist  upon  a  participation  in 
any  advantages  afforded  to  what  they  would  justly  de 
clare  was  the  foreign  nation  of  the  United  States ;  and 
thus,  any  relaxation  towards  their  ancient  colonies 
would  involve  a  complete  revolution  of  their  whole 
commercial  system.  Some  of  the  leading  English 
statesmen  went  further,  and  opposed  the  policy  of  any 
such  misplaced  liberality.  Lord  Sheffield  may  be  con 
sidered  the  head  of  this  party ;  and  he  argued,  with  great 
selfishness  it  may  be,  but  certainly  with  great  shrewd 
ness  :  "  Our  impatience  to  pre-occupy  the  American  mar 
ket  should  perhaps  be  rather  checked  than  encouraged. 
The  same  eagerness  has  been  indulged  by  our  rival 
nations.  They  have  vied  with  each  other  in  pouring 
their  manufactures  into  America,  and  the  country  is 
already  stocked,  most  probably  overstocked,  with  Euro 
pean  commodities.  It  is  experience  alone  that  can 
demonstrate  to  the  French  or  Dutch  trader  the  fallacy 
of  his  eager  hopes,  and  that  experience  will  operate 
every  day  in  favor  of  the  British  merchant.  He  alone 
is  able  and  willing  to  grant  that  liberal  credit  which 
must  be  extorted  from  his  competitors  by  the  rashness 
of  their  early  ventures.  They  will  soon  discover  that 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  53 

America  has  neither  money  nor  sufficient  produce  to 
send  in  return,  and  cannot  have  for  some  time ;  and  not 
intending  or  being  able  to  give  credit,  their  funds  will 
be  exhausted,  their  agents  will  never  return,  and  the  ruin 
of  the  first  creditors  will  serve  as  a  lasting  warning  to 
their  countrymen.  The  solid  power  of  supplying  the 
wants  of  America,  of  receiving  her  produce,  and  of 
waiting  her  convenience,  belongs  almost  exclusively  to 
our  own  merchants.  If  we  can  abstain  from  mischiev 
ous  precipitation,  we  shall  learn,  to  our  great  satisfac 
tion,  that  the  industry  of  Britain  will  encounter  little 
competition  in  the  American  market.  We  shall  observe 
with  pleasure,  that,  among  the  maritime  States,  France, 
after  all  her  efforts,  will  derive  the  smallest  benefits  from 
the  commercial  independence  of  America.  She  may 
exult  in  the  dismemberment  of  the  British  Empire  ;-but 
if  we  are  true  to  ourselves  and  to  the  wisdom  of  our 
ancestors,  there  is  still  life  and  vigor  left  to  disappoint 
her  hopes,  and  to  control  her  ambition." 

Immediately  after  the  negotiation  of  the  preliminary 
Articles  of  Peace,  there  seems  to  have  been  some  anxi 
ety  on  the  part  of  England,  as  to  the  retention  of  the 
commerce  of  the  United  States.  The  administration 
of  Lord  Shelburne  did  in  fact  introduce  an  American 
Intercourse  Bill,  which  was  ably  argued  by  Mr.  Pitt  in 
the  House  of  Commons,  and  certainly  exhibited  in  its 
provisions  a  wise  and  generous  liberality.  It  was,  how 
ever,  warmly  opposed,  especially  by  Mr.  Eden,  who  was 
the  negotiator  of  the  Commercial  Treaty  with  France ; 
5* 


54  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

and  although  supported  by  Mr.  Burke,  it  was  opposed  by 
Mr.  Fox.  Lord  Shelburne's  administration  was  over 
turned  by  the  vote  of  censure  passed  by  the  House  of 
Commons  on  his  treaty  of  peace  with  the  United  States ; 
and  he  was  succeeded  by  the  Duke  of  Portland,  as  the 
head  of  the  famous  coalition  ministry  of  Lord  North 
and  Mr.  Fox.  One  of  Mr.  Fox's  earliest  proceedings 
was  to  move  the  postponement  of  this  bill ;  and  he  soon 
after  substituted  another,  simply  repealing  certain  com 
mercial  forms  which  were  attached  to  the  old  colonial 
navigation,  and  which  were  useless  and  improper  in  re 
lation  to  the  commerce  of  an  independent  nation.  In 
doing  so,  Mr.  Fox  declared  his  intention  of  making  the 
commercial  relations  between  the  two  countries  a  sub 
ject  of  large  and  liberal  negotiation  ;  but  that  negotia 
tion  never  came  to  any  result,  and  after  a  useless  delay, 
the  preliminary  articles  were  converted  into  the  defi 
nitive  treaty  of  peace  with  the  United  States.  Circum 
stances  unfortunately  proved  the  correctness  of  Lord 
Sheffield's  prophecy.  It  became  the  general  opinion  in 
England,  that  a  treaty  with  the  American  States  was 
unnecessary  and  impolitic ;  that  the  English  merchants 
would  have  as  much  of  the  American  trade  as  they 
ought  to  wish  for;  that  no  sacrifices  of  navigation  or 
commercial  regulations  could  avail  to  -secure  any  greater 
advantage  than  they  would  otherwise  have ;  and  that 
the  dependence  of  the  British  West  Indies,  as  repre 
sented  by  American  and  West  Indian  advocates,  was 
fallacious.  In  addition  to  this  subject  of  difference, 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  55 

large  and  perplexed  enough  to  tax  the  highest  ability  of 
any  negotiator,  England,  in  direct  violation  of  the  pro 
visions  of  the  treaty,  held  on  to  the  north-western  posts, 
a  wrong  to  which  the  United  States  could  not  submit 
with  dignity,  and  yet  which  they  had  not  the  force  to 
resist  with  success.  It  was  in  the  midst  of  this  very 
troubled  state  of  affairs,  that  Mr.  Adams  arrived  in 
London  as  Minister  Plenipotentiary  from  the  United 
States. 

His  instructions  were  brief  and  simple.  "  You  will, 
in  a  respectful  but  firm  manner,  insist  that  the  United 
States  be  put,  without  further  delay,  in  possession  of  all 
the  posts  and  territories  within  their  limits,  which  are 
now  held  by  British  garrisons,  and  you  will  take  the 
earliest  opportunity  of  transmitting  the  answer  you  may 
receive  to  this  requisition. 

"  You  will  remonstrate  against  the  infraction  of  the 
treaty  of  peace  by  the  exportation  of  negroes  and  other 
American  property,  contrary  to  the  stipulations  on  that 
subject  in  the  seventh  article  of  it.  Upon  this  head, 
you  will  be  supplied  with  various  authentic  papers  and 
documents,  particularly  the  correspondence  between 
Gen.  Washington  and  others  on  the  one  part,  and  Sir 
Guy  Carleton  on  the  other.  You  will  represent  to  the 
British  ministry  the  strong  and  necessary  tendency  of 
their  restrictions  on  our  trade  to  incapacitate  our  mer 
chants,  in  a  certain  degree,  to  make  remittances  to 
theirs. 

"  You  will  represent  in  strong  terms  the  losses  which 


56  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

many  of  our  and  also  of  their  merchants  will  sustain, 
if  the  former  be  unreasonably  and  immediately  pressed 
for  the  payment  of  debts  contracted  before  the  war.  On 
this  subject,  you  will  be  furnished  with  papers  in  which 
it  is  amply  discussed." 

On  the  1st  of  June,  1785,  Mr.  Adams  had  his  first 
audience  of  the  King.  And  surrounded  as  his  duty  wras 
with  difficulties,  surely  as  he  must  have  anticipated  the 
failure  of  all  negotiation  on  the  subjects  which  he  was 
commissioned  to  discuss,  yet  to  no  man  has  the  retribu 
tive  justice  of  history  offered  an  hour  of  prouder  life 
than  that  in  which,  as  the  recognized  representative  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  he  placed  in  the  hands  of 
his  ancient  sovereign  the  credentials  of  his  honorable 
trust.  In  his  person,  no  unworthy  example  of  the  vig 
orous  and  refined  manhood  which  at  that  day  charac 
terized  the  statesmen  of  America,  —  in  his  fame,  iden 
tified  with  every  great  event  of  his  country's  progress, 
from  the  Congress  which  declared,  to  the  treaty  which 
recognized,  independence,  —  well  might  he  be,  as  he  de 
scribes  himself,  the  focus  of  all  eyes  as  he  stood  in  the 
royal  antechamber,  full  of  ministers  of  state  and  bish 
ops  and  ambassadors. 

When  Mr.  Adams  was  introduced  into  the  King's 
closet,  he  thus  addressed  His  Majesty:  — 

"  SIR  :  The  United  States  of  America  have  appointed 
me  their  Minister  Plenipotentiary  to  your  Majesty,  and 
have  directed  me  to  deliver  to  your  Majesty  this  letter, 
which  contains  the  evidence  of  it.  It  is  in  obedience 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  57 

to  their  express  commands  that  I  have  the  honor  to  as 
sure  your  Majesty  of  their  unanimous  disposition  and 
desire  to  cultivate  the  most  friendly  and  liberal  inter 
course  between  your  Majesty's  subjects  and  their  citi 
zens,  and  of  their  best  wishes  for  your  Majesty's  health 
and  happiness,  and  that  of  your  royal  family.  The  ap 
pointment  of  a  minister  from  the  United  States  to  your 
Majesty's  court  will  form  an  epoch  in  the  history  of 
England  and  of  America.  I  think  myself  more  fortu 
nate  than  all  my  fellow-citizens,  in  having  the  distin 
guished  honor  to  be  the  first  to  stand  in  your  Majesty's 
royal  presence  in  a  diplomatic  character ;  and  I  shall  es 
teem  myself  the  happiest  of  men,  if  I  can  be  instru 
mental  in  recommending  my  country  more  and  more  to 
your  Majesty's  royal  benevolence,  and  of  restoring  an 
entire  esteem,  confidence,  and  affection,  or,  in  better 
words,  the  old  good-nature  and  the  old  good-humor 
between  people,  who,  though  separated  by  an  ocean  and 
under  different  governments,  have  the  same  language,  a 
similar  religion,  and  kindred  blood. 

"  I  beg  your  Majesty's  permission  to  add,  that  although 
I  have  some  time  before  been  intrusted  by  my  country, 
it  was  never  in  my  life  in  a  manner  so  agreeable  to 
myself." 

"  The  King,"  says  Mr.  Adams,  "  listened  to  every  word 
I  said  with  dignity,  but  with  an  apparent  emotion. 
Whether  it  was  the  nature  of  the  interview,  or  whether 
it  was  my  visible  agitation,  —  for  I  felt  more  than  I  did 
or  could  express,  —  that  touched  him,  I  cannot  say  ;  but 


58  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

he  was  much  affected,  and  answered  me  with  more  tre 
mor  than  I  had  spoken  with,  and  said  :  — 

" '  SIR  :  The  circumstances  of  this  audience  are  so 
extraordinary,  the  language  you  have  now  held  is  so 
extremely  proper,  and  the  feelings  you  have  discovered 
so  justly  adapted  to  the  occasion,  that  I  must  say  that 
I  not  only  receive  with  pleasure  the  assurance  of  the 
friendly  dispositions  of  the  United  States,  but  that  I 
am  very  glad  the  choice  has  fallen  upon  you  to  be  their 
minister.  I  wish  you,  sir,  to  believe,  arid  that  it  may  be 
understood  in  America,  that  I  have  done  nothing  in  the 
late  contest  but  what  I  thought  myself  indispensably 
bound  to  do,  by  the  duty  which  I  owed  to  my  people.  I 
will  be  very  frank  with  you.  I  was  the  last  to  consent 
to  the  separation ;  but  the  separation  having  been  made, 
and  having  become  inevitable,  I  have  always  said,  as  I 
say  now,  that  I  would  be  the  first  to  meet  the  friendship 
of  the  United  States  as  an  independent  power.  The 
moment  I  see  such  sentiments  and  language  as  yours 
prevail,  and  a  disposition  to  give  this  country  the  pref 
erence,  that  moment  I  shall  say,  let  the  circumstances 
of  language,  religion,  and  blood  have  their  natural  and 
full  effect.' " 

Notwithstanding  this  happy  inauguration  of  his  mis 
sion,  Mr.  Adams  soon  discovered  the  utter  hopelessness 
of  carrying  his  purposes.  His  despatches  were  but  con 
stant  complaint  and  sorrowful  acknowledgment  that  cir 
cumstances  were  too  strong  for  him.  It  is  clear,  from 
the  correspondence  between  Mr.  Jay  and  himself,  — 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  59 

1.  That  between  the  treaty  of  1783  and  his  arrival 
in  1785,  Lord  Sheffield's  views  had  become  almost  uni 
versal.     The   Marquis  of   Lansdowne,  in  whom  alone 
Mr.  Adams  saw  any  hope,  was  out  of  power,  and  not 
likely  to*  return  ;  while  neither  among  the  people,  nor  the 
various  political  parties,  was  there  manifest  the  slightest 
desire  to  liberalize  their  national  policy. 

2.  The  commerce  of  the  United  States  had  literally 
fulfilled  the  prophecy  of  its  enemies,  and  had  run  towards 
England  with  a  current  too  strong  to  be  turned  by  home 
legislation,  and  regardless  of  British  restriction.      And 
thus  England  was  already  in  full  enjoyment  of  almost 
all  which  she  could  have  obtained  by  the  most  concil 
iatory  policy. 

3.  The  right  of  each  State  to  govern  and  regulate  its 
own  commerce,  and  the  rivalry  of  their  various  inter 
ests,  rendered  it  impossible  to  resort  to  any  uniform  and 
consistent  system   of  retaliation,  by  which  alone  Eng 
land  could  be  brought  to  negotiation.     The  result  of 
Mr.  Adams's  labors  might  be  summed  up  in  a  few  des 
ultory  and  inconsequential  conversations  with  the  Brit 
ish  minister ;  for  the  question  of  the  posts  was  as  hope 
less  as  a  more  liberal  arrangement  of  their  commercial 
regulations.     In  the  first  place,  England  had  the  power, 
and  in  the  next,  she  pretended  a  right.     The  British 
minister  declared  that  the  United  States  had  broken  the 
treaty,  by  putting  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  recovery 
of  English  debts ;  and  they  found,  in  the  independent 
legislation  of  so  many  States,  some  laws  which  afforded 


60  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

a  plausible  ground  for  argument.  They  therefore  dis 
tinctly  signified  their  intention  to  hold  on  to  the  posts, 
until  the  legislation  of  which  they  complained  was  re 
pealed.  There  was,  of  course,  but  one  alternative-,  if  the 
issue  was  directly  made,  to  resist  or  to  submit.  The 
first  was  impossible ;  for  Mr.  Jay's  language,  applied  to 
the  state  of  affairs  between  Spain  and  the  United  States, 
was  still  more  painfully  true  in  reference  to  Great 
Britain.  "  Unblessed  with  an  efficient  government,  des 
titute  of  funds,  and  without  public  credit  either  at  home 
or  abroad,  we  should  be  obliged  to  wait  in  patience  for 
better  days,  or  plunge  into  an  unpopular  and  dangerous 
war,  with  very  little  prospect  of  terminating  it  by  a 
peace  either  advantageous  or  glorious."  To  submit  was 
equally  impossible ;  and  Mr.  Adams  was  therefore  in 
structed  by  Congress  to  protract  the  discussions,  and 
thus  avoid  a  categorical  answer,  which  would  have 
forced  upon  the  United  States  a  profitless  issue.  Hav 
ing  demonstrated  the  uselessness  of  his  mission,  Mr. 
Adams  was  recalled  at  his  own  request.  The  British 
government  had  never  reciprocated  the  courtesy  of  the 
United  States  in  sending  an  ambassador,  but  had  con 
tented  itself  with  appointing  Mr.  Temple  consul-gen 
eral  at  New  York,  an  appointment  which  Congress 
sanctioned  in  a  spirit  of  very  ill-judged  liberality.  The 
negotiations  between  the  two  countries  were  therefore 
ended,  and  as  the  Federal  Constitution  was  about  to  go 
into  operation,  Congress  suffered  the  foreign  affairs  of 
the  country  to  wait  in  patience  for  those  better  days. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  61 

Mr.  Adams  concluded  his  mission  early  in  1788,  and 
with  it  he  closed  his  diplomatic  life.  As  a  diplomatist, 
he  was  second  to  none.  He  possessed  neither  the  facil 
ity  of  Franklin,  nor  the  singular  'impartiality  of  Jay ; 
but  he  was  wider  and  bolder  in  his  views  than  either. 
His  appreciation  of  political  events  took  in  a  broader 
scope,  and  was  sustained  by  a  profounder  and  ampler 
study  of  political  history.  His  temper  was  not  concili 
ating,  for  his  intellect  was  too  active  and  impetuous  to 
wait  upon  other  men's  doubts.  From  the  outset  of  the 
Revolution,  he  realized,  more  vividly  than  perhaps  any 
other  public  man,  the  full  force  and  value  of  that  great 
event.  If  he  erred,  it  was  because  he  insisted  too  stren 
uously  upon  the  immediate  recognition  by  others  of  that 
consequence  which  he  foresaw  must  attach  to  the  polit 
ical  position  of  the  United  States.  In  his  despatches 
will  be  found  more  than  one  anticipation  of  political 
consequences  which  his  country  is  only  now  developing 
in  the  fulness  of  its  strength  and  prosperity;  and  the 
American  historian  would  be  unfit  for  his  task  who 
could  censure,  with  unsympathizing  criticism,  the  impa 
tience  of  an  enthusiasm  so  patriotic  in  its  zeal,  and  so 
far-seeing  in  its  hopes.  The  treaty  with  Holland,  which 
was  his  own  peculiar  work,  and  of  critical  importance 
at  the  time  of  its  signature,  could  have  been  negotiated 
only  by  one  who  knew  how  to  inspire  others  with  his 
own  confidence  in  his  country's  future.  His  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  colonies 

gave  his  services  incalculable  importance  in  the  peace 

6 


62  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

negotiations  with  Great  Britain ;  and  his  mission  to 
England  was  all  that  under  the  circumstances  it  could 
be,  —  a  strong  and  dignified  protest  against  the  wilful- 
ness  of  a  short-sighted  and  selfish  policy.  Since  the 
day  on  which,  in  St.  James's  Palace,  he  was  presented  to 
the  King,  a  long  line  of  worthy  successors,  in  that  same 
palace,  surrounded  by  the  same  royal  pomp  and  circum 
stance,  have  from  time  to  time  renewed  and  maintained 
the  bonds  of  national  intercourse,  and  each  new  minis 
ter  has  represented  a  vaster,  richer,  greater  nation.  But 
with  ah1  our  increase,  we  have  added  to  the  national 
possession  no  nobler  spirit,  no  truer  patriot,  no  higher 
gentleman,  than  he  who  purchased  his  honors  neither  by 
popular  lip  service  nor  party  jugglery,  but  who,  literally, 
by  journeyings  often,  in  perils  in  the  city,  in  perils  in 
the  sea,  in  perils  among  false  brethren,  in  weariness  and 
painfulness,  earned  the  proud  privilege  of  being  named, 
by  a  grateful  senate,  the  first  Minister  of  the  United 
States  to  the  court  of  England. 

This  necessarily  brief  review  of  the  diplomatic  trans 
actions  of  the  years  intervening  between  the  treaty  of 
peace  of  1783  and  the  institution  of  the  constitutional 
government  in  1789,  shows  the  difficulties  which  the 
new  government  had  to  encounter  at  the  outset  of  its 
administration  of  the  foreign  affairs  of  the  country. 
The  object  of  the  following  pages  will  be  to  trace  the 
policy  of  that  government  in  dealing  with  the  troubles 
it  inherited,  and  to  follow  the  progress  of  its  negotia 
tions  to  their  successful  conclusion. 


CHAPTER  II. 

NEGOTIATIONS  AND  TREATY  WITH  ENGLAND. 

Ox  the  30th  of  April,  1789,  George  Washington  was 
solemnly  inaugurated  as  first  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America.  After  taking  the  oath  of  office,  he 
addressed  the  two  houses  of  Congress  in  the  senate 
chamber.  And  with  an  "  aspect  grave  almost  to  sad 
ness,  his  modesty  actually  shaking,  his  voice  deep,  a  lit 
tle  tremulous,  and  so  low  as  to  call  for  close  attention," 
he  declared,  in  language  which  finds  its  fullest  and  fit 
test  application  in  the  history  of  his  own  administration, 
that  "  there  is  no  truth  more  thoroughly  established,  than 
that  there  exists,  in  the  economy  and  course  of  nature, 
an  indispensable  union  between  virtue  and  happiness, 
between  duty  and  advantage,  between  the  genuine  max 
ims  of  an  honest  and  magnanimous  policy  and  the 
solid  rewards  of  public  prosperity  and  felicity."  ' 

In  the  construction  of  the  cabinet,  which  immediately 
followed  the  inauguration,  the  secretaryship  for  Foreign 
Affairs  was  conferred  upon  Thomas  Jefferson,  of  Vir- 

*  Life  and  Works  of  Fisher  Ames,  Vol.  I.  p.  34. 


64  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

ginia.  Mr.  Jefferson  had  been  Governor  of  Virginia,  a 
distinguished  and  useful  member  of  the  Continental 
Congress,  and  had  achieved  in  that  body  a  lasting  and 
historical  reputation  by  the  authorship  of  the  famous 
Declaration  of  Independence.  He  had  taken  no  part  in 
the  deliberations  of  the  Constitutional  Convention ;  and 
although  at  that  time  not  properly  to  be  ranked  among 
either  the  advocates  or  the  opponents  of  the  constitu 
tion,  he  looked  upon  that  instrument  rather  as  an  experi 
ment  than  an  achievement.  At  the  time  of  his  appoint 
ment,  he  was  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of  the  United 
States  at  Paris,  but  on  leave  of  absence  from  his  mission. 
When  Mr.  Jefferson  left  Paris,  in  September,  1789, 
the  French  Revolution  had  commenced.  He  had  heard 
the  cannon  proclaim  the  fall  of  the  Bastile,  and  seen 
the  ferocious  crowd  which  tore  Foul  on  from  the  pro 
tecting  arms  of  Lafayette,  and  butchered  Savigny  under 
the  windows  of  the  Hotel  de  Ville.  He  had  seen  the 
fleur-de-lis,  which  had  floated  in  brave  and  noble  com 
panionship  with  his  national  flag  over  the  historic  fields 
of  the  Revolution,  sink,  stained  with  the  blood  of  its 
faithful  guardians,  before  the  tricolor,  and  had  heard 
Lafayette  predict  that  it  would  make  the  tour  of  the 
world.  The  King  of  France,  towards  the  power  and 
glory  of  whose  crown  he  had  looked  earnestly  in  the 
darkest  hours  of  his  country's  fate,  longing  to  see  its 
splendor  rise  sunlike  over  the  broad  Atlantic,  bringing 
healing  on  its  wings,  —  that  royal  friend  he  had  seen 
broken  and  humiliated,  surrounded,  to  use  his  own  de- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  65 

scription,  with  a  fierce  crowd  of  sixty  thousand  citizens, 
of  all  forms  and  colors,  armed  with  the  muskets  of  the 
Bastille  and  the  Invalides,  as  far  as  they  would  go,  the 
rest  with  pistols,  swords,  pikes,  pruning-hooks,  scythes, 
etc.,  and  while  the  tumultuous  shout  of  "  Vive  la  Na 
tion  "  hailed  the  States-General  who  accompanied  him, 
"  not  a  single  '  Vive  le  Roi '  was  heard."  He  had  seen 
Baily  attach  the  tricolor  cockade  to  the  King's  hat, 
and  thus  witnessed,  in  his  own  words,  the  conclusion  of 
"  such  an  amende  honorable  as  no  sovereign  ever  made, 
and  no  people  ever  received." 

Mr.  Jefferson  looked  upon  these  disturbances,  however 
unfortunate,  as  natural,  but  temporary.  He  had  great 
confidence  in  the  character  and  ability  of  the  popular 
leaders  of  the  States- General.  With  many  of  them  he 
was  in  the  habit  of  confidential  consultation,  and  by  all 
of  them  he  was  treated  with  great  respect,  while  his 
views  and  theories,  both  of  the  American  Revolution 
and  of  government,  found  among  them  general  accept 
ance  and  sympathy.  Mr.  Jefferson,  therefore,  left 
France,  deeply  and  favorably  interested  in  the  Revolu 
tion,  which,  just  before  his  departure,  had  been,  as  it 
were,  constitutionally  inaugurated  by  the  vote  which 
declared  the  permanence  of  the  Assembly.  It  was  nat 
ural  that  it  should  be  so.  As  a  speculative  politician, 
Mr.  Jefferson  belonged,  more  nearly  than  any  other  of 
the  great  American  statesmen,  to  that  school  in  which 
the  best  of  the  French  reformers  were  devoted  disciples. 
He  was,  like  them,  not  so  much  a  revolutionary  states- 
6* 


66  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

man  as  a  social  reformer.  Born  and  bred  in  Virginia, 
where  social  distinctions  were  wider  and  stronger  than 
in  any  other  of  the  colonies,  where  the  great  colonial 
proprietors  formed,  in  fact,  a  landed  aristocracy,  and 
where  the  institution  of  slavery  gave  even  an  intenser 
character  to  their  aristocratic  privileges,  Mr.  Jefferson 
had,  early  in  life,  placed  himself  in  direct  opposition  to 
the  social  system  into  which  he  was  born.  The  primo 
geniture  law,  the  established  church,  the  institution  of 
slavery,  he  attacked  early  and  continuously.  When  he 
entered  Congress,  he  gave,  by  the  Declaration  of  Inde 
pendence,  a  very  much  broader  and  more  radical  char 
acter  to  the  grounds  of  difference  between  the  mother 
country  and  the  colonies  than  had  yet  been  avowed. 
For  with  regard  to  the  leaders  of  the  American  Revolu 
tion,  it  has  been  said  with  great  force  and  truth :  "  What 
we  find  in  their  speeches,  what  we  read  in  the  writings 
of  those  days,  has  much  about  birthright  and  inheri 
tance,  charters  and  the  privileges  of  English  born  sub 
jects,  and  very  little  about  the  rights  of  man.  .  .  .  They 
had  gone  but  a  short  way  into  those  philosophical  ideas 
which  characterized  the  subsequent  and  real  revolution 
in  France.  The  great  State  papers  of  American  liberty 
are  all  predicated  on  the  abuse  of  chartered,  not  abso 
lute,  rights."*  These  opinions  Mr.  Jefferson  carried  with 

*  Gibbs,  Administration  of  Washington  and  Adams,  Vol.  I.  p.  2, 
3.  In  quoting  this  work,  while  I  cheerfully  admit  the  great  value  of 
its  original  matter  for  the  purposes  of  historical  illustration,  while  I 
sympathize  with  much  of  its  enthusiastic  regard  for  the  leaders  of 


DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY.  67 

him  into  the  Department  of  State.     In  the  unexpected 
contingencies  of  national  politics,  it  happened  that  these 

the  old  federal  parties,  and  admire  the  spirit  and  ability  displayed  in 
its  composition,  I  cannot  too  strongly  deplore  and  condemn  its  whole 
tone  and  temper.  It  is  written,  not  in  the  calm  and  conscientious 
spirit  of  history,  but  with  all  the  violent  animosity  of  perverted  party 
feeling.  The  small,  personal  jealousies,  the  idle  and  malignant  gossip, 
the  discredited  and  discreditable  scandal,  which  are  ajways  rife  in 
time*  of  great  party  excitement,  are  not  only  reproduced,  —  that 
might  be  justified,  as  necessary  for  the  illustration  of  the  sentiment 
and  opinions  of  the  day,  -r-ftut  niajj'e  ground  for  grave  historical  ref 
erence  and  induction.  Now*  to  say  the  lea^t,  it  is  very  unphilosophi- 
cal  to  assume,  that,  at  any  period  of  political  strife,  all  the  wisdom  and 
the  worth  belong  to  one  party.  Imperfect  as  is  human  nature,  and 
complicated  as  are  the  motives  of  human  action,  not  every  difference 
of  opinion,  even  where  we  feel  assured  that  our  own  judgment  is 
right,  not  every  weakness  or  inconsistency,  or  even  selfishness  of  pub 
lic  conduct,  although  repugnant  to  our  moral  sense,  is  ground  suffi 
cient  for  harsh  condemnation.  But  if  ever  there  was  a  time  when 
men  might  have  differed,  not  only  honestly,  but  hotly,  when  every 
allowance  ought  to  be  made  for  misconceptions  of  each  other's  mo 
tives,  and  misunderstandings  of  each  other's  characters,  it  was  during 
the  early  years  of  our  national  life.  A  new  government,  a  vast 
country,  unsettled  interests,  wide  spread  privation  and  unreasonable 
hopes,  ambition  in  high  places,  restlessness  everywhere,  and  great 
political  difficulties  both  at  home  and  abroad,  —  surely,  all  these  ele 
ments  must  have  combined  in  a  public  life,  which  requires  for  its 
proper  appreciation,  not  only  wise  and  stern  judgment,  but  that  gen 
tler  arid  better  teacher,  the  charity  which  believeth  no  evil,  and 
which  hopeth  all  things.  That  the  men  of  the  day  misjudged  them 
selves  and  their  contemporaries,  and  that  they  spoke  bitterly  one  of 
another,  is  natural  enough,  for  they  were  mortal.  But  if  that  great 


68  DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY. 

opinions,  and  the  personal  sympathies  perhaps  conse 
quent  upon  them,  did  not  permit  him  cordially  to  ap 
prove  the  policy  of  the  cabinet  in  which  he  was  chief, 
and  "tlid  finally  induce  his  resignation.  But  he  certainly 
never  compromised  his  character  as  Secretary  of  State 
by  their  expression,  and  the  views  of  the  government, 
in  their  full  integrity,  were  announced,  enforced,  and 
supported  by  him  with  a  strength  of  logic,  an  elevation 
of  sentiment,  and  an  elegance  of  style,  which  have 
made  his  State  papers  memorable  illustrations  of  the 
national  mind. 

The  questions  which  demanded  the  attention  of  his 
department  have  already  been  indicated ;  but  some  time 
necessarily  elapsed  before  the  new  government  was 
ready  for  active  negotiation ;  and  it  was  not,  in  fact, 
until  1791,  that  the  diplomatic  system  of  the  country 
was  organized  by  the  appointment  of  Thomas  Pinck- 
ney,  of  South  Carolina,  to  London,  Gouverneur  Morris, 
of  New  York,  to  Paris,  and  William  Short,  of  Mary 
land,  to  the  Hague,  Colonel  David  Humphreys,  of  Con 
necticut,  having  been  previously  nominated  Minister  Res- 
band  of  worthies  has  been  reunited  in  a  higher  sphere,  looking  back, 
perhaps  with  joy,  perhaps  with  sorrow,  but  certainly  with  profound 
humility,  upon  their  best  achievements,  how  little  would  they  desire 
that  we  should,  in  a  spirit  of  unwise  and  exaggerated  partisanship, 
expose  their  weaknesses,  repeat  their  misunderstandings,  and  .coun 
teract,  as  much  as  in  us  lies,  the  sacred  work  of  time.  What  they 
did,  they  did  all  together;  the  humblest  of  them  doing  much 
that  we  should  imitate,  the  highest  of  them  much  that  we  should 
avoid. 


DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY.  69 

ident  at  Lisbon,  and  Mr.  Carmichael  remaining,  under 
his  old  commission.  Charg6  d' Affaires  at  Madrid.  When 
Mr.  Jefferson  entered  upon  his  official  duties,  the  inter 
ests  of  the  country  required  immediate  negotiation  with 
Spain  and  England.  But  while  the  negotiations  with 
Spain  pursued  their  distinct  course  to  their  consumma 
tion  by  treaty,  in  1795,  the  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  England  became  so  complicated  with  the 
relations  of  both  to  France,  as  to  render  the  negotiations 
with  these  courts  to  a  great  degree  dependent  on  each 
other.  This  complication  found  its  solution  in  Mr.  Jay's 
treaty  of  1794 ;  but  to  comprehend  thoroughly  the  bear 
ing  of  this  treaty,  it  will  be  necessary  to  follow  sepa 
rately  the  parallel  lines  of  the  French  and  English  nego 
tiations,  until  they  converge  into  this  central  and  critical 
transaction  of  our  diplomatic  history. 

By  the  treaty  of  1783,  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  United.  States,  it  had  been  agreed,  that  creditors  on 
either  side  should  meet  with  no  lawful  impediment  to 
the  recovery  of  the  full  value,  in  sterling  money,  of  all 
bond  fide  debts  heretofore  contracted ;  that  Congress 
should  earnestly  recommend  to  the  legislatures  of  the 
respective  States  restitution  of  all  confiscated  estates, 
and  the  adoption  of  such  conciliatory  legislation  as 
would  effectually  carry  out  the  prior  provision  of  the 
treaty ;  and  that  his  Britannic  Majesty  should,  with  all 
convenient  speed,  and  without  causing  any  destruction, 
ox  carrying  away  any  negroes  or  other  property  of  the 
American  inhabitants,  withdraw  all  his  armies,  garri- 


70  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

sons,  and  fleets  from  the  United  States,  and  from  any 
port,  place,  and  harbor  within  the  same.  These  pro 
visions,  it  was  mutually  alleged,  had  not  been  executed 
on  either  side.  When  Mr.  Adams,  after  failing  in  his 
effort  to  settle  these  difficulties,  had  returned  from  his 
mission,  the  British  government,  as  has  been  stated, 
contemptuously  neglected  the  courtesy  of  reciprocating 
a  diplomatic  representation,  and  the  complaints  of  the 
two  countries  were  thus  aggravated  by  the  impossibil 
ity  of  all  explanation.  The  retention  of  the  posts  by 
the  British,  wounded  the  national  honor,  while  their 
commercial  restrictions  sensibly  affected  the  national 
interests.  Feeling  the  urgent  necessity  for  some  action, 
and  prevented  by  the  discourtesy  of  Great  Britain  from 
any  direct  approach,  the  government  resolved  to  open 
an  informal  communication  with  the  British  court. 
For  this  purpose,  Washington  authorized  Gouverneur 
Morris,  at  that  time  in  London  on  private  business,  to 
ascertain,  if  possible,  the  intentions  of  Great  Britain. 
In  view  of  the  final  treaty,  the  instructions  of  Washing 
ton  are  specially  important,  as  indicating  what  were,  at 
the  outset,  the  objects  of  any  negotiation  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States.  Mr.  Jefferson  not  having  yet  as 
sumed  his  functions,  General  Washington  himself 
addressed  Mr.  Morris:  — 

"  Your  inquiries  will  commence  by  observing,  that  as 
the  present  constitution  of  government,  and  the  courts 
established  in  pursuance  of  it,  remove  the  objections 
hitherto  made  to  putting  the  United  States  in  posses- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  71 

sion  of  their  frontier  posts,  it  is  natural  to  expect,  from 
the  assurances  of  his  Majesty,  and  the  national  good 
faith,  that  no  unnecessary  delays  will  take  place.  Pro 
ceed,  then,  to  press  a  speedy  performance  of  the  treaty 
respecting  that  object. 

"  Remind  them  of  the  article  by  which  it  was  agreed, 
that  negroes  belonging  to  our  citizens  should  not  be 
carried  away;  and  of  the  reasonableness  of  making 
compensation  for  them.  Learn,  with  precision,  if  pos 
sible,  what  they  mean  to  do  on  this  head. 

"  The  commerce  between  the  two  countries  you  well 
understand.  You  are  apprised  of  the  sentiments  and 
feelings  of  the  United  States  on  the  present  state  of  it ; 
and  you  doubtless  have  heard,  that,  in  the  late  session  of 
Congress,  a  very  respectable  number  of  both  houses 
were  inclined  to  a  discrimination  of  duties  unfavorable 
to  Britain,  and  that  it  would  have  taken  place  but  for 
conciliatory  considerations,  and  the  probability  that  the 
late  change  in  our  government  and  circumstances  would 
lead  to  more  satisfactory  arrangements. 

"  Request  to  be  informed,  therefore,  whether  they 
contemplate  a  treaty  of  commerce  with  the  United 
States,  and  on  what  principles  or  terms  in  general.  In 
treating  this  subject,  let  it  be  strongly  impressed  on  your 
mind,  that  the  privilege  of  carrying  our  productions  in 
our  vessels  to  their  islands,  and  bringing  in  return  the 
productions  of  those  islands  into  our  own  ports  and  mar 
kets,  is  regarded  here  of  the  highest  importance,  and 
you  will  be  careful  not  to  countenance  any  idea  of  our 


72  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

dispensing  with  it  in  a  treaty.  Ascertain,  if  possible, 
their  views  on  this  point,  for  it  would  not  be  expedient 
to  commence  negotiations  without  previously  having 
good  reasons  to  expect  a  satisfactory  termination  of 
them. 

"  It  may  also  be  well  for  you  to  take  a  proper  occa 
sion  for  remarking,  that  their  omitting  to  send  a  minister 
here,  when  the  United  States  sent  one  to  London,  did 
not  make  an  agreeable  impression,  and  request  to 
know  what  would  be  their  future  conduct  on  similar 
occasions." 

In  virtue  of  this  authority,  Mr.  Morris  had  several 
interviews  with  the  Duke  of  Leeds  and  Mr.  Pitt.  They 
resulted  in  nothing.  "  I  have,"  said  he,  in  writing  to 
General  Washington,  "  some  reason  to  believe  that  the 
present  administration  intend  to  keep  the  posts,  and 
withhold  payment  for  the  negroes.  If  so,  they  will 
color  their  breach  of  faith  by  the  best  pretexts  in  their 
power.  I  incline  to  think,  also,  that  they  consider  a 
treaty  of  commerce  with  America  as  being  absolutely 
unnecessary,  and  that  they  are  persuaded  they  shall 
derive  all  the  benefit  from  our  trade  without  the  treaty. 
It  is  true,  we  might  lay  them  under  restriction  in  our 
ports ;  but  they  believe  that  an  attempt  of  that  sort  would 
be  considered  by  one  part  of  America  as  calculated  by 
the  other  for  private  emolument,  and  not  for  the  general 
good.  The  merchants  here  look  on  it  as  almost  impos 
sible  for  us  to  do  without  them ;  and  it  must  be 
acknowledged,  that  past  experience  and  the  present  situ- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTOEY.  73 

ation  of  neighboring  countries  go  far  to  justify  that 
opinion.  Whether  the  ministers  shall  act  according  to 
their  own  ideas,  or  consult  mercantile  people,  they  will 
equally,  I  think,  repel  advances  from  us,  and  therefore  it 
seems  more  prudent  to  lay  the  foundations  of  future 
advantage,  than  attempt  to  grasp  at  present  benefit." 

And  the  whole  negotiation  was  thoroughly  and  briefly 
summed  up  by  the  President  in  the  message  which  ac 
companied  the  despatches  sent  to  the  Senate. 

"  The  sum  is,  that  they  declare  without  scruple  they 
do  not  mean  to  fulfil  what  remains  of  the  Treaty  of 
Peace  to  be  fulfilled  on  their  part,  (by  which  we  are  to 
understand  the  delivery  of  the  posts  and  payment  for 
property  carried  off,)  till  performance  on  our  part,  and 
compensation  where  the  delay  has  rendered  the  perform 
ance  now  impracticable  ;  that  on  the  subject  of  a  treaty 
of  commerce,  they  avoided  direct  answers,  so  as  to  sat 
isfy  Mr.  Morris  they  did  not  mean  to  enter  into  one, 
unless  it  could  be  extended  to  a  treaty  of  alliance  offen 
sive  and  defensive,  or  unless  in  the  event  of  a  rupture 
with  Spain.  As  to  sending  a  minister  here,  they  made 
excuses  at  the  first  conferences,  seemed  disposed  to  it  in 
the  second,  and  in  the  last,  express  an  intention  of  so 
doing." 

Nothing  could  be  clearer,  and  nothing  more  embar 
rassing.  Conscious  of  weakness,  and  irritated  at  the 
injustice  which  it  could  not  resist,  is  it  wonderful  that 
the  public  opinion  of  the  country  should  have  become 

extravagant  in  its  antagonism  to  England,  or  that  the 

7 


74  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

system  of  restriction  on  English  commerce  should  have 
found  a  stronger  and  more  vehement  support  than  its 
intrinsic  merits  justified  ?  Before,  however,  the  govern 
ment  had  determined  upon  a  line  of  policy  to  meet  the 
requirements  of  the  position,  Great  Britain  had  so  far 
opened  the  door  for  an  arrangement,  as  to  send  an  ac 
credited  minister  to  Philadelphia.  And,  in  1791,  Mr. 
Hammond,  who  had  been  secretary  to  Mr.  Hartley's 
mission  at  Paris  in  1783,  and  was,  at  the  time  of  his 
appointment,  Secretary  of  Legation  at  Madrid,  arrived 
in  this  country  as  Minister  Plenipotentiary.  But  before 
the  opening  of  any  discussion  between  the  two  govern 
ments,  the  presence  of  the  British  minister  raised  two 
preliminary  questions,  which  it  was  expedient  to  have 
answered.  The  first  was,  did  he  come  authorized  to 
conclude  a  treaty ;  and  the  second,  whether  the  British 
government  were  in  good  faith  prepared  to  give  up  the 
posts,  upon  the  fulfilment  of  what  they  claimed  to  be 
treaty  obligations  ;  or  were  these  difficulties  made  simply 
to  supply  a  diplomatic  excuse  for  the  permanent  reten 
tion  of  these  important  military  positions  ?  Mr.  Jeffer 
son  therefore  formally  asked  of  Mr.  Hammond  the  ex 
tent  of  his  powers ;  and  a  short  correspondence  made  it 
apparent  that  the  British  minister  had  not,  to  use  his 
own  language,  any  "  special  commission  empowering 
him  to  conclude  any  definite  arrangements  upon  the 
subject  of  the  commercial  intercourse  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States,"  but  that,  under  his  gen 
eral  plenipotentiary  powers,  he  felt  fully  "  competent  to 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  75 

enter  into  a  negotiation  with  this  government  for  that 
purpose,  in  the  discussion  of  principles  which  may  serve 
as  a  basis,  and  constitute  the  stipulations,  of  any  such 
definite  arrangements."  Feeling  very  justly  that  a  mere 
procrastinating  discussion  of  abstract  commercial  prin 
ciples  would  be  idle ;  satisfied  that  the  American  minis 
ter  at  London  could  learn  more  directly  and  certainly 
the  inclination  of  the  British  government  on  that  head ; 
and  indisposed,  moreover,  to  mix  up  the  clear  questions 
of  treaty  obligations  with  the  doubtful  issues  of  com 
mercial  expediency,  Mr.  Jefferson  wisely  determined  to 
limit  his  discussion  with  the  British  minister  "to  the 
measures  which  reason  and  practicability  may  dictate 
for  giving  effect  to  the  stipulations  of  our  treaties  yet 
remaining  to  be  executed." 

On  the  15th  of  December,  1791,  he  addressed  a  letter 
to  Mr.  Hammond,  containing  a  full,  clear,  and  explicit 
statement  of  the  claims  of  the  United  States  govern 
ment. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  propose,"  said  the  letter,  "  that 
we  shall  begin  by  specifying,  on  each  side,  the  particular 
acts  which  each  considers  to  have  been  done  by  the 
other  in  contravention  of  the  treaty.  I  shall  set  the 
example. 

"  The  provisional  and  definitive  treaties  in  their  seventh 
article  stipulated,  that  '  His  Britannic  Majesty  should 
with  all  convenient  speed,  and  without  causing  any  de 
struction  or  carrying  away  any  negroes  or  other  property 
of  the  American  inhabitants,  withdraw  all  his  armies, 


76  DIPLOMATIC     HISTOKY. 

garrisons,  and  fleets  from  the  said  United  States,  and 
from  every  port,  place,  and  harbor  within  the  same.' 

"  But  the  British  garrisons  were  not  withdrawn  with 
all  convenient  speed,  nor  have  ever  yet  been  withdrawn, 
from  Michilimackinac,  on  Lake  Michigan ;  Detroit,  on 
the  straits  of  Lake  Erie  and  Huron ;  Fort  Erie,  on 
Lake  Erie ;  Niagara ;  Oswego,  on  Lake  Ontario ; 
Oswegatchie,  on  the  River  St.  Lawrence  ;  Port-au-fer, 
and  Dutchman's  Point,  on  Lake  Champlain. 

"  2.  The  British  officers  have  undertaken  to  exercise 
a  jurisdiction  over  the  country  and  inhabitants  in  the 
vicinities  of  the  forts. 

"  3.  They  have  excluded  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  from  navigating  even  on  our  side  of  the  middle 
line  of  the  rivers  and  lakes,  established  as  a  boun 
dary  between  the  two  nations. 

"  By  these  proceedings,  we  have  been  intercepted 
entirely  from  the  commerce  of  furs  with  the  Indian 
nations  to  the  northwards,  a  commerce  which  has  ever 
been  of  great  importance  to  the  United  States,  not  only 
for  its  intrinsic  value,  but  as  it  was  the  means  of  cher 
ishing  peace  with  those  Indians,  and  of  superseding  the 
necessity  of  that  expensive  warfare  we  have  been 
obliged  to  carry  on  with  them  during  the  time  that 
these  posts  have  been  in  other  hands. 

"  On  withdrawing  the  troops  from  New  York,  1st,  a 
large  embarkation  of  negroes,  the  property  of  the  inhab 
itants  of  the  United  States,  took  place,  before  the  com 
missioners,  on  our  part,  for  inspecting  and  superintend- 


DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY.  77 

ing  embarkations  had  arrived  there,  and  without  any 
account  ever  rendered  thereof;  2nd,  near  three  thou 
sand  others  were  publicly  carried  away  by  the  avowed 
order  of  the  British  commanding  officer,  and  under  the 
view  and  against  the  remonstrances  of  our  commis 
sioners  ;  3d,  a  very  great  number  were  carried  off'  in 
private  vessels,  if  not  by  the  express  permission,  yet 
certainly  without  opposition,  on  the  part  of  the  com 
manding  officer,  who  alone  had  the  means  of  preventing 
it,  and  without  admitting  the  inspection  of  the  Ameri 
can  commissioners  ;  and,  4th.  of  other  species  of  prop 
erty  carried  away,  the  commanding  officer  permitted 
no  examination  at  all.  In  support  of  these  facts,  I  have 
the  honor  to  inclose  you  documents,  a  list  of  which 
will  be  subjoined;  and  in  addition  to  them,  I  beg  leave 
to  refer  to  a  roll  signed  by  the  joint  commissioners,  and 
delivered  to  your  commanding  officer  for  transmission 
to  his  court,  containing  a  description  of  the  negroes 
publicly  carried  away  by  his  order,  as  before  mentioned, 
with  a  copy  of  which  you  have  doubtless  been  furnished. 

"  A  difference  of  opinion,  too,  having  arisen  as  to  the 
river  intended  by  the  plenipotentiaries  to  be  the  boun 
dary  between  us  and  the  dominions  of  Great  Britain, 
and  by  them  called  the  St.  Croix,  which  name  it  seems 
is  given  to  two  different  rivers,  the  ascertaining  of  this 
point  becomes  a  matter  of  present  urgency ;  it  has  here 
tofore  been  the  subject  of  application  from  us  to  the 
government  of  Great  Britain. 

"  There  are  other  smaller  matters  between  the  two 
7* 


78  DIPLOMATIC    HISTOKY. 

nations,  which  remain  to  be  adjusted ;  but  I  think  it 
would  be  better  to  refer  these,  for  settlement,  through 
the  ordinary  channels  of  our  ministers,  than  to  embarrass 
the  present  important  discussions  with  them.  They 
can  never  be  obstacles  to  friendship  and  harmony. 

"  Permit  me  now,  sir,  to  ask  from  you  a  specification 
of  the  particular  acts  which,  being  considered  by  his 
Britannic  Majesty  as  a  non-compliance  on  our  part 
with  the  engagements  contained  in  the  4th  and  5th 
articles  of  the  treaty,  induced  him  to  suspend  the  exe 
cution  of  the  7th,  and  render  a  separate  discussion  of 
them  inadmissible." 

On  the  5th  of  March,  1792,  about  three  months  after 
the  receipt  of  this  letter,  a  lapse  of  time  which  certainly 
indicated,  on  the  part  of  the  British  minister,  no  such 
full  and  matured  instruction  as  he  would  have  neces 
sarily  possessed,  had  the  complaints  of  his  government 
been  simple  and  sincere,  Mr.  Hammond  addressed  to 
Mr.  Jefferson  his  reply.  In  this  reply,  after  stating  that 
its  delay  resulted  from  the  necessity  of  collecting  from 
distant  parts  of  the  continent  the  requisite  materials, 
and  of  combining  and  arranging  them,  Mr.  Hammond 
distinctly  avowed,  that  the  action  of  the  British  govern 
ment  in  suspending  the  7th  article  was  justifiable  and 
justified,  on  the  ground  of  the  irreparable  injury  which 
many  classes  of  British  subjects  had  sustained,  and  the 
heavy  expense  to  which  the  British  nation  had  been 
subjected,  by  the  non-performance  of  their  engagements 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States.  In  support  of  his 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  79 

position,  he  quoted  the  treaty  by  which  Congress  bound 
itself  to  recommend  the  necessary  legislation  to  the 
States ;  the  circular  letters  of  Congress,  urging  such 
legislation  upon  the  various  States ;  and  the  language 
of  the  old  Congress,  through  their  Secretary,  Mr.  Jay, 
by  which  they  declared,  "they  had  deliberately  and 
dispassionately  examined  and  considered  the  several 
facts  and  matters  urged  by  Great  Britain  as  infractions 
of  the  treaty  of  peace  on  the  part  of  America;  and 
regret,  that,  in  some  of  the  States,  too  little  attention 
appears  to  have  been  paid  to  the  public  faith,  pledged 
by  treaty."  He  then  recited  the  continued  interposition 
of  Congress  with  the  States,  to  induce  them  to  con 
form  their  legislation  to  their  treaty  engagements,  and 
the  continuous  disregard  of  their  obligations  on  the 
part  of  the  States,  — 

1.  In  not  repealing  laws  that  existed  antecedently  to 
the  pacification. 

2.  In  enacting  laws,  subsequent  to  the  peace,  in  con 
travention  of  the  treaty,  such  as  related  to  the  estates 
of  the  loyalists,  such  as  respected  their  persons,   and 
such  as  obstructed  the  recovery  of  debts  due  to  subjects 
of  the  crown. 

3.  In  the  decisions  of   the  State  courts  upon  ques 
tions  affecting  the  rights  of  British  subjects,  especially 
those  decisions  which  refused  to  allow  interest  on  debts 
contracted  before  the  Revolution. 

And  the  reply  was  accompanied  by  a  long  list  of  the 
acts  of  the  States,  and  the  decisions  of  the  State  courts, 


80  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

in  proof  and  illustration  of  each  head  of  the  complaint. 
Mr.  Hammond  did  not  reply  to  the  charge  of  the  ab 
straction  of  the  negroes  and  other  property,  nor  to  the 
alleged  irregularities  attendant  upon  the  evacuation  of 
the  British  armies. 

On  May  29th,  1792,  Mr.  Jefferson  furnished  the  British 
minister  with  his  rejoinder,  a  voluminous  and  most 
elaborate  state  paper.  In  this  document,  Mr.  Jefferson 
met  not  only  the  broad  questions  open  between  the  gov 
ernments,  but  went  into  an  able  and  minute  review  of 
the  legislation  and  judicial  decisions  of  every  State,  as 
quoted  by  Mr.  Hammond.  He  proved  that  such  asts 
as  were  complained  of  had  followed  and  been  provoked 
by  the  British  infractions  of  the  treaty,  and  that,  consid 
ered  as  acts  of  retaliation,  which  they  were,  they  were 
"  all  of  them  so  moderate,  of  so  short  duration,  the  re 
sult  of  such  necessities,  and  so  produced,  that  we  might 
with  confidence  have  referred  them  alterius  principis,  quo 
boni  viri,  arbitrio"  "  That  induced  at  length,  by  assur 
ances  from  the  British  court  that  they  would  concur  in 
a  fulfilment  of  the  treaty,  Congress,  in  1787,  declared 
to  the  States  its  will  that  even  the  appearance  of  obsta 
cle,  raised  by  their  acts,  should  no  longer  continue,  and 
required  a  formal  repeal  of  every  act  of  that  nature; 
and,  to  avoid  question,  required  it  as  well  from  those 
who  had  not,  as  those  who  had,  passed  such  acts,— which 
was  complied  with  so  fully  that  no  such  laws  remained 
in  any  State  of  the  Union,  except  one ;  and  even  that 
one  could  not  have  forborne,  if  any  symptom  of  com- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  81 

pliance  from  the  opposite  party  had  rendered  a  reiterated 
requisition  from  Congress  important."  He  went  on  to 
argue,  that  even  this  repeal  was  unnecessary,  as  treaties 
were  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  overriding  all  incon 
sistent  legislation,  and  that  the  courts,  both  of  the  State 
and  general  government,  had  so  decided ;  —  that  British 
creditors  had  been  for  some  time  in  the  habit  of  having 
recourse  to  these  courts  with  perfect  success ;  —  that  no 
external  influence  was  brought  to  bear  on  either  courts  or 
creditors,  and  that,  in  fact,  the  class  of  separate  and  un 
settled  debts  contracted  before  the  war  formed  but  a 
small  portion  of  the  original  amount.  He  then  exam 
ined  the  question  of  the  interest  which  had  accumulated 
on  the  American  debt  during  the  war,  and  reviewed  the 
decisions  of  the  State  courts,  concluding  "  on  the  whole, 
without  undertaking  to  say  what  the  law  is,  which  is 
not  the  province  of  the  Executive,  we  say  that  the  rea 
sons  of  those  judges  who  deny  interest  during  the  war 
appear  sufficiently  cogent  to  account  for  their  opinion  on 
honest  principles,  to  exempt  it  from  the  charge  of  pal 
pable  and  flagrant  wrong,  and  to  take  away  all  pretence 
of  withholding  execution  of  the  treaty  by  way  of  re 
prisal  for  that  cause."  It  is  fortunately  unnecessary  to 
follow  in  detail  this  masterly  argument,  which  was  char 
acterized  by  an  extent  and  accuracy  of  legal  knowledge, 
both  international  and  local,  worthy  of  a  judicial  decis 
ion.  For  its  great  excellence  consists  in  the  strength, 
clearness,  and  elegance  with  which  it  brought  out  the 
two  leading  points  of  the  American  argument,  and 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

which,  once  settled,  swept  away  the  crowd  of  small  and 
special  issues  with  which  Mr.  Hammond  had  very  in 
geniously  obscured  the  main  points  of  the  controversy. 
These  were  simple  enough.  The  government  of  the 
United  States,  pointing  to  the  seventh  article  of  the 
treaty,  said  to  England,  "in  violation  of  that  article, 
you  have  not  delivered  up  the  posts,  and  you  have  car 
ried  away  negroes."  The  British  government  answered, 
"  Yes,  we  have  not  executed  that  article,  we  have  not 
given  up  the  posts,  and  we  have  carried  away  negroes, 
because  you  have  not  carried  out  in  good  faith  the 
fourth  and  fifth  articles  of  the  treaty."  To  this,  the  con 
clusive  reply  of  the  United  States  government  was  :  — 

"  1.  We  have  done  ah1  that  we  promised  to  do.  By 
the  explicit  language  of  the  treaty,  the  United  States 
simply  covenanted  to  recommend  to  the  several  States 
the  legislation  which  you  claim.  And  that  the  charac 
ter  of  this  recommendation  was  understood  in  all  its 
possible  and  probable  inefficiency,  appears  from  the  cor 
respondence  between  the  negotiators  and  the  language 
of  your  own  statesmen  in  the  discussion  upon  its  mer 
its.  Now  that  Congress  has  recommended  and  labored 
earnestly  to  secure  the  adoption  by  the  States  of  those 
recommendations,  you  yourself  admit.  What  further, 
then,  can  you  claim  ? 

"  2.  Granting  that  the  United  States,  however,  were 
bound  to  procure  the  passage  in  each  State  of  this  con 
ciliatory  legislation,  how  does  the  case  stand  ?  You 
covenant  to  deliver  up  the  posts, — we  agree  to  pass 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  83 

certain  laws.  The  delivery  of  the  posts  is  a  matter  sim 
ple  in  its  nature,  requiring  but  little  time  and  small 
preparation.  The  legislation  you  desire  requires  the 
action  of  thirteen  independent  States,  scattered  over  a 
continent,  and  demanding  time,  temper,  and  tact  in  its 
attainment.  You  have  never  made  the  first  movement 
towards  the  performance  of  your  part  of  the  contract, 
and  your  neglect  has  been  the  strongest  argument  with 
the  States  against  our  recommendation.  With  what 
hope  could  we  approach  them  to  ask  such  legislation  as 
would  heal  old  wounds  and  restore  kindness  and  confi 
dence,  while  your  troops  are  encamped  on  our  territory 
in  direct  and  insulting  violation  of  your  own  promises  ? 
If  you  had  given  up  the  posts,  and  we  had  then,  in  the 
process  of  a  reasonable  time,  neglected  what  we  were 
bound  to  perform,  then,  but  not  until  then,  could  you 
fairly  have  complained  of  our  failure,  and  then,  in  a  thou 
sand  ways,  you  could  have  retaliated  our  want  of  faith." 
With  Mr.  Jefferson's  letter,  the  correspondence 
ceased ;  and  when  the  American  Secretary,  more  than 
eighteen  months  after,  "  had  it  again  in  charge  from  the 
President  of  the  United  States  to  ask  whether  we  can 
now  have  an  answer  to  the  letter  of  May  29th,"  Mr. 
Hammond,  the  22d  of  Nov.,  1793,  replied,  "  I  have  not 
yet  received  such  definitive  instructions  relative  to  your 
communication  of  the  29th  of  May,  1792,  as  will  enable 
me  to  renew  the  discussions  upon  the  subject  of  it,  which 
have  been  for  some  time  suspended."  In  a  conversa- 


84  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

tion  between  Mr.  Pitt  and  Mr.  Gouverneur  Morris,  as 
far  back  as  1790,  Mr.  Pitt  had  hinted  that  it  would  be 
better  to  make  a  new  treaty  than  comply  with  the  old ; 
and  in  November,  1793,  while  this  useless  negotiation 
was  dragging  its  slow  length  along,  Lord  Grenville  had 
the  following  very  significant  conversation  with  the 
American  Minister  in  London :  "  With  respect  to  the 
posts,  he  observed,  that  the  negotiation  concerning  them 
was  proceeding  in  another  place,  in  which  we  were 
both  of  opinion,  for  obvious  reasons,  that  it  was  too 
inconvenient  to  continue  it;  that  this  negotiation  was 
not  terminated ;  and  he  assured  me  that  he  continued  to 
receive  pressing  applications  from  the  commercial  sub 
jects  of  his  Majesty,  on  account  of  the  non-execution  of 
the  treaty  on  our  part,  He  further  said,  that  if  the  meas 
ure  of  relinquishing  the  posts  were  to  take  place,  their 
settlements  would  be  exposed  to  the  ravages,  and  them 
selves  to  the  expense  and  disadvantage,  which  I  had 
described  to  be  at  present  the  case  with  us.  For  these 
reasons,  he  thought,  administration  would  not  be  justi 
fied  in  relinquishing  the  posts  at  this  time,  and  ex 
pressed  his  regret  that  Mr.  Hammond  had  not  been  per 
mitted  by  us  to  enter  into  a  negotiation  for  some 
arrangements  relating  particularly  to  the  posts,  and  (as 
I  apprehended  him)  Indian  affairs,  which  he  had  no 
doubt  would  have  terminated  in  our  common  advan 
tage  and  mutual  satisfaction ;  but  that,  when  Mr.  Ham 
mond  wished  to  open  that  business,  he  was  given  to 


DIPLOMATIC     HISTOEY.  85 

understand  (though  in  the  most  civil  terms)  that  the  less 
that  was  said  on  that  subject  the  better."  * 

It  is  clear  from  this  correspondence,  especially  when 
taken  in  connection  with  these  conversations,  that  the 
English  government  had  at  that  time  no  idea  of  negoti 
ating.  Mr.  Hammond's  mission  was  simply  a  dilatory 
plea.  His  appointment  was  delayed  beyond  any  reason 
able  reciprocity  of  diplomatic  intercourse.  When  he  did 
arrive,  he  was  entirely  unauthorized  to  conclude  a  treaty. 
When  the  discussion  was  fairly  opened,  instead  of  sim 
plifying  the  argument,  he  started,  by  his  course  of 
reasoning,  a  thousand  small  and  subordinate  issues, 
which  would  have  led  in  their  full  debate  to  an  inex 
tricable  confusion  of  legal  niceties.  And,  finally,  when 
Mr.  Jefferson  met  him  on  his  own  ground,  and  under 
took  the  discussion  which  he  had  himself  introduced,  he 
allowed  the  whole  matter  to  drop,  without  attempting 
even  the  obligatory  courtesy  of  an  official  reply.  And 
when,  at  the  close  of  1793,  Mr.  Jefferson  resigned  the 
Secretaryship  of  State,  this  negotiation,  wilfully  and 
perversely  prolonged,  still  remained  to  irritate  national 
sentiment  and  perplex  the  national  policy. 

In  the  mean  time,  in  the  beginning  of  August,  1792, 
Mr.  Pinckney  arrived  in  London,  as  Minister  Plenipo 
tentiary  from  the  United  States,  and  in  a  despatch,  in 
December  of  the  same  year,  he  described  his  situation 
to  the  Secretary. 

*  Pinckney  MSS.     See  next  note. 

8 


86  DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY. 

"  In  my  first  communication,  I  mentioned  the  civility 
with  which  I  was  received  at  St.  James's  and  at  the 
Office  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  only  circumstance  worth 
mentioning  in  my  conference  with  the  King  was,  that 
Lord  North's  rope  of  sand  appeared  not  to  have  been 
entirely  effaced  from  his  Majesty's  memory,  which  I 
infer  from  his  mentioning  the  differing  circumstances 
between  the  northern  and  southern  parts  of  our  coun 
try,  tending  to  produce  disunion.  I  declined  entering 
on  any  discussion,  observing  only,  that  we  agreed  very 
well  at  present,  and  hoped  a  continuance  of  the  same 
disposition.  I  have  been  constant  in  rny  attendance  at 
the  King's  levees,  since  the  return  of  the  court  to  St. 
James's,  and,  placing  myself  in  the  circle  of  foreign  min 
isters,  his  Majesty  never  fails  to  have  a  few  moments' 
conversation  with  me  on  the  weather,  or  other  topics 
equally  important ;  but,  notwithstanding  the  great  vari 
ety  of  incident  that  has  lately  occurred  in  European 
politics,  he  never  touches  that  subject  with  me  ;  indeed, 
not  only  the  King,  but  most  of  his  courtiers,  and  (except 
the  Pole)  all  the  foreign  ministers,  seem  to  consider  the 
Americans  as  united  in  principles  with  the  French,  and 
as  having,  by  example,  at  least,  assisted  in  exciting  the 
commotions  with  which  great  part  of  Europe  is  con 
vulsed,  and  consequently  are  not  very  agreeable  associ 
ates.  Some  of  the  foreign  ministers  with  whom  I  am 
most  intimate  have  told  me  that  this  idea  prevails; 
at  the  same  time,  they  have  been  polite  enough  to 
make,  themselves,  a  proper  distinction  between  the 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  87 

modes  of  conducting  the  revolutions  in  the  two  coun 
tries  ;  although  I  consider  this  as  an  honorable  testi 
mony  of  the  good  conduct  of  my  country,  it  serves  to 
keep  me  at  a  greater  distance  from  those  with  whom 
it  is  my  business  to  have  most  intercourse  than  would 
otherwise  be  the  case.  The  Queen  received  me  with 
affability  at  my  audience  ;  but  at  the  drawing-rooms, 
though  she  condescends  to  say  a  few  words  to  me,  yet 
she  gives  a  marked  priority  to  any  person  near ;  it  is,  in 
short,  very  evident,  that  I  am  by  no  means  in  favor  in 
any  of  the  apartments  at  St.  James's. 

"  You  may  be  assured  that  I  avoid  every  thing  that 
may  tend  to  widen  the  distance,  by  keeping  as  clear  as 
possible  of  all  European  politics,  by  forbearing  all  men 
tion  of  the  cold  civility  which  I  experience,  and,  in  gen 
eral,  by  aiming  at  a  conciliatory  conduct.  Of  the  diplo 
matic  corps,  the  Minister  from  Poland  converses  freely 
with  me,  and  we  are  on  good  terms ;  the  rest  consider 
me  as  one  who,  with  respect  to  the  present  European 
politics,  neither  rejoices  in  their  joy,  nor  is  afflicted  with 
their  sorrow.  They  have  all,  however,  paid  me  the  com 
pliment  of  the  first  -visit,  except  the  Russian  minister, 
and  with  him  I  have  no  acquaintance."  * 

*  This  extract  is  copied  from  General  Pinckney's  Letter  Book, 
Vol.  I.  p.  74.  For  these  volumes,  together  with  a  large  collection  of 
private  correspondence,  I  am  indebted  to  his  son,  Charles  Cotesworth 
Pinckney,  Esq. ;  and  I  am  under  further  obligation  to  other  members 
of  the  family  for  the  Letter  ABook  and  papers  of  General  Charles 
Cotesworth  Pinckney,  Minister  to  France.  In  using  these  manu- 


88  DIPLOMATIC    HISTOEY. 

The  negotiation  which  had  been  opened  between  Mr. 
Jefferson  and  Mr.  Hammond  was  not  transferred  to 
Mr.  Pinckney,  and  his  mission  was  therefore  confined 
to  the  discussion  of  such  points  of  difference  as  might 
arise  in  the  current  relations  between  the  two  countries ; 
and  these,  unfortunately,  were  irritating  enough.  The 
relations  of  the  two  countries  were  disturbed,  not  only 
by  the  restrictive  policy  of  the  English  commercial  laws, 
but  by  a  suspicion  on  the  part  of  the  American  people, 
almost  substantiated  into  certainty,  that  Lord  Dorches 
ter  was  using  the  frontier  posts  as  centres,  from  which 
to  stimulate  the  savage  hostility  of  the  Indian  tribes 
against  the  United  States ;  and  by  the  repeated  impress 
ments  of  American  seamen,  —  impressments  incapable 
of  justification,  and  almost  always  conducted  with  the 
rudest  insolence.  In  vain  did  Mr.  Pinckney  urge  upon 
Lord  Grenville  the  propriety  of  coming  to  some  amica 
ble  settlement  of  the  question  of  impressment,  before  it 
had  excited  too  much  feeling,  or  had  become  complicated 
with  more  difficult  issues.  Lord  Grenville  agreed  that 
it  would  be  wise  to  do  so,  but  the  difficulties  were  im 
mense,  the  cabinet  busy ;  and  so  the.  matter  ended,  as  far 

scripts,  I  have,  of  course,  confined  my  extracts  to  such  documents 
only  as  have  not  been  published  in  any  collection  of  State  papers. 
The  quotation  from  General  Thomas  Pinckney's  papers  is  marked 
T.  P.  MSS. ;  those  from  General  Cotesworth  Pinckney,  C.  C.  P.  MSS. 
It  is  a  very  small  matter,  but  in  reference  to  the  despatch  above,  it 
is  proper  to  add,  that  a  postscript  states,  "  Since  writing  the  above, 
the  Russian  minister  sent  me  his  card." 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  89 

as  preventive  action  went.  The  length  to  which  the 
contemptuous  violation  of  American  rights  was  carried 
may  be  illustrated  by  the  following  case,  not  perhaps 
the  most  extreme  that  might  be  selected.  An  Ameri 
can  vessel,  bound  from  China  to  Ostend,  was  driven  by 
stress  of  weather  into  the  port  of  Ramsgate.  While 
there,  several  seamen,  who  were  under  contract  to  per 
form  the  whole  voyage  from  Boston  to  the  East  Indies, 
thence  to  Ostend,  and  then  back  to  Boston,  deserted  and 
entered  a  British  ship  of  war.  The  British  commander 
not  only  detained  the  men,  but  insisted  upon  payment 
of  their  wages,  although  by  their  own  contract  they 
had  forfeited  all  right  to  compensation ;  and  threatened 
to  enforce  his  demand  by  the  retention  of  the  vessel. 

Mr.  Pinckney  immediately  brought  the  whole  subject 
to  Lord  Grenville's  attention,  and  briefly,  but  very  ably, 
pointed  out  the  illegality  of  the  course  of  the  British 
commander.  As  to  the  taking  and  detaining  American 
seamen,  which  w^as  becoming  too  common,  he  showed 
the  difficulty  of  distinguishing  between  the  citizens  of 
the  two  countries ;  the  fact  that  the  declaration  of  a  de 
serter  could  not  be  assumed  as  proof  of  what  he  had  so 
much  interest  in  proving;  that  the  question  of  what 
constituted  citizenship  might  be  open  to  the  govern 
ments,  but  should  not  be  left  to  the  British  naval  com 
manders  ;  that  the  captains,  on  both  sides,  were  in  every 
case  interested  and  prejudiced;  that  in  every  case  of 
dispute,  force  must  be  appealed  to  for  a  decision  ;  a  con 
dition  of  things  which  placed  the  peace  and  commerce 
8* 


90  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

of  the  country  at  perpetual  hazard ;  and  that  it  was  a 
practice  not  exercised  by  any  other  nation  of  the  world. 
It  was  further  suggested,  that,  granting  these  men  to  be 
British  citizens,  they  had  voluntarily  made  a  contract 
not  forbidden  by  the  laws  of  their  own  country,  or  of 
that  where  the  contract  was  made  ;  that  Great  Britain 
herself  encouraged  the  engagement  of  foreign  mariners 
in  her  merchant  service ;  and  that  such  an  interference 
with  a  lawful  contract  was  a  great  and  deliberate  out 
rage.*  Lord  Grenville  admitted  the  force  of  the  argu 
ment  as  to  the  contract,  but  no  redress  was  offered. 
All  Mr.  Pinckney's  representations  were  met  in  the  same 
spirit,  —  answered  courteously,  but  very  slowly ;  dis 
cussed  vaguely  and  at  tedious  intervals,  and  allowed 
finally  to  rest  without  result  in  the  dusty  obscurity  of 
the  Foreign  Office.  But  the  march  of  events  in  Europe 
was  fast  hurrying  beyond  the  ordinary  limits  of  diplo 
matic  discussion. 

On  the  30th  of  January,  1793,  Mr.  Pinckney,  writing 
to  his  government  as  to  the  probability  of  war  between 
France  and  England,  after  referring  to  certain  advan 
tages  which  the  commercial  stipulations  with  some  of 
the  belligerents  afforded,  said,  "  I  wish  we  had  similar 
articles  in  a  treaty  with  this  country ;  for,  although  the 
administration  of  this  country  appear  sensible  of  the 
importance  of  our  trade,  and  profess  an  inclination  to 
cultivate  our  friendship,  yet  they  are  adopting  a  measure 

*  T.  P.  MSS.  Letter  Book,  Vol.  I.  p.  102-108. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  91 

respecting  the  French,  which,  in  its  execution,  may  lead 
to  disagreeable  consequences  with  respect  to  us.  I 
mean  their  plan  of  distressing  them,  by  preventing  them 
from  receiving  supplies  of  provisions.  Now  as  we 
shall  be  the  people  who  must  principally  supply  them, 
and  have  no  treaty  with  Great  Britain  respecting  our 
intercourse  with  countries  with  whom  she  may  be  at  war, 
and  although  our  claim  to  a  free  intercourse  is  founded 
in  reason  and  our  national  right,  yet,  as  we  have  no 
armed  neutrality  the  members  whereof  this  people  have 
to  fear,  they  may  stop  our  vessels  bound  to  French  ports 
with  provisions."  *  Circumstances  soon  justified  Mr. 
Pinckney's  apprehensions.  Early  in  1793,  war  between 
England  and  France  was  formally  declared,  and  the 
efforts  of  the  United  States  to  maintain  a  just  neutral 
ity  complicated  their  relations  with  both.  The  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  France,  springing  out  of 
the  French  Revolution,  will  be  detailed  in  the  chapter 
devoted  to  the  history  of  the  French  negotiation.  At 
present,  it  is  only  necessary  to  state  that  an  angry  arid 
harassing  controversy  was  engendered  between  the  two 
governments  ;  that  they  were  upon  the  brink  of  a  most 
disastrous  rupture ;  and  that  the  conduct  of  the  French 
minister  was  in  such  open  violation  of  all  the  decencies 
of  national  intercourse,  that  his  recall  was  finally  de 
manded  of  his  government.  On  the  9th  of  May,  1793, 
the  National  Convention  of  France  passed  a  decree,  by 

*  T.  P.  MSS.  Letter  Book,  Vol.  I.  p.  143,  144. 


92  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

which,  among  other  things,  ships  of  war  and  privateers 
were  "  authorized  to  seize  and  carry  into  the  ports  of 
the  republic,  merchant  vessels  which  are  wholly  or  in 
part  loaded  with  provisions,  being  neutral  property, 
bound  to  an  enemy's  port,  or  having  on  board  merchan 
dise  belonging  to  an  enemy."  Merchandise  belonging 
to  an  enemy  was  declared  lawful  prize,  seizable  for  the 
profits  of  the  captors  ;  but  provisions,  being  neutral  prop 
erty,  were  to  be  paid  for  at  the  price  they  would  have 
sold  for  at  the  port  to  which  they  were  bound.  Against 
this  decree,  Mr.  Morris,  United  States  minister  in 
France,  protested  immediately,  both  on  general  grounds 
and  upon  the  special  obligations  of  the  treaties  between 
the  two  countries ;  and  in  consequence,  a  few  days  after, 
the  Convention  passed  another  decree,  by  which  they 
declared,  that  the  vessels  of  the  United  States  were  not 
included  in  their  first  decree  of  the  9th  of  May. 
Scarcely,  however,  had  the  French  government  decreed 
this  exemption  of  American  commerce,  than  Great 
Britain  passed  a  hostile  set  of  orders,  based  upon  the 
same  principles,  and  admitting  of  no  exception.  On 
the  8th  of  June,  1793,  by  the  additional  instructions 
issued  by  the  British  government,  it  was  ordered :  — 

"  1.  That  it  shall  be  lawful  to  stop  and  detain  all  ves 
sels  loaded  wholly  or  in  part  with  corn,  flour,  or  meal, 
bound  to  any  port  in  France,  or  any  port  occupied  by 
the  armies  of  France,  and  to  send  them  to  such  ports  as 
shall  be  most  convenient,  in  order  that  such  corn,  meal, 
or  flour  may  be  purchased  on  behalf  of  his  Majesty's 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  93 

government,  and  the  ships  be  released  after  such  pur 
chases,  and  after  a  due  allowance  for  freight ;  or  that 
the  masters  of  such  ships,  on  giving  due  security,  to  be 
approved  of  by  the  Court  of  Admiralty,  be  permitted 
to  proceed  to  dispose  of  their  cargoes  of  corn,  meal,  or 
flour  in  the  ports  of  any  country  in  amity  with  his 
Majesty." 

The  other  instructions  were  the  usual  ones  in  relation 
to  blockaded  ports,  making  a  slight  modification  in  re 
gard  to  ships  of  Sweden  and  Denmark. 

Less  fortunate  than  Mr.  Morris,  Mr.  Pinckney  re 
monstrated  in  vain.  "  If,"  said  he,  in  language  that  act 
ually  represented  the  condition  to  which  the  country 
was  soon  reduced,  "  If  one  nation  had  a  right  to  shut 
up  to  the  produce  of  another  all  the  ports  of  the  earth 
except  her  own  and  those  of  her  friends,  she  may  shut 
them  up  also,  whereby  the  neutral  nation  would  be  con 
fined  to  her  own  ports ;  or  if,  from  motives  of  policy, 
she  were  to  abstain  from  this  last  exclusion,  yet  the. op 
posite  party  would  certainly  have  an  equal  right  to  pur 
sue  the  same  measure,  whereby  the  same  consequence 
would  ensue.  But  for  a  nation  to  have  its  peaceable 
industry  suspended,  and  its  citizens  reduced  to  idleness 
and  want  by  the  act  of  another,  is  a  restriction  which 
reason  and  justice  do  not  authorize.  .  .  .  This  act,  too, 
tends  directly  to  draw  the  United  States  from  that  state 
of  peace  in  which  they  wish  to  remain ;  for  it  is  an  es 
sential  character  of  neutrality  to  furnish  no  aids  not 
stipulated  by  previous  treaties  to  one  party,  which  are 


94  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

not  furnished  with  equal  readiness  to  the  other.  If  the 
United  States  permit  corn  to  be  sent  to  Great  Britain 
and  her  friends,  they  are  equally  bound  to  permit  it  to 
France ;  to  restrain  it,  would  lead  to  war  with  France  ; 
and  between  restraining  it  themselves,  and  acquiescing 
in  the  restraint  by  her  enemies,  is  no  difference.  She 
will  consider  this  acquiescence  as  a  pretext,  and  the 
United  States  will  see  themselves  plunged  by  this  meas 
ure  into  a  war  with  which  they  meddle  not,  and  which 
they  wish  to  avoid,  if  justice  to  all  parties  and  from  all 
parties  will  enable  them  to  avoid  it.  In  the  case  where 
they  found  themselves  obliged  by  treaty  to  withhold  from 
the  enemies  of  France  the  right  of  coming  into  their 
ports,  they  thought  themselves  in  justice  bound  to  with 
hold  the  same  right  from  France  also,  and  they  did  it ; 
were  they  to  withhold  supplies  of  provisions,  they  would, 
by  the  same  principle  of  impartial  neutrality,  be  bound 
to  withhold  them  from  her  enemies  also,  and  thus  either 
shut  to  themselves  all  the  ports  of  Europe  where  corn  is 
in  demand,  or  make  themselves  parties  in  the  war."  * 
But  argument  was  useless.  Great  Britain  was  resolved 
upon  her  course,  and  it  was  soon  evident,  from  the  re 
ciprocal  treaty  obligations  of  the  allies  in  this,  the  first, 
coalition  against  France,  that  the  policy  of  England  was 

*  1.  T.  P.  MSS.  Letter  Book,  Vol.  I.  p.  479. 

2.  These  orders  are  to  be  found  under  their  various  dates  in  the 
1st  vol.,  American  State  Papers:  Foreign  llelations.  On  page  183, 
Vol.  L,  of  his  "  Diplomacy  of  the  United  States,"  Mr.  Lyman  has 
collected  them  together. 


DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY.  95 

the  policy  of  Europe.  A  series  of  other  maritime  in 
structions  followed  these,  by  which  the  property  of  ene 
mies  was  seized  in  neutral  ships  ;  the  trade  between 
the  United  States  and  the  French  West  Indian  col 
onies  was  forbidden  under  the  rule  of  '56,  by  which 
the  principle  was  established,  that  neutrals  could  con 
duct  no  trade  in  time  of  war  with  colonial  possessions 
of  a  belligerent,  not  allowed  by  the  same  belligerent  in 
time  of  peace ;  a  general  system  of  fictitious  blockade 
was  established;  and  provisions  were  declared  contra 
band  of  war.  These  proceedings  on  the  one  side  pro 
voked,  of  course,  retaliation  on  the  other ;  and  from  this 
date  the  relations  of  the  United  States  became  more 
and  more  embarrassed.  Their  ships  were  confiscated, 
their  seamen  impressed,  the  sovereignty  of  their  harbors 
violated,  their  neutral  rights,  in  every  way  and  on  all 
occasions,  disregarded;  while  the  bureaux  of  their  embas 
sies  were  piled  with  heaps  of  impotent  protests  and  un 
heeded  reclamations.  The  exemption  permitted  by 
France  was  soon  withdrawn  ;  for  as  soon  as  it  was  evi 
dent  that  the  United  States  had  not  the  power  to  pre 
vent  the  seizure  of  her  vessels  by  England,  France  re 
fused  to  allow  her  enemies  only  to  profit  by  the  weakness 
of  a  neutral ;  and  as  soon  as  it  was  clear  that  the 
United  States  did  not  intend  to  be  forced  into  a  war 
by  the  exactions  of  England,  France  abandoned  a  pol 
icy  which  was  intended  to  win  an  ally,  and  not  merely 
to  protect  a  lukewarm  friend.  It  would  be  idle  now  to 
resume  the  diplomatic  debates  of  that  day,  and  to  draw 


96  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

out,  in  balanced  argument,  the  international  reasonings 
and  learned  quotations  with  which  all  the  parties  con 
ducted  their  discussion  of  neutral  rights.  No  jurist 
would  hesitate  to  admit,  that  neutral  rights  were  vio 
lently  abused  and  disregarded.  No  statesman  would 
undertake  to  measure  the  actions  of  great  nations,  en 
gaged  in  the  fiercest  contest  that  history  has  recorded, 
by  the  technical  rules  of  any  code,  however  strong  in 
the  logic  of  its  morality,  or  wise  in  the  consequences  of 
its  peaceful  justice.  The  war  between  Europe  and 
France  was  a  war  for  existence.  It  was  confined  in  its 
scope  to  the  settlement  of  no  commercial  interests,  the 
vindication  of  no  territorial  aggrandizement,  the  adjust 
ment  of  no  narrow  balance  of  national  power.  Its 
terrible  tempest  shook  the  foundations  of  society ;  and 
the  very  heart  of  Christendom  was  hot  with  a  passion, 
to  be  cooled  only  when  the  lifeblood  of  a  full  genera 
tion  of  men  had  the  whole  globe  '  incarnardined.'  It 
would  have  been  folly  to  expect,  that,  in  a  conflict  like 
this,  the  interests  of  any  one  nation  would  be  permitted 
to  stand  between  the  destructive  energies  of  the  com 
batants  ;  still  less,  those  of  a  nation  young,  weak,  un- 
considered,  and  barely  admitted  into  that  national  soci 
ety  whose  very  life  was  now  in  deadly  peril.  And  it 
must  in  candor  be  acknowledged,  that  the  weakness  of 
the  United  States  was  their  salvation.  Had  their  active 
participation  on  either  side  been  a  positive  advantage, 
they  would,  like  all  the  second-rate  powers  of  Europe, 
have  been  dragged  into  the  struggle.  Had  they  pos- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTOEY.  97 

sessed  such  a  tolerable  naval  force  as  would  have 
tempted  them  to  maintain  by  arms  their  neutral  rights, 
they  would  have  been  committed  to  the  conflict.  For, 
between  the  two  enemies,  to  act  against  one,  on  grounds 
ever  so  special  to  the  United  States,  would  have  been 
alliance  with  the  other ;  and  the  interests  of  the  country 
would,  with  the  certainty  of  incalculable  damage,  have 
been  involved  for  ever  in  the  complications  of  European 
politics.  And  the  great  credit  of  Washington's  admin 
istration  was,  that  it  realized  the  strength  of  the  coun 
try's  weakness.  To  have  tried  the  tempting  diplomatic 
game  of  playing  off  the  supposed  advantage  of  alliance 
with  one  party  against  the  other,  would  have  led  to  com 
plete  defeat  with  both.  While,  by  accepting  the  real 
condition  of  the  country  as  the  basis  of  a  frank  nego 
tiation  with  both  England  and  France,  Gen.  Washing 
ton  was  enabled  to  preserve  the  nation  safe  through  a 
storm  which  threatened  to  drag  it  from  its  moorings, 
and  sweep  it  defenceless  and  adrift  upon  the  tempestu 
ous  sea  of  revolutionary  politics.  But,  however  im 
pressed  with  a  sense  of  its  own  weakness,  it  was  impos 
sible  for  the  administration  to  keep  the  country  in  this 
embarrassing  position.  It  was  necessary  to  make  some 
effort  to  better  its  relation  to  one  or  both  of  the  contend 
ing  parties.  In  the  country,  at  this  time,  putting  out  of 
view  those  who,  as  is  always  the  case  in  times  of  ex 
cited  political  differences,  held  impossible  and  extreme 
opinions,  there  were  two  clearly  denned  parties,  each 
led  by  able  men,  actuated  by  an  earnest,  patriotic  spirit, 

9 


98  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

and  sustained  in  its  connections  by  strong  argument. 
One  party  recognized  the  commercial  dependence  of  the 
United  States  on  England,  felt  an  honest  sympathy 
with  the  spirit,  and  great  admiration  for  the  forms,  of 
the  British  constitution,  were  at  first  disquieted,  and 
then  horrified,  at  the  progress  of  the  French  Revolution, 
and  resented  with  indignant  vehemence  the  insolent 
tone  of  the  French  government.  They  believed  that 
much  of  the  wrong  to  which  they  were  subjected  could 
not,  in  such  stormy  times,  be  hindered ;  and  that  time 
and  the  manifest  interests  of  the  country  would  open 
the  eyes  of  the  English  statesmen,  and  gradually  unite 
more  closely  and  affectionately  the  American  and  Eng 
lish  people.  They  were  anxious,  therefore,  to  approach 
as  near  to  England  as  they  could,  consistently  with 
what  was  due  to  the  character  of  the  country ;  to  avoid 
every  possible  relation  with  France,  other  than  was  ab 
solutely  necessary  to  the  strictest  and  narrowest  treaty 
obligation ;  and  thus  gain  time  to  strengthen  their  own 
forces. 

The  other  party  sympathized  earnestly  and  naturally 
with  the  efforts  of  the  French  republic.  They  regarded 
the  horrors  of  the  revolution  as  the  terrible  but  unavoid 
able  convulsions  of  a  dying  despotism,  and  pitied  and 
palliated  what  they  could  not  justify.  They  regarded 
the  conduct  of  Great  Britain  in  holding  on  to  the  posts, 
restricting  our  West  Indian  commerce,  and  violating 
our  neutral  privileges,  as  an  insolent  manifestation  of 
superior  force,  intended  to  mortify  the  national  pride, 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  99 

and  injure  the  national  interests  ;  and  they  would  have 
rejoiced  at  any  means  which  would  possibly  have  sev 
ered  the  commercial  connection  between  England  and 
the  United  States,  and  transferred   those  relations  to 
France.     But  even  this  pa'rty  did  not  wish  war  with 
England.       They   would   have   interpreted    the   treaty 
with  France  liberally,  gone  to  the  furthest  edge  of  their 
duties  as  neutrals,  while  at  the  same  time  they  replied 
to  the  commercial  restrictions  of  Great  Britain  by  simi 
lar  restrictions   on  the  British   trade  with  the  United 
States.    At  the  outset,  the  administration  took  a  course 
between  these  two  parties,  but  its  tendencies  were  evi 
dently  towards  the  former ;  and  just  when  the  conse 
quences   of  its  neutrality  were  beginning  to  be   most 
embarrassing,  Mr.  Jefferson  resigned.    He  could  scarcely 
have  done  otherwise ;  for  all  his  sympathies  and  convic 
tions  were  with  that  second  party  to  whom  reference 
has  just  been  made,  and  which  was  fast  becoming  an 
organized  opposition  party.     And  immediately  after  his 
resignation,  the  administration  resolved  upon  a  proceed 
ing,  to  which,  as  will  be  demonstrated,  he  could  never 
consistently  have  consented.     This  was  a  solemn  and 
special  mission  to  Great  Britain,  in  the  hope  of  finally 
and  promptly  settling  the  differences  between  the  two 
countries.     It  cannot  be  denied  that  this  mission  was  a 
step  beyond   the  first   position  of  the  government,  in 
which  direction  the  history  of  its  action  will  show.     It 
must  be  borne  in  mind,  that,  at  the  date  of  this  mission, 
the  position  of  the  United  States  between  England  and 


100  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

France  was  not  that  of  a  neutral  standing  in  equally 
amicable  relations  to  two  hostile  nations,  but  that  of  an 
independent  power,  complaining  with  equal  justice  of 
arbitrary  and  hostile  conduct  on  the  part  of  two  gov 
ernments  waging  internecine  war  against  each  other, 
and  so  hampered  by  treaty  obligations  and  old  and 
peculiar  relations,  that  a  change  of  relation  to  either 
laid  them  open  to  the  reprisals  of  both.  The  fact  that 
the  French  minister  had  been  dismissed,  that  serious 
differences  existed  between  the  two  governments,  and 
that,  in  face  of  their  treaties  and  past  connection,  the 
United  States  had  proclaimed,  and  were  observing,  a 
strict  neutrality,  permitted  the  English  government  to 
hope  a  change  in  the  policy  of  the  United  States  favor 
able  to  British  views ;  while  the  retention  of  the  posts, 
the  popular  irritation  arising  from  England's  commer 
cial  illiberality,  and  her  violation  of  the  American  neu 
tral  rights,  allowed  the  French  government  to  anticipate 
a  final  rupture,  before  very  long,  between  England  and 
the  United  States,  which  would  further  French  inter 
ests.  A  deviation,  therefore,  towards  either,  was  closely 
watched  by  each.  But  it  must  be  allowed,  that  Eng 
land  seemed  much  the  least  concerned  of  the  two  as  to 
the  course  of  the  United  States.  Secure  in  her  com 
mercial  connection,  in  possession  of  the  frontier  posts, 
and  wielding  an  immense  naval  power,  England  looked 
rather  superciliously  upon  the  advances,  and  very  indif 
ferently  upon  the  complaints,  of  the  American  govern 
ment.  A  treaty  with  England,  it  was  obvious,  could 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  101 

be  negotiated  only  at  great  disadvantage  ;  but  it  was 
unquestionably  worth  the  trial.  For  one  thing  was  cer 
tain,  —  the  United  States  could  not  stand  still,  and  the 
state  of  public  opinion  was  such,  that,  unless  they  could 
approach  nearer  to  Great  Britain,  unless  some  settle 
ment  of  the  many  points  in  controversy  could  be  ob 
tained,  the  United  States  would  drift  into  closer  and 
dangerous  relations  to  France.  And  this  is  the  just  and 
only  ground  of  defence  for  the  mission  at  that  time. 
The  administration  believed  that  it  could  reconcile 
some  of  its  difficulties  with  England  without  compro 
mising  its  neutrality  with  France ;  but  that  it  could  not 
draw  nearer  to  France  without  putting  itself  in  hostile 
relation  to  England, —  a  position  which  the  interests  of 
the  country  imperatively  forbade  it  to  occupy.  The 
mission  was  therefore  resolved  on,  in  face  of  the  violent 
denunciation  of  all  those  who  sympathized  with  France, 
and  with  much  misgiving  on  the  part  of  many,  who, 
without  any  undue  French  sympathy,  felt  an  honest  and 
natural  indignation  against  the  course  of  British  policy. 
The  selection  of  the  individual  for  the  mission  was  not 
a  happy  one.  Mr.  Jay,  who  received  the  appointment, 
was,  in  point  of  ability  and  character,  one  of  the  fore 
most  men  of  his  day  and  generation,  and  General 
Washington  could  have  found  for  the  public  service  no 
purer,  truer,  nobler  citizen.  But  Mr.  Jay  was  Chief 
Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  ; 
and,  however  willing  we  may  be  to  admit,  that,  in  the 
infancy  of  a  nation's  political  life,  it  is  impossible,  per- 

9* 


102  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

haps  unnecessary,  to  separate  with  stringent  exclusive- 
ness  the  departments  of  public  service,  yet  it  was  not 
seemly  to  permit  the  chief  of  the  national  judiciary  to 
be  mixed  up  with  questions  which  excited  the  most  vio 
lent  party  feeling ;  nor  did  it  become  the  head  of  the 
Supreme  Court  to  make  a  treaty,  which,  as  the  law  of  the 
land,  it  was  his  duty  to  expound.  There  was,  however, 
another  and  more  fatal  objection.  It  will  be  recollected, 
that  one  of  the  very  first  acts  of  General  Washington, 
after  his  inauguration,  was  to  send  his  instructions  to 
Mr.  Morris  in  reference  to  the  points  in  controversy 
between  the  two  countries ;  and  that  Mr.  Jefferson,  as 
.Secretary  of  State  and  authorized  exponent  of  the  gov 
ernment,  had,  in  his  correspondence  with  the  British 
minister,  distinctly  stated  the  position  of  the  United 
States.  Both  General  Washington  and  himself  had 
demanded  the  immediate  delivery  of  the  posts,  vindi 
cated  the  good  faith  of  the  United  States  in  their 
efforts  to  carry  out  the  treaty  of  peace,  and  insisted 
upon  the  return  of  the  negroes  carried  off,  or  upon  rea 
sonable  compensation.  Now  it  so  happened  that  Mr. 
Jay,  during  the  time  he  held  the  office  of  Secretary  of 
Foreign  Affairs  under  the  Confederation,  had  gone  over 
this  very  ground  of  the  difference  between  the  two 
countries,  with  that  fearless  candor  which  was  his  hon 
orable  characteristic  under  all  circumstances ;  he  had 
expressed  opinions  not  in  consonance  with  the  present 
official  language  of  the  administration.  In  reference  to 
the  restoration  of  the  negroes,  and  more  especially  in 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  103 

regard  to  such  as,  confiding  in  proclamations  and  prom 
ises  of  freedom  and  protection,  fled  from  their  masters, 
and  were  received  and  protected  within  the  British 
camps  and  lines,  he  had  said :  — 

"  Whenever  the  conduct  of  nations  or  of  individuals 
becomes  the  subject  of  investigation,  truth  and  candor 
should  direct  the  inquiry.  The  circumstances  under 
which  these  last-mentioned  negroes  were  carried  away, 
make  a  strong  impression  on  the  mind  of  your  Secre 
tary,  and  place  that  transaction  before  him  in  a  point  of 
view  less  unfavorable  to  Britain  than  it  appears  in  to 
his  countrymen  at  large.  He  is  aware  he  is  about  to 
say  unpopular  things  ;  but  higher  motives  than  personal 
considerations  press  him  to  proceed. 

"  If  a  war  should  take  place  between  France  and 
Algiers,  and,  in  the  course  of  it,  France  should  invite 
the  American  slaves  there  to  run  away  from  their  mas 
ters,  and  actually  receive  and  protect  them  in  their 
camp,  what  would  Congress,  and,  indeed,  the  world, 
think  and  say  of  France,  if,  on  making  peace  with  Al 
giers,  she  should  give  up  those  American  slaves  to  their 
former  Algerine  masters  ?  Is  there  any  other  difference 
between  the  two  cases  than  this,  namely,  that  the  Amer 
ican  slaves  at  Algiers  are  white  people,  whereas  the 
African  slaves  at  New  York  were  black  people?  It 
may  be  said  that  these  remarks  are  made  out  of  season  ; 
for,  whether  they  be  well  or  ill-founded,  the  fact  is  that 
Britain  expressly  agreed  to  give  them  up,  and  therefore 
ought  to  have  done  it. 


104  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

"  How  far  an  obligation  to  do  wrong  may,  consistent 
with  morality,  be  so  modified  in  the  execution  as  to 
avoid  doing  injury,  and  yet  do  essential  justice,  merits 
consideration.  By  this  agreement,  Britain  bound  her 
self  to  do  great  wrong  to  these  slaves,  and  yet,  by  not 
executing  it,  she  would  do  great  wrong  to  their  masters. 
This  was  a  painful  dilemma ;  for,  as  on  the  one  hand 
she  had  invited,  tempted,  and  assisted  these  slaves  to 
escape  from  their  masters,  and,  on  escaping,  had  re 
ceived  and  protected  them,  it  would  have  been  cruelly 
perfidious  to  have  afterwards  delivered  them  up  to  their 
former  bondage,  and  to  the  severities  to  which  such 
slaves  are  usually  subjected;  so,  on  the  other  hand, 
after  contracting  to  leave  these  slaves  to  their  masters, 
then  to  refuse  to  execute  that  contract,  and  in  the  face 
of  it  to  carry  them  away,  would  have  been  highly  in 
consistent  with  justice  and  good  faith.  But  one  way 
appears  to  your  Secretary,  in  which  Britain  could  extri 
cate  herself  from  these  embarrassments :  that  was,  to 
keep  faith  with  the  slaves  by  carrying  them  away,  and 
to  do  substantial  justice  to  their  masters  by  paying 
them  the  value  of  those  slaves.  In  this  way,  neither 
could  have  just  cause  to  complain;  for,  although  no 
price  can  compensate  a  man  for  bondage  for  life,  yet 
every  master  may  be  compensated  for  a  runaway 
slave."  *  And,  further  on  in  the  same  report,  discussing 

*  Secret  Journals  of  Congress,  Foreign  Affairs,  Vol.  IV.  p.  277, 
278,  280. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  105 

the  question  as  upon  whom  the  responsibility  of  the 
first  treaty  violation  rested,  he  said :  "  In  whatever  light, 
therefore,  deviations  from  the  treaty,  prior  to  its  final 
conclusion  and  ratification,  may  be  viewed,  it  is  certain 
that  deviations  on  our  part  preceded  any  on  the  part  of 
Britain,  and  therefore,  instead  of  being  justified  by 
them,  afford  excuse  to  them. 

"As  to  the  detention  of  our  posts,  your  Secretary 
thinks  that  Britain  was  not  bound  to  surrender  them 
until  we  had  ratified  the  treaty.  Congress  ratified  it  on 
the  14th  of  January,  1784,  and  Britain  on  the  9th  of 
April  following.  From  that  time  to  this,  the  fourth  and 
fifth  articles  of  the  treaty  have  been  constantly  violated 
on  our  part  by  legislative  acts,  then  and  still  existing 
and  operating. 

"  Under  such  circumstances,  it  is  not  a  matter  of  sur 
prise  to  your  Secretary  that  the  posts  are  detained ;  nor, 
in  his  opinion,  would  Britain  be  to  blame  in  continuing 
to  hold  them,  until  America  shall  cease  to  impede  her 
enjoying  every  essential  right  secured  to  her  and  her 
people  and  adherents  by  the  treaty."  This  report  was 
a  public  and  official  document,  of  which  it  could  not  be 
supposed  that  the  English  government  was  ignorant. 
To  send  a  minister,  holding  such  opinions,  at  such  a 
time,  was  unquestionably  to  withdraw  from  the  original 
ground  which  the  administration  had  occupied,  and  in 
direct  contradiction  to  the  whole  tenor  of  Mr.  Jefferson's 
despatches  as  Secretary  of  State. 


106  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

Mr.  Jay  arrived  in  England  early  in  June,  1794.*  His 
instructions,  furnished  by  Mr.  Edmund  Randolph,  who 
had  succeeded  Mr.  Jefferson,  covered  four  points.  He 
was  instructed,  — 

First,  to  protest  against,  and  demand  compensation 

*  Mr.  Jay's  mission  was  not  intended  to  supersede  Mr.  Pinckney, 
and  he  was  accordingly  instructed  to  confine  himself  to  the  special 
objects  of  his  negotiation,  and  to  communicate  fully  and  freely  with 
that  gentleman.  Mr.  Pinckney  could  not,  however,  help  feeling  that 
his  own  consideration  was  diminished,  and  the  regular  mission  very 
much  sunk  in  importance  by  this  special  appointment.  This  feeling 
he  expressed  with  frankness  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  in  announcing 
Mr.  Jay's  arrival  in  London. 

"  With  respect  to  this  gentleman's  mission,  as  it  personally  concerns 
me,  if  I  were  to  say  I  had  no  unpleasant  feelings  on  the  occasion,  I 
should  not  be  sincere ;  but  the  sincerity  with  which  I  make  this  dec 
laration  will,  I  trust,  entitle  me  to  credit,  when  I  add  that  I  am  con 
vinced  of  the  expediency  of  adopting  any  honorable  measures  which 
may  tend  to  avert  the  calamities  of  war,  or,  by  its  failure,  cement 
our  union  at  home  ;  that  I  consider  Mr.  Jay's  appointment,  from  the 
solemnity  of  the  mission,  supported  by  his  established  reputation, 
diplomatic  experience,  and  general  talents,  as  the  most  probable 
method  of  effecting  this  purpose ;  and  that  I  am  sensible  of  the  deli 
cacy,  respecting  myself,  with  which  the  measure  has  been  carried 
into  execution.  Under  these  impressions,  it  will  be  scarcely  neces 
sary  for  me  to  say  further,  that  I  will  cheerfully  embrace  every  op 
portunity  of  promoting  the  objects  of  Mr.  Jay's  mission,  and  of  ren 
dering  his  residence  here  agreeable."  He  kept  his  word ;  and  in 
the  political  excitement  which  followed  the  treaty,  gave  strong  and 
generous  testimony  to  Mr.  Jay's  services.  -— T.  P.  MSS.  Letter  Book, 
Vol.  II.  p.  120. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  107 

for,  the  vexations  and  spoliations  to  which  the  com 
merce  of  the  United  States  was  subjected. 

Second,  and  "  subsequent  in  order,"  he  was  to  draw 
to  a  conclusion  all  points  of  difference  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain,  concerning  the  treaty 
of  peace.  And  in  reference  to  this  portion  of  his  mis 
sion,  his  instructions  contained  a  clause,  singular  to 
say  the  least,  and  certainly  implying  extraordinary  con 
sideration  for  the  person  of  the  ambassador :  "  Except 
in  this  negotiation,"  said  Mr.  Randolph,  "you  have 
been  personally  conversant  with  the  whole  of  the  trans 
actions  connected  with  the  treaty  of  peace.  You  were 
a  minister  at  its  formation,  the  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs  when  the  sentiments  of  the  Congress,  under  the 
Confederation,  were  announced  through  your  office  ; 
and,  as  Chief  Justice,  you  have  been  witness  to  what 
has  passed  in  our  courts,  and  know  the  real  state  of 
our  laws  with  regard  to  British  debts.  It  will  be  super 
fluous,  therefore,  to  add  more  to  you  than  to  express  a 
wish  that  these  debts  and  the  interest  claimed  upon 
them,  and  all  things  relating  to  them,  may  be  put  aside  in 
a  diplomatic  discussion,  as  being  certainly  of  a  judicial 
nature,  to  be  decided  by  our  courts  ;  and  if  this  cannot 
be  accomplished,  that  you  support  the  doctrines  of  gov 
ernment  with  arguments  proper  for  the  occasion,  and 
with  that  attention  to  your  former  public  opinions  which 
self-respect  will  justify,  without  relaxing  the  pretensions 
which  have  hitherto  been  maintained." 

Thirdly.   "  In    case    that  the   two    preceding   points 


108  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

should  be  so  accommodated  as  to  promise  the  continu 
ance  of  tranquillity  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain,"  it  was  referred  to  his  discretion  to  pro 
pose  a  commercial  treaty  between  the  two  countries, 
on  certain  bases  included  in  the  instructions.  And, 
fourthly,  "  You  will  have  no  difficulty  in  gaining  access 
to  the  ministers  of  Russia,  Denmark,  and  Sweden,  at 
the  court  of  London.  The  principles  of  the  armed 
neutrality  would  abundantly  cover  our  neutral  rights. 
If.  therefore,  the  situation  of  things  with  respect  to 
Great  Britain  should  dictate  the  necessity  of  taking  the 
precaution  of  foreign  cooperation  on  this  head,  if  no 
prospect  of  accommodation  should  be  thwarted  by  the 
danger  of  such  a  measure  being  known  to  the  British 
court,  and  if  an  entire  view  of  all  our  political  relations 
shall,  in  your  judgment,  permit  the  step,  you  will  sound 
those  ministers  upon  the  probability  of  an  alliance  with 
their  nations  to  support  those  principles."  And  the 
instructions  concluded  with  this  plenary  power :  — 

"  Such  are  the  outlines  of  the  conduct  which  the 
President  wishes  you  to  pursue.  He  is  aware  that  at 
this  distance,  and  during  the  present  instability  of  pub 
lic  events,  he  cannot  undertake  to  prescribe  rules  which 
shall  be  irrevocable.  You  will,  therefore,  consider  the 
ideas  herein  expressed  as  amounting  to  recommendations 
only,  which,  in  your  discretion,  you  may  modify  as  seems 
most  beneficial  to  the  United  States,  except  in  the  two 
following  cases,  which  are  immutable :  1st.  That  as  the 
British  ministry  will  doubtless  be  solicitous  to  detach  us 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  109 

from  France,  and  may  probably  make  some  overture  of 
this  kind,  you  will  inform  them  that  the  government  of 
the  United  States  will  not  derogate  from  our  treaties 
and  engagements  with  France,  and  that  experience  has 
shown  that  we  can  be  honest  in  our  duties  to  the  Brit 
ish  nation  without  laying  ourselves  under  any  particu 
lar  restraints  as  to  other  nations.  And,  2d.  That  no 
treaty  of  commerce  be  concluded  or  signed  contrary  to 
the  foregoing  prohibition." 

After  a  few  informal  conversations  with  Lord  Gren- 
ville,  the  negotiation  proceeded  rapidly  to  its  conclu 
sion  ;  and  before  the  opinion  of  the  United  States  gov 
ernment  on  its  details  could  reach  their  minister,  the 
treaty  was  signed.  It  was  evident,  very  early  in  the 
progress  of  the  discussion,  that  most  of  the  positions 
taken  by  the  United  States  would  have  to  be  aban 
doned  ;  and  some  of  them  the  American  negotiator  was 
only  too  ready  to  abandon.  Thus,  in  his  letter  to  Mr. 
Randolph,  of  the  13th  of  September,  1794,  Mr.  Jay 
said :  "  A  number  of  informal  conversations  on  other 
points  then  took  place,  and  every  difficulty  which 
attended  them  came  into  view,  and  was  discussed  with 
great  fairness  and  temper ;  the  inquiry  naturally  led  to 
the  fact  which  constituted  the  first  violation  of  the 
treaty  of  peace?  The  carrying  away  of  the  negroes 
contrary  to  the  7th  article  of  the  treaty  of  peace  was 
insisted  upon  as  the  first  aggression.  To  this  it  was 
answered,  in  substance,  that  Great  Britain  understood 
10 


110  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

the  stipulation  contained  in  that  article  in  the  obvious 
sense  of  the  words  which  expressed  it;  namely,  as  an 
engagement  not  to  cause  any  destruction  nor  to  carry 
away  any  negroes  or  other  property  of  the  American 
inhabitants;  or,  in  other  words,  that  the  evacuation 
should  be  made  without  depredation ;  that  no  alteration 
in  the  actual  state  of  property  was  operated  or  intended 
by  that  article ;  that  every  slave,  like  every  horse  which 
escaped  or  estrayed  from  within  the  American  lines  and 
came  into  the  possession  of  the  British  army,  became, 
by  the  laws  and  rights  of  war,  British  property,  and 
therefore  ceasing  to  be  American  property,  the  exporta 
tion  thereof  was  not  inhibited  by  the  stipulation  in 
question ;  that  to  extend  it  to  the  negroes,  who,  under 
the  faith  of  proclamations,  had  come  into  them,  and  to 
whom,  according  to  promise,  liberty  had  been  given, 
was  to  give  to  the  article  a  greater  latitude  than  the 
terms  of  it  would  warrant,  and  was  also,  unnecessarily, 
to  give  it  a  construction,  which,  being  odious,  could  not 
be  supported  by  the  known  and  established  rules  for 
construing  treaties.  To  this  was  replied  the  several 
remarks  and  considerations  which  are  mentioned  in  a 
report  which  I  once  made  to  Congress  on  this  subject, 
and  which,  for  that  reason,  it  would  be  useless  here  to 
repeat ;  on  this,  point  we  could  not  agree.  .  .  .  Here, 
again,  the  affair  of  the  negroes  emerged,  and  was  in 
sisted  upon,  and  was  answered  as  before.  I  confess, 
however,  that  this  construction  of  that  article  has  made 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  Ill 

an  impression'upon  my  mind,  and  induced  me  to  sus 
pect  that  my  former  opinions  on  that  head  may  not  be 
well  founded."  *  That  Mr.  Jay  should  have  been  im 
pressed  by  the  transparent  sophistry  of  this  reasoning, 
can  only  be  accounted  for  by  the  fact  of  his  sympathy 
with  its  conclusion,  as  manifested  in  the  opinions  of  his 
report,  when  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs.  This  con 
struction  of  the  treaty  was  thoroughly  refuted  by  Mr. 
Randolph,  in  his  reply  of  the  15th  of  December,  1794. 

"  But  really,  sir,  the  force  of  Lord  Grenville's  reason 
ings  appears  to  fall  very  far  short  of  its  objects. 

"  That  a  property  is  acquired  in  movables  as  soon  as 
they  come  within  the  power  of  the  enemy,  is  acknowl 
edged.  But  it  will  not  be  denied  that  rights,  even  in 
movables,  acquired  by  war,  may,  by  the  treaty  of 
peace,  be  renounced.  In  this  instance,  there  was  great 
reason  for  such  a  renunciation.  Negroes  were  not,  like 
movables  in  general,  difficult  to  be. distinguished.  They 
carried  an  infallible  mark.  British  debts  were  stipu 
lated  to  be  paid,  and  the  States  in  which  the  mass  of 
them  lay,  depended  for  their  payment  principally  on  the 

*  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Affairs,  Vol.  I.  p.  485,  486.  The 
opinion  to  which  Mr.  Jay  refers,  is  that  expressed  in  his  report  as 
Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  under  the  Confederation,  and  a  portion 
of  which  has  been  quoted  above.  "  But  however  capable  of  pallia 
tion  the  conduct  of  Britain  respecting  these  negroes  may  be,  it  un 
questionably  was  an  infraction  of  the  seventh  article."  —  Secret 
Journal,  Vol.  IV.  p.  279.  That  Mr.  Jay  found  it  easy  to  change  his 
opinion  will  surprise  no  one  who  reads  the  report. 


112  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

culture  of  their  soil,  and  for  the  culture  of  their  soil,  on 
this  species  of  labor.  As  property,  the  British  govern 
ment  could  not  have  been  tenacious  of  negroes  ;  and  it 
may  therefore  be  supposed,  that,  in  this  view,  they  were 
so  indifferent  as  to  be  the  more  easily  given  up. 

"  If  the  stipulation  as  to  the  negroes  did  not  mean  an 
alteration  in  the  actual  state  of  property,  and  imported 
only  an  engagement  not  to  cause  any  destruction,  or 
carry  away  any  negroes  or  other  American  property, 
why  was  it  made  ?  The  cessation  of  war  implied  the 
cessation  of  further  depredation  ;  the  renewal  of  depre 
dation  would  have  been  the  renewal  of  war.  The 
words  of  treaties,  if  they  can  be  construed  in  an  oper 
ative  sense,  ought  not  to  be  turned  to  signify  merely 
what  would  have  existed  without  them.  It  was  a 
thing  of  course  that  orders  should  be  given  by  the  Brit 
ish  government  against  plundering  on  the  evacuation  ; 
or,  if  they  should  not  be  given  by  the  government,  it 
became  incumbent  upon  the  commander,  in  behalf  of 
the  British  army  in  America,  to  issue  them  under  his 
own  authority.  The  essence  of  Lord  Grenville's  argu 
ment  seems  to  consist  in  a  refinement  of  interpretation 
which  he  gives  to  the  words  '  other  property  of  the 
American  inhabitants,'  as  if  they  confined  the  word 
'  negroes  '  to  those  negroes  who  should  thereafter  be 
captured  from  the  Americans  by  the  British  arms,  and 
such  as  were  then  denominated,  by  the  rights 


of  war,  British  property.     The  use  of  the  term  'negroes  ' 
by  itself,  proves  that  the   inquiry  was   simply  to  be, 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  113 

whether  the  persons  who  were  not  to  be  carried  away 
came  within  the  description  of  negroes,  generally ;  and 
it  is  as  fair  to  conclude  from  the  words  '  other  property 
of  the  American  inhabitants,'  that  the  opinion  of  the 
negotiators  was,  that  negroes  within  the  British  power 
were  made  thereby  American  property,  as  the  reverse. 
The  fact  too  is,  that  the  original  proprietors  of  the  ne 
groes  never  lost  entirely  the  hope  of  recovering  them, 
still  called  them  theirs,  would  have  reclaimed  them  upon 
the  principles  of  postliminy,  if  they  had  been  retaken 
by  the  army  of  America  or  its  ally,  and  thus  even  the 
plenipotentiaries  themselves  might,  without  any  impro 
priety,  have  talked  of  the  negroes  in  British  possession 
as  the  negroes  of  American  inhabitants.  These  ideas 
are  supported  by  other  parts  of  the  seventh  article. 
Why  is  the  *  carrying'  away '  only  mentioned,  if  ne 
groes  which  might  be  thereafter  seized  were  chiefly 
contemplated  ?  Is  it  not  reasonable  to  believe,  that, 
with  this  impression,  it  would  have  been  said  that  ne 
groes  shall  not  be  captured  and  carried  away?  If  a 
critical  exposition  must  be  resorted  to,  '  carrying  away ' 
implies  that  the  thing  to  be  carried  is  already  in  posses 
sion.  Another  part  of  the  stipulation  is,  that  the  Amer 
ican  artillery  that  may  be  in  the  fortifications  shall  be 
left  therein.  That  is,  not  artillery  made  in  America,  but 
artillery  the  property  of  America,  or,  in  other  words,  of 
the  United  States.  Now  this  artillery  w;as  surely  the 
property  of  the  British  at  the  moment  of  capture,  and 
10* 


114  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

yet  no  pretence,  as  far  as  I  can  learn,  was  hatched  up 
to  carry  away  our  cannon. 

"  For  the  interpretation  of  treaties,  as  well  as  in  moral 
reasoning,  general  rules  are  prescribed;  but  your  own 
experience  must  have  satisfied  you  that  these  rules  can 
seldom  be  applied  with  mathematical  precision.  We 
have  an  example  of  this  in  Lord  Grenville  sheltering 
himself  from  the  true  construction  of  the  article  of  the 
treaty,  by  branding  it  with  the  epithet '  odious.'  What 
is  more  customary  than  for  nations  to  surrender  rights  ? 
What  more  common  than  for  them  to  surrender,  on  a 
peace,  rights  acquired  purely  and  solely  through  a  war  ? 
The  construction  is  not  odious  because  the  British  gov 
ernment  hate  slavery.  No,  sir ;  they  established  it  in 
the  United  States  while  colonies;  they  continued  the 
importation  of  slaves  against  the  will  of  most  of  the 
States ;  it  exists,  by  their  authority,  in  many  of  their 
foreign  dominions.  The  odium,  then,  of  the  business 
must  be  in  depriving  the  slaves  of  the  liberty  granted  to 
them ;  that  is,  in  fact,  giving  and  then  taking  away. 
In  answer  to  this,  I  observe,  that  the  construction  is  not 
so  doubtful  as  to  let  in  any  remarks  upon  odium,  for 
vague  ideas  of  this  kind  are  inadmissible,  except  in 
truly  doubtful  cases.  There  might,  perhaps,  have  been 
some  countenance  to  this  plea,  if  we  should  insist  that 
slaves  originally  belonging  to  the  British,  and  afterwards 
manumitted  by  them,  were  now  demanded  by  us  to 
return  to  their  former  condition.  But  those  in  question 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  115 

belonged  to  our  citizens  ;  —  the  war  only  presented  the 
chance  of  liberation.  They  were  covered,  in  their  flight 
from  their  masters,  by  the  operation  of  war.  They  must 
have  been  conscious  (and  such  is  the  law  of  nations) 
that  if  they  had  been  regained  by  their  former  propri 
etors  in  the  course  of  the  war,  they  would  have  reverted 
to  the  condition  of  slaves,  and  that  what  the  war  gave, 
might,  by  a  peace,  be  taken  away. 

"  You  must  be  too  sensible  of  the  anxiety  of  many 
parts  of  the  United  States  upon  this  subject,  to  pass  it 
over  unnoticed.  Permit  me,  therefore,  to  beg  your  at 
tention  to  the  foregoing  ideas,  since  I  have  it  greatly  at 
heart  that  your  negotiation  may  not  be  incumbered  by 
any  objection  which  may  be  anticipated."  4 

This  letter,  unfortunately,  did  not  reach  London  until 
some  time  after  the  treaty  had  been  concluded;  for, 
with  such  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  American  nego 
tiator,  discussion  was  rapidly  exhausted,  and,  on  the 
19th  of  November,  1794,  a  treaty  was  signed  by  Mr. 
Jay  and  Lord  Grenville.  The  consideration  of  the 
treaty  may  be  divided  under  four  heads  :  1.  The  ques 
tions  arising  under  the  treaty  of  peace  of  1783 ;  2.  The 
questions  of  neutral  rights  springing  out  of  the  immedi 
ate  circumstances  of  the  day ;  3.  The  commercial  ques 
tions  ;  and  4.  Such  miscellaneous  provisions  as  the  gen 
eral  interests  of  the  countries  required. 

1.  The  questions  under  the  old  treaty  were  those  per- 

*  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Aff.,  Vol.  I.  p.  510. 


116  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

taining  to  the  delivery  of  the  posts,  the  abstraction  of 
the  negroes,  the  collection  of  the  British  debts,  and  the 
north-eastern  boundary  line.  As  to  the  first,  it  was 
agreed,  by  article  2,  that  the  posts  should  be  evacuated 
by  the  1st  of  June,  1796,  about  two  years  more  being 
thus  allowed  the  British  government  to  withdraw  its 
troops.  As  to  the  negroes,  the  subject  was  dropped, 
and  no  mention,  either  of  restoration  or  compensation, 
was  made  in  the  treaty.  As  to  the  debts,  by  article  6, 
a  joint  commission  was  appointed  to  decide  upon  all 
cases  where  it  was  alleged  that  lawful  impediments  had 
been  placed  in  the  way  of  their  collection,  and  the 
United  States  undertook  the  payment  of  all  claims 
awarded  by  the  board.  The  settlement  of  the  north 
eastern  boundary  line  was  also  referred  to  a  joint  com 
mission. 

2.  The  second  class  of  cases  included  the  difficulties 
arising  from  the  right  of  impressment  claimed  by  Great 
Britain,  accompanied  by  the  exercise  of  the  right  of 
search ;  from  the  violation  of  the  clear  neutral  rights  of 
the  United  States ;  and  from  the  orders  in  council,  by 
which  grain,  on  its  way  to  France,  was  treated  as  con 
traband.  Of  these,  the  question  of  impressment  was 
abandoned,  as  impossible  of  settlement,  between  the 
two  countries.  A  commission  was  appointed  by  article 
7  similar  to  that  provided  for  the  adjustment  of  the 
British  debts,  which  was  to  decide  upon  all  claims  for 
violation  of  neutral  rights.  And  as  it  was  found  im 
possible  to  reconcile  the  opinions  of  the  negotiators  on 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  117 

the  question  of  making  provisions  contraband,  it  was 
agreed,  in  article  18,  which  was  almost  a  transcript  of 
the  obnoxious  order,  that,  "whereas  the  difficulty  of 
agreeing  on  the  precise  cases  in  which,  alone,  provisions 
and  other  articles  not  generally  contraband  may  be  re 
garded  as  such,  renders  it  expedient  to  provide  against 
the  inconveniences  and  misunderstandings  which  might 
thence  arise,"  such  articles  should  not  be  confiscated, 
but  the  owner  should  be  by  the  captors  speedily  and 
completely  indemnified,  "  and  the  captors  or,  in  their 
default,  the  government  under  whose  authority  they  act, 
shall  pay,  to  the  masters  or  owners  of  such  vessels,  the 
full  value  of  such  articles,  with  a  reasonable  profit 
thereon,  together  with  freight,  and  also  the  damage 
incident  to  such  detention." 

3.  As  to  the  commercial  interests  of  the  country,  it 
was  provided  by  the  llth,  12th,  13th,  and  14th  articles, 
that  there  should  be  a  reciprocal  and  perfect  liberty  of 
navigation  between  all  the  dominions  of  Great  Britain 
in  Europe  and  the  territories  of  the  United  States ;  that 
the  citizens  of  the  United  States  may  freely  carry  on  a 
trade  between  the  British  territories  in  the  East  Indies 
and  the  United  States,  in  all  articles,  the  importation 
and  exportation  of  which  should  not  be  entirely  forbid 
den.  And  that,  as  regarded  the  British  West  Indian 
possessions,  the  United  States  should  be  permitted  to 
carry  and  bring  away,  in  their  own  vessels,  all  articles  of 
commerce,  the  produce  of  the  two  countries,  which 
could  be  carried  or  brought  in  British  vessels:  Provided 


118  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

the  vessels  of  the  United  States  were  not  above  seventy 
tons  burden,  and  that  the  cargoes  should  be  landed  in 
the  United  States  only ;  it  being  also  agreed,  that,  dur 
ing  the  continuance  of  the  article  in  relation  to  the 
West  Indian  trade,  the  United  States  should  prohibit 
and  restrain  the  carrying  any  molasses,  sugar,  coffee,  or 
cotton,  in  American  vessels,  either  from  his  Majesty's 
islands,  or  from  the  United  States,  to  any  part  of  the 
world  except  the  United  States. 

The  other  articles  related  to  the  Indian  trade  on  the 
borders,  defined  contraband  according  to  the  strictness 
of  English  pretension,  established  the  right  of  sending 
consuls,  and  contained  the  usual  stipulations  as  to  pri 
vateers  and  the  right  of  bringing  prizes  into  port,  that 
generally  belong  to  friendly  relations,  stipulating,  how 
ever,  that  nothing  in  the  treaty  should  operate  or  be 
construed  contrary  to  former  arid  existing  treaties  with 
other  sovereigns  or  States. 

When  the  treaty  was  received  in  the  United  States, 
it  became  the  subject  of  long  discussion  in  the  cabinet, 
and  the  most  violent  agitation  in  public.  The  question 
of  its  ratification  became  complicated  with  the  re-issue 
of  the  obnoxious  orders  of  1793,  and  by  the  unwilling 
ness  of  the  government  to  accept  the  12th  article,  in 
relation  to  the  West  India  trade.  But,  after  much  de 
liberation,  the  Senate  advised  the  President  to  ratify  the 
treaty,  subject  to  the  suspension  of  the  West  Indian 
provisos  by  a  supplementary  article.  Accordingly,  as 
Mr.  Jay  had  returned  home,  and  Mr.  Pinckney  was 


DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY.  119 

absent  in  Madrid  on  a  special  mission,  the  ratifications 
were  exchanged,  on  the  28th  of  October,  1795,  between 
Lord  Grenville  and  William  Allen  Deas,  Esq.,  the  Sec 
retary  of  the  United  States  Legation,  the  British  gov 
ernment  making  no  objection  to  the  suspension  of  the 
12th  article.*  No  act  in  our  political  history  has,  either 

*  Mr.  Lyman,  in  his  "  Diplomacy  of  the  United  States,"  Vol.  I.  p. 
204,  says,  referring  to  the  ratification  of  this  treaty,  "  This  act  was 
performed  by  Mr.  J.  Q.  Adams,  minister  resident  at  the  Hague,  de 
spatched  for  that  purpose  to  London,  Mr.  Pinckney  being  then  in 
Madrid."  It  is  not  a  matter  of  much  importance ;  but  as  the  volume 
of  treaties,  published  by  the  United  States  in  their  Statutes  at  Large, 
does  not  contain  the  ratification,  it  may  be  as  well  to  quote  the  au 
thority  for  my  statement.  In  the  third  volume  of  Mr.  Pinckney's 
Letter  Book,  containing  the  correspondence  between  Mr.  Deas,  act 
ing  as  Charge  d' Affaires,  and  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  also  be 
tween  himself  and  Mr.  Pinckney,  will  be  found  his  letters,  giving  an 
account  of  the  ratification.  Under  date  of  23d  of  October,  1795,  he 
writes  to  the  Secretary  of  State  :  "  Mr.  Adams  not  having  arrived  in 
London  by  the  20th  instant,  I  opened,  agreeably  to  your  direction, 
the  despatches  addressed  to  him,  and  on  the  same  day  acquainted 
Lord  Grenville,  the  minister  of  the  foreign  department,  by  note,  that 
I  was  authorized  to  exchange  the  ratifications,  and  transact  what 
remained  to  be  accomplished  respecting  it,  and  requested  a  confer 
ence  on  the  subject.  He  appointed  this  morning,  when  I  waited 
upon  him.  Upon  stating  that  I  was  possessed  of  the  President's  rat 
ification  of  the  treaty,  conformably  to  the  advice  of  the  Senate,  and 
offering  to  exchange  the  same  for  an  equivalent  ratification  on  the 
part  of  this  government,  his  Lordship  observed,  unofficially,  that  he 
had  no  reason  to  think  such  an  exchange  would  not  take  place,  but 
that  it  would  be  necessary  to  lay  the  business  before  the  King  for  his 
determination.  He  requested  a  copy  of  the  President's  ratification, 


120  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

in  its  inception  or  execution,  provoked  a  more  violent  or 
prejudiced  popular  excitement,  or  a  warmer  discussion 
in  Congress.  At  public  meetings  throughout  the  coun 
try,  and  in  private  correspondence,  in  voluminous  essays 
and  sharp  pamphlets,  the  controversy  raged,  dealing  in 
extravagant  denunciation  or  labored  panegyric.  In  the 
national  legislature,  it  provoked  the  discussion  of  the 
gravest  constitutional  issues,  and,  in  some  sections  of 
the  country,  excited  the  most  discreditable  riots.  With 
the  details  of  this  great  party  contest,  these  pages  have 

•which  I  have  since  sent  him,  and  appointed  Wednesday  next,  the 
28th,  to  conclude  the  business.  .  .  . 

"  The  letter  of  credence  was  absolutely  necessary ;  for,  upon  open 
ing  my  business,  Lord  Grenville  remarked,  that,  it  being  unusual  for 
the  ratifications  of  a  treaty  to  be  exchanged  by  any  other  than  the 
persons  who  negotiated  it,  it  was  necessary  that  he  should  see  my 
powers.  I  handed  to  him  a  copy  of  your  letter  of  25th  August,  which, 
after  perusing,  he  observed  was  rather  informal,  and  begged  to  know 
if  I  was  furnished  with  any  other  papers.  I  then  produced  the  letter 
of  credence,  with  which  he  expressed  himself  perfectly  satisfied." 
-  pp.  262-2G5. 

On  the  30th  of  October,  writing  to  Mr.  Pinckney,  he  says,  "  The 
ratifications  of  the  treaty  were  exchanged,  on  the  28th,  without  any 
objections  to  the  additional  article,  which  is  inserted  immediately 
after  Mr.  Jefferson's  letter,  and  is  in  the  words  following."  —  p.  275. 
Writing  to  the  same,  on  the  13th  of  November,  1795,  he  says:  "Mr. 
Adams  arrived  from  Holland  the  day  before  yesterday.  As  the  rati 
fications  of  the  treaty  had  taken  place,  he  of  course  waits  until  in 
structions  arrive  relative  to  further  negotiations,  before  he  takes  any 
steps." —  p.  304.  Mr.  Pinckney  returned  from  Spain  before  the  arrival 
of  any  such  instructions,  and  of  course  resumed  his  place  as  minister. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  121 

properly  no  concern  ;  and  the  lapse  of  more  than  half  a 
century  of  national  life,  equivalent  in  its  events  and 
wonderful  developments  to  centuries  of  older  and 
slower  years,  has  carried  us  far  beyond  an  active  sym 
pathy  with  the  partisan  struggles  of  that  day.  This 
famous  treaty  has  become  part  of  our  ancient  history; 
and  we  ought  to  be  able  to  do  impartial  justice  to  the 
exaggerations  of  honest  patriotism  in  either  party,  to 
neutralize  distempered  invective  by  extravagant  eulogi- 
um,  and  to  pronounce  calmly  upon  the  character  of  this 
important  transaction  ;  for,  as  in  all  such  cases,  "  the 
debatable  land  "  of  party  politics  has  long  since  passed 
under  the  "  eminent  domain  "  of  history.* 

*  On  the  7th  of  March,  1796,  after  the  ratification  of  the  treaty 
with  Great  Britain,  and  before  the  motion  was  made  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  for  the  appropriation  necessary  to  its  execution,  Mr. 
Livingston,  of  New  York,  made  in  the  House  the  following  motion : 

"  Resolved,  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be  requested 
to  lay  before  this  House  a  copy  of  the  instructions  to  the  Minister 
of  the  United  States,  who  negotiated  the  treaty  with  the  King  of 
Great  Britain,  communicated  by  his  message  of  the  first  of  March, 
with  the  correspondence  and  other  documents  relative  to  the  said 
treaty." 

Upon  this  resolution  ensued  one  of  the  most  interesting  and  im 
portant  debates  in  our  political  annals.  After  a  long  discussion,  in 
which  the  leaders  of  the  House  on  both  sides  participated,  the  resolu 
tion  was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  62  to  37.  "  Thus,"  says  Mr.  Benton, 
in  whose  valuable  abridgment  of  Congressional  Debates  this  debate 
will  be  found,  "  the  House,  by  a  majority  of  25,  passed  the  call  upon 
the  President  for  the  papers,  and  upon  the  declared  ground  of  a 

11 


122  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

As  a  mere  trial  of  diplomatic  skill,  this  treaty  is  a 
confessed   failure  ;   for,  with  a  solitary   exception,   the 

right  to  judge  the  treaty,  as  it  contained  a  regulation  of  commerce, 
and  also  required  an  appropriation  of  money.  President  Washing 
ton  received  the  call  in  the  sense  in  which  it  was  made ;  and  although 
he  had  no  objection  to  furnishing  the  papers,  and  had  laid  them  be 
fore  the  Senate,  (whence  they  became  public,)  yet  he  deemed  it  his 
duty  to  resist  the  claim  of  right  asserted  by  the  House,  and  therefore 
to  refuse  the  papers,  which  he  did  in  a  closely  reasoned  message,  an 
epitome  of  the  arguments  used  in  the  House  on  that  side."  The 
House,  in  reply,  by  a  vote  of  57  to  35,  then  passed  the  following 
resolutions :  — 

"  Resolved,  That  it  being  declared  by  the  second  section  of  the 
second  article  of  the  Constitution,  '  that  the  President  shall  have 
power,  by  and  with  the  advice  of  the  Senate,  to  make  treaties,  pro 
vided  two  thirds  of  the  Senate  present  concur/  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives  do  not  claim  any  agency  in  making  treaties ;  but  that, 
when  a  treaty  stipulates  regulations  on  any  of  the  subjects  submitted 
by  the  Constitution  to  the  power  of  Congress,  it  must  depend  for  its 
execution,  as  to  such  stipulations,  on  a  law  or  laws  to  be  passed  by 
Congress,  and  it  is  the  constitutional  right  and  duty  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  in  all  such  cases,  to  deliberate  on  the  expediency  or 
inexpediency  of  carrying  such  treaty  into  effect,  and  to  determine 
and  act  thereon  as,  in  their  judgment,  may  be  most  conducive  to  the 
public  good. 

"  Resolved,  That  it  is  riot  necessary  to  the  propriety  of  any  appli 
cation  from  this  House  to  the  executive,  for  information  desired  by 
them,  and  which  may  relate  to  any  constitutional  functions  of  the 
House,  that  the  purpose  for  which  such  information  may  be  wanted, 
or  to  which  the  same  may  be  applied,  should  be  stated  in  the  appli 
cation." 

The    House   of   Representatives  and  the    President  were  thus 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  123 

tardy  evacuation  of  the  posts,  its  ratification  abandoned 
every  position  which  the  government  had  assumed  in 
the  preliminary  discussions,  and  its  formal  diplomatic 
instructions.  The  condition  of  the  country  was  too 
weak  to  insist  upon  an  equality  of  exchanges ;  and  Mr. 

directly  at  issue;  but  upon  the  final  vote  to  make  the  necessary 
appropriation  to  carry  the  treaty  into  effect,  after  a  protracted  dis 
cussion,  the  resolution  to  carry  the  treaty  into  effect  was  adopted  by 
a  vote  of  57  to  48. 

'•  This  vote  of  the  House,"  says  Mr.  Beiiton,  "  to  carry  the  treaty 
into  etfect,  was  no  abandonment  of  the  right  it  had  asserted  to  judge 
its  merits,  and  to  grant  or  withhold  the  appropriation  according  to 
its  discretion." 

This  may  be  so.  And  it  is  possible  to  suppose  extreme  cases, 
where  a  treaty  may  be  so  injurious  that,  the  patriotism  of  a  House 
would  be  sorely  tried  in  executing  its  provisions.  But  the  vote  of 
the  House  docs  not  agree  with  what,  I  think,  may  now  be  fairly  con 
sidered  the  authoritative  exposition  of  the  Constitution.  See  Story 
and  Kent. 

Where  the  Senate  has  acted  with  the  President,  within  the  limits 
of  thviir  constitutional  prerogative,  their  action  is  final  and  binding. 
To  give  the  House  any  power  of  revision  or  check  can  only  spring 
from  confounding  the  ideas  of  power  and  right.  That  the  House  can, 
without  violating  any  express  clause  of  the  Constitution,  refuse  an 
appropriation,  is  clear ;  but  that  is  far  from  proving  the  moral  right  of 
such  refusal.  It  is  impossible  to  create  a  government  with  any  free 
dom  of  action  at  nil,  without  affording  an  opportunity  for  the  abuse 
of  that  power ;  and  a  capacity  to  do  wrong  does  not  surely  imply  a 
right  to  do  so.  And,  however  plausible  certain  extreme  cases  may  be 
made  to  appear,  ii  is  certain,  that,  to  adopt  this  theory  would  be  to 
introduce  inconsistency  in  the  principles,  and  confusion  in  the  prac 
tice,  of  the  government. 


124  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

Jay  had  little  else  to  do  than  to  accept  or  reject  what 
the  British  government  chose  to  offer.  Nor,  in  the 
details  of  the  treaty,  considered  as  a  regulation  of  our 
interests  and  a  settlement  of  our  difficulties,  is  there  any 
thing  to  excite  our  pride.  The  posts  were  delivered  up 
only  after  an  additional  and  unnecessary  delay ;  —  the 
question  of  the  negroes,  which  involved  a  principle  of 
the  deepest  import  to  one  half  the  country,  was  aban 
doned  ;  —  impressment  was  not  prevented ;  —  the  injuri 
ous  and  presumptuous  interpolation  into  the  law  of 
nations,  contained  in  the  British  orders  of  1793,  was 
acquiesced  in;  —  and  the  only  concession  offered  to  the 
commerce  of  the  country  was  so  small,  and  its  accom 
panying  conditions  were  so  distasteful  and  injurious, 
that,  after  mature  deliberation,  the  United  States  re 
fused  to  accept  it. 

But  true  as  is  all  this,  and  paradoxical  as  it  may  seem, 
it  is  equally  true  that  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of 
1794  was  an  immense  benefit  to  the  country.  The  con 
dition  of  things  was  such,  that  some  arrangement  of 
the  open  questions  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States,  or  war,  was  the  impending  alternative. 
For  the  policy  of  which  Mr.  Jefferson  was  the  represent 
ative,  and  which  he  had  the  opportunity  of  carrying  out 
a  few  years  after,  was  impracticable.  That  policy  con 
sisted  in  preserving  neutrality  between  the  contending 
parties,  according  to  the  strict  letter  of  existing  treaties ; 
but  to  infuse  a  warmer  and  friendlier  temper  into  the 
relations  with  France  on  the  one  hand,  and  at  the  same 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  125 

time  to  oppose  the  commercial  illiberality  of  Great 
Britain  by  a  system;  of  reciprocal  domestic  restriction 
at  home.  A  little  .'examination  will  show,  that  this  pol 
icy  would  have  effectually  injured  our  own  commerce, 
excited  strong  sectional  irritation,  checked  very  consid 
erably  the  spirit  of  commercial  and  maritime  enterprise, 
which,  in  spite  of  all  difficulties,  was  rapidly  developing 
itself,  and  failed  entirely  to  remove. any  one  of  the  causes 
of  ill  feeling  between  the  two  nation's.  Gen.  Washing 
ton  thought  differently.  The  tone  of  Prance  was  be 
coming  every  day  more  insolent,  and  her  demands  more 
exacting,  while  the  progress  of  the  Revolution  was 
diminishing  constantly  the  real  material  interests  which 
connected  her  with  the  United  States.  But  it  was  im 
possible  to  reply  to  France  with  becoming  temper,  while 
the  presence  of  British  troops  on  the  soil  of  the  United 
States,  and.  the  unscrupulous  disregard  of  neutral  rights 
by  England,  kept  alive  and  strengthened  the  bitter 
popular  animosity,  which  the  events  of  the  revolu 
tionary  war  had  excited.  Some  arrangement  with 
England  was  therefore  indispensable ;  such  an  arrange 
ment  as  he  desired  he  could  not  obtain,  and  he  there 
fore  wisely  determined  to  take  what  he  could  get.  In 
the  first  place,  the  negotiation  of  any  treaty  was  a 
point  gained.  For  in  this,  as  in  every  difficulty  be 
tween  England  and  the  United  States,  grave  as  were 
the  issues,  they  were  complicated  by  a  conviction  on 
the  mind  of  the  American  people,  of  a  supercilious  in 
difference  on  the  part  of  England  as  to  their  feelings, 
11* 


126  DIPLOMATIC    II I  S  T'O  E  Y  . 

accompanied  by  a  shrewd  and  active  desire  to  injure 
their  interests.  The  fact  that  questions  of  prime  im 
portance  to  them  had  been  wiJ  fully  left  open  by  Great 
Britain,  that  remonstrance  after  remonstrance  had  been 
neglected,  that  discussion  was  provokingly  delayed,  and 
that  the  reciprocity  of  diplomatic  representation  had 
been  slowly  conceded  and  barely  sustained,  were  sources 
of  perpetual  complaint.  A  treaty  put  an  end  to  this 
vague  but  powerful  dissatisfaction.  The  discussion  of 
differences  implied  a  certain  respect  and  consideration 
for  the  parties  with  whom  they  were  conducted ;  and 
although  there  might  be  strong,  perhaps  insuperable, 
difficulties,  a  frank  commencement  of  explanation  was 
a  great  step  to  satisfactory  settlement.  Then  the  evac 
uation  of  the  posts  removed  one  great  offence ;  the  as 
sumption  of  the  British  debts  by  the  United  States,  sub 
ject  to  the  decision  of  a  joint  commission,  however 
doubtful  in  principle,  put  an  end  to  a  clamor  on  the  part 
of  a  large  and  influential  class  in  England,  which  was 
always  provoking  angry  retorts  from  the  United  States, 
and  thus  keeping  up  the  bad  blood  between  the  two 
countries;  and  the  appointment  of  another  commission 
to  decide  upon  the  alleged  violation  of  neutral  rights 
might  fairly  be  represented  as  an  approach  towards 
justice.  Unpopular,  too,  as  the  treaty  might  be,  it  had 
this  great  advantage.  As  long  as  the  popular  feeling 
was  excited  against  Great  Britain  as  the  direct  cause  of 
ah1  these  evils,  its  expression  tended  to  the  encourage 
ment  of  actual  hostilities ;  and  in  connection  with  the 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  127 

sympathy  for  France,  growing  stronger  every  day,  could 
not  have  been  long  repressed.  Bat  as  soon  as  the 
treaty  —  an  act  of  the  United  States  government  — 
was  interposed  between  England  and  the  popular  feel 
ing,  the  excitement,  though  concentrated  in  its  current, 
was  diverted  in  its  channel:  and  the  same  popular  in 
dignation,  which,  directed  against  England,  was  almost 
too  strong  for  control,  when  directed  against  the  treaty, 
encountered  an  opposition  equally  national  in  its  char 
acter  and  patriotic  in  its  motive.  And  thus  questions, 
which  at  one  time  threatened  to  involve  the  country  in 
foreign  war,  passed  passionately,  but  harmlessly,  into 
the  safer  arena  of  domestic  politics.  For  it  must  be 
recollected,  that  the  basis  upon  which  the  justification 
of  this  treaty  rests  is,  that  it  was  the  alternative  of 
war,  —  a  war  in  which  the  United  States  could,  accord 
ing  to  the  confession  of  a  contemporary  statesman,  have 
barely  maintained  their  existence  and  their  honor ;  and 
that,  by  accepting  this  treaty,  while  they  avoided  war 
with  England,  they  so  strengthened  their  position  that 
they  were  enabled  to  avoid  a  war  with  France,  and  so 
preserved  the  opportunity  for  that  development  which 
enabled  them,  in  future  years,  to  deal  with  both  powers 
on  the  footing  of  the  most  perfect  equality.  The  great 
merit,  therefore,  of  Gen.  Washington's  administration 
is,  that  it  was  wise  enough  to  recognize,  and  firm 
enough  to  accept,  a  great  national  necessity.  And  this 
is  no  slight  praise.  It  is  an  easy  and  pleasant  thing 
for  a  statesman  to  become  the  instrument  of  national 


128  D  I  P  T,  0  M  A  T  I  C     II I  8  T  0  11  Y  . 

strength,  the  mouth-piece  of  national  pride  ;  but  only 
to  a  few  chief  spirits  of  history  is  it  given  to  create 
strength  from  their  weakness,  and  to  develop  a  noble 
pride  from  a  wise  humility.  This  high  privilege  was, 
however,  granted  to  Washington  and  the  great  men 
who  supported  him  in  that  momentous  struggle.  They 
were  forced  to  stand  with  folded  arms  in  the  presence 
of  wrongs  which  they  resented ;  to  check  national  sym 
pathies  which  they  shared :  to  confess  national  weakness 
which  they  deplored.  But  they  looked  beyond  the 
wounded  pride  of  the  present  moment  to  the  sober  cer 
tainty  of  a  future  recompense.  They  had  faith  enough 
in  their  work  to  trust  the  future  to  posterity,  and  suffi 
ciently  and  successfully  has  that  posterity  vindicated 
their  policy. 

This  view  of  the  treaty,  while  it  authorizes  the  pro- 
foundest  admiration  for  those  who  negotiated  and  main 
tained  it,  allows  us  at  the  same  time  to  comprehend 
thoroughly,  and  appreciate  fairly,  the  earnest  patriotism 
of  that  great  party  which  opposed  it.  ft  is  easy  to  un 
derstand  how  repugnant  to  many  sincere  convictions, 
how  odious  to  many  honest  prejudices,  how  injurious 
to  many  important  interests,  this  treaty  must  have  ap 
peared  ;  and  we  may  well  be  grateful  that  the  elements 
of  political  strife  were  so  tempered  that  mutual  con 
cession  and  opposition  worked  together  upon  the  popu 
lar  mind,  and  the  very  progress  of  the  adoption  of  an 
unsatisfactory  and  unpopular  treaty  tended  to  that 
unity  and  energy  of  national  sentiment,  which  was  sure, 
in  time,  to  render  all  such  treaties  unnecessary. 


CHAPTER,   III. 

NEGOTIATIONS  AND    CONVENTION  WITH    FRANCE. 

WHEN  Mr.  Jefferson  was  appointed  Secretary  of 
State,  it  became  necessary  to  nominate  a  successor  for 
the  French  mission  ;  and  certainly,  a  more  perfect  con 
trast  to  Mr.  Jefferson  than  that  successor  it  would 
have  been  impossible  to  find.  Gouverneur  Morris 
sprang  from  a  family  which  had  for  generations  pos 
sessed  large  wealth  and  wielded  great  political  influ 
ence  in  New  York.  His  grandfather  had  been  Gov 
ernor  of  New  Jersey,  and  Chief  Justice  of  New  York. 
His  father  had  held  high  judicial  office  in  New  York, 
with  jurisdiction  extending  into  the  neighboring  colo 
nies.  His  uncle  had  held  both  judicial  and  executive 
office  of  the  highest  rank  in  New  Jersey  and  Pennsyl 
vania.  Of  his  three  brothers,  one  was  a  signer  of  the 
Declaration  of  Independence,  another  was  Chief  Jus 
tice  of  New  York,  and  the  third  had  been  for  some 
years  an  officer  in  the  British  army,  and  a  member  of 
Parliament.  Mr.  Morris  himself  had  taken  an  active 
part  in  the  politics  of  the  United  States.  He  was  a 
member  of  the  Continental  Congress,  assistant  finan- 


130  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

cier  to  his  eminent  kinsman,  Robert  Morris,  who  was 
the  financial  genius  of  the  Revolution,  and  a  member 
of  the  convention  which  framed  the  Constitution.  He 
was  one  of  Washington's  most  intimate  friends,  and 
had  been  intrusted  by  him  with  the  informal  negotia 
tions  with  England,  the  history  of  which  has  already 
been  narrated.  He  was  an  accomplished  scholar,  a 
thinker  of  some  depth  and  great  quickness,  and  as  an 
orator  he  had  distinguished  himself  both  in  the  Con 
gress  and  in  the  convention,  where  his  manner  was 
eminently  graceful,  and  his  style  both  pointed  and 
fluent.  In  spite  OL'  an  accident  by  which  he  had  lost 
a  leg,  he  was  a  man  of  elegant  address  and.  courtly 
manners,  fond  of  the  pleasant  courtesies  of  society,  and 
an  expert  in  that  delicate  social  science  which  adds  a 
charm  to  the  warmth  of  bospilality  by  the  refinement 
of  its  display,  hi  more  regular  times,  his  presence  in 
Paiis  would  have  heen  agreeable  to  the  court  of  France, 
and  .serviceable  to  his  own  government.  As  it  was, 
never  was  an  ambassador  more  miserably  misplaced. 
He  received,  his  appointment  —  an  appointment  very 
reluctantly  confirmed  by  the  Senate  —  in  1792,  in 
Paris,  where  he  had  been  residing,  with  short  absences, 
since  1789.  In  communicating  the  appointment,  Gen 
eral  Washington  addressed  him  specially  and  privately, 
and  stated  the  objections  which  had  been  made,  to  his 
nomination.  "  Ii  was  urged,"  said  he,  "that  in  France 
you  were  considered  as  a  favorer  of  the  aristocracy,  and 
unfriendly  to  its  Revolution  (I  suppose  they  meant  the 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  131 

constitution) ;  that  under  this  impression,  you  could  not 
be  an  acceptable  character,  and,  of  consequence,  you 
would  not  be  able,  however  willing,  to  promote  the 
interest  of  this  country  in  an  essential  degree."  Wheth 
er,  at  this  time,  anybody  could  have  served  the  coun 
try  ';  in  an  essential  degree,"  may  well  be  doubted ;  but 
if  there  was  one  man  who  must  have  been  peculiarly 
unacceptable  to  every  administration  with  which  he  had 
to  deal,  from  Dumourier,  who  was  Minister  of  .Foreign 
Affairs  when  he  was  presented,  to  the  bloodthirsty  ruf 
fians  -who  were  in  power  when  he  was  recalled,  Mr. 
Morris  was  that  man.  During  the  two  or  three  years 
previous  to  his  appointment,  in  which  he  had  resided 
in  Paris,  he  had  identified  himself,  as  completely  as  it 
was  possible  for  a  stranger,  with  the  King's  friends. 
He  expressed  openly  his  conviction  that  the  new  consti 
tution  was  a  failure;  and,  through  those  connected 
with  the  court,  had  submitted  to  his  Majesty  the  draft 
of  an  address  to  be  made  when  accepting  the  constitu 
tion.  The  address  commences  thus  :  — 

"  GENTLEMEN:  It  is  no  longer  your  King  who  ad 
dresses  you.  Louis  XVI.  is  only  a  private  individual. 
You  have  just  offered  him  the  crown,  and  informed  him 
on  what  conditions  he  must  accept  it.  I  assure  you, 
gentlemen,  that  if  I  were  a  stranger  in  France,  I  would 
not  mount  the  slippery  steps  of  the  throne."  It  con 
cludes  :  "  I  have  been  a  king.  Nothing  remains  for  me 
now  either  of  authority  or  of  influence.  Yet  I  have  a 
last  duty  to  fulfil.  It  is  that  of  imparting  to  you  my 


132  DIPLOMATIC    HISTOEY. 

reflections  on  your  work.  I  pray  you  to  hear  them 
with  serious  attention."  And  then  follows  a  very  long, 
but  not  very  profound  political  essay,  on  the  faults  of 
the  constitution  which  he  had  just  accepted.  Accom 
panying  this  strange  paper  was  a  still  stranger  memoir, 
given  to  Mons.  Montmorin  on  the  31st  of  August, 
1791.  It  appears  not  to  have  reached  the  King  until 
after  his  acceptance  of  the  constitution,  and  was  re 
turned  to  Mr.  Morris,  with  a  request  for  a  translation. 
It  would  be  useless  to  review  this  document,  but  one 
paragraph  deserves  notice.  Speaking  of  the  King  in 
the  third  person,  Mr.  Morris  says:  "  But  it  is  important 
for  him  to  show  that  he  has  acted  consistently.  And 
yet  this  should  be  accomplished  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
produce  the  effect,  without  appearing  to  intend  it;  be 
cause  such  appearance  would  place  him  in  the  situation 
of  one  who  defends  himself  before  his  judges ;  and  a 
king  should  never  forget  Lhat  he  is  accountable  only  to 
God." 

That  Mr.  Morris  was  entitled  to  hold  his  own  opin 
ions,  and,  so  long  as  he  was  a  private  person,  to  advise 
any  policy  to  which  his  Majesty  thought  fit  to  listen, 
and  to  act  with  any  party  who  had  his  sympathies,  and 
whose  confidence  he  had,  nobody  will  dispute.  But  it 
is  equally  as  indisputable,  that  any  one  holding  such 
opinions,  and  so  connected,  could  be  of  no  possible  ser 
vice  either  to  France  or  the  United  States,  in  a  diplo 
matic  capacity,  at  that  time.  But  Mr.  Morris's  inter 
ference  did  not  end  when  his  public  character  began. 


.     DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  133 

As  minister  of  the  United  States,  he  contrived,  and 
very  nearly  accomplished,  the  escape  of  Louis  XVI. 
from  Paris.  He  became  that  monarch's  agent,  by  re 
ceiving  and  disbursing  a  large  amount  of  money ;  and 
the  unexpended  balance  of  that  fund  he  preserved  •  and 
accounted  for,  after  the  termination  of  his  mission. 
While  it  is  impossible  to  attach  any  moral  blame  to 
this  conduct,  while  it  is  impossible  not  to  sympathize 
with  Mr.  Morris's  righteous  indignation  at  the  horrors 
with  which  he  was  surrounded,  while  every  instinct  of 
common  humanity  would  rejoice  at  the  success  of  his 
earnest  endeavor,  it  is  impossible  to  justify  his  conduct 
as  the  diplomatic  representative  of  the  United  States. 
The  minister  of  any  other  power  occupied  a  different 
position.  The  representatives  of  the  kindred  Bourbon 
dynasties,  the  ambassadors  of  allied  monarchs,  would 
have  been  justified  in  regarding  Louis  as  France.  Not 
so  with  the  minister  of  the  United  States.  They  had 
received  from  Louis  himself  notice  of  his  acceptance 
of  the  new  constitution,  and  they  had  expressed  their 
joy  at  the  prospect  of  a  freer  life  to  the  French  nation. 
Any  difference  between  the  French  monarch  and  the 
Assembly  was  a  subject  purely  domestic,  and  their  min 
ister  could  not  interfere  with  decency.  If,  after  that 
constitution  had  gone  into  operation,  such  disorganiza 
tion  was  the  result  as  dissolved  all  authority,  the  course 
of  Mr.  Morris  was  clear ;  either  to  disembarrass  himself 
promptly  of  his  diplomatic  character,  or  inform  his  gov 
ernment  of  the  state  of  things,  and  wait  their  decision. 
12 


134  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

His  action,  such  as  it  was,  was  injudicious,  inconsist 
ent,  and  not  mischievous  only  because  it  was  useless.* 
As  may  be  supposed,  his  residence  in  Paris  was  far 
from  agreeable.  The  majesty  which  he  reverenced  and 
would  have  served  was  humiliated,  persecuted,  mur 
dered.  The  graceful  and  generous  society  which  he 
loved  was  scattered  by  death,  and  into  exile.  The  gov 
ernment  to  which  he  was  accredited  was  administered 
by  fierce  fanatics  or  rude  and  ribald  ruffians.  His 
house  was  thronged  with  pale  and  trembling  fugitives, 
whose  prosperity  he  had  shared,  and  whose  weakness 
he  protected  with  a  courage  worthy  of  his  character  and 
his  country.  His  differences  with  the  government  be 
came  every  day  more  serious,  and  his  personal  annoy 
ances  more  irritating.  Almost  his  only  diplomatic 
duties  were  to  protest,  and  to  protest  vainly,  against 
French  decrees  which  violated  neutral  rights,  and  the 
lawless  depredation  of  French  privateers.  His  diplo 
matic  colleagues,  one  after  another,  had  withdrawn 
from  the  dismal  and  bloody  city ;  and  he,  finally,  with- 

*  While  commenting  thus  freely  upon  the  conduct  of  Mr.  Morris 
in  permitting  his  honorable  and  natural  sympathies  to  govern  his 
public  course,  it  is  but  fair  to  add  the  following  extract  from  a  letter 
of  the  Duke  of  Dorset,  the  English  ambassador  at  Paris.  Writing 
to  Mr.  Pitt,  July  9,  1789,  he  said:  "Mr.  Jefferson,  the  American 
minister  at  this  court,  has  been  a  great  deal  consulted  by  the  prin 
cipal  leaders  of  the  tiers  etat ;  and  I  have  great  reason  to  think  it 
was  owing  to  his  advice  that  order  called  itself  L' Assemblee  Na- 
tionale"  —  Tomline's  Life  of  Pitt,  Vol.  II.  p.  266. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  135 

out  abandoning  his  diplomatic  character,  removed  to 
Sainport,  about  thirty  miles  from  Paris,  where  he  pur 
chased  a  country  residence,  and  remained  until  his 
recall. 

While  the  presence  of  Mr.  Morris  in  Paris  was  far 
from  beneficial  to  the  relations  of  the  two  countries, 
the  extraordinary  conduct  of  the  French  minister  at 
Philadelphia  was  forcing  the  governments  to  an  im 
mediate  issue.  M.  Genet  had  been  sent  from  Paris  in 
1793,  just  after  the  declaration  of  war  against  England. 
When  he  left  France,  the  feeble  virtues  of  the  Giron 
dists  were  fast  yielding  before  the  unscrupulous  energy 
of  their  opponents,  and,  as  a  party,  they  were  sinking 
from  power  to  persecution  ;  while  the  Jacobin  party, 
under  the  lead  of  Robespierre,  was  gathering  to  itself 
those  elements  of  fierce  and  relentless  strength  with 
which,  soon  after,  it  terrified  and  trampled  over  the 
allied  monarchies  of  Europe.  M.  Genet  did  not  share 
the  ferocious  fanaticism  of  the  Jacobins  ;  but  the  smell 
of  blood  was  on  his  ambassadorial  garments.  As  the 
representative  of  the  Convention,  he  spoke  from  the 
scaffold  of  Louis,  the  true  and  tried  friend  of  the  peo 
ple  among  whom  he  had  come.  His  conduct  could  not 
be  discreet  nor  his  language  moderate,  as,  unfortunately 
for  himself,  whatever  may  been  his  private  virtues,  he 
was  the  mouth-piece  of  a  usurped  and  selfish  despot 
ism.  Scarcely  had  he  landed,  therefore,  before  he  ex 
hibited  in  his  words  and  deeds  that  reckless  insolence 
which  is  the  constant  accompaniment  of  a  false  and 


136  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

forced  authority.  He  had  come  to  the  country  to  use 
it,  —  as  a  commissioner  of  the  Convention,  to  draft  its 
men,  convert  its  money,  and  constrain  its  laws,  in  sub 
servience  to  the  policy  of  France.  He  began  where  he 
landed ;  and,  from  Charleston  to  New  York,  he  organ 
ized  public  opinion,  enlisted  men,  equipped  vessels,  and 
commissioned  privateers.  In  vain  the  government  re 
monstrated  with  him,  warned  him,  checked  him.  Every 
remonstrance  provoked  a  more  extravagant  reply  ;  every 
warning  was  followed  by  a  renewed  violation  of  law 
and  courtesy;  and,  finally,  when  a  positive  prohibition 
stopped  him  in  his  violent  career,  he  denounced  the 
conduct  of  the  government  in  language  unparalleled  in 
the  diplomatic  intercourse  of  the  world.  "  In  vain," 
was  his  insulting  reply,  "  in  vain  the  desire  to  preserve 
peace  leads  you  to  sacrifice  the  interests  of  France  to 
this  interest  of  the  moment ;  in  vain  the  thirst  for  riches 
preponderates  against  honor,  in  the  political  balance  of 
America;  all  this  management,  all  these  condescen 
sions,  all  this  humiliation,  end  in  nothing.  Our  enemies 
laugh  at  it ;  and  the  French,  too  confident,  are  punished 
for  having  believed  that  the  American  nation  had  a 
flag ;  that  it  had  some  respect  for  its  laws,  some  convic 
tion  of  its  force,  and  that  it  had  some  sentiment  of  its 
dignity.  ...  If  our  fellow-citizens  have  been  deceived, 
if  you  are  not  in  a  condition  to  maintain  the  sover 
eignty  of  your  people,  speak.  We  have  guaranteed  it 
when  slaves :  we  know  how  to  render  it  respectable  hav 
ing  become  free."  This  language  forced  the  govern- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  137 

ment  to  demand  his  immediate  recall.  The  French 
government  complied  with  the  demand,  but  it  accom 
panied  its  acquiescence  with  a  desire  that  Mr.  Morris 
should  be  likewise  recalled  from  Paris,  a  request  which 
was  immediately  granted.  But  the  personal  career  of 
these  two  ministers,  useless  in  one  case,  and  mischiev 
ous  in  the  other^  was  only  an  incident  among  greater 
events,  and  a  symptom  of  the  working  of  those  princi 
ples  which  shaped  the  policy  of  the  country,  and  to  the 
course  of  which,  disembarrassed  of  their  personal  con 
nection,  attention  must  now  be  directed. 

However  public  sentiment  may  have  been  affected 
towards  the  events  and  principles  of  the  French  Rev 
olution,  the  declaration  of  war  by  the  new  republic 
against  England,  in  February,  1793,  made  the  relation 
of  the  United  States  to  France  a  question  of  practical 
politics.  For,  by  the  treaty  and  convention  negotiated 
with  the  old  French  monarchy,  the  United  States  had 
bound  themselves  to  perform  certain  duties,  and  had 
assumed  certain  responsibilities.  By  the  treaty  of  alli 
ance,  they  had  guaranteed  the  French  possessions  in 
America,  had  pledged  themselves  to  put  France  com 
mercially  on  the  footing  of  the  most  favored  nation,  had 
undertaken  a  system  of  mutual  convoy  and  protection, 
had  entered  into  a  special  agreement  as  to  contraband, 
had  assured  to  France  the  right  of  bringing  into  Ameri 
can  ports  all  prizes  without  restraint  or  question,  had 
excluded  all  prizes  of  her  enemies  from  the  same  privi 
lege,  and,  by  the  consular  convention,  had  permitted 
12  * 


T38  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

the  organization  of  a  consular  jurisdiction,  which  might 
easily,  if  not  legitimately,  be  expanded  into  an  exclusive 
authority  on  the  most  important  and  delicate  neutral 
questions.  The  declaration  of  war  summoned  the 
United  States  distinctly  to  the  discharge  of  these  obli 
gations,  the  faithful  execution  of  which  must  necessarily 
have  involved  them  in  a  war  with  England.  But  with 
that  nation  they  were  at  peace,  and  the  commercial 
interests  of  the  country  required  that  they  should  con 
tinue  so ;  while  the  condition  both  of  their  military 
strength  and  financial  capacity  made  the  idea  of  war 
impossible.  And  yet,  unfortunately,  both  England  and 
France  deemed  it  necessary,  not  indeed  to  compel  the 
participation  of  the  United  States  in  actual  war,  but  to 
disregard,  altogether  the  neutral  position  which  it  was 
their  great  policy  to  occupy.  At  the  outset,  therefore, 
there  were  two  courses  open  to  the  United  States ;  — 
either  to  give  way  to  the  pressure  of  circumstances,  and 
join  one  or  the  other  of  the  contending  parties,  or  to  de 
clare  the  French  treaties  null  and  void,  and,  without 
approaching  England,  hold  themselves  free  and  neutral. 
Neither  their  wishes  nor  their  weakness  permitted  the 
first  course.  And  although  the  execution  of  the  treaties 
in  their  spirit  was  scarcely  reconcilable  with  a  genuine 
neutrality,  the  second  course  was  opposed  by  a  strong 
public  sentiment,  which  naturally  sympathized  with 
France ;  by  the  unfriendly,  if  not  hostile  relations  with 
England ;  and  by  the  fact  that  it  was  doubtful  if  France 
would  admit  any  such  right  of  abrogation,  and  would 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  139 

not  consider  its  exercise  as  a  declaration  of  war.  It  is 
true,  that,  when  the  treaty  of  amity  and  alliance  was 
concluded,  it  was  concluded  with  France  occupying  an 
established  position  in  the  European  system ;  a  position, 
which,  involving  certain  well-known  relations  with  other 
powers,  afforded  to  both  governments  the  means  of  a 
reasonable  calculation  as  to  the  nature,  extent,  and  con 
sequences  of  their  obligations.  Now  the  Revolution  in 
France  had  destroyed  that  position,  altered  those  rela 
tions,  and  forced  consequences  upon  those  obligations 
such  as  the  original  parties  could  never  have  contem 
plated.  Besides  which,  the  French  government  had,  in 
Condorcet's  famous  report  on  the  declaration  of  war 
against  Austria,  claimed  the  right,  under  her  changed 
circumstances,  of  determining  for  herself  what  treaties  of 
the  old  monarchy  she  would  accept,  and  what  reject, — 
a  right  which  she  could  not,  therefore,  deny  to  any 
other  parties  to  her  treaties.  But  such  an  abrogation 
carried  with  it  an  implied  condemnation  of  the  French 
Revolution,  and  an  inferential  denial  of  popular  rights, 
which  were  totally  inconsistent  with  the  historical  posi 
tion  of  the  United  States ;  while,  in  case  of  a  gei^eral 
war,  great  benefits  might  be  drawn  from  the  faithful 
execution,  by  France,  of  certain  articles  in  the  treaty. 
After  long  and  conscientious  deliberation,  General 
Washington  determined  upon  a  course  which  was 
neither  one  nor  the  other ;  and  which,  notwithstanding 
its  fair  and  honest  spirit,  combined,  it  must  be  acknowl 
edged,  the  difficulties  of  both.  He  resolved  to  main- 


140  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

tain  neutrality  and  the  French  treaty  together  ;  and,  on 
the  22d  of  April,  1793,  published  his  proclamation  of 
neutrality :  — 

"  Whereas  it  appears  that  a  state  of  war  exists  be 
tween  Austria,  Prussia,  Sardinia,  Great  Britain,  and 
the  United  Netherlands  on  the  one  part,  and  France  on 
the  other;  and  the  duty  and  interest  of  the  United 
States  require  that  they  should,  with  sincerity  and  good 
faith,  adopt  and  pursue  a  conduct  friendly  and  impar 
tial  towards  the  belligerent  powers  :  — 

"  I  have,  therefore,  thought  fit,  by  these  presents,  to 
declare  the  disposition  of  the  United  States  to  observe 
the  conduct  aforesaid  towards  those  powers  respectively, 
and  to  exhort  and  warn  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  carefully  to  avoid  all  acts  and  proceedings  what 
soever,  which  may  in  any  manner  tend  to  contravene 
such  disposition. 

"  And  I  do  hereby  also  make  known,  that  whoso 
ever  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  shall  render 
himself  liable  to  punishment  or  forfeiture  under  the  law 
of  nations,  by  committing,  aiding,  or  abetting  hostilities 
against  any  one  of  the  said  powers,  or  by  carrying  to 
any  of  them  those  articles  which  are  deemed  contra 
band  by  the  modern  usage  of  nations,  will  not  receive 
the  protection  of  the  United  States  against  such  pun 
ishment  or  forfeiture  ;  and,  further,  that  I  have  given 
instructions  to  those  officers  to  whom  it  belongs,  to 
cause  prosecutions  to  be  instituted  against  all  persons 
who  shall,  within  the  cognizance  of  the  courts  of  the 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  141 

United  States,  violate  the  law  of  nations  with  respect 
to  the  powers  at  war,  or  any  of  them. 

"  GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 
"  By  the  President,  THOMAS  JEFFERSON." 
Scarcely  had  this  proclamation  been  published,  than 
the  difficulties  of  the  course  resolved  on  began  to  de 
velop  themselves.  From  one  end  of  the  country  to  the 
other,  public  opinion  was  in  a  ferment.  Public  meet 
ings,  under  the  influence  of  passionate  speeches,  passed 
resolutions  of  the  most  extravagant  sympathy  with 
France.  Turbulent  spirits  everywhere  hastened  to 
the  Frenoh  minister  with  offers  of  material  aid  ;  arms 
were  purchased,  privateers  fitted  out,  commissions 
issued,  and  the  French  minister  superintended  these 
illegal  proceedings  with  all  the  insolent  effrontery  that 
sprang  from  the  consciousness  of  a  popular  power 
which  he  deemed  above  the  administration.  Every 
day  brought  a  new  subject  of  complaint;  and  the 
Department  of  State  was  involved  in  perpetual  and  irri 
tating  controversy  with  M.  Genet,  who  appealed,  not 
without  a  show  of  reason,  to  the  covenanted  friend 
ship  of  the  treaty  of  alliance. 

Besides  complaints  of  so  trivial  a  character  that  they 
would  have  been  simply  ridiculous,  but  for  the  studied 
impertinence  of  tone  in  which  they  were  couched, 
M.  Genet,  under  the  22d  article  of  the  treaty,,  which 
provided  that  "it  shall  not  be  lawful  for  any  foreign 
privateers,  not  belonging  to  the  subjects  of  the  most 
Christian  King,  nor  citizens  of  the  said  United  States 


142  DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY. 

who  have  commissions  from  any  prince  or  state  in 
amity  with  either  nation,  to  fit  their  ships  in  the  ports 
of  either  the  one  or  the  other  of  the  aforesaid  parties," 
claimed  the  right  of  arming  privateers  in  the  ports,  and 
enlisting  the  citizens,  of  the  United  States.  To  this, 
Mr.  Jefferson  replied,  that  the  right  of  arming  privateers, 
not  being  a  natural  right,  and  depending  upon  express 
treaty  provision,  could  not  be  claimed  by  inference; 
and  that  prohibition  of  this  right  to  one  nation,  did  not 
necessarily  imply  permission  to  another;  that  it  was 
one  thing  to  forbid  any  nation  at  war  with  France  to 
arm  in  American  ports,  but  another  and  a  very  differ 
ent  thing  to  permit  French  privateers  to  arm  therein 
against  any  other  nation;  that  to  give  such  negative 
stipulations  an  affirmative  effect  would  be  to  render 
them  inconsistent,  and,  in  good  faith,  impossible. 
France  herself  was,  previous  to  the  war  with  Eng 
land,  bound  by  treaty  stipulation  not  to  allow  the 
arming  of  privateers  in  her  ports  of  nations  at  war 
with  England.  If,  then,  the  United  States  had  been 
at  war  with  England,  and  the  22d  article  of  the  treaty 
with  France  was  construed  according  to  the  French 
interpretation,  she  would  be  bound  by  one  treaty  to 
allow  American  privateers  to  arm  in  her  ports,  while  by 
another,  equally  positive,  she  was  bound  to  forbid  such 
a  proceeding.  If,  therefore,  such  a  right  was  not  the 
strict  and  inevitable  consequence  of  the  treaty,  to  per 
mit  it  in  the  present  case  would  be  so  far  distinctly  to 
abandon  the  neutrality  between  France  and  her  ene- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  143 

mies,   upon   which   the    government  had   formally   re 
solved. 

Several  British  vessels  having  been  taken  within  the 
waters  of  the  United  States  by  French  privateers,  the 
government  demanded  their  restitution,  stating  ex 
plicitly,  that,  in  case  of  refusal,  it  would  itself  make  the 
necessary  compensation,  and  hold  the  French  govern 
ment  responsible  for  repayment.  In  reply  to  this, 
M.  Genet  claimed,  that,  under  the  treaty,  and  espe 
cially  in  view  of  the  consular  convention,  the  courts 
of  the  United  States  could  take  no  cognizance  as  to 
whether  vessels  held  by  the  French  as  prizes  were 
lawful  prizes  or  not;  that  such  jurisdiction  belonged 
exclusively  to  their  consulates,  which  had  recently,  by 
decree  of  the  Assembly,  been  erected  into  complete 
courts  of  admiralty.  In  reply,  Mr.  Jefferson  denied  the 
right  of  the  French  government  to  extend  their  consular 
jurisdiction  by  investing  their  consuls  with  admiralty 
powers,  unless  with  consent  expressly  given  by  the 
United  States.  But  without  dwelling  upon  -this  point, 
which  the  unfortunate  consular  convention  perhaps 
rendered  disputable,  he  declared  that  the  United  States 
claimed  no  right  to  determine  the  question  of  prize  as 
to  captures  made  on  the  high  seas,  but  that  the  United 
States  were  bound,  in  virtue  of  their  voluntarily  as 
sumed  neutrality,  to  protect  their  own  waters,  and  to 
maintain  the  inviolability  of  every  vessel  within  their 
maritime  limits  ;  that  they  had,  therefore,  in  every  case, 
a  perfect  right  to  determine  whether  a  capture  had  been 


144  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

made  within  their  waters,  and  if  it  had,  they  were  fur 
ther  bound  to  dissolve  such  illegal  seizure. 

M.  Genet  further  demanded  that  the  United  States, 
having  stipulated  with  France,  that,  as  between  them, 
free  ships  should  make  free  goods,  they  were  bound  to 
enforce  that  doctrine,  as  a  principle  of  international  law, 
against  all  the  belligerents  in  the  present  war ;  —  that 
merchant  vessels,  coming  into  American  ports  with  such 
armaments  as  are  usually  carried  for  self-protection, 
should  be  treated  as  privateers,  or  at  least  not  allowed 
to  return  to  sea  with  such  armament;  —  and  that  all 
goods  captured  by  French  privateers  should  be  sold  in 
the  ports  of  the  United  States  without  the  imposition 
of  the  customs  duty  usually  charged  on  ordinary 
merchandise.  In  other  words,  M.  Genet  demanded 
that  the  United  States  should  do  every  thing  which 
an  ally  cquld,  without  committing  an  overt  and  direct 
act  of  hostility  to  England.  The  United  States,  on  the 
other  hand,  had  resolved  to  carry  out  a  system  of  com 
plete  neutrality,  and  to  allow  it  to  be  infringed  only 
where  the  narrowest  and  strictest  interpretation  of  the 
treaties  with  France  compelled  them  to  deviate  in  the 
discharge  of  treaty  obligations.  The  real  condition  of 
the  two  nations  was  evidently  inconsistent  with  their 
treaty  relations.  The  treaties  had  been  formed  at  a 
time  when  the  interests  and  sympathies  of  the  two  na 
tions  were  identical,  and  they  reflected  correctly  both 
the  public  sentiment  and  the  political  necessities  of 
their  dates.  But  circumstances  had  greatly  changed, 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  145 

and  it  was  possible  for  neither  party  to  discharge  their 
obligations  with  reciprocal  advantage.  The  French 
Republic  demanded  that  the  alliance  made  with  the  old 
monarchy  should  be  carried  out  in  the  spirit  of  frank  and 
friendly  reciprocity  in  which  it  was  formed ;  forgetting 
that  their  revolution  had  literally  obliterated  one  of  the 
contracting  parties,  and  that  they  could  prove  no  suc 
cession  to  its  sentiments,  interests,  or  rights.  While 
the  United  States  were  compelled  to  reply  to  these  de 
mands,  exacting  in  tone  and  disastrous  in  consequence, 
by  that  sort  of  special  pleading  which,  however  logical 
and  necessary,  is  scarcely  ever  in  conformity  with  the 
temper  "  of  a  true  and  sincere  friendship." 

While  the  French  minister  was  making  reclamations 
and  claiming  the  privileges  of  the  treaty  in  one  interest, 
the  British  legation  was  clamorous  in  the  other.  Mr. 
Hammond  watched  the  proceedings  of  the  French 
minister  closely ;  and  whenever  a  complaint  could  be 
supported  or  an  argument  made,  he  appealed  to  the 
principles  of  the  proclamation  against  M.  Genet's 
interpretation  of  the  treaties.  Between  the  two,  the 
course  of  the  government  was  difficult  and  dangerous  ; 
but  having  entered  upon  it  in  good  faith,  the  adminis 
tration  advanced  with  firmness  and  ability.  But  the 
contest  in  Europe  was  fast  assuming  colossal  propor 
tions.  The  whole  world  was  in  arms,  and  in  the  ter 
rible  struggle  for  existence  upon  which  the  nations  soon 
entered,  all  rules  of  right,  all  those  sacred  principles 

which,  in  times    of  ordinary    strife,  protect  truth   and 

13 


146  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

weakness,  were  swept  before  the  storm.  Whenever 
neutral  duties  served  the  purpose  of  the  combatants, 
they  were  sternly  exacted  ;  whenever  neutral  rights  in 
terfered  with  the  violence  of  conquest,  or  stood  in  the 
path  of  destruction,  they  were  relentlessly  stricken 
down ;  and  again,  in  the  history  of  the  world,  there 
opened  a  sorrowful  period,  when  might,  red  and  ruth 
less,  put  its  foot  in  bloody  triumph  on  the  neck  of  shud 
dering  humanity. 

It  was  at  this  period  of  distress  and  danger  that 
General  Washington,  in  pursuance  of  the  policy  which 
has  been  described,  undertook  those  negotiations  with 
England  which  terminated  in  the  treaty  of  1794,  and 
the  progress  and  results  of  which  have  been  related  in 
the  preceding  chapter. 

The  first  consequences  of  this  treaty  tended  greatly 
to  increase  the  embarrassment  of  the  government.  At 
the  same  time  that  Mr.  Jay  had  been  sent  to  England, 
Mr.  Morris  had  been  recalled  from  Paris ;  and  it  became 
necessary  to  appoint  a  successor.  The  selection  was  a 
matter  of  grave  and  pressing  importance,  not  only  as 
indicating,  by  the  character  of  the  party  from  whom  the 
selection  was  made,  the  tendencies  of  the  administra 
tion,  but  also  on  account  of  the  delicacy  of  the  negotia 
tions  committed  to  the  charge  of  the  new  minister ;  for 
it  was  his  business,  not  merely  to  maintain,  but  if  pos 
sible  to  improve,  the  relations  between  France  and  the 
United  States,  and  to  reconcile  France  to  the  results  of 
the  negotiation  with  England.  In  making  the  selec- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  147 

tion,  General  Washington  gave  striking  evidence  of 
that  disregard  of  mere  party  connection,  which  was  one 
of  the  special  traits  of  his  administration.  But  it  must 
be  confessed  that  his  choice  only  proved,  by  its  conse 
quences,  how  entirely  impracticable  such  a  principle  is, 
in  application  to  the  necessities  of  political  life.  The 
mission  was  tendered  to,  and  accepted  by,  James  Mon 
roe  of  Virginia,  who  had  served  with  credit  during  the 
war  of  the  Revolution,  and  was,  at  the  time  of  his  ap 
pointment,  United  States  Senator  from  his  native  State. 
The  singular  character  of  this  appointment  will  best 
appear  from  Mr.  Monroe's  own  description  of  his  polit 
ical  position  at  that  time  :  — 

"  I  was  at  this  time  a  member  of  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States,  for  the  State  of  Virginia,  which  station 
I  had  held  for  several  years  before.  It  had  been,  too, 
my  fortune  to  differ  from  the  administration  upon 
many  of  our  most  important  public  measures.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  specify  here  the  several  instances  in  which 
this  variance  in  political  sentiment  took  place  between 
the  administration  and  myself.  I  think  proper,  how 
ever,,  to  notice  two  examples  of  it,  since  they  serve  to 
illustrate  the  principles  on  which  that  variance  was 
founded,  and  the  light  in  which  I  was  known  to  the 
administration  and  my  country,  before  the  proposal 
was  made  to  me.  The  first  took  place  when  Mr.  Mor 
ris  was  nominated  Minister  Plenipotentiary  to  the 
French  Republic  ;  which  nomination  I  opposed,  because 
I  was  persuaded,  from  Mr.  Morris's  known  political 


148  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

character  and  principles,  that  his  appointment  —  espec 
ially  at  a  period  when  the  French  nation  was  in  a 
course  of  revolution  from  an  arbitrary  to  a  free  govern 
ment —  would  tend  to  discountenance  the  republican 
cause  there  and  at  home,  and  otherwise  weaken,  and 
greatly  to  our  prejudice,  the  connection  subsisting  be 
tween  the  two  countries.  The  second  took  place  when 
Mr.  Jay  was  nominated  to  Great  Britain ;  which  nomi 
nation,  too,  I  opposed,  because,  under  all  the  well- 
known  circumstances  of  the  moment,  I  was  of  opinion 
we  could  not  adopt  such  a  measure  consistently  either 
with  propriety  or  any  reasonable  prospect  of  adequate 
success ;  since,  being  a  measure  without  tone,  and  one 
which  secured  to  that  power  time,  which  of  all  things 
it  wished  to  secure,  it  seemed  better  calculated  to 
answer  its  purposes  than  ours ;  moreover,  because 
I  was  of  opinion,  in  the  then  state  of  European 
affairs,  it  would  be  made  by  the  enemies  of  the  two 
republics  the  means  of  embroiling  us  with  France,  the 
other  party  to  the  European  war;  and  because  I 
thought  it  was  unconstitutional  to  appoint  a  member 
of  the  judiciary  into  an  executive  office ;  and,  lastly, 
because  I  also  thought,  from  a  variety  of  considera 
tions,  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  find,  within  the 
limits  of  the  United 'States,  a  person  who  was  more 
likely  to  improve,  to  the  greatest  possible  extent,  the 
mischief  to  which  the  measure  naturally  exposed  us. 
This  last  example  took  place  only  a  few  weeks  before 
my  appointment,  which  was  on  the  28th  of  May, 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  149 

1794."*  The  effect  of  this  appointment  was  most 
unfortunate ;  for  it  forbade  what  was,  at  the  moment, 
of  prime  importance  to  the  success  of  either  mission,  — 
a  complete  understanding  and  sympathy  between  the 
administration  at  home  and  their  minister  in  Paris, 
and  that  mutual  confidence  between  the  ministers  to 
England  and  France,  which  was  absolutely  necessary 
if  they  were  to  work  together  harmoniously  for  a  com 
mon  purpose. 

Besides  the  general  directions  relative  to  such  points 
as  required  special  negotiation,  Mr.  Monroe  was  re 
minded  by  the  Secretary  of  State,  in  his  official  instruc 
tions,  that  — 

"  The  President  has  been  an  early  and  decided  friend 
of  the  French  Revolution,  and  whatever  reason  there 
may  have  been,  under  our  ignorance  of  facts  and  policy, 
to  suspend  an  opinion  upon  some  of  its  important 
transactions,  yet  is  he  immutable  in  his  wishes  for  its 
accomplishment,  —  incapable  of  assenting  to  the  right 
of  any  foreign  prince  to  meddle  with  its  interior  ar 
rangements,  and  persuaded  that  success  will  attend 
their  efforts  ;  and  particularly,  that  union  among  them 
selves  is  an  impregnable  barrier  against  external  as 
saults.  .  .  .  We  have,  therefore,  pursued  neutrality  with 
faithfulness ;  we  have  paid  more  of  our  debt  to  France 
than  was  absolutely  due,  as  the  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 

*  Monroe's  View  of  the   Conduct  of  tlie  Executive   in    Foreign 
Affairs,  etc.  etc.     Philadelphia,  1797.     p.  Ill,  iv. 

13* 


150  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

ury  asserts  ;  and  we  should  have  paid  more,  if  the  state 
of  our  affairs  did  not  require  us  to  be  prepared  with 
funds  for  the  possible  event  of  war.  We  mean  to  con 
tinue  the  same  line  of  conduct  in  future;  and,  to 
remove  all  jealousy  with  respect  to  Mr.  Jay's  mission 
to  London,  you  may  say,  that  he  is  positively  forbidden 
to  weaken  the  engagements  between  this  country  and 
France.  It  is  not  improbable  that  you  will  be  obliged 
to  encounter,  on  this  head,  suspicions  of  various  kinds. 
But  you  may  declare  the  motives  of  that  mission  to  be 
to  obtain  immediate  compensation  for  our  plundered 
property,  and  restitution  of  the  posts.  You  may  inti 
mate,  by  way  of  argument,  without  ascribing  it  to  the 
government,  that  if  war  should  be  necessary,  the  affec 
tions  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  towards  it 
would  be  better  secured  by  a  manifestation  that  every 
step  had  been  taken  to  avoid  it ;  and  that  the  British 
nation  would  be  divided  when  they  found  that  we  had 
been  forced  into  it.  ...  To  this  matter  you  cannot  be 
too  attentive  ;  and  you  will  be  amply  justified  in  repel 
ling  with  firmness  any  imputation  of  the  most  distant 
intention  to  sacrifice  our  connection  with  France  to 
any  connection  with  England.  You  may  back  your 
assertions  by  a  late  determination  of  the  President  to 
have  it  signified  abroad,  that  he  is  averse  to  admit  into 
his  public  room,  which  is  free  to  all  the  world  beside, 
any  Frenchmen  who  are  obnoxious  to  the  French 
Republic.  .  .  .  To  conclude  ;  you  go,  sir,  to  France  to 
strengthen  our  friendship  with  that  country;  and  you 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  151 

are  well  acquainted  with  the  line  of  freedom  and  ease 
to  which  you  may  advance  without  betraying  the  dig 
nity  of  the  United  States.  You  will  show  our  confi 
dence  in  the  French  Republic,  without  betraying  the 
most  remote  mark  of  undue  complaisance.  You  will 
let  it  be  seen,  that,  in  case  of  war  with  any  nation  on 
earth,  we  shall  consider  France  as  our  first  and  natural 
ally.  You  may  dwell  upon  the  sense  which  we  enter 
tain  of  past  services,  and  for  the  more  recent  interposi 
tion,  on  our  behalf,  with  the  Dey  of  Algiers.  Among 
the  great  events  with  which  the  world  is  teeming,  there 
may  be  an  opening  for  France  to  become  instrumental 
in  securing  to  us  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi. 
Spain  may  perhaps  negotiate  a  peace,  separate  from 
Great  Britain,  with  France.  If  she  does,  the  Missis 
sippi  may  be  acquired  through  this  channel,  especially 
if  you  contrive  to  have  our  mediation  in  any  manner 
solicited." 

Along  with  these  instructions,  Mr.  Monroe  received 
the  official  reply  of  the  House  of  Representatives  to 
the  French  Committee  of  Public  Safety,  which  was 
made  through  the  Secretary  of  State.  In  making 
this  response,  the  Secretary  said :  "  The  President  of 
the  United  States  has  consigned  this  honorable  and 
grateful  function  to  the  Department  of  State.  In  no 
manner  can  it  be  more  properly  discharged  than  by 
seizing  the  occasion  of  declaring  to  the  ally  of  the 
United  States,  that  the  cause  of  liberty,  in  the  defence 
of  which  so  much  American  blood  and  treasure  have 


152  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

been  lavished,  is  cherished  by  our  Republic  with  increas 
ing  enthusiasm ;  that  under  the  standard  of  liberty, 
wheresoever  it  shall  be  displayed,  the  affections  of  the 
United  States  will  always  rally ;  and  that  the  successes 
of  those  who  stand  forth  as  her  avengers,  will  be  gloried 
in  by  the  United  States,  and  will  be  felt  as  the  suc 
cesses  of  themselves  and  the  other  friends  of  humanity." 
With  these  instructions  to  guide  him,  Mr.  Monroe 
arrived  in  Paris  on  the  2d  of  August,  1794,  about  two 
months  after  the  arrival  of  Mr.  Jay  in  London.  He 
found  the  commercial  interests  of  the  country  suffering 
under  legislative  enactments,  impolitic  in  themselves, 
and  at  variance  with  the  explicit  stipulations  of  exist 
ing  treaties ;  general  distrust  of  the  sentiments  and 
intentions  of  the  United  States ;  great  dissatisfaction 
with  the  course  and  sympathies  of  his  predecessor;  a 
special  jealousy  of  Mr.  Jay's  mission  to  London,  and 
an  apparent  conviction  that  his  own  embassy  was  a 
mere  feint  to  withdraw  the  attention  of  the  French 
government,  and  to  amuse  it  with  warm  expressions 
of  friendship  until  the  conclusion  of  the  English  nego- 
I  tiation  should  enable  them  to  drop  the  mask.  The 
objects  of  his  mission  were  :  —  1.  To  raise  the  embargo 
which  had  been  laid  at  Bourdeaux,  as  far  as  it  affected 
American  vessels,  and  to  obtain  compensation  for  any 
loss  under  its  previous  action.  2.  To  obtain  compensa 
tion  for  the  illegal  captures  which  American  commerce 
had  suffered  at  the  hands  of  French  privateers.  3.  To 
correct  certain  violations  of  the  explicit  provisions  of 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTOKY.  153 

the  treaties  between  the  two  countries.  4.  To  explain 
the  objects  of  Mr.  Jay's  mission,  and  to  remove  any 
suspicion  entertained  by  the  French  government  as  to 
the  character  of  its  objects.  And,  5.  To  obtain,  if 
possible,  the  cooperation  of  France  in  an  effort  to 
secure  from  Spain  the  free  navigation  of  the  Missis 
sippi.  The  first  and  second  points  were  easily  and 
promptly  put  in  train  for  friendly  solution.  The  third 
somewhat  embarrassed  him,  for  he  was  afraid  to  de 
mand  explicitly  the  fulfilment  of  the  treaty  stipulations, 
lest  the  French  government  should  reciprocate  by  a 
demand  for  the  execution  of  the  guarantee  of  the 
West  Indian  possessions  by  the  United  States.  In 
deed,  when  he  approached  the  subject,  he  was  met  by 
the  question,  directly  put,  "  Do  you  demand  the  strict 
execution  of  the  treaties  ? "  And  it  was  only  by  a 
judicious  evasion  that  he  avoided  the  consequences  of  a 
reply,  and  succeeded,  after  some  negotiation,  in  obtain 
ing  the  repeal  of  the  decrees  by  which  the  treaty  was 
violated.  As  to  the  fifth  object,  he  took  the  necessary 
measures  to  secure  its  accomplishment,  and  was,  to 
some  extent,  favored  by  circumstances  in  advancing  the 
views  of  his  government,  when  the  negotiations  with 
Spain  were  transferred  to  Mr.  Pinckney,  and  he  was 
relieved  of  further  attention  to  them.  But  the  fourth 
object  of  his  mission  was  surrounded  with  difficulties, 
and  not  only  created  perpetual  embarrassment  with 
the  French  government,  but  involved  him  in  unpleasant 
misunderstanding  with  the  administration  at  home. 


154  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

Under  the  circumstances  of  his  appointment,  and 
resting  upon  the  explicit  language  of  his  instructions, 
Mr.  Monroe  felt  authorized  to  assure  the  French  gov 
ernment,  that  the  mission  to  England  was  intended 
simply  to  obtain  the  evacuation  of  the  posts,  and  com 
pensation  for  losses  sustained  by  American  commerce 
from  the  English  naval  and  privateering  forces,  and 
that  it  contemplated  no  negotiation  which  could  affect 
the  relations  between  France  and  the  United  States,  or 
weaken  in  any  degree  the  sincere  friendship  which 
existed  between  them ;  and  these  opinions  he  undoubt 
edly  expressed  in  language  of  very  highly  colored  en 
thusiasm.  The  French  government  watched  the  prog 
ress  of  the  British  treaty  with  suspicious  jealousy  ;  and 
Mr.  Monroe  soon  found  that  he  needed  the  most  ac 
curate  information  in  reference  to  its  probable  character, 
in  order  to  meet  the  constant  and  unfriendly  references 
made  to  it.  He  accordingly  applied  to  Mr.  Jay.  But 
between  Mr.  Jay  and  Mr.  Monroe  there  existed,  very 
naturally,  no  political  confidence  ;  and  as  he  was  not 
instructed  to  that  effect,  Mr.  Jay  declined  furnishing 
Mr.  Monroe  the  information  he  sought  during  the  prog 
ress  of  the  negotiation.  When  the  treaty  was  signed, 
he  offered  to  inform  him  confidentially  of  its  provisions, 
stating  generally,  that  it  contained  nothing  in  deroga 
tion  of  the  treaty  with  France.  This  information  Mr. 
Monroe  declined  to  receive,  as  he  considered  that  a 
knowledge  of  the  treaty,  without  the  right  of  using 
that  knowledge  in  his  conferences  with  the  French 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  155 

government,  would  only  embarrass  his  position.     That 
government   manifested  a  growing  uneasiness,  which, 
upon  the  publication  of  the  treaty,  became  openly  and 
angrily   avowed    dissatisfaction.      It   suspended,    how 
ever,  any  definite  action,  until  the  Senate  had  advised 
the   President   to  ratify   Mr.  Jay's   treaty.      Upon   the 
receipt  of  this  news,   Mr.   Monroe  was  unofficially  in 
formed   that   the    French    government   considered   the 
treaties  between    France    and  the    United   States   sus 
pended,  and  that  a  special  minister  would  be  sent  to 
Philadelphia  to  protest  against  this  violation  of  Ameri 
can  faith.    Mr.  Monroe  immediately  demanded  an  inter 
view  with  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.    «  I  attended 
him,"  says  Mr.  Monroe,  "  again  on  the  day  following 
(February  16,  1796),  and  remonstrated  most  earnestly 
against   the   measure,  urging   every   argument   that    I 
could  avail  myself  of  to  divert  the  government  from  it ; 
offering  to  enter  with  him,  whenever  he  thought  fit,  into 
a  discussion  of  his  objections  to  our  treaty,  or  any  other 
act  of  our  government ;  assuring  him  that  I  should  not 
only  be  always  ready  to  enter  with  him  into  such  expla 
nations,  but,  in  the  present  instance,  should  do  it  with 
pleasure,  since,  by  being  possessed  of  our  view  of  the 
subject,  they  would  be  better  able  to  decide  whether  the 
complaint  was  well  or  ill  founded,  and,  of  course,  how 
far  it  merited  to  be  considered  in  that  light.     Upon  this 
occasion,  as  upon  the  preceding  one,  the  minister  de 
clined  stating  any  specific  objections  to  the  treaty  or 
any  other  act  of  our  government,  and,  therefore,  I  could 


156  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

make  no  specific  defence."*  On  the  12th  of  March, 
1796,  M.  De  la  Croix,  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
furnished  Mr.  Monroe  with  "  a  summary  exposition  of 
the  complaints  of  the  French  Republic  against  the 
United  States  of  America."  The  complaints  were 
divided  under  three  heads  :  1.  The  inexecution  of  the 
treaties,  which  comprised  almost  identically  the  same 
subjects  of  dissatisfaction  which  had  been  discussed 
between  M.  Genet  and  Mr.  Jefferson,  and  to  which  ref 
erence  has  already  been  made  ;  namely,  —  1.  the  cogni 
zance  taken,  by  the  United  States  courts  of  prizes  carried 
by  French  vessels  into  American  ports,  notwithstanding 
the  express  clause  in  the  treaty,  which,  the  French  gov 
ernment  contend,  forbade  it ;  2.  the  admission  of  Eng 
lish  vessels  of  war  into  the  ports  of  the  United  States 
against  the  express  stipulation  of  the  17th  article  of  the 
treaty ;  3.  the  unequal  execution  of  the  consular  con 
vention  ;  4.  the  arrest  of  a  captain  of  a  French  corvette 
for  acts  done  on  the  high  seas.  In  reply  to  these,  Mr. 
Monroe  reiterated  the  argument  made  by  Mr.  Jeffer 
son.  The  second  head  of  complaint  was  the  arrest,  in 
the  waters  of  the  United  States,  by  an  English  ship  of 
war,  of  the  vessel  in  which  M.  Fauchet,  the  French 
minister,  sailed  for  Europe,  and  the  search  of  his  trunks 
and  papers.  To  this  Mr.  Monroe  replied,  that  the 
United  States  had  done  all  it  could  to  punish  the  out 
rage,  had  revoked  the  exequatur  of  the  British  consul  at 

*  Monroe's  View,  p.  xlix. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  157 

the  port  where  the  violation  had  been  committed,  or 
dered  all  supplies  to  be  withheld  from  the  offending  ves 
sel,  and  her  immediate  departure  from  the  waters  of  the 
United  States;  and  had  instructed  the  United  States 
minister  in  London  to  make  the  conduct  of  his  Majes 
ty's  officer  a  subject  of  formal  and  special  complaint, 
and  to  demand  such  immediate  and  ample  satisfaction 
as  the  nature  of  the  case  required. 

The  third  cause  of  complaint  was  the  treaty  with 
England,  inasmuch  as  by  it  the  United  States  had  "  not 
only  departed  from  the  principles  that  were  consecrated 
by  the  armed  neutrality  during  the  War  of  Independ 
ence,  but  they  had^also  given  to  England,  to  the  injury 
of  their  first  allies,  a  mark  of  the  most  striking  conde 
scension  without  limits,  in  abandoning  the  rule  which 
the  rights  of  nations,  their  treaties  with  all  other  pow 
ers,  and  even  the  treaties  of  England  with  most  of  the 
maritime  powers,  had  given  to  contraband,"  and  had 
"  consented  to  extend  the  denomination  of  contraband 
even  to  provisions.  Instead  of  restricting  it,  as  all  trea 
ties  had  done,  to  the  case  of  an  effectual  blockade  of  a 
port,  as  proving  the  only  exception  to  the  complete  free 
dom  of  this  article,  they  had  tacitly  acknowledged  the 
pretensions  of  England,  the  blockade  to  our  (the  French) 
colonies,  and  even  to  France,  by  the  force  of  a  procla 
mation  alone."  To  which  Mr.  Morris  replied,  "that 
although  the  principles  of  the  armed  neutrality  were  very 
dear  to  his  government,  yet  it  was  not  in  their  power 
to  force  them  upon  England,  and  they  could  not  be  held 

14 


158  DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY. 

censurable  for  this  incapacity ;  and  that,  whatever  they 
might  desire,  they  stood  in  the  same  position  as  to  con 
traband.  That  With  regard  to  allowing  provisions  to 
be  made  contraband,  the  treaty  recognized  no  such 
principle,  but  simply,  acknowledging  the  impossibility 
of  settling  the  question,  waived  it,  providing  that,  as  it 
was  doubtful,  compensation  should  be  always  made  in 
case  of  seizure."  Here  the  discussion  rested  until  July, 
when  the  news  reached  France  that  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  after  long  and  violent  discussion,  had  de 
termined  that  the  treaty  should  be  carried  into  effect. 
The  tone  of  the  French  government  became  immedi 
ately  more  imperative.  M.  Adet  was  recalled,  and  his 
place  —  the  grade  being  reduced  —  was  about  to  be 
filled  by  a  gentleman  who,  as  consul  in  Charleston,  had 
made  himself  peculiarly  unacceptable  to  the  United 
States  government;  but  this  app6intment  Mr.  Monroe 
had  still  influence  enough  to  prevent.  In  the  mean 
time,  great  changes  had  taken  place  at  home.  Mr.  Ran 
dolph  had  been  compelled  to  resign,  under  circumstances 
which  excited  great  irritation,  on  the  part  of  Gen.  Wash 
ington,  against  that  party  whose  sympathies  were 
French  ;  and  the  policy  of  his  cabinet,  more  harmonious 
in  opinion  than  it  had  ever  yet  been,  manifested  the 
change  in  his  temper.*  The  political  struggle  over  the 

*  The  circumstances  of  Mr.  Randolph's  resignation  belong  rather 
to  the  personal  and  party  history  of  'the  day,  than  to  its  diplomatic 
history.  For,  although  they  tended  directly  to  increase  the  bias  of 
Gen.  Washington's  prejudice  in  favor  of  one  section  of  his  cabinet,  I 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTOKY.  159 

treaty,  unsurpassed  in  bitterness  of  spirit  and  language, 
had  ended  in  victory  for  the  administration.  The  treaty 

do  not  think  they  seriously  affected  the  course  of  events.  To  review 
them  in  detail  would  require  a  special  chapter  on  the  personal  history 
of  the  times,  a  subject  to  me  alike  unpleasant  and  unprofitable.  The 
misconstruction  of  Mr.  Randolph's  conduct,  which,  in  the  then  distem 
pered  state  of  public  opinion,  was  both  natural  and  unfair,  has  not 
received  historical  sanction.  The  facts  may  be  very  briefly  stated  thus. 
A  despatch  from  M.  Fauchet,  the  French  minister  at  Philadelphia, 
was  intercepted  by  a  British  vessel,  sent  by  the  British  government 
to  their  minister,  Mr.  Hammond,  and  by  him  transmitted  to  the  Pres 
ident  through  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  This  despatch  pur 
ported  to  be  a  full  report  of  several  conversations  between  Mr.  Ran 
dolph  and  the  French  minister,  in  which,  according  to  the  latter,  Mr. 
Randolph  had  given  him  a  very  distressing  account  of  the  factions 
in  the  country,  and  the  divisions  in  the  cabinet,  entered  into  a  mi 
nute  and  indiscreet  detail  of  the  President's  private  views,  and  sug 
gested  to  the  French  minister  certain  ways  of  meeting  a  local  com 
bination  against  the  government  in  some  of  the  States,  which  he 
construed  into  an  implication  of  the  venality  of  certain  public  char 
acters.  These  conversations  were  vaguely  reported,  and  accompa 
nied  by  a  running  commentary  of  insolent  and  inflated  sentiment, 
that  makes  it  almost  impossible  to  say  what  is  fact  and  what  fancy. 
This  document  was  exhibited  to  Gen.  Washington  just  at  the  time 
when  he  was  most  troubled  and  annoyed  by  the  opposition  to  Mr. 
Jay's  treaty,  —  that  treaty  being  then  under  his  consideration  for  rati 
fication.  He  submitted  the  despatch  to  Mr.  Randolph  in  a  personal 
interview,  and  demanded  an  explanation  in  a  manner  that  Mr.  Ran 
dolph  considered  evidence  of  a  foregone  conclusion  and  of  confidence 
already  forfeited.  He  accordingly  resigned,  and  addressed  his  vin 
dication  to  the  public.  In  reference  to  the  facts,  I  would  only  ob 
serve,  that  no  mere  statement  of  the  French  ministers  in  the  United 


160  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

with  Spain,  which,  at  the  outset  of  Mr.  Monroe's  mis 
sion,  was  doubtful,  had  been  negotiated  without  the  aid 

States,  during  the  period  of  their  Revolution,  has  any  value  as  evi 
dence.  For  without  deliberately  intending  to  misrepresent,  they 
took  such  strange  and  extravagant  views  of  men  and  things,  and 
misunderstood  so  completely  the  relation  of  measures  and  parties, 
that  their  opinions  cannot  be  trusted  ;  and  the  whole  of  this  very  de 
spatch  is  conceived  in  that  spirit  of  ingenious,  clever,  but  extravagant 
misconception,  which  is  the  characteristic  of  the  French  Revolution 
ary  diplomacy ;  a  spirit  which  insisted  upon  treating  the  wildest  po 
litical  dreams  as  the  realities  of  political  life.  It  is  impossible  to 
separate  what  the  French  minister  calls  Mr.  Randolph's  "  precious 
confessions  "  from  his  own  general  narrative  of  American  politics ; 
and  the  absurd  inconsistency  of  this  fancy  sketch  of  our  politics  is 
manifest  to  every  student  of  our  earlier  history.  But  the  charge  of 
corruption,  I  cannot  believe,  was  ever  really  believed,  even  by  those 
small  partisans  who  mistake  malignity  for  honesty.  Mr.  Randolph 
belonged  to  a  class  of  men  who  had  faults,  and  grave  ones ;  they 
were  passionate  and  prejudiced,  but  not  treacherous ;  they  were 
reckless  and  extravagant,  but  not  corrupt ;  and  whatever  were  their 
failings,  it  might  be  said  of  that  great  old  Virginia  stock,  as  Fuller 
said  of  Woolsey,  "  Truly,  nothing  mean  could  enter  this  man's 
mind." 

As  to  the  indiscretion  of  such  conferences  with  Fauchet,  especially 
after  the  experience  of  French  ministers  which  the  government  had 
suffered,  that  will  depend  upon  the  view  taken  of  Mr.  Randolph's 
position  in  the  cabinet,  and  the  political  sympathies  of  the  student. 
He  endeavored  to  hold  middle  ground  between  the  two  sections,  and, 
in  consequence,  and  I  think  unavoidably,  was  sacrificed. 

I  would  not  have  said  this  much,  were  it  not  that  Mr.  Gibbs,  in 
his  Memoirs  of  the  Administrations  of  Washington  and  Adams,  a 
work  to  which  I  have  specially  referred  elsewhere,  has  devoted  many 


DIPLOMATIC     HISTOKY.  161 

of  France.  The  treaty  with  England  was  secured,  and 
the  government  felt  able  to  speak  a  higher  and  firmer 

pages  of  malicious  ingenuity  to  the  examination  of  Mr.  Randolph's 
conduct,  and  concludes  his  review  with  these  sentences  :  "  Mr.  Ran 
dolph,  in  his  vindication,  gave  many  reasons  against  the  probability 
of  his  guilt.  There  was  produced,  soon  after  his  resignation,  one  in 
favor  of  the  supposition.  The  investigation  of  his  accounts  con 
ferred  upon  him  the  distinguished  honor  of  being  the  first  cabinet 
officer  who  was  a  DEFAULTER."  —  Vol.  I.  p.  280. 

The  facts  are  these,  as  proved  by  the  official  records  in  the  proper 
Departments.  Immediately  upon  his  resignation,  he  surrendered 
the  key  of  his  public  office  to  the  door-keeper,  and  refused  to 
cross  its  threshold  again,  thus  leaving  all  his  official  papers  to  the 
custody  of  his  successor,  Mr.  Pickering.  An  account  of  his  admin 
istration  was  ordered  and  reported,  covering  the  receipt  and  dis 
bursement  of  over  $1,000,000,  which,  according  to  the  custom  then, 
but  no  longer  existing,  passed  through  his  hands,  on  account  of  the 
maintenance  of  foreign  diplomatic  agents  and  intercourse.  This  ac 
count  brought  him  in  debt  to  the  government.  On  his  part,  he  im 
mediately  stated  his  account,  making  the  government  in  debt  to  him, 
asserting  his  perfect  confidence  in  the  correctness  of  his  account,  and 
sustaining  it  by  vouchers,  so  far  as  they  were  in  his  possession,  and 
calling  for  the  production  of  other  vouchers,  which  he  positively  al 
leged  were  deposited  by  him  in  his  own  and  other  public  offices,  and 
remained  in  the  custody  of  other  public  officers,  but  some  of  which 
were  never  obtained.  A  suit  was  instituted  by  government  to  re 
cover  of  him  the  balance  reported  against  him ;  but  upon  several  tri 
als,  the  juries  were  divided,  and  no  verdict  could  be  obtained.  Mr. 
Randolph  then  proposed  to  leave  the  decision  to  the  Solicitor  of  the 
Treasury,  —  a  proposition  which  clearly  vindicated  his  confidence  in 
his  own  integrity.  That  officer  confirmed  the  precise  balance  re 
ported  against  Mr.  Randolph  by  the  government  account ;  and  accord- 

14* 


162  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

language ;  and  early  in  November,  Mr.  Monroe  was  re  - 
called.     This  recall  was  inevitable,  but  its  manner  was 

ing  to  his  agreement,  judgment  was  entered  up  against  him  for  that 
amount.  To  satisfy  this  judgment,  Mr.  Randolph  devoted  every 
cent  he  possessed,  by  conveying  it  to  a  trustee  for  that  purpose  ;  and 
it  appears  from  the  record  of  the  Treasury  Department,  that  not  only 
the  entire  balance,  principal  and  interest,  was  discharged,  but  that, 
in  consequence  of  the  government  having  become  the  purchaser  of  a 
portion  of  the  property  conveyed  in  the  deed  of  trust  for  its  benefit, 
it  had  actually  received,  by  a'  resale  of  that  property,  some  seven 
thousand  dollars  more  than  the  balance  it  claimed  from  Mr.  Ran 
dolph.  In  addition  to  this,  the  official  records  of  this  transaction 
show,  that,  while  every  cent  received  by  Mr.  Randolph  was  charged 
to  him  with  interest,  no  credit  was  allowed  him  which  was  not  sup 
ported  by  the  voucher  of  the  receipt  of  the  agent  of  the  government, 
to  whose  use  it  was  ultimately  applied ;  and  that,  where  bills  of  ex 
change  had  been  bought  by  Mr.  Randolph,  as  Secretary  of  State,  of 
merchants  or  bankers  in  the  country,  drawn  on  foreign  merchants 
or  bankers  resident  in  the  country  to  which  the  remittance  to  our 
foreign  agent  had  been  sent,  the  receipt  of  the  person  of  whom  the 
bill  was  bought  was  not  allowed  as  a  voucher,  but  that  of  the  gov 
ernment  agent  abroad  was  required  as  indispensable ;  so  that,  if  by 
any  casualty  resulting  from  the  dangers  of  the  sea,  the  existence  of 
a  general  state  of  war  in  Europe,  or  the  bankruptcy  of  foreign  mer 
chants  or  bankers,  the  foreign  agent  of  our  government  failed  to 
receive  the  remittance  purchased  for  him  here,  the  Secretary  of  State 
had  to  bear  the  loss ;  and  instances  of  this  to  large  amounts  are  dis 
closed  on  the  face  of  the  accounts  reported  against  Mr.  Randolph, 
and  acknowledged  in  the  documents  accompanying  them.  In  one  of 
these  cases,  the  usual  channel  of  remittance  abroad,  through  Amster 
dam,  was  cut  off  by  the  blockade  of  the  coast  of  Holland ;  and  it 
becoming  necessary  to  remit  to  our  minister  at  Madrid,  through  bills 


DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY.  163 

not  considerate,  nor  its  alleged  motives  just.  The 
grounds  of  his  removal  may  be  gathered  from  the  letter 
of  Mr.  Pickering,  who  had  succeeded  Mr.  Randolph, 
under  date  of  July  13,1796. 

"As  early  as  October  last,  you  predicted  that  if  Mr. 
Jay's  treaty  should  be  ratified,  it  would  excite  great  dis 
content  in  France.  Early  in  November,  you  men 
tioned  the  arrival  of  M.  Fauchet,  extremely  dissatisfied 
with  the  treaty,  adding  that  he  was  well  received,  and 
would  therefore  be  attended  to.  On  the  6th  of  Decem 
ber,  you  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  my  letter  of  Sep 
tember  12th,  written  subsequently  to  the  ratification  of 
the  treaty,  to  repeat  and  further  explain  the  principles 
and  views  of  the  government  concerning  it.  M.  Adet's 

on  Madrid  bankers  purchased  here,  the  bankruptcy  of  the  parties  to 
the  bill,  occurring  after  the  purchase  of  the  bill,  devolved  upon  Mr. 
Kandolph  a  heavy  loss  under  the  rule  mentioned.  Add  to  this  the 
principle  universally  adopted  in  government  accounts,  of  charging 
interest  on  all  sums  received  fro?n,  and  allowing  no  interest  on  sums 
due  from  government,  and  it  will  be  readily  seen  how  easy  it  is  to 
make  out  an  account  against  a  public  officer,  receiving  and  disburs 
ing  over  one  million  of  dollars,  and  that  at  a  time  when  the  adminis 
trative  details  of  all  the  executive  departments  were  more  or  less 
imperfect. 

In  concluding  this  note,  I  ought  to  say,  that  I  was  not  able  to  con 
duct  the  above  interesting  and,  I  think,  conclusive  investigation, 
directly.  I  am  indebted  for  it  to  one  whose  interest  in  Mr.  Ran 
dolph's  fair  fame  guarantees  the  thoroughness,  and  whose  character 
assures  the  conscientious  accuracy,  of  its  details.  To  say  that  I  am 
responsible  for  the  accuracy  of  its  statements,  may  be  proper,  but  it 
can  add  nothing  to  its  authority. 


164  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

objections  to  the  treaty,  and  their  refutation,  accompa 
nied  my  letter.  And  with  such  means  in  your  hands, — 
means  amply  sufficient  to  vindicate  the  conduct  of  the 
United  States,  —  not  less  regret  than  surprise  is  excited 
that  no  attempt  was  made  to  apply  them  to  the  highly 
important  use  for  which  they  were  sent.  Although  you 
anticipated  discontents  ;  although  the  symptoms  of  dis 
content  appeared ;  although  these  symptoms,  unattend 
ed  to  and  unallayed,  might  increase  to  an  inflammation, 
and  M.  Fauchet's  arrival,  with  all  his  dissatisfaction 
and  prejudices  about  him,  would  assuredly  add  to  the 
irritation,  yet  you  were  silent  and  inactive,  until,  on  the 
15th  of  February,  you  were  alarmed  by  the  project  of 
the  Directory,  accidentally  communicated  to  you  by  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  of  sending  to  this  country 
an  envoy  extraordinary  to  represent  to  our  government 
their  decision  concerning  the  treaty  with  Great  Britain, 
"  that  they  considered  the  treaty  of  alliance  between  us 
as  ceasing  to  exist  from  the  moment  the  treaty  was  rat 
ified."  Your  letter  of  the  20th  of  the  same  month 
describes  your  second  interview  with  the  minister  on 
the  project  of  sending  an  envoy  extraordinary ;  and  the 
reasons  you  urged  to  dissuade  them  from  it  were  cer 
tainly  very  cogent.  Your  letter  of  the  10th  of  March 
informs  us  that  the  project  was  laid  aside ;  and  your 
letter  of  the  25th  of  March,  that  you  had  an  audience 
of  the  Directory  on  the  subject,  and  that  they  had 
agreed  to  suspend  their  proposed  extraordinary  mission 
until  the  points  in  question  should  be  discussed  be- 


DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY.  165 

tween  you  and  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  The 
result  of  this  audience  appears  satisfactory ;  and  from 
the  good  effect  produced  by  the  partial  explanations 
then  given  may  be  calculated  the  happy  consequences 
of  the  full  communications  which  might  have  been 
made,  and  which  for  so  long  a  time  you  had  possessed 
the  means  of  making,  in  vindication  of  the  measures 
of  the  government  you  represent.  That  these  were  not 
made  even  so  late  as  March  25th,  is  again  to  be  ex 
tremely  regretted,  because  the  justice,  the  honor,  and 
the  faith  of  our  country,  were  questioned,  and  conse 
quently  their  most  important  interests  w^ere  at  stake." 
The  point  of  this  censure  was,  that  Mr.  Monroe  had 
been  for  some  time  aware  that  dissatisfaction  with  the 
treaty  existed,  and  that,  having  in  his  hands  a  full  vindi 
cation  of  that  treaty,  he  had  not  used  it;  the  proof 
being,  that,  when  he  did  produce  the  defence  of  the 
treaty,  he  obtained  from  the  Directory  a  suspension  of 
hostile- proceedings.  Now  this  argument  assumes  two 
facts,  neither  of  which  the  future  confirmed :  1.  That 
the  reply  of  the  Secretary  of  State  in  Mr.  Monroe's 
possession  was  a  satisfactory  justification  of  the  treaty ; 
and,  2.  that  its  production  by  Mr.  Monroe  did  affect 
the  action  of  the  Directory.  And  as  to  the  proof  on 
which  the  argument  rested,  Mr.  Monroe  rejoined  with 
perfect  success,  if  you  admit  that  great  dissatisfaction 
against  the  treaty  did  exist,  is  it  not  a  fair  presumption 
that  to  my  conduct  is  due  the  delay  of  the  Directory  in 


166  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

openly  expressing  that  discontent.  The  truth  was,  that 
the  French  government  did  not  care  for  any  argument, 
however  able ;  it  was  beyond  the  reach  of  the  subtlest 
diplomatic  dialectic.  The  hope  of  the  Directory  —  and 
that  alone  caused  delay  —  was,  first,  that  the  treaty 
would  not  be  ratified,  and  next,  that  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives  would  interpose  obstacles  to  its  execution. 
They  believed  that  the  country  was  divided  into  two 
parties,  the  French  and  English.  They  expected  that 
popular  strength  would  secure  victory  to  the  first,  and 
considering  Mr.  Monroe  as  the  representative  of  the 
French  party,  they  were  willing,  through  him,  to  concil 
iate  and  strengthen  his  friends  at  home.  But  when  the 
action  of  the  Senate  and  the  vote  of  the  House  con 
firmed  the  triumph  of  the  administration,  they  gave  up 
all  hope,  and  determined  to  follow  their  original  course. 
Mr.  Monroe's  recall  at  such  a  moment  was  a  great 
relief  to  them ;  for  anxiety  to  maintain  their  influence 
with  the  party  to  which  he  belonged,  and  his  personal 
sympathy  with  themselves,  prevented  them  from  visit 
ing  on  him  the  burden  of  their  displeasure,  while  his 
removal  freed  them  from  any  such  embarrassment,  and 
allowed  them  to  represent  the  action  of  the  United 
States  as  the  work  of  the  opposite  English  faction. 
And  accordingly,  in  taking  leave  of  him,  they  drew  an 
unwarrantable  but  politic  distinction  between  him  and 
his  government.  "As  for  you,"  said  the  President  of 
the  Directory,  "As  for  you,  Mr.  Minister  Plenipotentiary, 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  167 

you  have  combated  for  principles ;  you  have  known 
the  true  interests  of  your  country.  Depart  with  our 
regret.  We  restore  in  you  a  representative  to  America, 
and  we  preserve  the  remembrance  of  the  citizen  whose 
personal  qualities  did  honor  to  that  title." 

That  Mr.  Monroe's  identification  with  the  party  in 
the  United  States  who  sympathized  with  France,  and 
opposed  the  English  treaty,  rendered  him  an  unfit  ex 
ponent  of  the  administration,  cannot  be  denied  ;  but 
then  in  justice  it  must  be  recollected,  that  he  had  ex 
pressed  that  opposition  in  the  senate  chamber  before 
his  appointment ;  that  he  had  declared  the  mission  to 
England  unwise,  and  the  minister  most  objectionable ; 
that  his  strong  sympathies  with  the  French  Revolution 
were  among  the  alleged  motives  of  his  choice ;  and  that 
during  his  mission  he  had  acted  in  strict  consistency 
with  his  professions.  And  the  administration  which 
authorized  Mr.  Jay  to  conduct  his  negotiations  "with 
that  attention  to  your  (his)  former  public  opinions 
which  self-respect  will  justify,"  was  surely  bound  to 
measure  Mr.  Monroe  by  the  same  charitable  standard. 
Besides,  Mr.  Monroe  had  really  done  effectual  service 
during  his  mission.  He  conciliated  the  temper  of  the 
French  government,  carried  out  three  of  the  four  points 
which  were  committed  to  his  care,  and,  without  doubt, 
delayed  the  expression  of  the  French  discontent  for  a 
long  time  ;  and  this,  too,  when  he  knew  that  he  had  not 
the  confidence  of  his  own  government,  and  when  the 
want  of  frank  intercourse  between  himself  and  the 


168  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

minister  in  London   seriously  embarrassed  his  action.* 
The  government,   however,  found  it  absolutely  neces- 

*  It  is  very  much  to  be  regretted  that  Mr.  Monroe,  upon  his 
return  home,  felt  warranted  in  vindicating  his  conduct  before  the 
people.  It  led  to  an  undignified  controversy  between  himself  and 
the  Secretary  of  State,  which  could  only  diminish  the  consideration 
of  both  parties  in  the  public  eye. 

A  diplomatist,  who  necessarily  assumes  confidential  relations  to  his 
government,  is  not  at  liberty  to  dissolve  that  confidential  connection 
for  his  own  vindication.  One  of  the  consequences  of  his  position  is, 
that,  without  the  consent  of  his  government,  his  lips  are  closed,  even 
as  to  his  own  conduct.  He  runs  the  risk  of  being  misunderstood, 
misrepresented,  and  even  sacrificed ;  and,  if  the  interests  of  the 
country  require  it,  he  must  be  content  with  his  martyrdom.  Time 
will  surely  do  him  justice  ;  and  even  if  extraordinary  circumstances 
warrant  his  demand  for  justice,  the  Senate  is  the  proper  channel 
through  which  to  seek  it.  They  are  impartial  enough  to  judge  truly, 
and  powerful  enough  to  act  effectively,  if  his  case  requires  their  in 
terference. 

I  am  no  advocate  of  the  mystification  on  foreign  affairs  which  has 
been  the  besetting  sin  of  the  cabinet  policy  of  Europe  ;  and  it  is  only 
wholesome  and  right  that  the  people  should  have  clear  notions  and 
proper  information  as  to  their  foreign  interests.  But  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  a  wise  reticence  ;  and  if,  whenever  a  foreign  minister  is 
superseded,  he  is  at  liberty  to  publish  despatches  and  attack  the  gov 
ernment,  the  whole  diplomatic  system  had  better  be  abandoned. 
For  it  was  meant  to  guarantee  moderation,  prudence,  and  temper,  in 
the  conduct  of  international  relations.  A  foreign  minister  has  noth 
ing  to  do  with  the  people.  He  is  the  instrument  of  the  executive. 
The  executive  is  responsible  to  the  nation,  but  he  is  responsible  to 
the  executive.  Our  diplomatic  history  has  furnished  more  than  one 
unfortunate  illustration  of  the  neglect  of  this  truth;  and  it  may 


DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY.  169 

sary,  in  carrying  out  its  policy,  to  have  a  minister  in 
Paris  who  should  sympathize  with  its  sentiments,  as 
well  as  represent  its  opinions ;  and  Washington  ten 
dered  the  French  mission  to  General  Charles  Cotes- 
worth  Pinckney,  of  South  Carolina,  the  brother  of 
Thomas  Pinckney,  at  that  time  minister  to  England. 
A  better  selection  it  would  have  been  impossible  to 
make.  Representing  an  old  and  honored  name,  habitu 
ated  to  the  exercise  of  that  acknowledged  influence 
which  belongs  to  large  fortune,  established  position,  and 
individual  ability,  —  an  eminent  jurist,  an  active  and  ex 
perienced  soldier,  a  distinguished  member  of  the  con 
vention  which  framed  the  Constitution, —  General 
Pinckney  had  worked  faithfully  and  fruitfully  in  every 
department  of  his  country's  service.  To  these  claims 
upon  public  consideration,  he  added  the  charm  of  a 
character  singularly  frank,  simple,  and  unselfish,  and  he 
was  one  of  that  small  band  of  Revolutionary  worthies 
who  shared  not  only  the  confidence,  but  the  warm  per 
sonal  affection,  of  their  great  chief.  After  the  adoption 
of  the  Constitution,  he  had  withdrawn  from  the  wider 
field  of  federal  politics,  and  devoted  his  still  vigorous 

safely  be  asserted,  that  in  every  case  the  ex-official  vindication  has 
sprung  rather  from  wounded  pride  than  public  spirit,  and  that  the 
interests  of  the  country  have  suffered  more  from  the  exposure  than 
the  character  of  the  minister  could  possibly  have  done  from  his 
silence.  With  a  Senate  constituted  as  is  ours,  the  legal  and  natural 
council  of  the  President  in  foreign  affairs,  injustice  to  a  foreign  min 
ister  can  always  be  corrected. 

15 


170  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

energies  to  the  interests  of  his  family  and  State.  Gen 
eral  Washington  made  more  than  one  effort  to  draw 
him  into  the  national  service  ;  but  he  declined,  on  differ 
ent  occasions,  the  departments  both  of  war  and  state, 
and  it  was  with  great  reluctance  that  he  accepted  the 
almost  hopeless  mission  that  was  now  pressed  upon 
him.  In  a  history  like  the  present,  it  would  be  scarcely 
possible  or  proper  to  dwell  at  any  length  on  the  general 
character  of  the  public  men  to  whom  reference  is  made, 
as  it  is  concerned  with  their  career  simply  in  connec 
tion  with  a  special  employment.  But  it  is  difficult  to 
resist  the  strong  desire  to  linger  with  affectionate  regard 
in  sight  of  characters  so  high,  so  pure,  so  "  true  and 
just  in  all  their  dealings,"  as  the  two  Pinckneys.  Culti 
vated  in  their  tastes  and  simple  in  their  manners, 
placed  by  fortune  where  the  exercise  of  a  graceful  and 
liberal  hospitality  was  the  habit  of  their  daily  life,  and 
the  assumption  of  high  duties  the  natural  consequence 
of  their  position,  brave  'and  gentle,  free,  with  all  the 
genuine  frankness  of  the  southern  nature,  and  yet  grave 
as  became  earnest  men  in  trying  times,  able,  unselfish, 
active,  their  success  in  life  was  free  from  all  the  feverish 
excitement  of  political  adventure.  They  sought  nei 
ther  place  nor  power,  but  rose  gradually  from  duty  to 
duty,  illustrating,  in  the  fulness  of  their  lives  and  ser 
vices,  the  virtues  of  the  class  to  which  they  belonged, 
and  bearing,  through  a  long  and  spotless  career, 

"  Without  abuse 
The  grand  old  name  of  gentleman." 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  171 

At  the  date  of  his  appointment,  General  Pinckney  rep 
resented,  as  fairly  as  possible,  the  real  sentiment  of  the 
large  conservative  party  in  the  country.  His  experience 
during  the  war,  which,  in  South  Carolina,  assumed  a 
peculiarly  bitter  and  bloody  character,  guaranteed  him 
against  any  extravagant  British  sympathies;  and,  in 
common  with  his  native  State,  he  felt  a  warm  and 
direct  interest  in  the  success  of  the  French  Revolution. 
But  he  was  eminently  an  American  patriot;  and  his 
correspondence,  both  public  and  private,  is  filled  with 
indignant  protests  against  the  spirit  which  would  sub 
ordinate  the  national  policy  to  the  interests  or  caprice 
of  any  foreign  power.  The  motive  and  purpose  of  his 
appointment  were  clearly  and  strongly  set  forth  in  his 
instructions.* 

*  These  instructions  are  quoted  from  the  original,  among  General 
Pinckney 's  MSS.  I  am  surprised  that  they  have  never  been  pub 
lished,  for  they  are  exceedingly  creditable  to  Mr.  Pinckney.  As  an 
illustration  of  General  Pinckney's  character,  I  shall  cite  the  following 
letter  from  the  same  MSS.  collection.  It  was  written  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  State,  upon  the  rumor  that  Mr.  Madison  had  arrived  in  Paris 
to  take  his  place,  he  having  been  superseded  on  account  of  his 
failure. 

"  All  the  Paris  papers  which  were  received  here  two  nights  ago 
brought  accounts  that  Mr.  Madison  had  arrived  in  that  city  as  Envoy 
Extraordinary  from  the  United  States  of  America  to  the  French 
Republic.  My  letters  from  Paris,  this  morning,  do  not  mention  any 
thing  about  it,  and  I  therefore  conclude  it  is  without  foundation.  It 
may,  however,  not  be  improper  to  explain  myself  on  this  subject.  It 
may  not  be  within  your  knowledge,  sir,  but  the  fact  is  so,  that  it  was 
with  very  great  reluctance  I  quitted  private  life  to  accept  of  public 


172  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

"  Your  own  observation  will  furnish  abundant  proof 
of  the  zeal,  and  even  enthusiasm,  with  which  the  people 
of  the  United  States  embraced  the  cause  of  the  French 
Revolution.  Having  recently  closed  a  contest  for  the 
maintenance  and  establishment  of  their  own  liberties, 
the  attempt  of  any  nation  to  recover  its  long  lost  rights 
could  not  fail  to  attract  the  good  wishes  of  the  people 
of  the  United  States.  But  such  an  attempt  by  the  peo 
ple  of  France,  who  had  rendered  them  important  aid  in 

office.  The  inconvenience  to  my  affairs  was  considerable.  No  con 
sideration  would  have  induced  me  to  accept  my  appointment,  but  the 
flattering  one  of  being  serviceable  to  my  country.  If,  therefore,  the 
service  I  was  sent  to  perform  can  be  better  executed  by  Mr.  Madi 
son,  or  any  other  gentleman,  I  earnestly  entreat  that  no  idea  of  deli 
cacy  with  regard  to  me  may  prevent  the  nomination  from  immedi 
ately  taking  place.  Perhaps  political  circumstances  might  render 
some  other  character  a  more  acceptable  agent  than  myself.  It  is 
generally  thought  in  France,  and  my  heart  swells  proudly  at  the 
idea,  that  I  am  the  friend,  and  beloved  by  our  illustrious  Washington. 
To  men  determined  to  see  no  neutrality  but  what  is  partial  in  their 
favor,  and  to  allow  of  no  independence  but  what  is  submission  to 
their  will,  the  friend  of  Washington  cannot  be  acceptable.  Act, 
therefore,  in  the  case,  as  the  honor  and  interest  of  our  country 
require.  At  the  same  time,  do  not  misunderstand  me,  and  think  that 
when  my  country  is  embarrassed,  I  mean  to  shrink  from  public  ser 
vice.  If  it  is  thought  necessary  for  me  to  remain  on  this  side  of  the 
Atlantic,  I  will  cheerfully  remain.  If  it  is  thought  my  country's  in 
terest  would  be  probably  promoted  by  my  recall,  I  will  with  pleasure 
return.  In  a  word,  while  my  country  is  in  danger,  the  little  abilities 
I  possess,  whether  in  the  cabinet  or  the  field,  when  she  calls  for  them, 
are  devoted  to  her."  —  C.  C.  P.  MSS.  Letter  Book,  p.  106. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTOKY.  173 

their  own  Revolution,  was  sure  to  excite  the  liveliest 
sensibility ;    for   every  nerve   was   in   unison,    and  the 
slightest  motion  there    produced  here  a  corresponding 
vibration.     You  have  felt,  and  you  have  witnessed,  in 
your  fellow-citizens,  a  solicitude  for  the  success  of  the 
French  Revolution  scarcely  surpassed,  and  hardly  to  be 
distinguished  from  that  which  was  manifested   in  our 
own  struggle  for  independence.     This  strong  sympathy 
demanded  all  the  prudence  and  energy  of  our  rulers  to 
restrain  it  within  the  limits  of  that  neutrality  which  our 
duty  and  safety,  and   the   interests  of  France  herself, 
required  us  to  maintain.     Unhappily,  during  the  course 
of  the  successive  and  violent  revolutions  of  parties  in 
that  country,  attempts  were  made  tending  to  produce 
one  in  our  own.     You  will  perceive  that  I  refer  to  the 
extraordinary    proceedings    of    M.    Genet,   during    the 
short  period  in  which  he  was  the  accredited  minister  of 
the  French  Republic  to  the  United  States.     Neverthe 
less,  to  the  anarchical  proceedings  of  himself  and  his 
agents,  to  their  flagrant  insults  to  the  authority  of  the 
laws,  and  to  their  endeavors  to  involve  us  in  a  foreign 
war,  was  opposed  only  the  exercise  of  the  established 
powers  of  government.     Where  the  danger  from  these 
acts   was   not  imminent,  they  were  borne  with    from 
sentiments   of  regard  to  his  nation ;  from   a  sense  of 
their  friendship  towards  us,  and  from  a  conviction  that 
they  would  not  suffer  us  to  remain  long  exposed  to  the 
actions  of  a  person  who  so  little  represented  our  mutual 
dispositions.      To   this   forbearance,  indeed,  a  reliance 
15* 


174  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

on  the  firmness  of  our  citizens,  in  their  principles  of 
peace  and  order,  proportionally  contributed. 

"  This  man,  agreeably  to  our  request,  was  speedily 
recalled;  and  in  his  successor  we  hoped  to  find  that 
candor  and  moderation  which,  superseding  all  suspi 
cions,  would  permit  us  to  indulge  in  that  pleasing 
amity  and  those  cordial  good  wishes  which  our  orig 
inal  sentiments  inspired.  But  here,  too,  we  were  in  no 
small  degree  disappointed.  Prompt  to  complain,  on 
the  slightest  cause,  and  not  seldom  on  mistaken 
ground  ;  equally  ready  to  charge,  as  violations  of  our 
treaty,  acts  which,  on  a  fair  exposition  of  the  articles, 
were  perfectly  innocent,  and  founded  on  the  neutral 
ground  we  had  taken ;  an  unpleasant  altercation  soon 
began,  and  towards  the  close  of  his  mission  rose  to  a 
degree  of  asperity,  accompanied  with  a  marked  aliena 
tion  from  the  government,  and  a  studied  neglect  of 
those  civilities  which  foreign  ministers  were  accus 
tomed  to  render  to  the  chief  magistrate  of  the  United 
States.  A  simple  remark  might  seem  to  account  for 
this  issue  of  M.  Fauchet's  mission.  He  received  his 
appointment  under  the  administration  of  Robespierre. 
The  change  of  system  consequent  on  the  death  of  that 
scourge  of  France  and  opprobrium  of  human  nature 
was  followed  by  a  change  in  the  representation  of 
France  to  the  United  States.  In  M.  Adet  we  trusted 
to  experience  all  that  frankness  and  all  those  evidences 
of  confidence  which  the  sincerity  of  our  government 
and  its  real  good-will  to  France  might  justly  challenge. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  175 

He  was  informed  by  the  President  himself  of  the  true 
situation  of  the  United  States,  and  in  the  most  friendly 
as  well  as  the  most  serious  manner,  cautioned  to  avoid 
the  rock  on  which  the  harmony  that  attended  the  com 
mencement  of  his  predecessor's  mission  had  been 
wrecked.  M.  Adet  received  this  information  and  these 
cautions  with  that  propriety  and  apparent  cordiality 
which  might  be  looked  for  in  a  man  of  sense  and  a  well- 
disposed  minister.  But,  although  no  interruption  of 
customary  civilities  has  ever  happened,  although  the 
external  appearance  of  harmony  subsists,  his  conduct 
has  plainly  indicated  a  distrust  in  the  government, —  a 
distrust  probably  cherished,  perhaps  excited,  by  those  of 
our  own  citizens,  with  whom  he  was  chiefly  associated. 
Under  such  circumstances,  the  best  interests  of  the  two 
nations  may  be  injured  by  mutual  jealousies ;  for  dis 
trust  on  one  side  begets  suspicion  on  the  other.  Un 
happily,  as  was  natural,  the  distrusts  and  jealousies  of 
the  ministers  have  been  communicated  to  their  nation, 
to  the  government  of  their  nation,  and  while  they  con 
sider  the  people  of  the  United  States  as  the  warm  and 
invariable  friends  of  France,  they  have  been  persuaded 
to  believe  that  the  government  is  hostile  to  their  inter 
ests,  and  perhaps  even  to  the  principles  of  the  Revolu 
tion.  Nothing  can  be  more  unfounded  than  this  opin 
ion  concerning  the  government  of  the  United  States, 
and  nothing  is  more  important  to  the  interests  of  the 
two  countries  than  its  eradication,  —  than  the  restora 
tion  of  mutual  confidence  as  the  basis  of  mutual  good- 


176  DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY. 

will,  and  of  the  exercise  of  offices  highly   and  recipro 
cally  beneficial. 

"  Faithfully  to  represent  the  disposition  of  the  govern 
ment  and  people  of  the  United  States  (for  their  dis 
position  is  one),  to  remove  jealousies  and  to  obviate 
complaints  by  showing  that  they  are  groundless,  to 
restore  that  mutual  confidence  which  has  been  so  un 
fortunately  and  injuriously  impaired,  and  to  explain 
the  relative  interests  of  both  countries,  and  the  real 
sentiment  of  your  own,  are  the  immediate  objects  of 
your  mission." 

The  French  government,  however,  did  not  intend  to 
be  conciliated.  Trusting  to  the  erroneous  and  exag 
gerated  representations  of  their  ministers,  —  all  of  them 
men  of  most  distempered  political  fancy,  —  they  as- 
sumed  that  there  was  a  broad  gulf  between  the  sympa 
thies  of  the  American  people  and  the  sentiment  of  their 
government ;  that  the  final  triumph  of  the  popular  pas 
sion  was  certain,  and  that  they  could,  by  the  influence 
of  their  agents,  direct  and  control  the  national  policy  of 
the  United  States.  Considering  Mr.  Monroe's  appoint 
ment  as  a  concession  by  the  government  to  the  popular 
sentiment,  they  conciliated  him  in  order  to  strengthen 
the  party  of  which  he  was  a  distinguished  member, 
relying  upon  that  party  to  defeat  the  English  treaty. 
When  these  anticipations  were  disappointed,  —  when 
the  result  of  the  discussion  in  both  the  House  and  the 
Senate  proved  the  strength  of  the  government,  and  the 
recall  of  Mr.  Monroe  its  resolution  to  maintain  its 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  177 

ground,  dissatisfaction  warmed  into  anger.  The  appoint 
ment  of  General  Pinckney,  the  brother  of  the  minister 
to  England,  the  known  personal  friend  of  the  President, 
and  one  of  the  most  eminent  members  of  the  Federal 
party,  put  an  end  to  all  hesitation.  For  some  time 
before  his  recall,  the  Directory  had  treated  Mr.  Monroe 
with  marked  coolness  ;  *  but  immediately  upon  the  news 
of  this  change,  their  attentions  were  renewed,  and  until 
his  departure,  he  was  the  object  of  most  flattering 
attention. 

General  Pinckney  arrived  at  Bourdeaux  on  the  15th 
of  November,  1796,  and  was  received  with  all  the 
courtesy  and  distinction  to  which  his  official  character 
entitled  him.  He  proceeded  overland  to  Paris,  where 
the  usual  preliminary  steps  were  taken,  in  order  to  his 
formal  presentation  to  the  constituted  authorities; 
when,  without  the  slightest  previous  intimation,  M. 
De  la  Croix  addressed  the  following  note  to  Mr.  Mon 
roe,  December  11,  1796  :  — 

"  CITIZEN  MINISTER  :  1  hastened  to  lay  before  the 
Executive  Directory  the  copies  of  your  letters  of  recall, 
and  of  the  letters  of  credence  of  Mr.  Pinckney,  whom 
the  President  has  appointed  to  succeed  you  in  quality  of 
Minister  Plenipotentiary  from  the  United  States  near 
the  French  Republic.  The  Directory  has  charged  me 
to  notify  you,  '  that  it  will  not  acknowledge  nor  re 
ceive  another  Minister  Plenipotentiary  from  the  United 

*  C.  C.  P.  MSS.  Letter  Book,  p.  37. 


178  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

States,  until  after  the  redress  of  the  grievances  de 
manded  of  the  American  government,  and  which  the 
French  Republic  has  a  right  to  expect  from  it.' 

"  I  pray  you  to  be  persuaded,  citizen  minister,  that  this 
determination  having  become  necessary,  allows  to  sub 
sist  between  the  French  Republic  and  the  American 
people  the  affection  founded  upon  former  benefits  and 
reciprocal  interests;  an  affection  which  you  yourself 
have  taken  a  pleasure  in  cultivating  by  every  means  in 
your  power." 

The  personal  treatment  of  General  Pinckney,  after 
this  letter,  was  marked  by  intentional  and  aggravated 
discourtesy.  Refusing  to  recognize  him  as  an  accred 
ited  minister,  they  refused  also  to  furnish  him  with  the 
permit  necessary  to  warrant  his  stay  in  Paris  as  a  pri 
vate  stranger.  In  violation  of  his  official  character, 
which  was  indisputable,  he  was  subjected  to  the  super 
vision  of  the  police,  and  finally  enjoined  to  leave  the 
territory  of  the  Republic.  Accordingly,  after  two  or 
three  spirited  attempts  to  vindicate  his  position  and 
maintain  his  diplomatic  privilege,  he  removed,  early  in 
1797,  to  Amsterdam,  and,  informing  his  government  of 
the  recent  occurrences,  there  waited  further  instruc 
tions.  During  this  period,  General  Pinckney  was  not 
idle.  He  kept  up  a  constant  correspondence  with 
Paris,  and  had,  at  one  time,  great  reason  to  hope  that 
his  mission  would  be  re-opened  with  fairer  chances  of 
success.  On  June  28,  1797,  he  wrote  to  the  depart 
ment,  from  the  Hague  :  — 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  179 

"  On  the  20th,  M.  Pastoret,  in  the  council  of  Five 
Hundred,  referred  to  the  article  of  the  constitution 
which  vests  in  the  legislature  the  right  of  declaring  war 
on  the  requisition  of  the  Directory :  '  There  exists,' 
said  he,  (  a  people  to  whom  we  are  united  by  treaties, 
and  yet  whose  particular  situation  with  regard  to  us 
we  are  ignorant  of.  The  Directory  appears  to  treat  the 
Americans  as  enemies,  and  yet  the  legislature  have 
not  declared  war  against  them.  The  arrete  of  the  12th 
Ventose  seems  to  suppose,  that,  in  violation  of  the 
treaty  of  1778,  the  Americans  had  committed  hos 
tilities  against  us.  The  commissioners  of  the  Directory, 
in  the  colonies,  applaud  themselves  for  having  taken 
measures  by  which  French  privateers  have  made  a  great 
number  of  American  prizes.  But  what  right  had  they 
to  fit  out  privateers  against  this  people  ?  What  law 
authorizes  them  to  do  so  ? 

" ;  It  is  true,  that  the  treaty  of  1794,  concluded  with 
England,  our  most  inveterate  enemy,  excites  well- 
grounded  suspicion  with  respect  to  the  intentions  of  the 
government  of  the  United  States ;  but  this  cannot  be  a 
sufficient  reason  for  the  Directory  violating,  with  respect 
to  them,  both  the  constitution  and  the  law ;  besides,  at 
that  time,  we  had  no  marine  to  assist  us  in  protect 
ing  their  commerce,  and  our  miserable  country  was  a 
prey  to  the  most  dreadful  anarchy.' 

"  He  finished  with  moving,  first,  that  the  Directory  be 
required  to  give  an  account  of  the  actual  political  rela 
tions  of  France  and  the  United  States.  Secondly,  that 


180  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

the  arrete  of  the  12th  Ventose  and  the  17th  Germinale, 
concerning  the  treaties  with  the  American  government, 
should  be  referred  to  a  commission  to  report  on  the 
question,  whether  the  legislature  can  annul  the  arretes 
of  the  Directory.  Both  these  propositions  were  referred 
to  a  committee  of  five  members,  and  the  speech  was 
ordered  to  be  printed.  .  .  .  The  measure  was  recom 
mended  by  the  new  Director.  By  means  of ,  at 

Paris,  I  am  informed  that  Barras  will  join  Barthelemy 
in  our  favor.  Astonishing;  but  though  the  authority 
appears  good,  I  can  hardly  credit  it.  Your  letter  to  me, 
of  the  16th  of  January,  has  been  read,  not  only  by  the 
members  of  the  legislature  in  France,  but  also  by  most 
of  the  officers  of  government.  M.  Segur,  who  writes 
sometimes  in  our  favor,  wishes  the  case  of  gratitude 
had  been  treated  more  moderately;  but  it  was  abso 
lutely  necessary  to  answer  the  continual  charges  of 
ingratitude  and  perfidy,  nor  do  I  conceive  it  could  have 
been  done  with  greater  mildness.  To  the  thousand 
copies  I  directed  originally  to  be  distributed,  I  have 
added  five  hundred  more,  as  many  of  our  consuls  in  the 
ports  of  France  are  writing  for  them,  saying  they  have 
had  a  wonderful  effect  upon  the  minds  of  many  per 
sons,  both  in  and  out  of  office,  who  neither  knew  the 
facts,  nor  were  aware  of  the  arguments  used." ' 

From  further  despatches  it  appears,  that,  although  the 
majority  of  the  commission  were  disposed  to  make  a 

*  C.  C.  P.  MSS.  Letter  Book,  p.  143-145. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  181 

favorable  report,  they  felt  constrained,  in  view  of  the 
immediate  circumstances  of  their  domestic  policy, 
and  the  negotiations  with  England  then  pending  at 
Lisle,  to  postpone  their  action;  and  before  General 
Pinckney  had  an  opportunity  to  test  the  sincerity  of  the 
feeling,  which  seemed  evidently  growing  more  friendly, 
a  change  in  the  character  of  his  mission,  as  well  as 
great  changes  in  the  political  relations  of  French  par 
ties,  altered  the  character  of  the  negotiation. 

Owing  to  the  immense  time  then  necessary  to  the 
transmission  of  communications  between  Europe  and 
America,  General  Pinckney's  despatch,  announcing  his 
rejection,  did  not  reach  Philadelphia  until  after  the 
Presidential  election.  General  Washington's  official 
life  had  closed,  and  John  Adams,  the  Vice-President 
during  his  administration,  had  been  chosen  President. 
Although  party  spirit  still  ran  high,  and  the  sympathies 
of  a  large  party  in  the  country  were  unduly  excited  in 
behalf  of  French  politics,  the  news  of  General  Pinck 
ney's  rejection  provoked  universal  and  patriotic  indig 
nation.  But  the  condition  of  the  country  was  too  per 
ilous  to  be  trusted  to  the  council  of  passion,  however 
natural.  While  some  difference  of  opinion  existed,  the 
wisest  and  best  men  of  both  parties  desired  reconcilia 
tion.  Alexander  Hamilton,  the  former  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  and  leader  of  the  Federal  party,  and  who, 
indeed,  possessed  a  larger  influence  with  that  great 
party  than  the  President  himself,  was  urgent  for  a 

resumption  of  negotiations.     In  a  letter,  dated  April  5, 
16 


182  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

1797,  in  reply  to  a  member  of  the  Cabinet,  with  whom 
he  differed,  he  said :  — 

"  The  situation  of  our  country,  my  dear  sir,  is  singu 
larly  critical.  .  .  .  Either  to  be  in  rupture  with  France, 
united  with  England  alone,  or  singly,  as  is  possible, 
would  be  a  most  unwelcome  situation.  Divided  as  we 
are,  who  can  say  what  would  be  hazarded  by  it  ?  In 
such  a  situation,  it  appears  to  me  we  should  rather  err 
on  the  side  of  condescension,  than  on  the  opposite  side. 
We  ought  to  do  every  thing  to  avoid  a  rupture,  with 
out  unworthy  sacrifices.  No  measure  can  tend  more  to 
this  than  an  extraordinary  mission.  And  it  is  certain, 
that,  to  fulfil  the  ends  proposed,  it  ought  to  embrace  a 
character  in  whom  France  and  the  opposition  have  fuh1 
credit.  .  .  .  Besides,  there  ought  to  be  certain  leading 
instructions,  from  which  they  may  not  deviate.  I  agree 
with  you,  that  we  have  nothing  to  retract;  that  we 
ought  to  risk  every  thing  before  we  submit  to  any  dis 
honorable  terms.  But  we  may  remould  our  treaties ; 
we  may  agree  to  put  France  on  the  same  footing  as 
Great  Britain,  by  our  treaty  with  her.  We  may  also 
liquidate,  with  a  view  to  future  wars,  the  import  of  the 
mutual  guaranty  in  the  treaty  of  alliance  ;  substituting 
specific  succors,  and  defining  the  casus  foederis.  But 
this  last  may  or  may  not  be  done,  though  with  me  it  is 
a  favorite  object."  * 

When,  therefore,  the  President,  in  his  special  mes- 

*  Gibbs's  Administration,  Vol.  I.  p.  489-490. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  183 

sage  to  Congress,  an  extra  session  of  which  he  had 
immediately  convened,  declared,  after  giving  a  history 
of  the  transaction :  — 

"  It  is  my  desire,  and  in  this  I  presume  I  concur  with 
you  and  our  constituents,  to  preserve  peace  and  friend 
ship  with  all  nations;  and  believing  that  neither  the 
honor  nor  the  interest  of  the  United  States  absolutely 
forbid  the  repetition  of  advances  for  securing  these  de 
sirable  objects  with  France,  I  shall  institute  a  fresh 
attempt  at  negotiation,  and  shall  not  fail  to  promote 
and  accelerate  an  accommodation,  on  terms  compat 
ible  with  the  rights,  duties,  interests,  and  honor  of  the 
nation ; " 

The  Senate,  in  their  address,  responded :  — 
"  We  do,  therefore,  most  sincerely  approve  of  your 
determination  to  promote  and  accelerate  an  accommo 
dation  of  our  existing  differences  with  that  republic,  on 
terms  compatible  with  the  rights,  duties,  interests,  and 
honor  of  our  nation,  and  you  may  rest  assured  of  our 
cordial  cooperation,  so  far  as  it  may  become  necessary 
in  this  pursuit." 

And  the  House  of  Representatives  replied :  — 
"  Sensibly  as  we  feel  the  wound  which  has  been 
inflicted  by  the  transactions  disclosed  in  your  com 
munications,  yet  we  think  with  you,  that  neither  the 
honor  nor  the  interest  of  the  United  States  forbid  the 
repetition  of  advances  for  preserving  peace.  We,  there 
fore,  receive  with  the  utmost  satisfaction  your  informa- 


184  DIPLOMATICHISTOKY. 

tion  that  a  fresh  attempt  at  negotiation  will  be  insti 
tuted." 

The  wisdom  of  this  resolution  can  scarcely  be  dis 
puted,  but  the  mode  of  its  execution  was  open  to  very 
grave  objections.  Mr.  Adams  determined  to  appoint 
two  additional  ministers,  to  assist  General  Pinckney  in 
resuming  the  negotiations. 

Now,  in  the  first  place,  General  Pinckney's  de 
spatches,  although  in  justice  it  must  be  said  that  they 
did  riot  arrive  in  time  to  influence  the  President's  de 
cision,  indicated  that  there  was  a  growing  feeling  in 
favor  of  the  American  cause.  A  large  majority  in  the 
Council  of  Five  Hundred  disapproved  of  the  impolitic 
and  discourteous  proceedings  of  the  Minister  for  For 
eign  Affairs ;  the  committee  to  whom  the  whole  matter 
had  been  referred  were  prepared  to  report  against  the 
conduct  of  their  government,  and  only  delayed  the  pre 
sentation  of  their  report  from  motives  of  prudential 
policy ;  public  opinion  had  been  reached  by  means  of 
the  American  state  papers,  which  General  Pinckney 
had  translated  and  circulated  in  France ;  and  Talley 
rand  himself,  as  late  as  July,  1797,  had  courteously 
expressed  the  hope  that  he  would  soon  have  the  pleas 
ure  of  seeing  General  Pinckney  again  in  Paris.*  The 
return  and  recognition  of  General  Pinckney  would 
have  been  altogether  the  fittest  and  fullest  acknowledg- 

*  C.  C.  P.  MSS.  Letter  Book,  p.  173  et  passim. 


-DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY.  185 

ment  of  the  wrong  which  had  been  done ;  and  in  view 
of  his  integrity,  firmness,  and  ability,  would  have  been 
the  best  guarantee  for  the  sincerity  and  success  of  the 
negotiations. 

In  the  next  place,  the  appointment  of  a  commission, 
including  men  of  opposite  political  opinions  in  refer 
ence  to  the  very  subject  of  negotiation,  was  only  sow 
ing,  in  advance,  the  seeds  of  difference  in  the  commis 
sion  itself,  and  of  discontent  among  parties  at  home. 
For,  it  was  certain,  that,  in  a  commission  of  three,  one 
party  must  be  in  a  powerless  minority ;  and  the  private 
history  of  the  time  proves  that  it  was  impossible  to  per 
suade  a  firstrate  man  of  the  opposition  to  accept,  in 
face  of  the  experience  of  Mr.  Monroe's  mission,  so  dis 
tasteful  and  responsible  a  position. 

And,  finally,  the  presence  of  the  representatives  of 
differing  opinions  in  the  commission  subjected  it  to 
the  wily  intrigues  of  the  accomplished  diplomatist  then 
at  the  head  of  foreign  affairs  in  France,  —  kept  alive 
the  belief  in  the  French  mind  that  there  was  a  party  in 
the  United  States  whom  they  could  conciliate  at  the 
expense  of  the  government,  and  thus  weakened  the 
strength  of  the  negotiators  in  a  contest  where  they 
needed  firmness,  energy,  and,  above  all,  unanimity. 

In  pursuance  of  his  plan,  however,  Mr.  Adams  nom 
inated,  to  join  General  Pinckney,  John  Marshall  of  Vir 
ginia,  one  of  the  most  distinguished  Federalists  of  the 
day,  and,  in  after  times,  one  of  the  most  illustrious  of  all 
the  great  men  of  the  country,  and  Elbridge  Gerry  of 
16* 


186  DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY. 

Massachusetts,  who  was  a  very  conspicuous  member 
of  the  opposition,  and  who,  coming  from  the  same 
State  as  the  President,  shared  his  friendship,  and  pos 
sessed  more  of  his  confidence  than  any  other  public 
man  of  the  same  political  party.  The  history  of  this 
mission  is  painful  and  unprofitable,  for  it  effected  noth 
ing,  and  ended  in  sore  humiliation  to  the  country. 

On  the  4th  of  October,  1797,  the  three  envoys 
reached  Paris,  and  on  the  8th  were  formally  and  courte 
ously  received  by  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  But 
this  first  step  was  their  only  one ;  for  while  all  direct 
conference  with  the  minister  upon  the  business  of  their 
mission  was  perseveringly  postponed,  they  were  ap 
proached  by  informal  agents,  and  through  them  sounded 
as  to  propositions  alike  dishonorable  to  him  from  whom 
they  came,  and  unworthy  of  those  before  whom  they 
were  laid.  The  details  of  this  miserable  intrigue,  and 
the  conduct  and  character  of  the  agents  who  managed 
it,  do  not  deserve  historical  record.  It  combined  all  the 
meanness  of  cunning  and  the  tenacious  energy  of 
avarice ;  but  it  was  base  in  conception,  clumsy  in  con 
trivance,  and  fruitless  in  result.* 

*  The  history  of  this  intrigue,  generally  known  as  the  X.  Y.  Z. 
correspondence,  can  be  found  at  length  in  the  published  despatches 
of  the  ministers,  and  in  the  general  histories  of  the  United  States. 
Another,  and  very  full  account,  will  be  found  in  the  Life  of  Talley 
rand,  published  in  the  continuation  of  the  Biograplde  Universelle.  In 
this  latter,  Talleyrand's  character  is  more  unscrupulously  attacked 
than  even  by  American  histories.  I  cannot  attach  much  importance 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  187 

It  is  sufficient  to  state,  that  through  agents  whom  he 
afterwards,  but  in  vain,  disavowed,  Talleyrand  endeav 
ored  to  compromise  the  American  envoys  in  prelimi 
nary  discussions.  He  made  three  propositions,  the  ante 
cedent  conditions  of  any  serious  negotiation  :  —  1.  An 
apology  for  the  language  used  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  in  his  message  to  Congress  in  reference 
to  the  conduct  of  the  French  government,  both  in  their 
farewell  of  Mr.  Monroe  and  their  reception,  or  rather 
rejection,  of  Mr.  Pinckney.  2.  A  loan  from  the  United 
States  government  to  the  French  Republic.  And,  3.  a 
point  which  was  urged  with  scandalous  pertinacity,  — 
the  gift  of  a  large  sum  of  money  to  the  members  of  the 
Directory,  with  the  exception  of  Merlin,  who,  the  envoys 
were  frankly  informed,  derived,  as  Minister  of  Justice, 
sufficient  perquisites  from  the  prizes  which  he  con 
fiscated  in  violation  of  the  solemn  treaties  between  the 
two  governments. 

The  American  ministers  listened  with  long  suffering 
patience  to  the  discussion  of  these  points,  varied,  as 
they  occasionally  were,  by  reference  to  the  real  points  at 
issue  between  the  two  governments.  But  they  were 
decided,  that  any  explanation  of  the  language  of  the 
President  addressed  to  the  national  legislature  France 
had  no  right  to  demand,  and  no  hope  to  obtain ;  that 
any  negotiation  touching  a  loan  was  clearly  beyond 

to  the  transaction,   and  have   not   therefore   dwelt   upon  it  in  de 
tail. 


188  DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY. 

their  powers,  and  must  be  referred  back  for  instructions  ; 
and  that  they  could  not  even  consider  the  proposition 
of  personal  remuneration  to  the  Directory. 

Having  waited  in  vain  for  months,  in  hopes  of  direct 
communication  with  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
they  addressed  to  him,  January  27,  1798,  a  long  and 
very  able  letter,  reviewing  the  various  grounds  of  differ 
ence  between  the  two  countries,  and  concluding  with 
the  following  language :  — 

"  Perceiving  no  probability  of  being  allowed  to  enter, 
in  the  usual  forms,  on  those  discussions  which  might 
tend  to  restore  harmony  between  the  two  republics, 
they  have  deemed  it  most  advisable,  even  under  the  cir 
cumstances  of  informality  which  attend  the  measure,  to 
address  to  your  government,  through  you,  this  candid 
review  of  the  conduct,  and  this  true  representation  of 
the  sentiments  and  wishes,  of  the  government  of  the 
United  States.  They  pray  that  it  may  be  received  in 
the  temper  with  which  it  is  written,  and  considered  as 
an  additional  effort,  growing  out  of  a  disposition  com 
mon  to  the  government  arid  people  of  America,  to  cul 
tivate  and  restore,  if  it  be  possible,  harmony  between 
the  two  republics.  If,  citizen  minister,  there  remains  a 
hope  that  these  desirable  objects  can  be  effected  by  any 
means  which  the  United  States  have  authorized,  the 
undersigned  will  still  solicit,  and  will  still  respectfully 
attend,  the  development  of  those  means. 

"  If,  on  the  contrary,  no  such  hope  remains,  they  have 
only  to  pray  that  their  return  to  their  own  country  may 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  189 

be  facilitated ;  and  they  will  leave  France  with  the 
most  deep-felt  regret,  that  neither  the  real  and  sincere 
friendship  which  the  government  of  the  United  States 
has  so  uniformly  and  unequivocally  displayed  for  this 
great  republic,  nor  its  continued  efforts  to  demonstrate 
the  purity  of  its  conduct  and  intentions,  can  protect  its 
citizens,  or  preserve  them  from  the  calamities  which 
they  have  sought,  by  a  just  and  upright  conduct,  to 
avert." 

Two  very  unsatisfactory  interviews  with  Talleyrand 
followed  this  communication ;  and  on  the  18th  of 
March,  he  replied  at  length  to  the  despatch  of  the  en 
voys.  The  spirit  of  this  reply  would,  in  itself,  have 
precluded  all  further  discussion ;  but  it  contained  a 
paragraph  which  effectually  closed  all  communication. 

"  It  is,  therefore,"  said  Talleyrand,  "  only  in  order  to 
smooth  the  way  of  discussion  that  the  undersigned  has 
entered  into  the  preceding  explanations.  It  is  with  the 
same  view  that  he  declares  to  the  commissioners  and 
envoys  extraordinary,  that,  notwithstanding  the  kind 
of  prejudice  that  has  been  entertained  with  respect 
to  them,  the  Executive  Directory  is  disposed  to  treat 
with  that  one  of  the  three,  whose  opinions,  presumed 
to  be  more  impartial,  promise  in  the  course  of  the  ex 
planation  more  of  that  reciprocal  confidence  which  is 
indispensable." 

Upon  the  receipt  of  this  letter,  Messrs.  Pinckney  and 
Marshall  terminated  their  mission.  That  they  fully 
represented  the  sentiment  of  their  government,  was 


190  DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY. 

manifested  in  a  despatch,  which  did  not,  however,  reach 
them,  until  after  their  withdrawal.  That  despatch, 
"Sated  March  23,  1798,  conveyed  the  following  explicit 
instructions  :  — 

"  1.  That  if  you  are  in  treaty  with  persons  authorized 
by  the  Directory,  on  the  subjects  of  your  mission,  then 
you  are  to  remain  and  expedite  the  completion  of  the 
treaty,  if  it  should  not  be  concluded.  Before  this  letter 
gets  to  your  hand,  you  will  have  ascertained  whether 
the  negotiation  is  or  is  not  conducted  with  candor  on 
the  part  of  the  French  government ;  and  if  you  shall 
have  discovered  a  clear  design  to  procrastinate,  you  are 
to  break  off  the  negotiation,  demand  your  passports, 
and  return  home.  For  you  will  consider  that  suspense 
is  ruinous  to  the  essential  interests  of  your  country. 

"  2.  That  if,  on  the  receipt  of  this  letter,  you  shall  not 
have  been  received,  or,  whether  received  or  not,  if  you 
shall  not  be  in  treaty  with  persons  duly  authorized  by 
the  Directory,  with  full  and  equal  powers,  you  are  to 
demand  your  passports  and  return. 

"  3.  In  no  event  is  a  treaty  to  be  purchased  with 
money,  by  loan  or  otherwise.  There  can  be  no  safety 
in  a  treaty  so  obtained.  A  loan  to  the  Republic  would 
violate  our  neutrality,  and  a  douceur  to  the  men  now  in 
power  might,  by  their  successors,  be  urged  as  a  reason 
for  annulling  the  treaty,  or  as  a  precedent  for  further 
and  repeated  demands." 

Unfortunately,  the  history  of  this  mission  does  not 
close  here.  Mr.  Gerry  became  the  dupe  of  the  astute 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  191 

but  unprincipled  minister  with  whom  he  dealt.  He 
consented  at  the  outset  of  the  negotiations  to  receive 
and  discuss  propositions  which  he  was  pledged  to  keep 
secret  from  his  colleagues ;  he  committed  himself  in 
private  to  opinions  which  contradicted  the  record  of  the 
despatches  which  bore  his  signature ;  and  when,  having 
exhausted  all  honorable  expedients,  his  fellow  ministers 
withdrew  in  patriotic  indignation,  he  became  a  party  to 
their  humiliation,  and  remained  in  Paris  to  renew  dis 
cussions  which  were  idle,  upon  propositions  which  were 
dishonorable. 

It  is  true,  that,  in  reply  to  a  note  from  Talleyrand, 
proposing  "  a  day  upon  which  to  resume  our  reciprocal 
communications  upon  the  interests  of  the  French  Re 
public  and  the  United  States  of  America,"  he  said,  "  I 
can  only,  then,  confer  informally  and  unaccredited  on 
any  subject  respecting  our  mission,  and  communicate 
to  the  government  of  the  United  States  the  result  of 
such  conferences ;  being,  in  my  individual  capacity,  un 
authorized  to  give  them  an  official  stamp."  It  is  true, 
that  he  said  and  believed  that  war  would  be  the  result 
of  his  departure ;  but  his  duty  was  clear,  and  the  rebuke 
administered  by  the  Secretary  of  State,  in  a  despatch  of 
June  25th,  most  justly  deserved. 

"  The  respect  due  to  yourselves  and  to  your  country 
irresistibly  required  that  you  should  turn  your  backs  to 
a  government  that  treated  both  with  contempt,  a  con 
tempt  not  diminished  but  aggravated  by  the  flattering 
but  insidious  distinction  in  your  favor,  in  disparage- 


192  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY 

ment  of  men  of  such  respectable  talents,  untainted 
honor,  and  pure  patriotism,  as  Generals  Pinckney  and 
Marshall,  and  in  whom  their  government  and  country 
reposed  entire  confidence ;  and,  especially,  when  the  real 
object  of  the  distinction  was  to  enable  the  French  gov 
ernment,  trampling  on  the  authority  and  dignity  of  our 
own,  to  designate  an  envoy  with  whom  they  would  con 
descend  to  negotiate.  ...  It  is  presumed  that  you  will 
consider  the  instructions  of  the  23d  of  March,  before 
mentioned,  as  an  effectual  recall;  lest,  however,  by  any 
possibility,  those  instructions  should  not  have  reached 
you,  and  you  should  still  be  in  France,  I  am  directed  by 
the  President  to  transmit  you  this  letter,  and  to  inform 
you  that  you  are  to  consider  it  as  a  positive  letter  of  re 
call." 

The  communications  between  Mr.  Gerry  and  Tal 
leyrand,  after  the  departure  of  his  colleagues,  are  of 
no  historical  consequence.  Talleyrand's  letters  mani 
fest  but  slender  regard  for  so  weak  an  instrument  as 
he  soon  found  he  had  secured ;  and  when  the  publica 
tion  of  the  despatches  at  home  gave  to  the  world  the 
history  of  the  small  and  disgraceful  intrigue  which 
Talleyrand  had  conducted  through  his  informal  agents, 
that  minister  with  bold  effrontery  disavowed  his  sub 
alterns,  appealed  to  Mr.  Gerry  to  vindicate  his  inno 
cence,  and  involved  him  in  a  correspondence  which 
only  added  to  the  bitterness  of  the  unfortunate  envoy's 
mortification.  Whatever  may  have  been  Mr.  Gerry's 
private  virtues,  and  virtues  he  undoubtedly  had, — 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  193 

whatever  may  have  been  his  public  services,  and  some 
he  had  rendered,  —  of  his  conduct  in  this  negotiation 
impartial  history  can  only  record,  that  it  was  false  to 
himself,  faithless  to  his  colleagues,  and  fatal  to  the 
honor  and  interest  of  his  country.* 

The  news  of  this  second,  and,  in  its  accompanying 
circumstances,  even  more  aggravating  failure,  the  suc 
cessive  arrival  of  the  baffled  plenipotentiaries,  and  the 
publication  of  the  despatches,  excited  in  the  country 
universal  indignation.  Mr.  Adams  called  an  extra 
session  of  Congress,  and,  by  his  message,  rallied  to  the 
support  of  his  administration  the  full  and  active  sym 
pathy  of  the  whole  nation.  The  national  legislature 
responded  promptly  to  the  popular  feeling,  and  adopted 
measures  which  indicated  both  their  conviction  of  the 
gravity  of  the  crisis  and  their  resolution  to  meet  it. 
The  necessary  legislation  was  passed  to  increase  the 
army  and  navy,  and  to  provide  for  the  requisite  means 
of  defence.  The  command-in-chief  was  offered  to  and 

*  In  the  second  volume  of  the  Life  of  Gerry,  by  James  T.  Austin, 
Boston,  1829,  will  be  found  an  earnest  and  elaborate  defence  of  Mr. 
Gerry's  conduct  in  this  mission.  I  cannot  think  it  satisfactory,  but  it 
ought  to  be  carefully  read  by  any  one  who  wishes  to  form  an  impartial 
opinion.  I  have,  in  the  text  of  this  volume,  confined  myself  to  con 
clusions  without  the  detail  of  the  argument.  To  have  reasoned  out 
every  conclusion  would  have  made  this  a  book  of  episodes,  or  re 
quired  another  volume  of  notes.  Besides  which,  I  know  nothina- 
more  unprofitable  than  a  repetition  of  the  personal  controversies  of 
that  day,  which  were  more  numerous  and  more  bitter  than  at  any 
other  period  of  our  history. 

17 


194  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

accepted  by  Washington.  Merchant  vessels  were  per 
mitted  to  arm  in  their  own  protection,  and  the  Presi 
dent  was  authorized  to  instruct  the  public  armed  ves 
sels,  and  issue  commissions  to  private  ones,  to  capture 
French  armed  vessels,  wherever  found.  And  an  act 
was  passed,  alleging  the  repeated  violation  of  the 
treaties  between  the  two  countries,  the  just  claims  of 
the  United  States  for  reparation,  and  the  complete  fail 
ure  of  all  attempts  at  honorable  settlement,  and,  for 
these  reasons,  declaring  the  treaties  with  France  void. 

While  urging  upon  Congress  these  and  kindred 
measures,  Mr.  Adams  still  expressed  his  readiness  to 
accept  any  amicable  adjustment  of  these  national  dif 
ficulties  consistent  with  the  country's  honor ;  but  in  his 
message  of  June,  1798,  he  expressly  declared,  "  I  will 
never  send  another  minister  to  France  without  assur 
ances  that  he  will  be  received,  respected,  and  honored 
as  the  representative  of  a  great,  free,  powerful,  and 
independent  nation."  Earnest  and  resolute  to  prepare 
the  country  for  the  conflict  that  seemed  inevitable,  Mr. 
Adams  yet  realized  fully  the  perilous  condition  in 
which  a  war  with  France  would  involve  the  nation, 
and  while  these  preparations  were  in  progress,  without 
abating  one  jot  of  zeal  in  their  conduct,  influenced  by 
what  he  considered  a  change  of  conditions  in  France, 
he  resolved  once  more  to  attempt  negotiation. 

The  effect  of  this  resolution  upon  politics  at  home 
was  decisive,  and,  as  far  as  the  great  Federal  party  was 
concerned,  destructive  ;  and  these  consequences  have,  in 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTOEY.  195 

a  large  measure,  prevented  an  impartial  consideration 
of  its  merits  as  a  measure  of  foreign  policy.  As  such  it 
deserves  the  gravest  attention.  For  the  circumstances 
under  which  he  was  compelled  to  act,  Mr.  Adams  was 
in  no  way  responsible.  The  policy  of  neutrality,  a 
policy  eminently  wise  and  honorable,  had  been  initi 
ated  and  persevered  in  by  Washington's  administration. 
To  avoid  a  war  with  England,  negotiation  had  been 
resorted  to,  which  evidenced  no  foolish  sensitiveness  as 
to  national  honor,  and  resulted  in  no  extravagant  advan 
tage  to  the  national  interest.  The  very  success  of  this 
negotiation  had  complicated  our  relations  with  France ; 
and  the  natural,  the  necessary,  consequence  of  Jay's 
treaty  was,  that  the  succeeding  administration  was 
compelled  to  do  in  reference  to  France  what  that  treaty 
had  done  in  reference  to  England,  or  else  the  whole 
neutral  policy  of  the  country  had  to  be  abandoned.  To 
abandon  this  neutrality  was  to  render  useless  the 
laborious  diplomacy  of  the  last  eight  years ;  and,  in 
fact,  to  pass  the  most  pointed  condemnation  upon  Mr. 
Jay's  treaty,  for  that  treaty  would  have  been  the  osten 
sible  cause  of  the  French  dissatisfaction.  Justice,  there 
fore,  to  the  administration  of  Washington,  as  well  as  to 
the  great  interests  of  the  nation,  required  Mr.  Adams  to 
exhaust  every  honorable  means  of  amicable  adjustment 
before  he  resorted  to  the  perilous  venture  of  war.  The 
country  was  no  better  prepared  for  hostilities  at  this 
time  than  at  the  signature  of  the  treaty  of  London. 
Public  opinion,  though  for  the  moment  roused  into 


196  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

unanimous  indignation  at  the  insolence  of  the  Direc 
tory,  was  still  very  much  divided,  both  as  to  men  and  to 
measures ;  and  the  increased  and  onerous  taxation 
necessary  to  a  war  policy  would  have  aggravated  the 
difference.  Besides  this,  a  war  with  France  almost 
necessarily  implied  an  alliance  with  England ;  and, 
terminate  how  it  might,  seemed  to  involve  the  unavoid 
able  sacrifice  of  national  independence.  For,  scarcely 
able  to  stand  alone,  with  an  amount  of  domestic  legis 
lation  to  perfect  which  required  all  the  temper,  time, 
and  talent  of  its  rulers,  how  was  it  possible,  in  such  a 
conflict,  that  the  interest  and  honor  of  the  country  could 
escape  being  crushed  -between  the  upper  and  nether 
mill-stone  of  the  contending  nations  ?  More  than  this, 
a  war  with  France  was  war  with  Spain ;  and  already, 
at  Lisle,  where  England  and  France  were  endeavoring 
to  adjust  a  peace,  propositions  had  been  suggested 
looking  to  the  cession  of  New  Orleans  to  England.*  It 
involved  probable  difficulty  with  Portugal,  with  whom, 
on  account  of  its  relations  with  the  Barbary  powers,  the 
United  States  were  particularly  anxious  to  be  on  ami 
cable  terms.  For,  although  Portugal  had  been  the 
nominal  ally  of  England,  yet  during  the  negotiations  at 
Lisle,  in  which  England  made  the  interests  of  Portugal 
a  subject  of  indispensable  settlement,  the  Portuguese 

*  "  Trinidad  in  our  hands,  Pleville  said,  would  turn  to  great 
account.  So  would  New  Orleans,  and  he  immediately  saw  its  conse 
quences  as  to  the  Americans."  —  Lord  Malmesbury's  Diary,  July  8, 
1797,  Vol.  III.,  p.  370. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  197 

minister  at  Paris  treacherously  concluded  a  most  unex 
pected  peace  with  Talleyrand,  a  step  which  seriously 
and  most  unfairly  embarrassed  the  English  negotiator. 
It  promised  trouble  at  the  Hague,  and,  in  fact,  interfered 
directly  with  all  our  European  relations ;  and,  by  mix 
ing  up  the  only  independent  power  in  America  with 
the  contest  in  Europe,  suggested  and  excused  the  dis 
position  of  possessions  in  America  as  a  means  of  terri 
torial  adjustment  in  the  final  arrangement  of  an  Euro 
pean  peace. 

To  avoid  war,  therefore,  at  almost  any  hazard,  was 
clearly  the  interest  of  the  United  States.  All  that  Mr. 
Adams  was  bound  to  consider  on  the  other  hand,  was, 
first,  that  the  country  should  not  be  humiliated  in  its 
advances ;  and  secondly,  that  there  should  exist  some 
reasonable  prospect  of  a  fair  settlement. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  conduct  of  the  Directory 
had  been  insolent  in  the  extreme ;  but  this  diplomatic 
impertinence  was  not  displayed  for  the  sole  or  special 
benefit  of  the  United  States.     At  the  same  time  that 
they  refused  to  receive   Mr.  Pinckney,  they  dismissed""; 
Lord  Malmesbury  from  Paris,  with  almost  contemptu- ,  [ 
ous  rudeness.*     The  negotiations  at  Lisle,  resumed  by 

*  "  Burke  was  strongly  opposed  to  pacific  negotiations  with 
France,  and  taxed  the  government  with  meanness  in  proposing 
them.  Somebody  observing  that  the  badness  of  the  roads  had  ren 
dered  Lord  Malmesbury's  journey  a  slow  one,  he  replied,  *  no  won 
der,  as  he  went  the  whole  way  on  his  knees.' "  —  Diary  and  Corresp. 
of  Lord  Malmesbury,  Vol.  III.,  p.  311,  note. 

17* 


198  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

the  English  government  very  mueh  in  the  same  man 
ner  as  the  United  States  renewed  their  discussion 
through  Messrs.  Pinckney,  Marshall,  and  Gerry,  were 
characterized  by  the  same  dishonoring  and  irritating 
traits.  These  negotiations  were  terminated,  unsuccess 
fully,  only  a  few  days  before  the  arrival  in  Paris  of  the 
American  commissioners.  And  the  diary  of  Lord 
Malmesbury,  the  English  minister,  and  one  of  the  most 
celebrated  diplomatists  of  any  age  or  country,  and  his 
correspondence  with  Lord  Grenville  and  Mr.  Canning, 
are  full  of  constant  complaint.  The  same  deceitful  delay, 
the  same  vague  discussion,  the  same  secret  intermedi 
aries,  the  same  suspicion,  almost  certainty,  of  diplomatic 
manoeuvring  on  the  part  of  the  Directory  for  the  base 
purposes  of  stockjobbing  and  money  making.  Besides 
this,  it  is  clear  that  this  dishonorable  conduct  was  not 
the  action  of  the  French  people.  As  the  extract  already 
quoted  from  Mr.  Pinckney's  despatches  shows,  and  other 
sources  confirm,  there  were  two  parties  in  the  country, 
the  one  following  Barras,  Rewbell,  and  Lareveilliere,  the 
other  siding  with  Carnot  and  Barthelemy  :  the  first,  rude, 
Jacobinical,  aggressive,  insolent;  the  other,  disposed  to 
act  in  good  faith,  and  with  a  view  to  broad  and  fair 
national  interests.  The  uncertainty  of  these  parallel 
negotiations  with  England  and  the  United  States  fur 
nishes  continual  evidence  of  the  fluctuating  strength  of 
those  parties  in  the  Directory.  And  thus  the  United 
States  might  very  well  have  resolved  to  retort  the  policy 
of  Genet,  Fauchet,  and  Adet,  and  refuse  to  acknowl- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  199 

edge  the  discourteous  diplomacy  of  the  Directory  as  an 
expression  of  the  French  national  feeling.  But,  fortu 
nately  for  Mr.  Adams,  he  was  not  forced  to  any  such 
palliating  construction.  Just  before  the  arrival  of  the 
American  commissioners,  this  contest  in  the  Directory 
had  resulted  in  the  triumph  of  one  party,  and  Barras 
and  his  friends  were  confirmed  in  power,  while,  at  the 
same  time,  the  peace  of  Campo  Formio  crowned  with 
victory  the  policy  of  the  French  Republic.  From  this 
period  the  diplomacy  of  France  assumed  a  more  regular, 
if  not  a  more  moderate,  character ;  and  although  the 
American  ministers  derived  no  immediate  advantage 
from  the  change,  although  their  negotiation  seemed 
rather  the  expiring  effort  of  the  disgraceful  system  which 
had  hitherto  existed,  yet  they  had  scarcely  returned 
home  before  an  improvement  began  to  manifest  itself 
in  the  conduct  of  French  affairs.  Talleyrand  himself, 
in  a  manner,  —  indirect,  it  is  true,  but  recognized  and 
constantly  repeated  in  diplomatic  history,  —  made  ad 
vances  to  the  government  of  the  United  States.  The 
negotiations  had  been  closed,  and  the  ministers  had  re 
turned  home  early  in  1798.  In  the  August  of  the  same 
year,  M.  Pichon,  the  Secretary  of  the  French  Legation 
at  the  Hague,  acting  evidently  under  instructions,  had 
an  informal  conversation  with  Mr.  Vans  Murray,  the 
newly  appointed  American  minister  to  that  place.  In 
the  course  of  his  conferences  with  the  American  min 
ister,  he  showed  him  the  correspondence  between  Tal 
leyrand  and  himself,  in  which  the  former  signified  his 


200  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

satisfaction  at  the  step  taken  by  M.  Pichon,  expressed 
his  own  anxiety  to  see  the  negotiation  resumed  and 
terminated  amicably,  and  declared  the  readiness  of  his 
government  to  receive  and  treat  with  the  fullest  consid 
eration  any  minister  from  the  United  States.  These 
letters  were  forwarded  by  Mr.  Murray  to  the  President ; 
and  in  February,  1799,  Mr.  Adams,  basing  his  action 
upon  this  correspondence,  nominated  Mr.  Murray  as 
minister  to  France.  This  nomination  not  giving  satis 
faction,  he  joined  with  Mr.  Murray,  Chief  Justice  Ells 
worth,  of  Connecticut,  and  Governor  Davie,  of  North 
Carolina.  But  this  commission  —  and  it  is  to  be  re 
gretted  that  it  was  a  commission  instead  of  a  single 
minister  —  was  not  to  enter  France  until  distinct  and 
official  assurance  had  been  received  of  their  certain  and 
honorable  reception. 

On  the  12th  of  May,  1799,  Talleyrand,  in  reply  to 
Mr.  Murray's  notification  of  his  appointment  and  its 
condition,  said,  "Be  pleased  to  transmit  to  your  col 
leagues,  and  to  receive  yourself,  the  frank  and  explicit 
assurance  that  it  (the  government)  will  receive  the  en 
voys  of  the  United  States  in  the  official  character  with 
which  they  are  invested ;  that  they  shall  enjoy  all  the 
prerogatives  which  are  attached  to  it  by  the  law  of 
nations,  and  that  one  or  more  ministers  shall  be  duly 
authorized  to  treat  with  them." 

On  the  30th  of  March,  1800,  the  American  envoys 
met  in  Paris,  and  on  the  7th  were  officially  presented  to 
the  First  Consul ;  for  since  their  appointment,  another 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  201 

and  greater  revolution  had  occurred  in  the  form  of  the 
French  government. 

The  position  of  the  American  ministers  on  this  occa 
sion  differed  very  materially  from  that  occupied  by 
General  Pinckney,  or  the  commission  which  succeeded 
him.  The  former  ambassadors  had  borne  the  remon 
strances  of  one  friendly  and  allied  nation  to  another, 
and  their  representations  were  based  upon  existing 
treaties,  which  determined  the  relations  of  the  two  gov 
ernments  to  each  other.  And  these  treaties  indicated  a 
connection  of  such  mutual  advantage  as  to  recommend 
to  both  a  prompt  and  an  amicable  solution  of  their 
difficulties.  But,  by  the  act  of  the  American  Congress, 
these  treaties  were  now  declared  void,  and  the  question 
of  the  indemnity  for  the  wrongs  complained  of  stood 
unsupported  by  the  consequential  advantages  of  the 
treaties,  and  would,  therefore,  inevitably  involve  in  its 
discussion  a  new  arrangement  of  equivalents.  The  task 
of  the  first  ministers  had  been  to  settle  a  difficulty ;  the 
object  of  the  present  was  to  negotiate  a  treaty,  in  every 
respect  a  more  arduous  undertaking.  The  instructions 
to  the  new  ministers  exhibited  this  difference.  The 
business  details  of  the  instructions  were  prefaced  by  a 
statement  of  the  circumstances  under  which  the  nego 
tiation  was  undertaken. 

"  You  have  been  witnesses  of  the  enduring  patience 
of  the  United  States  under  the  unexampled  aggressions, 
depredations,  and  hostilities,  authorized  and  sanctioned 
by  the  French  Republic,  against  the  commerce  and 


202  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

citizens  of  the  United  States  ;  and  you  are  well  in 
formed  of  the  measures  adopted  by  our  government  to 
put  a  stop  to  these  evils,  to  obtain  redress  for  the  in 
jured,  and  real  peace  and  security  to  our  country.  And 
you  know,  that,  instead  of  indemnity  for  past  wrongs, 
our  very  moderate  demands  have  been  immediately 
followed  by  new  aggressions  and  more  extended  dep 
redations;  while  our  ministers,  seeking  redress  and 
reconciliation,  have  been  refused  a  reception,  treated 
with  indignities,  and  finally  driven  from  its  territo 
ries. 

"  The  conduct  of  the  French  Republic  would  well 
have  justified  an  immediate  declaration  of  war  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States ;  but,  desirous  of  maintaining 
peace,  and  still  willing  to  leave  open  the  door  of  recon 
ciliation  with  France,  the  United  States  contented 
themselves  with  preparations  for  defence,  and  measures 
calculated  to  protect  their  commerce. 

"  The  treatment  experienced  by  the  former  envoys  of 
the  United  States  to  the  French  Republic  having  de 
termined  the  President  not  to  send  thither  other  min 
isters,  without  direct  and  unequivocal  assurances,  previ 
ously  signified  by  its  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  that 
they  would  be  received  in  character  to  an  audience  of 
the  Directory,  and  that  they  should  enjoy  all  the  pre 
rogatives  attached  to  that  character  by  the  law  of  na 
tions,  and  that  a  minister  or  ministers  of  equal  powers 
should  be  appointed  and  commissioned  to  treat  with 
them;  the  French  government,  by  M.  Talleyrand,  its 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  203 

Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  has  declared  that  it  will 
receive  the  envoys  of  the  United  States  in  the  official 
character  with  which  they  are  invested ;  that  they  shall 
enjoy  all  the  privileges  annexed  to  it  by  the  law  of 
nations,  and  that  one  or  more  ministers  shall  be  duly 
authorized  to  treat  with  them.  This  the  President 
deems  to  be  substantially  the  assurance  which  he  re 
quired  as  the  previous  condition  of  the  envoys  entering 
on  their  mission.  It  now  belongs  to  you,  gentlemen, 
that  this  assurance  be  verified.  Your  country  will  not 
submit  to  any  new  indignity  or  neglect.  It  is  expected, 
when  you  shall  have  assembled  at  Paris,  and  have 
given  official  notice  of  it  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Relations,  that  you  will  be  received  to  an  audience  of 
the  Executive  Directory ;  that  a  minister  or  ministers, 
with  powers  equal  to  yours,  will  be  appointed  to  treat 
with  you ;  and  that  within  twenty  days  at  furthest,  after 
your  arrival  at  Paris,  your  negotiation  will  be  com 
menced.  If,  however,  your  passports  to  Paris  should 
be  unseasonably  withheld ;  if  an  audience  of  the  Direc 
tory  should  be  denied  or  procrastinated  ;  if  the  appoint 
ment  of  a  minister  or  ministers  with  equal  powers  to 
treat  with  you  should  be  delayed ;  or  if,  when  appointed, 
they  postpone  the  intended  negotiation;  you  are  to 
relinquish  your  mission,  demand  your  passports,  and 
leave  France ;  and,  having  once  resolved  to  terminate 
the  mission,  you  are  not  to  resume  it,  whatever  fresh 
overtures  or  assurances  may  be  made  to  you  by  the 
French  government. 


204  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

"  One  more  limitation.  The  subjects  of  difference 
between  the  United  States  and  France  have  often  been 
discussed,  and  are  well  understood,  and  therefore  admit 
of  a  speedy  decision.  The  negotiation  is  expected  to 
be  concluded  in  such  time  that  you  may  certainly  em 
bark  for  the  United  States  by  the  1st  of  next  April. 
This  is  highly  important,  in  order  that,  on  your  return, 
Congress  may  be  found  in  session  to  take  those  meas 
ures  which  the  result  of  your  mission  shall  require.  If 
it  can  be  earlier  concluded,  it  will  be  still  better. 

"  If  any  of  the  periods  above  mentioned  should  be 
prolonged  with  your  assent,  it  is  expected  that  the  cir 
cumstances  will  be  stated  for  your  justification." 

They  were  then  instructed  to  demand,  as  an  indis 
pensable  condition  of  any  treaty,  a  stipulation  for  in 
demnity  for  all  condemnation  or  captures  made  con 
trary  to  the  law  of  nations,  and  in  violation  of  the  pro 
visions  of  the  treaty  of  1778,  while  that  treaty  was 
in  force,  especially  where  such  condemnation  or  cap 
ture  was  made  on  either  of  the  three  following  pre 
texts  :  — 

1.  Because  the  vessel's  lading,  or  any  part  thereof, 
consisted  of  provisions  or   merchandise   coming   from 
England  or  her  possessions. 

2.  Because  the  vessels  were  not  provided  with  the 
roles  tfequipage  prescribed  by  the  laws  of  France,  and 
which,  it  had  been  pretended,  were    also   required  by 
treaty. 

3.  Because  sea  letters  or  other  papers  were  wanting, 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  205 

or  said  to  be  wanting,  where  the  property  was  admitted, 
or  proved,  to  be  American. 

4.  Where  the  owners,  masters,  or  supercargoes  had 
been  refused  a  hearing,  or  placed  in  situation^  rendering 
their  presence  at  the  trials  impossible. 

5.  When  the  vessels  or  other  property  captured  had 
been  sold  or  otherwise  disposed  of,  without  a  regular 
trial  or  condemnation. 

These  indemnities  were  to  be  ascertained  by  a  joint 
commission.  These  claims  being  admitted,  the  minis 
ters  were  directed  to  negotiate  a  treaty  which  should 
determine  the  political  and  commercial  relations  of  the 
two  nations.  Their  instructions  under  this  head  were 
minute  ;  but  the  XXI.  Section,  only,  need  be  quoted. 

"  XXL  The  17th  and  22d  articles  of  the  commercial 
treaty  between  the  United  States  and  France,  of  Febru 
ary  6th,  1778,  have  been  the  source  of  much  altercation 
between  the  two  nations  during  the  present  war.  The 
dissolution  of  that  and  our  other  treaties  with  France 
leaves  us  at  liberty  with  respect  to  future  arrangements ; 
with  the  exception  of  the  now  preferable  right,  secured 
to  Great  Britain  by  the  25th  article  of  the  treaty  of  am 
ity  and  commerce.  In  that  article,  we  promise  mutually, 
that,  while  we  continue  in  amity,  neither  party  will  in 
future  make  any  treaty  that  shall  be  inconsistent  with 
that  article  or  the  preceding  one.  We  cannot,  there 
fore,  renew  with  France  the  17th  and  22d  articles  of 
the  treaty  of  1778.  Her  aggressions,  which  occasioned 
the  dissolution  of  that  treaty,  have  deprived  her  of  the 
18 


206  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

priority  of  rights  and  advantages  there  stipulated.  In 
deed,  if  the  public  faith  pledged  in  the  British  treaty 
did  not  forbid  a  renewal  of  those  engagements  with 
France,  sound  policy  should  prevent  it.  We  should 
preserve  to  ourselves  the  right  of  allowing  every  com 
mercial  nation,  in  amity  with  us,  the  like  shelter,  sup 
plies,  and  assistance  under  like  circumstances ;  and  by 
excluding  all  equally  when  engaged  in  war,  (saving  to 
each  the  rights  of  humanity  and  hospitality,)  we  may 
keep  the  calamities  of  war  at  a  distance.  The  engage 
ments  with  Great  Britain  may  cease  in  two  years  after 
the  close  of  the  present  war ;  but  under  the  stipulations 
contained  in  the  28th  and  last  articles  of  the  British 
treaty,  the  engagement  in  question  may  be  continued 
to  a  longer  period.  If,  therefore,  you  should  find  any 
cogent  reasons  for  renewing  in  substance  the  17th  and 
22d  articles  of  the  commercial  treaty  with  France  of 
1778,  it  must  be  with  the  explicit  declaration,  that, 
neither  at  the  present  or  any  future  time,  shall  the  said 
articles  be  construed  to  derogate  from  the  whole  or  any 
part  of  the  24th  and  25th  articles  of  the  treaty  of  amity 
and  commerce  and  navigation  between  the  United 
States  and  his  Britannic  Majesty,  concluded  at  London 
on  the  19th  of  November,  1794." 

The  instructions  concluded  with  this  explicit  declara 
tion  :  — 

"  The  following  points  are  to  be  considered  ulti- 
mated  — 

"  1.  That   an   article   be  inserted  for   establishing  a 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  207 

board  with  suitable  powers,  to  hear  and  determine  the 
claims  of  our  citizens  for  the  causes  hereinbefore  ex 
pressed,  and  binding  France  to  pay  or  secure  pay 
ment  of  the  sums  which  shall  be  awarded. 

"2.  That  the  treaties  and  consular  convention,  de 
clared  to  be  no  longer  obligatory  by  act  of  Congress,  be 
not,  in  whole  or  in  part,  revived  by  the  new  treaty  ;  but 
that  all  engagements,  to  which  the  United  States  are 
to  become  parties,  be  specified  in  the  new  treaty. 

"  3.  That  no  guaranty  of  the  whole  or  any  part  of 
the  dominions  of  France  be  stipulated,  nor  any  engage 
ment  made  in  the  nature  of  an  alliance. 

"  4.  That  no  aid  or  loan  be  promised  in  any  form 
whatever. 

"  5.  That  no  engagement  be  made  inconsistent  with 
the  obligations  of  any  prior  treaty,  and,  as  it  may 
respect  our  treaty  with  Great  Britain,  the  instruc 
tion  herein  marked  XXI.  is  to  be  particularly  ob 
served. 

"6.  That  no  stipulation  be  made  granting  powers 
to  consuls  or  others,  under  color  of  which  tribunals  can 
be  established  within  our  jurisdiction,  or  personal  privi 
leges  be  claimed  by  Frenchmen,  incompatible  with  the 
complete  sovereignty  of  the  United  States  in  matters  of 
policy,  commerce,  and  government. 

"  7.  That  the  duration  of  the  proposed  treaty  be 
limited  to  twelve  years,  at  furthest,  from  the  day  of  the 
exchange  of  the  ratifications,  with  the  exceptions  respect- 


It 


208  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

ing  its  permanence  in  certain  cases  specified  under  the 
instructions  marked  XXX."  * 

The  plenipotentiaries  opened  their  conferences  by 
exchanging  their  powers ;  and  the  American  envoys 
having  objected  to  the  language  of  the  French  powers 
as  not  equal  in  extent  with  their  own,  the  French  gov 
ernment,  although  not  admitting  the  justice  of  the  criti 
cism,  issued  new  powers  to  their  ministers,  in  conform 
ity  to  the  wishes  of  the  American  commissioners. 

In  order  to  comprehend  fully  the  three  distinct  stages 
through  which  the  negotiation  passed,  the  following 
facts  must  always  be  borne  in  mind. 

1.  That  by  the  llth  article  of  the  treaty  of  alliance, 
France  and  the  United  States  had  mutually  guaranteed 
their  American  possessions,  and  that  by  the  17th  and 
22d  articles  of  the  treaty  of  commerce  of  1778,  they 
granted  to  each  other  the  mutual  and  exclusive  privi 
lege  of   taking   their   prizes   and   privateers   into  each 
other's  ports. 

2.  That  by  the  treaty  of   1794  with    England,  this 
same    exclusive   privilege    had    been    granted    by   the 
United  States  to  that  power ;  but  that,  owing  to  the 
priority  of  the  French  treaty,  and  the  exclusive  char 
acter  of  the  privilege,  it  remained  in  abeyance,  as  far  as 
England  was  concerned,  so  long  as  the  French  treaty 
lasted. 

*  This  instruction  referred  merely  to  the  permanence  of  such  arti 
cles  as  concerned  the  settlement  of  claims,  as  long  as  there  should  be 
any  subject-matter  for  their  action. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTOEY.  209 

3.  That  by  the  act  of  July,  1798,  the  United  States 
government  had  cancelled  the  French  treaties  of  1778, 
and  thus   given   priority  and  activity  to  the  exclusive ^ 
privilege  stipulated  in  the  treaty  with  England.  r 

After  the  exchange  of  one  or  two  notes  between  the 
plenipotentiaries,  conveying  their  general  ideas  as  to 
the  mode  and  principles  of  their  negotiation,  the  Amer 
ican  commission,  conceiving  that  the  way  was  now  pre 
pared,  submitted  certain  propositions  in  the  form  of  a 
treaty,  both  as  the  frankest  method  of  expressing  their 
opinions,  and  drawing  the  discussion  to  a  clear,  practi 
cal  point.  These  propositions  contained  a  general 
sketch  of  such  a  treaty  as  their  instructions  warranted, 
the  leading  article  of  which  provided  for  a  commission 
to  ascertain  the  indemnities  mutually  due.  And  the 
draft  of  this  article,  in  necessary  conformity  with  the 
views  and  action  of  the  United  States,  provided,  in 
reference  to  the  commissioners,  that  — 

"  They  shall  decide  the  claims  in  question  according 
to  the  original  merits  of  the  several  cases,  and  to  justice, 
equity,  and  the  law  of  nations,  and  in  all  cases  of  com 
plaint  existing  prior  to  the  1th  of  My,  1798,  according' 
to  the  treaties  and  consular  convention  then  existing 
between  France  and  the  United  States" 

The  French  commissioners  replied  to  this  communi 
cation,  stating  that,  in  their  opinion,  the  liquidation  and 
discharge  of  damages,  which  were  the  result  of  mutual 
misunderstanding,  could  only  be  considered  as  the  con 
sequence  of  such  a  common  interpretation  of  the  exist- 
18* 


210  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

ing  treaties  as  the  plenipotentiaries  could  agree  upon ; 
and  they  then  proceeded. 

"  The  ministers  of  the  French  Republic  would,  for 
this  reason,  have  seized  the  present  moment  to  develop 
their  views  respecting  the  various  interpretations  which, 
for  years  past,  have  been  given  to  the  treaties,  if,  upon 
reading  the  second  article  of  the  project  which  has  been 
submitted,  they  had  not  been  struck  with  an  interpreta 
tion,  of  which  they  can  conceive  neither  the  cause  nor 
the  object,  and  which,  therefore,  seems  to  require  expla 
nation  ; "  and  quoting  the  article  of  the  American  project 
just  cited,  they  added :  — 

"  The  ministers  plenipotentiary  of  the  French  Re 
public  are  not  aware  of  any  reason  which  can  authorize 
a  distinction  between  the  time  prior  to  the  7th  of  July, 
1798,  and  the  time  subsequent  to  that  date,  in  order  to 
apply  the  stipulations  of  the  treaties  to  the  damages 
which  have  arisen  during  the  first  period,  and  only  the 
principles  of  the  law  of  nations  to  those  which  have 
occurred  during  the  second." 

To  this  demand  for  explanation  the  American  min 
isters  immediately  replied,  that  they  would  cheerfully 
explain  why  they  assumed  the  date  of  the  7th  of  July, 
1798,  as  a  dividing  point  between  the  two  periods,  and 
also  why  they  could  not  regard  the  treaties  with  France 
as  the  basis  of  the  present  negotiation  for  any  other 
purpose  than  that  of  giving  a  rule  by  which  causes  of 
complaint,  prior  to  that  date,  were  to  be  tested. 

"  It  was  not  till  after  the  treaty  of  amity  and  com- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  211 

merce  of  February,  1778,  had  been  violated  to  a  great 
extent  on  the  part  of  the  French  Republic,  nor  till  after 
explanations  and  an  amicable  adjustment,  sought  by 
the  United  States,  had  been  refused,  that  they  did,  on 
the  7th  day  of  July,  1798,  by  a  solemn  public  act, 
declare  that  they  were  freed  and  exonerated  from  the 
treaties  and  consular  convention  which  had  been  en 
tered  into  between  them  and  France ;  nor  would  such 
a  declaration,  though  justified  by  the  law  of  nature  and 
of  nations,  have  even  then  been  made,  if  it  had  been 
possible  for  the  United  States,  while  continuing  the 
treaties  and  consular  convention  as  the  rule  of  their 
conduct,  to  guard  against  injuries  which  daily  in 
creased,  and  threatened  their  commerce  with  total 
destruction.  That  declaration  cannot  be  recalled ; 
and  the  United  States  must  abide  its  effects  with 
respect  to  the  priority  of  treaties,  whatever  inconven 
iences  may  result  to  themselves.  The  government,  it 
was  understood,  could  not  with  good  faith  give  to  the 
undersigned  powers  to  change  or  affect  such  priorities, 
and  they  do  not  possess  them." 

Upon  the  receipt  of  this  reply,  the  French  ministers 
informed  the  American  plenipotentiaries  that  the  nego 
tiation  was  at  a  stand;  that  their  instructions  would 
not  permit  them  to  negotiate  on  any  such  basis ;  that 
their  commission  had  designated  the  treaty  of  alliance, 
and  of  friendship  and  commerce,  and  the  consular  con 
vention,  as  the  sole  basis  of  their  negotiation,  and  that 
they  must  refer  the  matter  back  to  their  government  for 


212  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

further  instructions.  While  waiting  the  result  of  this 
reference,  which  was  delayed  in  consequence  of  the 
absence  of  the  First  Consul,  who  was  negotiating  after 
another  fashion  at  Marengo,  the  plenipotentiaries  had 
several  informal  conversations,  and  exchanged  some 
explanatory  notes.  In  reference  to  the  abrogation  of 
the  treaties,  the  American  ministers  took  two  positions. 

1.  That  a  treaty  being  a  mutual  compact,  its  viola 
tion  by  one  party  justified  its  abrogation  by  the  other; 
and  2.  "  That  it  had  become  impossible  for  the  United 
States  to  save  their  commerce  from  the  depredations  of 
the  French  cruisers,  but  by  resorting  to  defensive  meas 
ures;  and  that,  as  by  their  constitution  existing  trea 
ties  were  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  and  the  judicial 
department,  who  must  be  governed  by  them,  is  not  un 
der  the  control  of  the  executive  or  legislative,  it  was 
also  impossible  for  them  to  legalize  defensive  measures, 
incompatible  with  the  French  treaties,  while  they  con 
tinued  to  exist.  Then  it  was  they  were  formally  re 
nounced,  and  from  that  renunciation,  there  resulted, 
necessarily,  a  priority  in  favor  of  the  British  treaty,  as 
to  the  exclusive  asylum  for  privateers  and  prizes." 

To  these  arguments  the  French  government  replied 
with  great  force,  "  that,  when  on  the  one  hand  Congress 
declare  that  France  has  contravened  these  treaties,  and 
that  the  United  States  are  released  from  their  stipula 
tions  ;  and  when  France  declares  that  she  has  con 
formed  to  these  treaties,  that  she  desires  their  execution, 
and  that  the  United  States  alone  have  infringed  them, 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  213 

where  is  the  tribunal  or  law  to  enforce  the  exoneration 
in  preference  to  the  execution  ? 

"  So  long  as  a  difference  exists  between  two  contract 
ing  parties,  respecting  the  existence  or  abrogation  of  a 
treaty,  no  right  or  benefit  can  result  to  a  third  party 
from  the  abrogation  contended  for  by  one. 

"  If  France  had  declared  the  treaties  annulled,  and  the 
United  States  had  maintained  their  validity,  England 
would  have  no  ground  for  saying  to  America,  'we  suc 
ceed  to  the  rights  of  France.'  ...  If  one  of  two  con 
tracting  parties  is  at  liberty,  whenever  he  may  please,  to 
cancel  his  obligations  in  virtue  of  his  own  judgment 
concerning  facts  or  men  or  things,  no  binding  force  can 
be  attached  to  treaties,  and  the  term  itself  should  be 
erased  from  every  language.  If  the  right  of  anteriority 
can  be  destroyed  to  the  prejudice  of  the  nation  that 
possesses  it,  by  the  sole  act  of  one  of  the  parties  by 
whom  that  right  has  been  recognized,  it  must  be  ac 
knowledged  as  a  principle,  that  the  nation  making  the 
second  treaty  converts  the  one  with  whom  she  first  con 
tracted  into  an  enemy,  and  that  she  may  be  certain  of 
being  despoiled  by  that  enemy  whenever  the  time  may 
be  propitious  for  an  open  explanation." 

It  must  be  admitted  that  the  American  positions 
were  untenable.  The  first  position  contradicted  the 
fundamental  idea  of  a  treaty ;  but  admitting  its  princi 
ple,  it  is  clear  that  it  can  only  apply  to  cases  where  the 
offsets  are  distinctly  reciprocal,  and  the  mutual  obliga 
tion  expressly  refused.  To  admit  its  application  to 


214  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

treaties  for  both  special  and  general  purposes,  where 
the  stipulations  had  been,  in  a  large  measure,  and  for  a 
long  time,  carried  out  in  good  faith  and  effectively,  sim 
ply  on  account  of  temporary  misunderstanding,  would 
be  to  sacrifice  the  whole  system  of  international  law  to 
a  loose,  rather  than  to  a  liberal,  interpretation.  Now  the 
treaty  of  1778,  under  which,  and  to  a  large  extent  by 
which,  the  independence  of  the  United  States  had  been 
achieved,  had  in  good  faith,  on  the  part  of  France, 
effected  this  special  purpose,  and  its  general  provisions 
had,  for  twenty  years,  regulated  the  relations  between 
the  two  countries.  That  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolu 
tion  they  had  a  perfect  right  not  to  regard  the  republic 
as  the  legitimate  successor  of  the  old  monarchy  with 
whom  they  had  made  the  alliance,  is  one  thing.  But 
this  position  the  United  States  had  refused  to  assume, 
and  held  on  to  the  treaties ;  and  though,  under  changed 
circumstances,  difficulties  almost  insuperable  had  arisen, 
and  the  two  nations  might  even  be  driven  to  war,  the 
United  States  could  not  claim,  in  view  of  their  past 
action,  and  actual  receipt  of  great  advantages  under  the 
treaty,  the  right  alone  to  pronounce  the  treaties  annulled. 
It  was,  at  the  very  least,  an  attempt  to  force  a  doubtful 
principle  to  a  still  more  doubtful  application.  The  sec 
ond  position  was  even  weaker ;  for  if  this  one-sided  ab 
rogation  was  in  itself  void,  no  constitutional  necessity 
of  domestic  government  could  make  it  valid,  and  the 
French  government  had  no  concern  with  the  internal 
embarrassments  of  the  United  States  government,  re- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  215 

suiting  from  the  illegitimate  and  illogical  action  of  their 
own  legislature.  The  French  negotiators  were  there 
fore  enabled  to  place  the  American  ministers  in  a  most 
distressing  dilemma,  which  they  did,  with  great  ingenu 
ity  and  success. 

On  the  llth  of  August,  1800,  they  handed  in  their 
official  reply,  in  which  they  repeated  their  objections  to 
the  principle  offered  by  the  American  ministers,  as  the 
basis  of  their  negotiation.  But  they  added  that  they 
were  prepared  to  admit  the  importance  to  America  of 
avoiding  the  exclusive  privileges  of  the  old  treaties. 
They  were  willing,  therefore,  to  meet  the  wishes  of  the 
United  States,  as  far  as  they  consistently  could.  They 
would,  therefore,  consent  to  the  abrogation  of  the  old 
treaties ;  but  as  such  an  abrogation  could  only  be  the 
result  of  war,  they  were  obliged  to  consider  the  action 
of  the  United  States  preceding,  as  equivalent  to  war, 
and  a  new  treaty,  in  necessary  consequence,  as  a  treaty 
of  peace.  In  such  case,  the  question  of  indemnity  must 
be  laid  aside,  because  a  war  extinguished  all  mutual 
obligation ;  each  party  had  taken  the  remedy  of  com 
plaints  in  their  own  hands,  and  a  treaty  of  peace  was  a 
fresh  start,  upon  such  a  new  basis  as  their  respective  posi 
tions  warranted  them  in  proposing.  And  therefore  they 
offered  to  the  American  ministers,  either  the  abrogation 
of  the  old  treaties  without  indemnity,  or  indemnity  with 
the  old  treaties.  And  they  added,  that,  in  any  new 
treaty,  while  France  would  cheerfully  abandon  her  priv- 


216  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

ilege  of  exclusive  asylum,  she  would  not  consent  to  oc 
cupy  an  inferior  position  to  any  other  nation. 

At  this   point,  the    American   negotiators   very  cor 
rectly  informed  the  Secretary  of  State  that  they  were 
obliged  to  abandon  either  the  negotiation  or  their  in 
structions.     They  resolved  upon  the  latter  course ;  and 
as  they  could  not  procure  the  abrogation  of  the  treaties 
and  indemnity,  they  endeavored  to   obtain  indemnity, 
and  then  to  relinquish  that  indemnity  as  an  equivalent, 
to  purchase  the  abrogation  of  the  two  stipulations  in  the 
old  treaties  granting  the  exclusive  asylum,  and   guar 
anteeing  the  French  American  possessions.    There  was 
some  difference  as  to  the  equivalent  to  be  offered  in 
exchange  for  the  guarantee  ;  but  the  chief  and  the  in 
superable  difficulty  was  the   priority   accruing   to  the 
English  treaty,  in  consequence  of  the  act  of  Congress 
of  July  annulling  the  French  treaty.      France  declared 
she  was  willing  to   give  up  her  exclusive  privilege  in 
deference  to  the  wishes,  and  in  furtherance  of  the  inter 
ests,  of  her  old  ally ;  but  she  could  not  and  would  not 
consent   to   have   this   privilege   yielded   to  any  other 
power,  least  of  all  to  England,  her  constant  and  bitter 
est  enemy.     Indeed,  Joseph  Bonaparte,  the  chief  of  the 
French  commission,  declared,  that,  even  if  his  govern 
ment  authorized  such  a  concession,    he   would  resign 
rather  than  sign  the  treaty  which  contained  it.     But  the 
United  States  could  not  refuse  this  privilege  to  Eng 
land,  as  it  necessarily  followed  from  their  own  act  of 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  217 

abrogation ;  and  again  the  negotiation  came  to  a  dead 
halt.  The  fact  was,  that  the  French  government  could 
not,  and  did  not  intend  to,  pay  the  indemnity  that 
would  have  resulted  from  the  treaty ;  and  the  action  of 
the  United  States  in  complicating  their  relations  by  the 
act  of  abrogation  afforded  a  means  of  escape,  which 
the  French  negotiators  used  with  consummate  skill 
and  complete  success. 

Upon  this  unfortunate  termination  of  the  second 
stage  of  their  negotiations,  it  only  remained  for  the 
American  plenipotentiaries  either  to  demand  their  pass 
ports,  or  to  change  entirely  the  character  of  their  nego 
tiations.  Considering,  justly,  that  a  peremptory  con 
clusion  of  amicable  discussion  would  be  an  inevitable 
declaration  of  war,  they,  after  much  reflection,  deter 
mined  upon  the  milder,  and,  as  events  proved,  the  wiser, 
course  ;  and  they  resolved  "  to  attempt  a  temporary 
arrangement,  which  would  extricate  the  United  States 
from  the  war,  or  that  peculiar  state  of  hostility  in  which 
they  were  at  present  involved,  save  the  immense 
amount  of  property  of  our  citizens  now  depending 
before  the  council  of  prizes,  and  secure,  as  far  as  pos 
sible,  our  commerce  against  the  abuses  of  capture  dur 
ing  the  present  war." 

With  this  view,  they  proposed  to  the  French  nego 
tiators  a  temporary  convention,  based  on  the  four  follow 
ing  principles :  — 

1.  That  the  parties,  not  being  able  at  present  to  agree 
respecting  the  former  treaties  and  indemnity,  these  sub- 
19 


218  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

jects  should  be  postponed  for  further  negotiation,  and,  in 
the  mean  time,  that  the  said  treaties  should  have  no 
operation. 

2.  The  parties  shall  abstain  from  all  unfriendly  acts, 
their  commerce  shall  be  free,  and  debts  shall  be  recover 
able  in  the  same  manner  as  if  no  misunderstanding  had 
intervened. 

3.  Property   captured,    and    not   yet   definitely   con 
demned,  or  which  may  be  captured  before  the  exchange 
of  ratifications,  shall  be   mutually  restored.     Proofs  of 
ownership  to  be  specified  in  the  convention. 

4.  Some   provisional  regulations  to  be  made,  to  pre 
vent  abuses  and  disputes  in  future  cases  of  capture. 

Upon  this  basis,  and  after  some  little  discussion,  the 
plenipotentiaries  arrived  at  a  mutual  understanding. 
But  before  the  convention  which  embodied  the  result 
of  their  deliberations  was  signed,  another  difficulty 
arose,  which,  although  of  minor  importance  to  the  dif 
ficulties  they  had  failed  to  surmount,  was  yet  irritat 
ing  enough.  On  the  29th  of  September,  1800,  the 
French  envoys  addressed  a  note  to  the  American  min 
isters,  in  which  they  said  :  — 

"  The  ministers  of  France  insist,  in  relation  to  the 
treaty,  upon  one  of  three  things  :  — 

"  Either  that  the  treaty  shall  be  signed  in  the  French 
language  only,  without  any  reservation,  —  the  mode 
pursued  by  the  consular  convention  of  1788  between 
France  and  the  United  States,  and  by  the  treaty  of 
1786  between  France  and  England ; 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  219 

"  Or.  that  it  shall  be  Signed  in  the  French  language 
only,  and  that  a  separate  article  (similar  to  the  one  at 
the  close  of  the  treaty  of  1783  between  France  and 
England)  shall  stipulate,  that  the  French  language  used 
in  the  treaty  shall  not  constitute  a  precedent,  nor  oper 
ate  to  the  prejudice  of  either  of  the  contracting  parties. 

"  Or,  finally,  that  it  shall  be  signed  in  the  French 
and  English  languages,  accompanied  by  the  following 
declaration,  conforming  to  the  one  at  the  end  of  the 
treaty  of  alliance  and  the  treaty  of  commerce  of  1788 : 
'  In  faith  whereof,  the  respective  plenipotentiaries  have 
signed  the  above  articles,  both  in  the  French  and  Eng 
lish  languages ;  declaring,  nevertheless,  that  the  present 
treaty  was  originally  written  and  concluded  in  the 
French  language.'  " 

The  American  ministers,  as  they  informed  their  gov 
ernment,  "  finally,  but  with  great  reluctance,  agreed  to 
the  signing  in  the  form  of  the  treaty  of  1778  ; "  and  on 
the  30th  of  September,  1800,  the  convention  was 
signed  by  the  plenipotentiaries  of  both  nations. 

The  convention  was  very  general  in  its  provisions; 
—  it  contained  certain  regulations  to  avoid  abuses  in 
cases  of  capture  ;  relinquished  on  the  part  of  France 
the  demand  for  a  role  $  equipage,  which  had  caused  so 
much  injustice  and  irritation  ;  recognized  the  right  of 
convoy;  placed  France  upon  a  footing  with  the  most 
friendly  nation  as  to  the  right  of  asylum  for  privateers ; 
repeated  the  principle  of  free  ships  free  goods ;  and  pro- 


220  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

vided  for  the  exchange  of  consuls.  It  differed  very  little, 
in  points  outside  of  the  recent  controversy,  from  the 
provisions  of  the  treaty  of  commerce  of  1778 ;  and  the 
second  article  declared  expressly  :  — 

"  The  ministers  plenipotentiary  of  the  two  parties, 
not  being  able  to  agree  at  present  respecting  the  treaty 
of  alliance  of  February  6,  1778,  and  the  treaty  of  amity 
and  commerce  of  the  same  date,  and  the  convention  of 
the  14th  of  November,  1788,  nor  upon  the  indemnities 
mutually  due  and  claimed,  the  parties  will  negotiate 
further  on  these  subjects  at  a  convenient  time,  and 
until  they  may  have  agreed  upon  these  points,  the  said 
treaties  and  convention  shah1  have  no  operation,  and  the 
relation  of  the  two  countries  shall  be  regulated  as  fol 
lows." 

When  this  convention  was  submitted  to  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States  for  ratification,  they  expunged  the 
second  article,  and  limited  the  duration  of  the  treaty  to 
eight  years.  With  these  very  important  modifications, 
the  French  government  accepted  the  ratification  ;  but 
the  First  Consul  added  to  the  instrument  of  ratification, 
on  the  part  of  France,  a  declaratory  clause,  providing, 
"  that  by  this  retrenchment,  the  two  states  renounce  the 
respective  pretensions  which' are  the  objects  of  the  said 
article."  The  effect  of  this  anomalous  procedure  will 
be  discussed  hereafter.  At  present,  it  is  only  necessary 
to  state,  that  Mr.  Madison,  the  Secretary  of  State  in 
the  administration  which  had  just  (March  4,  1801)  sue- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  221 

ceeded  Mr.  Adams,  wrote  to  Mr.  Livingston,  minister 
to  France,  on  the  18th  of  December,  1801 :  — 

"  I  am  authorized  to  say  that  the  President  does  not 
regard  the  declaratory  clause  as  more  than  a  legitimate 
inference  from  the  rejection  by  the  Senate  of  the  second 
article." 

Mr.  Jefferson,  however,  deemed  it  proper  to  submit 
the  convention  thus  ratified  anew  to  the  Senate,  when 
that  body  declared  by  resolution,  that  they,  considered 
the  ratification  as  already  perfected,  and  returned  it  to 
the  President  for  the  usual  publication. 

Such  was  the  convention ;  and  such  as  it  wass,  it  could 
not,  either  in  its  argument  or  its  result,  be  claimed  as  a 
diplomatic  triumph.  The  history  of  its  consequences 
belongs  to  another  period  ;  butHike  the  English  treaty, 
which  in  many  features  it  resembled,  it  was  at  the  time 
a  positive  advantage.  It  is  true  that  it  merely  tempo 
rized,  but  to  temporize  wisely  is  sometimes  the  most 
skilful  policy.  It  unquestionably  saved  the  United 
States  from  war ;  for  had  the  negotiators  returned  with 
out  succeeding  in  any  arrangement,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how  war  could  have  been  avoided,  in  face  of  the  hostile 
preparations  and  energetic  language  of  the  government. 
The  United  States  had  openly  prepared  for  war,  and 
declared  that  this  mission  was  its  final  effort  at  con 
ciliation  ;  if  that  failed,  the  honor  of  the  country  had  no 
alternative.  Disastrous  as  such  a  necessity  would  have 
been  at  the  outset  of  the  mission,  it  would  have  been 
19* 


222  DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY. 

worse  at  its  close.  The  campaign  of  1800,  illustrated 
by  the  victories  of  Marengo  and  Hohenlinden,  had  scat 
tered  the  enemies  of  France.  The  treaty  of  Luneville 
made  her  mistress  of  Europe.  The  renewal  of  the 
armed  neutrality  had  detached  the  Northern  maritime 
states  from  their  natural  alliance  with  England ;  and  but 
a  very  few  months  after  the  signature  of  the  conven 
tion,  after  the  experience  of  the  negotiations  at  Paris 
and  at  Lisle,  where  her  ablest  diplomatist  had  met  with 
no  better  success  and  scarcely  better  treatment,  than 
our  own  ministers,  Great  Britain  was  forced  to  the 
humiliating  truce  known  as  the  Peace  of  Amiens.  Had 
this  state  of  things  found  the  United  States  in  open 
hostility  with  France,  who  can  anticipate  the  result? 
This  convention  avoided  these  difficult  issues  ;  and  it  is 
a  curious  fact,  worthy  of  notice,  that  the  treaty  of 
Luneville,  which  aggrandized  to  such  vast  extent  the 
power  of  France,  enabled  her  to  take  Louisiana  from 
Spain,  while  our  convention,  forced  on  us  by  the  con 
trast  of  our  weakness  with  such  strength,  enabled  us, 
by  avoiding  the  cost  and  suffering  of  war,  to  move  on 
our  path  slowly  but  surely,  and  to  purchase  that  very 
Louisiana  from  the  power  we  could  not  have  resisted. 
For  it  scarcely  needs  an  argument  to  show,  that  a  war 
with  France,  in  1800,  would  have  forbidden  all  hope  of 
the  acquisition  of  Louisiana  in  1806.  Another  great 
benefit  resulting  from  this  convention  was,  that  it  saved 
the  necessity  of  an  extreme  policy  just  at  a  most  crit- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  223 

ical  time  in  the  domestic  history  of  the  country.  For  if 
the  ministers  had  come  home  without  effecting  even  an 
armistice,  Mr.  Adams  would  have  been  going  out  of 
office,  and  in  the  few  remaining  months  of  his  adminis 
tration,  could  have  pursued  no  vigorous  line  of  conduct ; 
while  Mr.  Jefferson  would  not  yet  have  assumed  the 
responsibility  of  office,  and  would  naturally  have  re 
garded  the  war  as  an  odious  inheritance  from  an 
administration  whose  mischievous  career  he  had  been 
elected  to  check.  Between  the  two  parties,  the  inter 
ests  as  well  as  the  character  of  the  country  would  have 
been  in  serious  danger. 

This  convention  was,  in  fact,  the  necessary  comple 
ment  to  the  treaty  with  England.  They  were  both  the 
efforts  of  a  nation  too  weak  to  hold  its  own  in  the  face 
of  stronger  and  unscrupulous  powers.  The  most  which 
it  could  do  was  to  submit  without  yielding,  —  to  put 
certain  rights  in  abeyance,  and  adjourn  final  principles 
to  a  day  of  more  equal  argument.  Neutrality  is  scarcely 
ever  a  brilliant  policy.  It  is  always  difficult,  sometimes 
dangerous,  and  often  demands  hard  sacrifices  from  na 
tional  pride.  But  in  the  case  of  the  United  States,  their 
interests  clearly  required  it;  it  called,  on  the  part  of 
their  rulers,  for  firmness,  wisdom,  and  self-reliance ;  and 
the  manly  and  modest  hope,  expressed  by  the  American 
ministers  on  closing  their  harassing  and  unsatisfactory 
labors,  may  be  adopted  as  the  fair  verdict  of  history  on 
their  patriotic  efforts. 


224  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY 

"  If,  with  the  simple  plea  of  right,  unaccompanied  with 
the  menaces  of  power  and  unaided  by  events  either  in 
Europe  or  America,  less  is  at  present  obtained  than  jus 
tice  requires,  or  than  the  policy  of  France  should  have 
granted,  the  undersigned  trust  that  the  sincerity  and 
patience  of  their  efforts  to  obtain  all  that  thek  coun 
try  had  a  right  to  demand,  will  not  be  drawn  in  ques 
tion." 


CHAPTER    IV 

NEGOTIATIONS    AND    TREATY    WITH    SPAIN    AND    ALGIERS. 

THE  condition  of  the  negotiations  between  Spain 
and  the  United  States,  at  the  adoption  of  the  Constitu 
tion,  has  already  been  described.  Both  parties  had  ar 
rived  at  that  point  where  their  differences  were  distinct 
and  irreconcilable ;  Spain  having  asserted  a  positive 
and  prohibitory  right  to  the  navigation  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  and  the  United  States  having  exhausted  every 
conceivable  modification  to  which  they  could  give  even 
a  qualified  assent. 

Not  long  after  Mr.  Jay's  return  from  Spain,  where  he 
had  resided  as  minister  during  the  Revolution,  Mr.  Car- 
michael,  who  remained  as  Charge  d' Affaires,  received 
from  the  Spanish  government,  what  had  never  been 
vouchsafed  to  Mr.  Jay,  a  formal  recognition  as  the 
diplomatic  representative  of  the  United  States ;  and  the 
recognition  was  accompanied  by  circumstances  intended 
to  imply,  on  the  part  of  the  government,  its  distinguished 
consideration.  The  negotiations  were,  however,  trans 
ferred  from  Madrid  to  Philadelphia,  to  be  conducted  by 
Mr.  Jay,  then  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  Don 


226  DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY. 

Diego  de  Gardoqui,  the  Spanish  representative.  Their 
failure  has  been  narrated  in  the  opening  chapter  of  this 
volume. 

In  1790,  the  probability  of  a  rupture  between  Spain 
and  England  induced  the  government  of  the  United 
States  to  send  a  special  messenger  to  Mr.  Carmichael, 
charged  with  instructions,  to  be  used  if  circumstances 
permitted,  suggesting  that  in  case  of  war  the  part  of 
the  United  States  was  uncertain,  and  would  be  difficult. 
Mr.  Jefferson  intimated,  that  the  unsettled  condition  of 
our  affairs  with  Spain  might  give  a  direction  to  our  con 
duct  not  altogether  desirable ;  and  directed  the  United 
States  minister,  in  conversation  with  the  Spanish  secre 
tary,  to  "impress  him  thoroughly  with  the  necessity  of 
an  early,  and  even  immediate,  settlement  of  this  matter, 
and  of  a  return  to  the  field  of  negotiations  for  this  pur 
pose  ;  and  though  it  must  be  done  with  delicacy,  yet  he 
must  be  made  to  understand,  unequivocally,  that  a  re 
sumption  of  negotiation  is  not  desired  on  our  part, 
unless  he  can  determine,  in  the  first  opening  of  it,  to 
yield  the  immediate  and  full  enjoyment  of  that  navi 
gation." 

Circumstances,  however,  did  not  take  the  favorable 
turn  hoped  for ;  and  nothing  was  done  until  the  admin 
istration  received  an  intimation  from  the  Spanish  gov 
ernment,  that  it  would  resume  negotiations  at  Madrid. 
Washington  accordingly  nominated,  in  December,  1791, 
Mr.  Carmichael,  then  Charge  d' Affaires  in  Spain,  and  Mr. 
Short,  then  Chargd  d' Affaires  in  France,  Commissioners 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  227 

Plenipotentiary,  to  negotiate  and  conclude  "  a  conven 
tion  or  treaty  concerning  the  navigation  of  the  river 
Mississippi  by  the  citizens  of  the  United  States."  The 
commissioners  were  amply  and  thoroughly  instructed 
on  three  points  :  I.  Boundary.  II.  The  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi.  III.  Commerce. 

I.  Boundary.  Spain  claimed  certain  possessions 
within  the  limits  of  the  United  States,  as  having  been 
taken  by  force  from  the  British  during  the  revolutionary 
war.  To  this  claim,  the  reply  was,  1.  That  Spain  had 
acted,  along  with  Holland  and  France,  as  an  associate 
of  the  United  States  in  that  war ;  that,  having  a  com 
mon  enemy,  each  sought  that  enemy  wherever  he  was 
to  be  found;  that  dislodging  the  British  from  frontier 
settlements,  where  they  threatened  the  colonial  posses 
sions  of  Spain,  and  even  holding  such  possessions  by 
force  to  prevent  the  return  of  the  British,  could  raise  no 
right  against  the  lawful  possessors,  who  were  acting 
with  Spain  against  a  common  enemy.  2.  That,  even 
supposing  such  possession  to  be  held  as  a  conquest  of 
the  places  in  dispute,  conquest  is,  in  its  fullest  extent, 
only  an  inchoate  title,  which  must  afterwards  be  per 
fected  by  treaty  with  the  rightful  possessor.  Now 
either  Great  Britain  or  the  United  States  were  rightful 
possessors.  The  United  States  had  never  by  any 
treaty  perfected  any  such  title ;  and  Great  Britain,  by 
her  treaty  with  Spain  of  1783,  had  expressly  stipulated, 
that  Spain  should  restore  all  conquests  without  com- 


228  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

pensation,  except  Minorca  and  Majorca.  And  the 
United  States,  standing  by  the  treaty  of  1782  exactly 
in  the  place  of  Great  Britain,  was  entitled  to  the  ben 
efit  of  this  return.  3.  That  the  Spanish  government 
had  expressly  and  voluntarily  declared,  through  Count 
Florida  Blanca,  to  General  Lafayette,  that  it  recog 
nized  the  limits  of  the  United  States  as  defined  in  the 
treaty  of  peace  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  and  authorized  him  so  to  state  to  the  United 
States'  government. 

II.  The  Navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  Spain  claimed 
the  right  to  prohibit  the  navigation  of  the  river,  from 
the  31st  degree  of  latitude,  where  the  southern  boun 
dary  of  the  United  States  crossed,  on  to  the  Gulf,  rest 
ing  her  claim  upon  the  possession  of  both  banks.  To 
this  the  United  States  replied,  1.  That  the  navigation 
of  the  river  had  been  granted  by  Spain  to  England,  by 
the  treaty  of  1763.  2.  That  by  the  treaty  of  peace  of 
1782,  the  United  States  were  placed  in  the  position  of 
Great  Britain,  and  that  nothing  had  transpired  during 
the  war  which  was  closed  by  the  treaty  of  1782,  which 
could  possibly  affect  the  right  of  navigation  guaranteed 
by  the  treaty  of  1763.  And  3.  That  by  the  law  of 
nations,  the  United  States,  holding  the  upper  portion  of 
the  river,  and  possessing  a  territory  of  such  immense 
extent,  had  a  right  to  the  navigation  of  the  river,  as  an 
outlet  created  by  Providence  itself. 

On  the  subject  of  the  boundary  and  navigation,  the 


DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY.  229 

commissioners  were  to  consider  each  and  every  of  the 
following  conditions  as  a  sine  qua  non  of  any  treaty 
between  the  two  countries. 

"  1.  That  our  southern  boundary  remains  established 
at  the  completion  of  31  degrees  of  latitude  on  the  Mis 
sissippi,  and  so  on  to  the  ocean,  as  before  described, 
and  our  western  one  along  the  middle  of  the  channel 
of  the  Mississippi,  however  that  channel  may  vary,  as 
it  is  constantly  varying ;  and  that  Spain  cease  to  occupy, 
or  to  exercise  jurisdiction  in,  any  part  northward  or 
eastward  of  those  boundaries. 

"2.  That  our  right  be  acknowledged  of  navigating 
the  Mississippi,  in  its  whole  breadth  and  length,  from 
its  source  to  the  sea,  as  established  by  the  treaty  of 
1763. 

"  3.  That  neither  the  vessels,  cargoes,  or  persons  on 
board  be  stopped,  visited,  or  subjected  to  the  payment 
of  any  duty  whatsoever ;  or,  if  a  visit  must  be  permit 
ted,  that  it  be  under  such  restrictions  as  to  produce  the 
least  possible  inconvenience.  But  it  should  be  alto 
gether  avoided,  as  the  parent  of  perpetual  broils. 

"  4.  That  such  conveniences  be  allowed  us  ashore  as 
may  render  our  right  of  navigation  practicable,  and 
under  such  regulations  as  may  bond  fide  respect  the 
preservation  of  peace  and  order  alone,  and  may  not 
have  in  object  to  embarrass  our  navigation  or  raise  a 
revenue  on  it.  While  the  substance  of  this  article  is 
made  a  sine  qua  non,  the  modifications  of  it  are  left 

20 


230  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

altogether  to  the  discretion  and  management  of  the 
commissioners. 

"  We  might  add,  as  a  fifth  sine  qua  non,  that  no 
phrase  should  be  admitted  in  the  treaty  which  could 
express  or  imply  that  we  take  the  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi  as  a  grant  from  Spain.  But,  however  dis 
agreeable  it  would  be  to  subscribe  to  such  a  sentiment, 
yet  were  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  to  hang  on  that 
single  objection,  it  would  be  expedient  to  waive  it,  and 
to  meet  at  a  future  day  the  consequences  of  any  re 
sumption  they  may  pretend  to  make,  rather  than  at 
present  those  of  a  separation  without  coming  to  any 
agreement." 

The  commissioners  were  further  instructed,  as  a  con 
sequence  of  the  ground  they  were  directed  to  take,  that 
no  proposition  could  be  entertained  for  compensation 
in  exchange  for  the  navigation  ;  and  in  case  of  any 
such  proposition,  it  was  to  be  offset  by  a  claim  for  dam 
ages  to  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  by  duties 
and  detention  at  New  Orleans  for  nine  years. 

III.  Commerce.  Under  this  head  it  is  unnecessary 
to  recapitulate  the  details  of  the  instructions.  It  is 
sufficient  to  state  briefly,  that  the  commissioners  were 
authorized  to  negotiate  only  on  one  of  two  bases ;  either, 
1.  That  of  exchanging  the  privileges  of  native  citizens, 
or,  2.  That  of  the  most  favored  nation. 

Provided  with  these  instructions,  the  commissioners 
met  at  Madrid  about  the  1st  of  February,  1793,  almost 


DIPLOMATIC     HISTOEY.  231 

at  the  same  time  with  the  arrival  of  the  news  of  the 
execution  of  Louis  XVI.  They  found  circumstances 
very  much  altered  from  the  condition  which  had  in 
duced  their  appointment.  The  ministerial  power  of 
Spain,  which  had  been  transferred  from  Count  Florida 
Blanca  to  Count  d'Aranda,  had  again  been  shifted,  and 
was  now  firmly  held  by  Godoy.  The  difficulty  be 
tween  Spain  and  England  had  been  settled.  The  con 
ciliatory,  or  rather  deprecatory,  policy  which  Godoy  had 
adopted  towards  France,  in  the  delusive  hope  of  saving 
Louis  by  the  intervention  of  a  friendly  diplomacy,  was 
violently  destroyed  by  the  execution  of  that  unfortunate 
prince.  France  soon  declared  war  against  Spain ;  and 
the  commissioners  were  thus  deprived  of  the  support 
which  they  had  relied  upon,  from  the  only  power  in 
Europe  able  and  willing  to  facilitate  their  Spanish 
negotiations.  It  was  even  worse  than  that;  for  the 
inevitable  tendency  of  public  events  led  to  an  alliance 
between  Spain  and  the  combined  enemies  of  France, 
then,  as  afterwards,  headed  by  England.  The  relations 
between  England  and  the  United  States  were  of  the 
most  unfriendly  description  ;  and  at  this  very  period,  just 
preceding  the  institution  of  Mr.  Jay's  mission,  war  was 
considered  as  imminent  between  the  two  countries.  In 
fact,  during  the  negotiation  —  if  it  can  be  so  called  — 
of  the  commissioners,  Spain  concluded  an  alliance,  of 
fensive  and  defensive,  with  England,  and  its  terms  were 
such  as  could  be  easily  applied  to  the  contingency  of 
hostilities  with  the  United  States.  Well  might  the 


232  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

commissioners  write  to  the  Secretary,  "  We  cannot  help 
considering  it  unfortunate  that  an  express  commission 
should  have  been  sent  to  treat  here." 

Another  unfavorable  circumstance  was  the  appoint 
ment  of  Diego  de  Gardoqui  as  Spanish  plenipotentiary. 
All  the  former  negotiations  on  this  subject  had  been 
carried  on  with  him,  and  he  had  rejected  the  same  con 
clusions  too  often  to  be  open  to  new  argument ;  while 
his  experience  of  the  weak  and  wavering  character  of 
the  old  Confederation,  which  he  had  personally  studied, 
would  not  easily  permit  a  conviction  of  the  increased 
strength  and  efficiency  of  the  new  government. 

After  much  deliberation,  the  commissioners  wisely 
determined  not  to  press  their  claims.  Outside  of  their 
instructions  they  could  not  go,  and  even  within  that 
limit,  they  were  powerless  as  they  stood.  With  great 
judgment  they  concluded,  that,  to  urge  claims  con 
sidered  so  preposterous  by  the  Spanish  court,  just  at 
the  moment  that  it  was  negotiating  a  treaty  with  Eng 
land,  would  only  draw  the  attention  of  both  powers 
more  specially  to  these  interests,  and  secure  on  their 
part  a  provision  for  their  joint  action  against  the  rights 
of  the  United  States.  They  accordingly  temporized, 
and  found  in  the  dilatory  spirit  of  Gardoqui  ample 
opportunity  for  procrastination. 

The  news  of  these  changes  in  the  relations  of  the 
European  powers  did  not,  however,  make  the  same 
impression  at  home  ;  and  the  despatches  which  reached 
the  commissioners,  after  full  information  from  Europe 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTOKY.  233 

had  reached  Philadelphia,  left  them  no  alternative  but 
to  carry  out  their  instructions.  In  the  mean  time,  how 
ever,  they  had  so  far  improved  their  condition  that  they 
were  now  in  direct  communication  with  Godoy.  To 
him  they  submitted  the  claims  of  their  government,  as 
well  as  the  complaints,  now  become  loud  and  angry,  of 
Spanish  interference  with  the  Indian  tribes  on  the 
western  and  south-western  frontier.  As  to  the  great 
objects  of  their  mission,  they  made  no  progress.  Spain 
showed  no  disposition  to  recognize  their  claims,  nor 
any  profound  consideration  for  the  citations  of  interna 
tional  law  with  which  they  fortified  their  positions. 
With  regard  to  the  Indians,  they  were  more  fortunate, 
as  they  obtained  from  Godoy  what  might  fairly  be 
interpreted  as  a  disclaimer  of  any  intention  to  interfere 
between  them  and  the  United  States,  should  the  latter 
be  forced  into  active  hostilities. 

The  commission  was  finally  dissolved  by  the  depart 
ure  of  Mr.  Carmichael,  leaving  Mr.  Short  accredited  as 
Charge  d'affaires.  The  reception  of  Mr.  Short,  in  that 
character,  seems  to  have  met  with  some  difficulty, 
which,  in  all  probability,  was  meant  to  indicate  more 
than  a  mere  difference  of  etiquette.  Writing  under 
date  of  December  17,  1794,  to  Mr.  Pinckney,  in  Lon 
don,  he  says :  "  I  regret  exceedingly  the  miscarriage  of 
my  letter  of  September  24th,  as  it  was  to  apologize  to 
you  for  having  so  long  delayed  to  announce  to  you  (as 
is  the  general  custom,  and  was  my  particular  duty) 
that  I  had  presented  my  credentials  to  H.  C.  M.,  on  the 
20* 


234  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

7th  of  that  month.  I  mentioned  to  you,  at  the  same 
time,  the  difficulties  and  delays  which  were  occasioned 
by  the  United  States  having  given  me  a  character, 
of  which  they  had  no  precedent  at  this  court,  and  of 
which  they  could  find  none  in  their  archives,  notwith 
standing  much  time  and  trouble  were  spent  in  turning 
them  over  and  over,  perhaps  from  the  beginning  of  the 
monarchy,  and,  as  they  assured  me,  during  the  whole  of 
the  Austrian  and  Bourbon  race.  I  do  not  suppose  it 
was  the  intention  of  our  government  to  have  brought 
into  value  old  archives,  forms,  and  etiquette,  yet  they 
have  certainly  not  been  so  much  recurred  to,  for  half  a 
century  back,  as  in  my  case.  Such  things  will  often 
happen  to  those  \vho  leave  the  beaten  and  known  track, 
in  order  to  make  new  experiments  for  finding  out  a 
better.  I  am  sorry  that  I  should  have  been  chosen  for 
the  experimental  instrument  in  these  cases  ;  but  it  has 
been  the  case  in  every  commission  I  have  had,  both  in 
the  Hague  and  here,  in  three  succeeding  instances.  If 
they  were  only  my  personal  feelings  which  suffered,  it 
would  be  less  painful ;  but  in  the  two  instances  which 
occurred  at  this  court,  where  form  is  the  primum  mobile, 
the  public  interests  have  been  affected  thereby,  in  a 
manner,  of  which  it  would  be  as  impossible  to  give  an 
adequate  idea  to  a  person  who  had  not  been  here,  as  of 
color  to  the  blind,  or  of  sound  to  the  deaf."  * 

*  T.  P.  MSS.  Letters.  That  this  difficulty  in  Mr.  Short's  recep 
tion  sprang  from  an  objection  to  him,  rather  than  to  his  rank,  is 
clear  from  the  facts  of  the  reception  of  Mr.  Carmichael,  some  time 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  235 

But  another  and  still  more  important  change  in  the 
policy  of  Spain  was  at  hand.  The  three  campaigns 
against  France,  after  the  junction  of  England  and 
Spain,  had  not  been  fortunate,  however  honorable  to 
the  spirit  and  patriotism  of  the  Spanish  troops.  The 
alliance  against  France  gave  sure  signs  of  rapidly 
approaching  dissolution.  The  combination  between 
England  and  Spain  had  been  a  forced  one,  and  at  that 
time  there  was  little  real  sympathy  between  the  two 
countries.  The  internal  changes  in  French  politics 

previous,  with  precisely  the  same  diplomatic  grade,  and  from  the 
language  of  the  Spanish  commissioner  in  the  United  States,  quoted 
further  on  in  the  text.  As  it  may  be  interesting  to  learn  the  impres 
sion  made  by  Godoy  on  those  who  had  an  opportunity  of  judging  him 
fairly,  I  subjoin  two  extracts  from  Mr.  Short's  correspondence  with 
Mr.  Pinckney. 

"  In  the  mean  time,  this  government  manage  their  money  affairs, 
at  least,  with  much  prudence  and  success ;  their  finances  were  prob 
ably  never  in  a  more  flourishing  state,  and,  whatever  may  be  thought 
elsewhere  of  the  administration  of  a  young  man  without  experience 
in  affairs,  and  who  is  first  minister  in  fact,  it  has  hitherto  been  mild, 
prudent,  and  prosperous,  and  is  every  day  becoming  by  that  means 
more  acceptable  to  the  public." —  San  Lorenzo,  October  12,  1793. 

"  You  will  have  formerly  learned  the  progress  of  ministerial 
changes  in  this  country  since  the  spring  of  the  year  1792,  and,  of 
course,  you  will  not  be  surprised  at  the  exile  of  Comte  D'Aranda. 
He  is  probably  too  old  and  too  much  lost  ever  to  come  again  on  the 
carpet.  The  present  first  minister  is  all-powerful,  and  possesses  many 
qualities  to  keep  so.  Besides,  his  manners  are  affable ;  he  is  really 
obliging,  and  possesses  that  necessary  quality,  prudence,  to  a  degree 
of  which  there  are  few  examples."  —  Aranjuez,  April  2,  1794. 


236  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

opened  the  prospect  of  a  more  stable  and  conservative 
government  for  that  unhappy  country ;  and  the  peace  of 
Basle,  of  the  5th  of  April,  1795,  proclaimed  the  defec 
tion  of  Prussia,  the  centre  of  the  continental  combina 
tion.  This  state  of  things  could  not  long  endure.  "  I 
lay  it  down  as  a  principle,"  said  Mr.  Pitt,  soon  after 
that  peace,  in  a  conference  with  the  Spanish  ambassa 
dor,  "  that  the  distance  between  friends  and  neutrals  is 
immense ;  it  is  small,  on  the  contrary,  between  enemies 
and  neutrals ;  the  slightest  accident,  a  mere  chance,  the 
least  mistrust,  a  false  appearance,  is  enough  to  efface 
the  distinction  between  them."  *  On  the  29th  of  July, 
the  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  by  the  French  and 
Spanish  ministers ;  and  the  Spanish  ambassador  in 
London  soon  after  informed  his  court,  that  the  follow 
ing  questions  had  been  debated  in  a  cabinet  council:  — 
1.  To  take  possession  of  a  Spanish  harbor.  2.  To  land 
an  army.  3.  To  renew  the  offer  of  an  alliance  with 
England,  and  compel  Spain,  by  fair  means  or  by  force 
of  arms,  to  renew  the  war  against  France.  And  in 
subsequent  reports  he  alluded  to  projects,  on  the  part  of 
England,  of  seizing  upon  several  points  of  the  Spanish 
American  possessions. 

It  must  also  be  remembered,  that,  while  these  events 
were  transpiring,  the  relations  between  England  and  the 
United  States  were  generally  supposed  to  be  growing 
more  hostile,  and  those  with  France  to  be  improving, 

*  Godoy's  Memoir,  Vol.  I.  p.  468. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  237 

under  the  management  of  Mr.  Monroe.  In  view  of 
these  anticipated  and  inevitable  results,  the  government 
of  Spain  made  advances  to  France  through  the  Amer 
ican  minister  in  Paris,  and  also  took  the  necessary  steps 
to  resume  direct  negotiations  with  the  United  States. 

In  1794,  Diego  de  Gardoqui  desired  the  intervention 
of  Mr.  Monroe  with  the(r  reach  government,  to  obtain 
permission  for  a  visit  to  certain  French  baths,  his  health 
being  the  ostensible  motive  of  the  journey.  This  cor 
respondence  Mr.  Monroe  submitted  to  the  French  au 
thorities,  who  desired  him  to  inform  Gardoqui  that  his 
application  must  be  made  directly  to  them,  and  inti 
mated  that  it  would  be  favorably  received.  Mr.  Monroe 
took  advantage  of  this  opportunity  to  press  upon  the 
French  government  the  propriety  of  supporting  the 
claims  of  the  United  States,  and  insisting  upon  a  set 
tlement  of  such  points  as  were  in  dispute  between 
Spain  and  his  own  government,  whenever  a  negotiation 
should  be  opened  for  a  treaty  between  France  and 
Spain.  Early  in  1795,  and  before  it  was  aware  of  the 
character  of  Mr.  Jay's  treaty,  the  French  government 
notified  Mr.  Monroe  of  its  readiness  to  aid  the  United 
States  in  bringing  its  differences  with  Spain  to  an  ami 
cable  termination.  And  in  May,  1795,  Mr.  Short,  at 
the  express  request  of  Godoy,  wrote  to  Mr.  Monroe, 
stating  that  the  Spanish  court  was  anxious  to  adjust 
its  relations  with  France,  suggesting  hints  to  be  con 
veyed  to  the  French  ministers,  and  adding,  that  Godoy 
would  assure  the  settlement  of  the  difficulties  with  the 


238  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

United  States  at  the  same  time,  and  on  the  most  favor 
able  terms.*  But  fortunately,  before  any  steps  could  be 
taken  involving  the  United  States  in  any  joint  negotia 
tions  with  France,  or  in  any  stipulations  dependent 
upon  the  adjustment  of  interests  foreign  to  themselves, 
the  government,  at  the  instance  of  the  Spanish  court, 
transferred  the  whole  subject  to  Madrid,  and  intrusted 
its  arrangement  to  Mr.  Pinckney.  It  has  already  been 
stated,  that  when  the  Spanish  court  endeavored  to 
sound  the  French  government  through  Mr.  Monroe,  it 
also  made  a  direct  approach  to  the  United  States.  On 
the  16th  of  August,  1794,  Mons  Jaudenes,  the  Spanish 
commissioner  in  the  United  States,  addressed  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  a  communication,  in  which  he  ex 
pressed  his  great  regret  at  the  little  progress  made  in 
the  negotiation  between  the  two  countries,  owing,  how 
ever,  as  he  had  repeatedly,  both  by  letter  and  orally,  in 
formed  Mr.  Randolph's  predecessor,  to  the  fact  that  his 
Majesty  would  not  treat,  so  long  as  the  plenipotentiaries 
of  the  United  States  were  not  furnished  with  the  am 
plest  powers,  or  were  directed  by  their  secret  instruc 
tions  to  conclude  a  partial,  and  not  a  general,  treaty.  At 
the  least,  his  Majesty  expected  that  the  ministers  ap 
pointed  by  the  United  States  should  be  persons  of  such 
character,  eminent  distinction,  and  temper,  as  would 
become  a  residence  near  the  royal  person,  and  were  re- 

*  For  the  correspondence  of  M.  Gardoqui  with  Mr.  Monroe,  and 
Mr.  Short's  letter,  see  Mr.  Monroe's  "  View." 


DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY.  239 

quired  by  the  gravity  of  the  questions  under  negotiation. 
That  under  such  circumstances,  Spain  would  be  ready 
to  treat  on  the  subject  of  boundary,  Indians,  commerce, 
and  whatever  else  might  conduce  to  the  best  interests 
of  the  two  countries.  That  the  powers  given  to  Messrs. 
Carmichael  and  Short  were  not  ample ;  that  the  well- 
known  misconceptions  of  Mr.  Carmichael,  and  the  want 
of  circumspection  in  the  conduct  of  Mr.  Short,  rendered 
it  impossible  to  conclude  this  negotiation  with  them. 
And  that  his  Majesty  hoped  that  some  other  person  or 
persons  would  be  appointed,  with  full  powers,  to  settle 
this  treaty,  and  graced  with  such  a  character  as  became 
the  royalty  to  which  he  was  accredited.* 

*  As  the  above  paragraph  is  rather  a  liberal  interpretation  than  a 
literal  translation  of  the  Spanish  letter,  and  as  this  letter,  with  the 
one  which  followed  it,  are  referred  to  on  several  occasions,  in  such 
papers  relating  to  this  negotiation  as  have  been  published,  while 
they  themselves  have  never  been  printed,  I  subjoin  the  original  let 
ter,  in  Spanish,  from  among  Mr.  Pinckney's  MSS. 

"  Mui  SENOR  MIO  :  Con  no  poco  sentimiento  me  veo  en  la  presi- 
cion  de  anunciar  d  V.  S.  el  ningun  progreso  que  se  ha  hecho  en  la 
negociacion  planta  entre  el  Rey  mi  Amo  y  los  Estados  Unidos  d, 
causa  de  lo  que  tantas  vezes  predixe  al  Antecesor  de  V.  S.  de  escrito 
y  de  palabra  relative  a  que  Su  Majestad  no  entraria  en  tratado  al- 
guno  siempre  que  los  Poderes  conferidos  a  los  Ministros  de  los  Esta 
dos  no  fuesen  amplios  6  se  hallasen  cohartados  con  instrucciones  se- 
cretas  que  tubiesen  por  objeto  concluir  un  tratado  parcial  y  no  gene 
ral  ;  y  amenos  que  los  Ministros  que  los  Estados  nombrasen  para  el 
intento  fuesen  por  todas  suo  circanstan9ias  considerados  por  Su  Ma 
jestad  como  personas  de  aquel  carracter,  esplendor,  y  conducta  que 


240  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

Upon  the  receipt  of  this  letter,  Mr.  Randolph  desired 
an  interview  with  Mr.  Jaudenes,  which  took  place  on 
the  26th  of  August.  Referring  to  the  letter  of  the  16th, 
Mr.  Randolph  "  desired  to  understand  the  nature  of  the 
objection  as  to  the  power  of  the  commissioners  not 
being  ample."  Mr.  Jaudenes  entered  into  a  detail  of  the 
transaction  from  its  commencement,  in  December,  1791, 
as  it  appears  from  the  memoranda  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  and 
the  letters  between  the  Spanish  commissioner  and  him ; 

corresponden  para  resider  cerca  de  su  Real  persona  y  que  requiere 
la  gravedad  de  los  asuntos  que  deben  tratarse. 

"  En  esta  atencion  me  manda  el  Rey  hazer  presente  al  Presidente 
de  los  Estados  Unidos  que  Espana  esta  pronta  a"  tratar  con  los  Esta- 
dos  sobre  los  puntos  de  Limites,  Indies,  Comei^io,  y  demas  que 
conduscan  a  la  mexor  amistad  entre  los  dos  Paises :  peroque  no  si- 
endo  amplios  los  Poderes  conferidos  a  los  S'nes  Carmichael  y  Short, 
y  notorio  lo  desconceptuado  que  se  hallava  el  primero  y  que  la  con- 
ducta  del  segundo  tampoco  ha  sido  mui  circunspecta,  no  es  posible 
concluir  asuntos  tan  importantes ;  y  que  en  consideracion  a  estos  mo- 
tivos  espera  Su  Majestad  que  los  Estados  Unidos  embriaran  otra  per 
sona  6  personas  con  plenos  poderes  para  ajustar  el  tratado  y  ador- 
nado  de  aquel  Caracter  y  prendas  que  pueda  hazerse  bien  admitido 
por  el  Rey. 

"  En  vista  do  lo  expuesto  pido  a  V.  S.  se  sirva  informar  al  Presi 
dente  de  los  Estados  Unidos :  quien  me  lisonjeo  se  prestani  gustoso 
d  efectuarlo  segun  lo  desea  Su  Mag'd  a"  con  la  brevedad  que  lo  cxige 
el  interez  de  ambos  paises ;  y  suplico  a  V.  S.  me  coimmique  las  re- 
sultas  para  hacer  las  saber  el  Rey. 

"  Me  reitero,  &c.,  &c.,  &c. 

"  JOSEF  DE  JAUDENES. 
«  Nueva  York,  16th  Ag*°.,  1794. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  241 

adding,  that  it  appeared  to  be  Mr.  Jefferson's  policy  to 
negotiate  for  the  Mississippi  alone,  whereas  his  Catholic 
Majesty  would  never  treat  but  upon  all  the  subjects  un 
adjusted  between  him  and  the  United  States.  Mr.  Jau- 
denes  observed,  that  he  had  indeed  understood  that 
very  comprehensive  powers  had  been  afterwards  given 
to  the  commissioners ;  but  the  nature  of  them  was  not 
made  known  to  him  by  Mr,  Jefferson.  As  Mr.  Jau- 
denes  did  not  appear  to  have  seen  them,  and  as  he  laid 
much  stress  upon  an  admonition  which  he  contends  he 
frequently  gave  Mr.  Jefferson,  that  the  powers  of  the 
commissioners  should  be  as  comprehensive  as  those 
which  M.  Gardoqui  formerly  brought  with  him,  Mr. 
Randolph  showed  him  the  powers  of  the  American 
commissioners.  He  considered  them  sufficiently  com 
prehensive  upon  the  face  of  them.  Mr.  Randolph 
remarked,  that  their  comprehensiveness  must  have  been 
known  to  the  Spanish  minister  at  a  very  early  period, 
as  the  exchange  of  powers  precedes  every  act  of  nego 
tiation.  This  Mr.  Jaudenes  thought  probable.  Mr. 
Randolph  expressed  some  degree  of  surprise,  that,  after 
so  much  time  spent  in  the  negotiation,  after  repeated 
recognition  of  its  pendency,  as  well  by  the  Spanish 
ministry  at  Madrid  as  the  Spanish  minister  here,  the 
progress  of  it  should  be  checked  by  an  objection  which, 
if  valid,  ought  to  have  been  urged  at  the  beginning, 
when  it  might  have  been  immediately  removed.  To 
this,  Mr.  Jaudenes  replied,  that  he  was  not  instructed  in 
the  reasons  of  his  court  further  than  he  had  quoted  to 
21 


242  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

Mr.  Randolph,  in  his  letter  of  the  16th  of  August. 
But  as  the  conference  was  free,  he  might  conjecture 
that  they  were  governed  by  considerations  like  these : 
that  the  objection  to  powers  was  never  too  late,  if,  as 
the  business  advanced,  it  was  found  that  they  were  nar 
rowed  by  the  instructions  of  the  commissioners,  or  by 
the  obstinacy  of  their  conduct,  more  than  they  appeared 
to  be  on  the  face  of  the  papers  which  contained  them ; 
that  his  Catholic  Majesty  might  be  resolved  to  treat 
upon  all  the  matters,  or  none,  being  desirous  of  settling 
every  controversy,  and  possibly  seeing  some  connection 
between  them ;  that  Mr.  Jaudenes  had  expressed  his 
apprehension  to  his  court,  that  the  Mississippi  was  the 
object  which  the  negotiation  had  principally  in  view; 
that  this  would  naturally  attract  their  attention,  and 
induce  them  to  sound  and  explore ;  and  if  they  did  not 
find  perfect  explicitness  on  the  occasion,  they  might 
suspect  that  the  union  of  all  the  subjects  was  not  in 
tended  by  the  "United  States.  Indeed,  Mr.  Jaudenes 
dropped  an  idea  that  all  the  States  were  not  solicitous 
for  the  Mississippi;  that  a  majority  of  them  were 
against  it,  and  the  attempt  to  gain  it  might  perhaps  be 
conceived  as  in  fact  rather  to  pacify  Kentucky  than 
really  to  obtain  it.  This  idea  Mr.  Randolph  denied  to 
have  any  foundation.  Mr.  Jaudenes  seemed  to  renew  it 
in  another  form,  namely,  that  any  concession  which 
might  be  necessary  to  adjust  the  dispute,  though  agree 
able  to  some  of  the  States,  would  be  disagreeable  to  the 
others ;  and  that  there  was  a  kind  of  indisposition  in  the 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  243 

States  for  one  of  them  to  give  up  any  of  its  own  advan 
tages  for  the  accommodation  of  the  others.  To  this, 
Mr.  Randolph  answered,  that  there  ought  not  to  be  a 
doubt,  for  a  moment,  that  what  was  stipulated  by  the 
United  States  in  treaty  would  be  faithfully  fulfilled. 
But  it  was  necessary  to  return  to  the  supposition  above 
mentioned,  of  secret  instructions,  or  the  particular  con 
duct  of  the  commissioners,  restricting  the  powers  to  the 
Mississippi  only.  This  is  the  second  part  of  Mr.  Jau- 
denes's  letter,  requiring  explanation.  Mr.  Randolph 
inquired  whether  the  commissioners  had  been  interro 
gated  upon  their  instructions,  and  had  answered,  that 
they  were  restricted  ?  Whether  they  had  declared  that 
they  would  not  proceed  upon  a  new  subject  until  the 
Mississippi  was  definitely  settled,  without  relation  to 
any  other  matter  ?  Mr.  Jaudenes  could  afford  no  infor 
mation,  not  being  himself  informed.  He  only  observed, 
that  the  Spanish  nation,  being  candid  and  sincere  in  its 
transactions,  would  quickly  receive  disgust  if  it  should 
have  appeared  that  the  commissioners  deviated  from 
sincerity  and  candor  on  their  part. 

In  the  third  place,  Mr.  Randolph  desired  an  explana 
tion  of  what  was  meant  by  the  requisition  of  a  minister 
whose  character,  conduct,  and  splendor  would  render 
them  proper,  etc.  etc.  Mr.  Jaudenes  replied,  that,  when 
the  negotiation  was  first  talked  of,  Mr.  Jefferson  asked 
him  if  Mr.  Carmichael  would  be  acceptable  ;  to  which 
Mr.  Jaudenes  answered,  with  a  reluctance  which  noth 
ing  but  a  sense  of  duty  could  overcome,  that  there  was 


244  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

a  deficiency  of  decorum,  etc.,  in  Mr.  Carmichael.  Mr. 
Jefferson  then  said,  suppose  we  unite  Mr.  Short  with 
him?  Mr.  Jaudenes  replied,  that  he  was  not  per 
sonally  acquainted  with  Mr.  Short;  but  he  presumed 
that  Mr.  Jefferson  would  not  contemplate  an  unfit  per 
son.  Some  time  afterwards,  Mr.  Jaudenes  was  about 
to  say  to  Mr.  Jefferson,  that  Mr.  Pinckney  would  be 
acceptable,  and  might  probably  touch  at  Madrid  for 
that  purpose ;  but  he  was  told  by  Mr.  Jefferson  that  the 
President  had  already  nominated  Messrs.  Carmichael 
and  Short.  Upon  hearing  this,  Mr.  Jaudenes  consid 
ered  himself  as  no  longer  at  liberty  to  animadvert 
upon  an  appointment  which  was  consummated.  But 
Mr.  Jaudenes,  still  declaring  his  inability  to  assign  any 
reasons,  except  those  contained  in  his  letter  of  August 
16,  which  were  the  whole  of  what  had  been  written  by 
his  court,  said  that  he  might  conjecture  it  to  be  pos 
sible,  that  Mr.  Short,  being,  as  Charge*  d'affaires,  the 
author  of  the  offensive  memorial  which  was  addressed 
to  Spain  through  the  French  minister  at  Madrid, Jiad 
imbibed  sentiments  too  violent,  and  expressed  them  too 
vehemently.  He  might,  perhaps,  too,  (have)  partaken 
too  much  of  Mr.  Carmichael's  style  of  behavior.  Mr. 
Jaudenes  then  explained  the  words,  "  character,  con 
duct,  and  splendor,"  thus  :  —  By  "  character,"  he  meant 
a  diplomatic  grade  (no  matter  what)  invested  with  full 
powers  for  all  objects ;  by  "  conduct,"  a  proper  attention 
to  the  court,  and  a  proper  behaviour  in  the  manage 
ment  of  the  negotiation  ;  by  "  splendor,"  personal  dig- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  245 

nity  and  self-respect.  Splendor  as  the  effect  of  honor 
ary  birth,  or  proceeding  from  any  similar  considera 
tions,  was  not  included  in  his  requisitions. 

Mr.  Randolph  asked  Mr.  Jaudenes  if  the  negotiation 
was  at  a  stand.  He  answered  that  he  presumed  it 
was. 

Mr.  Randolph,  disclaiming  all  knowledge  of  what  the 
President's  ultimate  opinion  would  be,  but  desirous  of 
knowing  whether,  if  another  character  was  to  be  sent  to 
Spain,  the  old  delays  would  be  repeated,  was  assured 
by  Mr.  Jaudenes,  that,  in  his  opinion,  the  business 
might  be  immediately  settled,  either  by  a  treaty  signed 
and  executed,  or  by  a  statement  of  terms  upon  which  a 
treaty  might  be  concluded."  * 

In  consequence  of  these  intimations,  the  President,  in 
November,  1794,  appointed  General  Thomas  Pinckney, 
then  minister  at  London,  and  whose  character  fulfilled 
the  most  fastidious  requirements  of  his  Catholic  Maj 
esty,  minister  plenipotentiary  with  full  powers  to  con 
clude  a  treaty.  Before  Mr.  Pinckney  reached  Madrid, 
the  Spanish  commissioner  addressed  another  communi 
cation,  on  the  28th  of  March,  1795,  to  the  government 
of  the  United  States,  indicating  cautiously,  but  more 
specifically,  the  probable  basis  of  the  negotiation  on  the 
part  of  Spain. 

"  DEAR  SIR  :  In  reply  to  your  Excellency's  favor  of 

*  Memorandum  of  conference  between  Mr.  Randolph  and  Mr. 
Jaudenes,  25th  of  Aug.  1794.  —T.  P.  MSS.  Spanish  Papers. 
21* 


246  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

the  25th  instant,  I  must  repeat,  that  the  last  despatch 
received  by  me  from  my  court  was  under  date  of  the 
25th  of  July,  of  the  past  year,  with  some  private  letters 
of  the  beginning  of  August. 

"  As  the  channel  through  which  the  said  despatch 
reached  me  was  not  to  be  relied  on,  it  is  confined 
merely  to  a  suggestion  of  the  matters  about  which,  as 
your  Excellency  indicated  to  me,  the  executive  power  of 
the  United  States  desired  so  earnestly  to  be  informed. 

"  The  brevity  of  these  suggestions  has,  hitherto,  re 
strained  me  from  venturing  upon  propositions  of  so 
much  delicacy,  more  especially  as  I  have  had  reason  to 
expect,  from  day  to  day,  since  that  time,  despatches  ex 
planatory  of  the  suggestions  previously  communicated. 
"  Still,  in  the  spirit  of  directness  and  good  understand 
ing,  which  has  always  prevailed  in  the  correspondence 
between  your  Excellency  and  myself,  I  will  set  forth 
the  basis  upon  which,  as  I  understand,  it  is  the  inten 
tion  of  the  King,  my  master,  to  adjust  with  the  United 
States  the  pending  negotiation;  subject,  nevertheless, 
upon  the  receipt  of  the  explanatory  despatches  which  I 
am  expecting,  to  any  modification  of  the  following 
propositions  :  — 

"  1.  His  Majesty  will  enter  into  negotiation  with  the 
United  States,  as  soon  as  any  one  shall  have  been 
authorized,  with  full  powers,  to  attend  his  court  for  that 
purpose.  This  point,  I  flatter  myself,  is  already  cleared 
up  by  the  nomination  lately  made  by  the  executive 
power  of  the  United  States. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  247 

"  2.  The  King  will  be  prepared  to  fix  boundaries  as 
favorable  to  the  claims  of  the  United  States  as  may  be 
compatible  with  his  treaties  with  the  Indians. 

"  3.  His  Majesty  will  agree  to  consider  the  navigation 
of  the  river  Mississippi,  subject  to  such  restrictions  as 
may  be  demanded  by  the  interest  of  his  subjects. 

"  4.  The  King  expects,  in  return  for  these  concessions, 
that  there  should  be  a  substantial  treaty  of  alliance,  irre 
spective  of  the  relations  growing  out  of  the  existing 
war,  and  a  reciprocal  guarantee  of  his  own  possessions 
and  those  of  the  United  States. 

"5.  His  Majesty  also  hopes  that  questions  of  trade 
will  likewise  be  arranged  on  a  footing  of  reciprocity. 

"  I  have  thus  stated  what  I  think  we  may  presume  to 
be  the  intention  of  the  King,  as  far  as  I  am  at  liberty  to 
deduce  it  from  the  despatch  in  question,  and  which, 
up  to  this  time,  I  have  received  from  his  highness, 
etc."* 

Mr.  Pinckney  arrived  in  Madrid  about  the  18th  of 
June,  1795 ;  and  after  the  usual  formal  reception,  com 
menced  his  negotiation  directly  with  the  first  minister, 
Godoy.  He  found  the  Spanish  court  still  anxious  for 
delay ;  a  very  natural  course,  as  they  were  in  posses 
sion  of  the  chief  subjects  in  controversy.  In  pursu 
ance  of  this  procrastinating  policy,  the  Due  d'Alcudia 

*  T.  P.  MSS.  Spanish  Letter  Book.  This  letter  is  in  Spanish,  and, 
with  the  others  quoted,  was  sent  to  Mr.  Pinckney  from  the  State  de 
partment. 


248  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

(Godoy)  informed  Mr.  Pinckney  that  he  could  come  to 
no  positive  conclusion  until  he  had  received  the  answer 
of  the  United  States  to  the  propositions  transmitted 
through  Mr.  Jaudenes,  the  Spanish  Charge  at  Philadel 
phia.  Although  unprovided  with  special  instructions 
on  this  head,  Mr.  Pinckney  first  objected,  that  no 
definite  propositions  had  been  made,  and  that  the 
informal  suggestions,  of  the  24th  of  May,  could  not 
expect  a  formal  reply ;  and  that,  moreover,  as  his  pres 
ence  in  Madrid  was  the  direct  consequence  of  the  sug 
gestion  of  the  Spanish  Charge"  d'affaires,  any  discussion 
relating  to  terms  of  settlement  should  fairly  be  consid 
ered  as  adjourned,  in  deference  to  his  Spanish  Majesty, 
from  Philadelphia  to  Madrid.  He  further  added,  that, 
although  unprovided  with  special  instructions  as  to  the 
last  communication  of  the  Spanish  minister,  he  was 
fully  authorized  to  say,  that  a  mutual  guarantee  of  the 
national  possessions  was  impossible.  Godoy  also  sug 
gested,  that,  as  the  American  negotiation  was  very 
much  connected  with  the  accommodation  with  France, 
they  should  proceed  together;  and  proposed,  that,  in 
fact,  there  should  be  a  triple  alliance  between  France, 
Spain,  and  the  United  States.  This  proposition  the 
American  negotiator  respectfully  but  decidedly  put 
aside.  The  plenipotentiaries  then  proceeded  to  the  dis 
cussion  and  arrangement  of  the  old  issues  between 
their  governments ;  and,  after  an  interchange  of  notes 
and  projects,  it  became  apparent,  that,  without  conces- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  249 

sion,  they  could  not  come  to  a  satisfactory  agreement. 
Their  difference  resolved  itself  into  three  important 
points  :  — 

1.  The  Spanish  government  refused  to  treat  on  the 
subject  of  commerce.  Mr.  Pinckney  complained,  justly, 
that  his  mission  had  been  instituted  upon  the  explicit 
invitation  of  the  Spanish  Charge  d'affaires  in  Philadel 
phia;  that  in  August,  1794,  that  representative  had 
stated  that  "  his  Majesty  would  not  enter  into  any 
treaty,  unless  the  powers  to  the  minister  were  ample,  or 
accompanied  with  secret  instructions  having  for  their 
object  to  conclude  a  partial,  and  not  a  general,  treaty."  * 

*  I  have  quoted  this  language  of  Mr.  Pinckney  precisely  as  it  is 
found  in  his  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  State.  (See  American  State 
Papers,  folio;  Foreign  Relations,  Vol.  I.  page  542.)  But  it  is 
clearly  a  mistranslation.  To  say  that  his  Catholic  Majesty  would  not 
treat  unless  the  powers  of  the  ministers  of  the  United  States  were 
ample  or  restricted  by  secret  instructions,  is  simply  an  unmeaning 
contradiction,  and  renders  Mr.  Pinckney's  argument  utterly  unintel 
ligible.  By  reference  to  the  original  letter  (at  page  239)  referred  to 
by  Mr.  Pinckney,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  mistake  results  from  trans 
lating  "  siempre  que  "  "  unless,"  instead  of  "  so  long  as,"  and  omitting 
altogether  the  negative  particle,  "  no."  The  correct  translation  is, 
"  That  his  Majesty  will  not  enter  into  any  treaty  so  long  as  the 
powers  conferred  on  the  ministers  of  the  United  States  are  not 
ample,  or  are  restricted  by  secret  instructions  having  for  their  object 
the  conclusion  of  a  partial,  and  not  a  general  treaty."  This  not  only 
makes  Mr.  Pinckney's  objection  clear,  but  also  renders  intelligible 
the  conversations  between  Mr.  Randolph  and  M.  Jaudenes.  I  can- 


250  DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY. 

He  had  expressly  added,  "  that  Spain  is  ready  to  treat 
upon  the  points  of  limits,  Indians,  commerce^  and  what 
ever  may  conduce  to  the  best  friendship  between  the 
two  countries ; "  that  he  had  therefore  a  right  to  expect 
an  arrangement  of  the  commercial  interests  of  the  two 
countries ;  but  as  the  United  States  were  not  willing  to 
force  themselves  into  connection  with  a  reluctant  peo 
ple,  he  would  not  press  what  he  could  not  but  consider 
his  right. 

2.  As  to  the  Mississippi,  while  the  Spanish  govern 
ment  admitted  that  its  navigation   should  be  free  to 
both  nations,  it  objected  to  the  arrangement,  proposed 
by  the  American  minister,  in  reference  to  a  depot  for 
the  commerce  of  the  United  States  at  New  Orleans  ; 
and  also  insisted,  that  the  language  of  the  article  con 
veying  the  right  should  be  of  a  strictly  exclusive  char 
acter,  restricting  the  right  of  navigation  to  the  subjects 
of  Spain  and  to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

3.  As   to  reclamations,  the  Spanish  government  in 
sisted   that   all   captures    should   be   divided  into  two 
periods,  —  the  one  preceding   the   6th  of  April,   1795, 
in  which  the  rule  of  decision  should  be  the  maritime 
regulations  of   Spain,  then  at  war  with   France  ;   the 
other    following    that   date,    in    which    the    decisions 

not  see  how  such  a  misconstruction  escaped  attention ;  but  I  have 
thought  it  best  to  leave  the  text  as  in  the  official  publication,  and 
make  the  correction  in  the  note. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  251 

should  be  upon  the  usual  grounds  of  international  law. 
To  this  division  Mr.  Pinckney  positively  refused  his 
assent. 

Finding  that  the  Spanish  court  held  to  its  positions, 
Mr.  Pinckney  demanded  his  passports  on  the  24th  of 
October.  The  result  of  this  prompt  determination  to 
close  the  negotiations  was  a  compromise  of  the  dif 
ficulties  ;  and  on  the  27th  of  October,  1795,  a  treaty  of 
friendship,  limits,  and  navigation  was  signed  by  Mr. 
Pinckney  and  Godoy,  or,  as  he  had  recently  been  cre 
ated,  The  Prince  of  the  Peace. 

By   this   treaty,    Spain,    Art.   2,    acquiesced    in   the 
boundaries  of  the   United  States,  as  described  in  the 
treaty  of  peace  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain,  and  appointed  a  joint  commission  to  fix  the 
limits.     As  to  the  Indians,  the  two  countries  stipulated, 
Art.  5,  that  they  would  restrain  hostilities  on  the  part, 
of  those  tribes  within  their  respective  boundaries,  and   \ 
hereafter  would  enter  into  no  treaties  with  such  tribes 
as  lay  without  their  respective  limits.     As  to  the  Mis 
sissippi,  it  was  determined  by  Art.  4,  as  follows  :  — 

"  It  is  likewise  agreed  that  the  western  boundary  of 
the  United  States,  which  separates  them  from  the 
Spanish  colony  of  Louisiana,  is  the  middle  of  the  chan 
nel  or  bed  of  the  river  Mississippi,  from  the  northern 
boundary  of  the  said  States  to  the  completion  of  the 
thirty-first  degree  of  latitude  north  of  the  equator. 
And  his  Catholic  Majesty  has  likewise  agreed  that  the 
navigation  of  the  said  river,  in  its  whole  breadth,  from 


252  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY 


/  its  source  to  the  ocean,  shall  be  free  only  to  his  sub 
jects  and  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  unless  he 
should  extend  this  privilege  to  the  subjects  of  other 
powers  by  special  convention."  And  Art.  22  further 
provided,  that,  "  in  consequence  of  the  stipulations  con 
tained  in  the  4th  article,  his  Catholic  Majesty  will  per 
mit  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  for  the  space  of 
three  years  from  this  time,  to  deposit  their  merchandise 
and  effects  in  the  port  of  New  .Orleans,  and  to  export 
them  from  thence,  without  paying  any  other  duty  than 
a  fair  price  for  the  hire  of  the  stores  ;  and  his  Majesty 
promises,  either  to  continue  this  permission,  if  he  finds 
during  that  time  that  it  is  not  prejudicial  to  the  inter 
ests  of  Spain,  or,  if  he  should  not  agree  to  continue  it 
there,  he  will  assign  to  them,  on  another  part  of  the 
bank  of  the  Mississippi,  an  equivalent  establishment." 

As  to  the  reclamations  of  the  United  States,  a  joint 
commission  was  appointed,  Art.  21,  to  sit  at  Philadel 
phia  and  pronounce  up6n  all  claims. 

Articles  12  to  18  adjusted  various  questions  of  prize 
and  maritime  law,  declaring  that  free  ships  make  free 
goods,  and  exempting  from  contraband,  among  other 
things,  hemp,  flax,  tar,  anchors,  cables,  masts,  planks, 
etc.  etc.,  and  all  other  things  proper  for  building  or 
repairing  ships. 

This  treaty  was  all  that  the  United  States  could 
have  hoped  for.  It  secured  the  navigation  of  the  Mis 
sissippi,  and  thus  opened  the  way  for  that  magnificent 
internal  commerce,  almost  fabulous  in  its  present  ex- 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  253 

tent,  which  has  made  that  great  river  a  crowded  high 
way  of  an  unrivalled  domestic  trade.  And  it  placed  all 
the  other  questions  in  a  fair  way  for  solution.  Its 
negotiation  required  rather  firmness  than  skill,  and  its 
difficulties  were,  perhaps,  more  apparent  than  real. 
Political  circumstances  compelled  Spain  to  yield ;  and  it 
may  be  inferred  that  she  would  have  gone  even  further 
in  the  ways  of  concession,  from  the  language  of  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace  himself,  in  the  account  of  the  treaty 
which  he  has  given  the  world  in  his  Memoirs.  Refer 
ring  to  his  course  as  minister  of  Spain,  he  says :  — 

"  I  did  more;  I  had  taken  to  heart  the  treaty,  which, 
unknown  to  us,  the  English  cabinet  had  negotiated 
with  the  United  States  of  America  ;  this  treaty  afforded 
great  latitude  to  evil  designs ;  it  was  possible  to  injure 
Spain  in  an  indirect  manner,  and  without  risk,  in  her 
distant  possessions. 

"  I  endeavored  to  conclude  another  treaty  with  the 
same  states,  and  had  the  satisfaction  to  succeed  in  my 
object;  I  obtained  unexpected  advantages,  and  met  with 
sympathy,  loyalty,  and  generous  sentiments  in  that 
nation  of  republicans. 

"  This  was  a  mere  treaty  or  alliance  ;  it  was,  moreover, 
a  formal  act  of  navigation.  Independently  of  carefully 
providing  for  the  common  interests  of  both  nations,  we 
realized  the  first  application  of  modern  ideas  respecting 
the  equality  of  maritime  rights,  and  the  measures  which 
humanity  enjoins  in  order  to  lessen  the  evils  of  war; 
ideas  hitherto  recorded  in  books,  proclaimed  by  the 

22 


254  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

civilization  of  the  age,  but  the  practical  application  of 
which  has  at  all  times  been  opposed  by  England.  This 
creditable  and  successful  transaction  has  been  suffered 
to  pass  unnoticed,  like  so  many  important  facts  of  my 
political  life.  The  treaty  was  signed  at  the  Escurial, 
the  27th  of  October,  1795,  by  citizen  Thomas  Pinckney 
and  myself,  without  any  other  intervening  party.  The 
secret  was  so  well  kept  for  a  whole  year,  that  the  Eng 
lish  only  had  knowledge  of  it  on  the  4th  of  September, 
1796,  when  it  was  made  public,  the  war  having  been 
determined  on."  * 

Whatever  "unexpected  advantages"  Godoy  may 
have  obtained  in  this  treaty,  and  satisfied  as  he  may 
have  been  that  he  had  counteracted  any  mischievous 
effects  of  the  treaty  with  Great  Britain,  it  is  certain 
that  neither  the  language  nor  the  conduct  of  his  gov 
ernment  manifested  the  same  satisfaction.  During  the 
years  of  Mr.  Adams's  administration,  which  followed  the 
treaty,  the  correspondence  of  the  two  governments  was 
full  of  mutual  complaint.  The  commissioners  ap 
pointed  under  the  treaty  to  run  the  boundary  lines,  Mr. 
Ellicott  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  and  Baron 
Carondelet  on  the  part  of  Spain,  could  not  agree ;  and 
the  Spanish  government  finally  refused  to  withdraw  its 
troops  from  the  territory  of  the  United  States,  on  vari 
ous  grounds.  It  resolved  to  retain  its  troops  until  it 
was  decided  whether,  under  the  treaty,  the  Spanish  gar- 

*  Godoy's  Memoirs,  Vol.  I.  p.  458-460. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  255 

risons  were  to  leave  their  works  standing  or  to  destroy 
them,  and  until,  by  an  additional  article,  the  property  of 
the  inhabitants  should  be  secured,  and  also  until  the 
Spanish  officers  were  sure  that  the  Indians  would  con 
tinue  pacific  after  their  withdrawal.  To  meet  the  first 
objection,  the  President  left  it  to  the  discretion  of  the 
Spanish  officers  to  leave  or  demolish  their  works,  as  they 
pleased ;  and  proposed  to  obviate  the  second  by  caus 
ing  an  assurance  to  be  published,  that  the  settlers  or 
occupants  of  the  lands  in  question  should  not  be  dis 
turbed  in  their  possession  by  the  United  States  troops. 
The  Spanish  commander  then  declared  his  determina 
tion  to  remain,  as  he  expected  an  invasion  from  Can 
ada  on  the  part  of  the  British,  a  pretext  sufficiently 
exposed  by  the  explicit  denial  of  the  British  minister. 
To  arrange  these  difficulties  required  another  negotia 
tion  and  treaty,  the  history  of  which,  however,  belongs 
to  the  period  of  Mr.  Jefferson's  administration. 

Besides  these  practical  and  persistent  annoyances, 
the  Spanish  government,  having  entered  upon  a  war 
with  England,  thought  proper,  in  May,  1797,  to  make  a 
formal  protest  and  remonstrance  against  the  provisions 
of  the  treaty  of  1794,  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain.  The  Chevalier  de  Yrujo,  the  Spanish 
minister,  addressed,  on  the  6th  of  May,  1797,  a  letter  to 
the  Secretary  of  State,  in  which  he  said :  — 

"  The  King,  my  master,  desirous  of  drawing  closer 
the  connections  of  friendship  and  good  correspondence 
already  subsisting  between  Spain  and  the  United 


256  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

States,  concluded  with  them,  on  the  27th  of  October, 
1795,  a  treaty  dictated  by  the  most  generous  princi 
ples,  opening  to  the  Americans  the  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi  to  the  ocean,  and  ceding  to  the  United 
States  a  considerable  portion  of  territory,  by  agreeing 
to  draw  a  line  of  demarcation  between  the  possessions 
of  both  parties.  Equally  animated  by  the  desire  of 
diminishing,  for  humanity's  sake,  the  horrors  of  war,  he 
adopted  the  liberal  principle,  that  free  ships  make  free 
goods.  This  stipulation  was,  in  reality,  an  incalculable 
advantage  for  the  American  citizens,  who,  by  the 
extension  of  their  navigation,  the  geographical  situation 
of  their  country,  and  the  nature  of  their  political  con 
nections  at  that  epoch,  promised  a  neutrality  as  advan 
tageous  as  desirable.  At  the  same  time,  his  Majesty 
agreed,  by  the  said  treaty,  that  articles  necessary  to  the 
construction  and  repair  of  vessels  should  not  be  deemed 
contraband.  In  a  word,  the  concessions  on  the  part  of 
Spain,  for  cementing  a  sincere  union  between  both 
nations,  were  such,  that  the  treaty  was  received  through 
out  the  United  States  with  enthusiasm,  and  with  the 
most  evident  marks  of  general  approbation.  In  these 
circumstances,  the  king,  my  master,  who  had  so  effica 
ciously  advanced  the  interests  of  America,  promised 
himself,  by  the  effect  of  good  correspondence,  as 
sacred  among  nations  as  between  individuals,  that  the 
United  States,  at  least,  would  not  contribute  to  the 
injury  of  Spain.  What  should  be  the  surprise  of  his 
Majesty  on  knowing  that  this  country  had  contracted 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  257 

engagements  with  England  prejudicial  to  his  rights  and 
to  the  interests  of  his  subjects,  nearly  at  the  same  time 
in  which,  with  so  much  liberality,  he  was  giving  to  the 
United  States  the  most  striking  proofs  of  the  most  sin 
cere  friendship. 

"  Upon  the  whole,  the  King,  my  master,  well  persuaded 
that  England,  in  her  treaty  with  America,  had  surprised 
the  good  faith  of  the  federal  government,  reserved  to 
himself  to  make,  on  a  proper  opportunity,  the  necessary 
representations,  not  doubting  but  that  the  equity  of  the 
United  States  would  place  Spain,  in  relation  to  other 
powers,  upon  that  footing  of  equality,  without  which 
the  neutrality  adopted  by  America  would  exist  only  in 
appearance,  and  be  purely  nominal ;  but  experiencing, 
since  the  declaration  of  war  against  Great  Britain, 
injuries  and  evils  which  he  had  foreseen  from  the  mo 
ment  he  was  informed  of  the  English  treaty,  he  finds 
himself  under  the  necessity  of  anticipating  this  step, 
and,  therefore,  has  ordered  me  to  make  to  this  govern 
ment,  through  you,  the  following  observations." 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out  how  utterly  incon 
sistent  is  this  statement  with  the  claim  of  Godoy,  that 
he  had  intended  this  treaty  as  an  antidote  to  the  mis 
chief  of  the  English  one.  Referring  to  the  17th  article 
of  the  British  treaty,  which  waived  the  principle  of  free 
ships  free  goods,  and  the  18th  article,  which  included 
the  material  for  ship-building  among  the  articles  of 
contraband,  the  Spanish  minister  continued :  —  "In 
the  preamble  to  the  Spanish  treaty,  its  object  is  said  to 

22* 


258  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

be  for  the  mutual  advantage  and  reciprocal  utility  of 
both  countries.  I  leave  you  to  determine  what  advan 
tages  either  Spain  or  America  can  derive  from  the  15th 
and  16th  articles  of  their  treaty,  whilst  those  of  the  17th 
and  18th  of  the  English  treaty  remain  in  full  force." 

The  4th  and  22d  articles  of  the  Spanish  treaty,  it 
will  be  recollected,  referred  to  the  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi,  and  the  dep6t  at  New  Orleans.  When  he 
sent  the  treaty  home  for  ratification,  Mr.  Pinckney  had 
observed:  — 

"  The  wording  of  the  latter  part  of  this  article  (4th) 
seemed  objectionable^  and  various  alterations  were  pro 
posed.  It  required  much  contest  to  obtain  any  altera 
tion  from  the  mode  first  proposed  by  Spain,  whose 
doubts  were  principally  founded  on  a  jealousy  of  our 
letting  in  others.  The  substance,  however,  appears  to 
me  not  disadvantageous,  when  considered  as  connected 
with  the  provision  in  the  22d  article,  and  the  wording 
as  fully  authorized  by  my  instructions." 

The  Spanish  minister  now  insisted  upon  the  exclu 
sive  character  of  that  article  :  — 

"  Thus  far,"  said  he,  in  continuation  of  his  remon 
strance,  "  I  have  represented  merely  the  injury  done  to 
the  interests  of  Spain ;  but  I  shall  now  state  to  you  a 
point  in  which  her  rights  are  essentially  concerned,  I 
mean  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi. 

"  The  just  ground  upon  which  Spain  refused  to 
acknowledge  the  mutual  and  illegal  cession  which  Eng 
land  made  to  the  United  States,  in  the  18th  article  of 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  259 

the  treaty  of  the  3d  of  September,  1783,  of  the  free 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  to  the  ocean;  the  neces 
sity  in  which  America  has  found  herself  of  recurring  to 
a  special  treaty  with  Spain  for  obtaining  it ;  and  above 
all,  the  tenor  of  the  4th  article  of  the  said  treaty,  in 
which  it  is  agreed  that  the  free  navigation  of  the  said 
river  to  the  ocean  belongs  exclusively  to  the  subjects  of 
the  King,  and  to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  had 
given  his  Majesty  reason  to  believe  that  the  federal 
government,  by  this  stipulation,  annulled  as  illegal  the 
claim  which  it  had  made  with  England  as  to  this  point 
in  the  8th  article  of  the  treaty  of  1783.  But  his  Maj 
esty  has  seen  with  equal  surprise,  that  the  United 
States  not  only  pretend  to  confirm  that  right  to  Eng 
land  by  the  3d  article  of  their  commercial  treaty,  but 
that  they  have,  since  the  conclusion  of  that  with  Spain, 
in  which  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  is  confined 
exclusively  to  the  Spaniards  and  Americans,  agreed  to 
the  explanatory  article  signed  here  by  yourself,  and  the 
English  Charge  d'affaires,  Mr.  Bond,  on  the  4th  of 
May,  1796,  in  which  it  is  declared :  That  no  other  stipu 
lation  or  treaty  concluded  since,  by  either  of  the  contract 
ing  parties,  with  any  other  power  or  nation,  is  under 
stood  in  any  manner  to  derogate  from  the  right  to  the 
free  communication  and  commerce  guaranteed  by  the  3d 
article  of  the  treaty  to  the  subjects  of  his  Britannic  Ma 
jesty." 

The   Spanish  minister  then  proceeded  to  argue  that 
by  the  treaty  of  1763,  Spain   ceded  to  England  both 


260  DIPLOMATIC    HISTOIIY. 

banks  of  the  Mississippi,  which  cession  carried  with  it 
the  navigation  of  the  river  ; 

That  by  the  treaty  of  1783,  England  granted  that 
right  to  the  United  States,  she  still  being  mistress  of 
the  two  banks  ; 

But  by  a  treaty  of  the  same  date,  1783,  with  Spain, 
England  restored  to  Spain  both  banks  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  without  reserving  the  right  of  navigation.  This 
right,  therefore,  passing  away  from  England,  with  the 
possession  of  the  banks,  she  could  no  longer  cede  it  to 
any  other  power. 

Further,  that  if  the  absence  of  any  reservation  in  the 
treaty  of  1783  did  not  really  deprive  England  of  the 
right  to  use  the  navigation,  the  separation  of  the  colo 
nies  destroyed  the  right  which,  as  English  subjects,  the 
Americans  might  formerly  have  plead.  If,  therefore, 
the  American  right  could  not  be  derived  either  from 
their  former  character  as  British  subjects,  or  from  the 
void  grant  of  England  in  the  treaty,  there  was  but  one 
other  source  of  derivation,  namely,  the  special  treaty  with 
Spain.  But  that  treaty  confined  the  privilege  of  navi 
gation  exclusively  to  the  subjects  of  Spain  and  the  citi 
zens  of  the  United  States,  and  therefore  gave  no  power 
to  the  United  States  to  grant  this  privilege  to  any  one 
else. 

To  this  remonstrance,  Mr.  Pickering,  then  Secretary 
of  State,  replied  seriatim.  The  first  class  of  com 
plaints,  springing  from  the  difference  in  the  principles  of 
the  English  and  the  Spanish  treaties,  on  the  maxim  of 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  261 

free  ships  free  goods,  and  the  extension  of  contraband, 
he  disposed  of  summarily  and  effectually :  — 

"  1.  Free  ships  shall  make  free  goods.  It  is  impos 
sible  that  the  two  contracting  parties  should  ever  have 
conceived  that  this  rule,  as  between  themselves,  could 
have  any  operation,  except  when  one  was  at  war  and 
the  other  at  peace.  The  United  States,  being  in  the 
latter  situation,  have  a  right  to  carry  in  their  vessels 
goods  of  the  enemies  of  Spain,  without  being  liable,  on 
that  account,  to  capture.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the 
United  States  were  at  war,  and  Spain  at  peace,  her 
subjects  would  have  a  right  to  transport  in  their  vessels 
the  goods  of  our  enemies,  free  from  capture  by  the 
armed  vessels  of  the  United  States.  And  thus,  the 
stipulation  is  exactly  equal  on  both  sides. 

"  2.  Ship  timber  and  naval  stores  are,  by  the  law  of 
nations,  contraband  of  war ;  but  the  United  States  and 
Spain,  for  their  mutual  benefit,  agreed  to  consider  them 
as  free  goods,  in  order  that  either  party,  remaining  at 
peace,  might  safely  continue  its  commerce  in  those  arti 
cles,  even  by  carrying  them  to  the  enemies  of  the  other. 
And  this  rule  will  operate  equally  like  the  former. 

"  You  compare  the  liberal  stipulations  in  these  two 
articles,  with  those  of  a  contrary  nature  in  the  treaty 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  and  ask, 
what  should  be  the  surprise  of  his  Catholic  Majesty  on 
knowing  of  the  latter  engagements  ?  After  remark 
ing,  that,  if  these  stipulations  were  liberal  on  the  part 
of  Spain,  they  were  alike  liberal  on  the  part  of  the 


262  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

United  States,  seeing  that  they  were  perfectly  recip 
rocal,  permit  me  to  say,  that  the  engagements  with 
Great  Britain  do  not  appear  to  offer  any  cause  for 
'  surprise  '  on  the  part  of  his  Catholic  Majesty  ;  because 
his  Majesty  had  seen,  during  the  whole  course  of  the 
American  war,  how  steadily  Great  Britain  persisted,  in 
opposition  to  the  demands  of  all  the  maritime  powers, 
to  maintain  her  claims  under  the  law  of  nations  to  cap 
ture  enemies'  property  and  timber  and  naval  stores  as 
contraband  in  neutral  ships.  His  Majesty  has  also 
seen,  in  the  present  war,  in  which  he  was  for  a  time  a 
party  with  Great  Britain  against  France,  that  Great 
Britain  continued  to  avow  and  practise  upon  the  same 
principles.  And,  with  such  perfect  knowledge  of  the 
principles  and  conduct  of  Great  Britain,  and  while  she 
was  still  engaged  in  the  war  with  a  power  which  she 
strenuously  endeavored  to  deprive  of  timber  and  naval 
stores,  and  whose  mercantile  shipping  was  greatly 
reduced,  could  his  Catholic  Majesty  expect  that  Great 
Britain  would  relinquish  her  legal  rights  to  a  nation  (the 
United  States)  which  abounded  in  material  for  build 
ing  and  equipping  ships,  and  whose  vessels,  adapted 
to  the  carrying  trade,  traversed  every  sea,  and  visited 
every  quarter  of  the  globe  ?  You  seem  to  imagine 
there  is  more  reason  for  '  surprise  '  because,  as  you  say, 
the  engagements  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  were  contracted  '  nearly  at  the  same  time,' 
4  almost  at  the  same  moment,'  with  our  stipulations 
with  his  Catholic  Majesty.  But  allow  me  to  bring 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  263 

to  your  recollection  the  periods  when  these  different 
treaties  were  formed.  That  with  Great  Britain  was 
concluded  on  the  19th  day  of  November,  1794 ;  that 
with  Spain,  on  the  27th  of  October,  1795.  Further,  the 
treaty  with  Great  Britain  was  published  in  Philadel 
phia  on  the  1st  day  of  July,  1795,  almost  four  months 
before  the  treaty  with  his  Catholic  Majesty  was  con 
cluded,  and  nearly  ten  months  before  it  received  his 
ratification,  at  which  time  (Spain  and  the  United  States 
being  then  at  peace  with  all  the  world)  it  does  not 
appear  that  his  Catholic  Majesty  found  the  smallest 
difficulty  in  giving  his  final  sanction  to  this  treaty  with 
the  United  States  on  account  of  their  prior  treaty  with 
Great  Britain." 

On  the  next  point,  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi, 
the  Secretary  was  not  so  happy.  It  was  clear,  that,  if 
the  premises  of  the  Spanish  minister  were  granted,  his 
conclusions  followed  inevitably.  As  Mr.  Pickering 
said  :  "  If  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  the- naviga 
tion  of  the  Mississippi  originated  in  their  treaty  with 
Spain,  which  was  concluded  on  the  27th  of  October, 
1795,  it  requires  no  argument  to  prove  that  they  could 
not  have  granted  the  right  of  that  navigation  to  Great 
Britain  on  the  19th  of  November,  1794." 

Now,  the  United  States  had  always,  from  the  begin 
ning  of  this  tedious  negotiation  to  its  close,  denied  this 
dependence  of  their  right  upon  the  grant  of  Spain. 
They  had  maintained  it  upon  the  laws  of  nations,  and 
upon  the  fact  that  their  separation  from  the  mother 


264  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

country  left  them  in  independent  possession  of  all  rights 
they  had  formerly  claimed  as  British  subjects.  But 
the  great  difficulty  in  the  way  of  the  argument  was, 
whether  the  language  of  the  4th  article  of  the  Spanish 
treaty  had  not  waived  these  strong  points,  and  had 
they  not  voluntarily,  under  that  treaty,  come  down  to 
the  lower  ground  of  Spanish  permission?  Mr.  Picker 
ing  contended  not,  on  two  grounds,  both  ingenious,  but, 
it  must  be  added,  of  very  little  strength.  He  quoted 
the  following  extract  from  Mr.  Pinckney's  notes,  on  the 
project  of  a  convention  submitted  by  Godoy  during  the 
discussion,  which  project  contained  a  stipulation,  which 
would  have  gone  to  the  exclusion  of  Great  Britain  from 
the  Mississippi :  — 

"  The  words  '  alone  '  and  '  exclusively  '  should  be 
omitted,  for  Spain  could  scarcely  confide  in  the  good 
faith  of  the  United  States,  or  in  the  convention  which 
she  is  about  to  conclude  with  them,  if  they  agreed  to 
an  article  which  would  be  an  infraction  of  a  treaty 
previously  concluded;  for,  by  the  treaty  of  peace  be 
tween  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  concluded 
in  1783,  it  is  stipulated  that  the  navigation  of  the  river 
Mississippi  shall  continue  free  to  the  subjects  of  Great 
Britain  and  to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States." 

"  Here,  sir,"  continued  the  Secretary,  in  seeming 
triumph,  "you  see  that  the  Federal  government,  far 
from  'giving  his  Catholic  Majesty  (as  you  suggest) 
reason  to  believe  that  they  had  annulled,  as  illegal,  the 
claim  which  they  made  with  England  as  to  this  point 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  265 

in  the  8th  article  of  the  treaty  of  1783,  '  expressly  de 
clared  that  the  attempt  would  be  a  violation    of  the 
good   faith  of    the    "United    States,   pledged   to    Great 
Britain  in  that  treaty.'     Mr.  Pickering  does  not  seem  to 
have  realized  the  damaging  reply  to  which  he  laid  him 
self  open ;  for  what  could  he  have  said  had  the  Spanish 
minister  replied :  "  I  admit  the  good  faith  of  Mr.  Pinck- 
ney's  reasoning,  and  had  he  adhered  to  his  note,  his 
Majesty   must  have  found  some   solution  of  this    dif 
ficulty,  giving  all  credit  to  the  frankness  and  honesty  of 
the  American  minister.     But,  sir,  Mr.  Pinckney's  notes 
on    a   project   are    not  the    articles    of  a   treaty;    and 
although,  as  you  say,  he  undoubtedly  declared  that  the 
insertion  of  such  words  would  be  bad  faith  to  which 
he  could  not  consent,  it  is  equally  undeniable  that  he 
did  finally  consent,  and  that  article  4th  does  contain 
words  of  exclusion  fully  equivalent  to  '  alone  '  or  '  ex 
clusively  ; '    namely,    '  and    his    Catholic    Majesty   has 
likewise  agreed  that  the  navigation  of  the  said  river, 
etc.  etc.,  shall  be  free  only  to  his  subjects  and  the  citi 
zens  of  the  United  States,  unless  he  should  extend  this 
privilege  to  the  subjects  of  other  powers  by  special  con 
vention.'     Now,  believing  as  fully  as  you  do,  in  the 
high  character  and  good  faith  of  Mr.  Pinckney,  I  am 
justified  in  my  conclusion,  that  before  he  consented  to 
the  insertion  of  these  words,  the  effect  of  which  you 
cannot  dispute,  he  was  satisfied  that  his  Catholic  Maj 
esty  was  right  in  the  pretensions  that  rendered  their 
insertion    proper;    and   signing   the   treaty   with    that 


266  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

article,  he  did  mean  to  admit  its  full  significance. 
Otherwise  you  force  me  to  suppose  that  he  committed 
one  breach  of  faith  against  England,  only  to  provide 
the  opportunity  of  another  against  Spain." 

The  second  ground  upon  which  Mr.  Pickering  rested 
his  defence  was  the  fact,  that,  in  article  4th,  the  stipula 
tion  as  to  the  navigation  was  not  a  joint  stipulation, 
but  sole  on  the  part  of  the  Spanish  king,  and  that  it 
concerned  the  United  States  no  further  than  as  it  gave 
them  the  freedom  of  the  navigation.  It  would  be  dif 
ficult  to  support  this  position  in  relation  to  a  treaty 
consisting  of  mutual  stipulations ;  but,  supposing  it  to 
be  well  founded,  it  went  too  far.  Because,  if  the  free 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  was  the  sole  stipulation 
of  Spain,  it  could  only  be  because  she  had  the  sole  rig-Jit 
to  stipulate,  and  to  admit  this  was  to  give  up  the  whole 
argument  of  the  United  States. 

The  truth  was,  that  the  face  of  the  4th  article  was 
against  the  United  States.  But  that  article  was  not 
entitled  to  its  full  significance.  For,  in  fact,  it  was 
understood  between  the  two  countries,  that  the  United 
States  would  accept  any  arrangement  from  Spain 
which  would  effect  the  great  practical  object  of  opening 
the  navigation  of  the  river,  without  a  too  strict  scru 
tiny  of  the  language  of  the  concession  ;  provided  always, 
that  it  did  not  rest  that  concession  expressly  upon  a 
grant  from  Spain.  And  this  article  was  the  result  of 
such  a  determination.  The  objection  to  the  supple 
mentary  article,  signed  by  Mr.  Bond  and  the  Secretary 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  267 

of  the  United  States,  was  simply  captious,  for  it  could 
confer  no  possible  right,  and  in  no  way  go  a  step  beyond 
the  original  article  in  the  treaty  of  1783,  by  which  the 
United  States  did  nothing  more  than  grant  to  Great 
Britain  whatever  right  to  the  navigation  she  might  pos 
sess,  —  neither  the  original  nor  the  supplementary  arti 
cles  undertaking  to  express  what  those  rights  were. 

These  difficulties  between  the  two  countries  rendered 
another  negotiation  and  another  treaty  necessary ;  but 
their  history  belongs  to  the  period  of  Mr.  Jefferson's 
administration. 

The  treaty  with  England,  1794,  with  Spain,  1795, 
and  with  France,  1800,  sum  up  the  negotiations  during 
the  twelve  years  of  the  administrations  of  Washington 
and  Adams.  There  were  resident  ministers  at  the 
courts  of  Berlin,  Lisbon,  and  at  the  Hague;  but  their 
correspondence  involved  no  matter  of  large  or  lasting 
political  importance.  The  only  remaining  negotiation 
of  sufficient  importance  for  a  detailed  history  is  that 
with  the  Barbary  powers,  and  a  brief  summary  of  its 
course  and  results  will  be  amply  sufficient.  For  a 
minute  account  of  the  pious  efforts  of  the  Order  of  the 
Mathurins,  or  a  discussion  of  the  respective  influence  of 
the  great  Jewish  houses  of  Bassara  and  Bacri  upon  the 
Dey  of  Algiers,  would  have  at  present  but  small 
interest. 

The  American  trade  in  the  Mediterranean  was  at 
one  time  not  inconsiderable,  employing,  as  it  did,  from 
eighty  to  a  hundred  ships  annually,  amounting  to 


268  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

about  twenty  thousand  tons,  and  navigated  by  about 
twelve  hundred  sailors.  Its  articles  of  trade  comprised 
about  one  sixth  of  the  wheat  and  flour  exported  from 
the  United  States,  one  fourth  of  the  dried  and  pickled 
fish,  and  some  rice.  This  trade  was  abandoned  early 
in  the  war,  and  was  not  resumed,  to  any  noticeable 
extent,  for  a  long  time  after  the  peace.  The  necessity 
of  its  preservation,  however,  induced  the  old  Confedera 
tion,  as  early  as  1784,  to  authorize  the  conclusion  of 
peace  with  these  piratical  powers.  In  March,  1785, 
certain  of  the  United  States  ministers  in  Europe  were 
empowered  to  send  agents  to  negotiate  such  treaties. 
Their  expenses  were  limited  to  eighty  thousand  dollars, 
and  they  were  sent  to  Morocco  and  Algiers.  A  treaty 
with  Morocco  was  then  effected  at  a  very  reasonable  cost, 
about  nine  thousand  dollars ;  and  even  previous  to  the 
treaty,  the  Emperor  of  Morocco  had,  at  the  instance  of 
the  court  of  Spain,  restored  an  American  vessel  which 
had  been  captured,  and  liberated  the  prisoners.  This 
treaty  was  terminated  by  the  death  of  the  Emperor, 
and  as  it  was  not  renewed  with  his  son,  owing  to  the 
civil  commotions  in  Morocco  which  accompanied  his 
succession,  and  as  the  condition  of  Morocco,  conse 
quent  upon  these  internal  dissensions,  rendered  her 
powerless  for  evil,  the  only  negotiation  which  it  is 
necessary  to  follow  is  that  with  Algiers. 

At  the  time  of  the  appointment  of  the  minister, 
there  were  no  American  captives;  but  before  the  com 
mencement  of  any  negotiation,  some  time  in  July  and 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  269 

August,  1785,  two  American  ships  were  taken  by  the 
Algerines ;  and,'  with  their  cargoes  and  crews,  amount 
ing  to  about  twenty-one  persons,  were  carried  into 
Algiers.  Their  ransom  became,  therefore,  a  necessary 
element  in  the  negotiation,  and  the  agent  sent  to 
Algiers  was  authorized  to  offer,  in  redemption,  two 
hundred  dollars  per  man.  This  offer  was  rejected,  and 
he  returned  in  1786,  without  having  effected  either  the 
ransom  or  a  peace. 

Early  in  1787,  Mr.  Jefferson,  the  American  minister 
then  in  Paris,  appealed  to  the  good  offices  of  the  Gen 
eral  of  the  Mathurins,  a  religious  Order  of  France,  insti 
tuted  in  ancient  times  for  the  redemption  of  Christian 
captives  from  the  infidel  powers,  and  which  had  been 
very  successful  in  redeeming  French  captives  at  a  very 
moderate  ransom.  The  general  of  the  Order  promised 
every  assistance  in  his  power,  although  he  stated  the 
difficulties  in  the  way,  and  the  utter  impossibility  of 
ransoming  American  prisoners  at  the  low  prices  ac 
cepted  for  French  captives.  The  necessary  communi 
cations  between  the  American  minister  in  Paris  and 
his  government  consumed  a  long  time  ;  but  the  assist 
ance  of  the  Order  was  finally  accepted,  and  the  general 
authorized  to  offer  five  hundred  and  fifty-five  dollars  a 
man.  But  in  the  mean  time,  the  Spaniards,  the  Nea 
politans,  and  the  Russians  had  redeemed  captives  at 
exorbitant  sums ;  and  the  appropriation  by  the  French 
republic  of  the  lands  and  revenues  of  the  clergy  had  sus 
pended  the  proceedings  of  the  Mathurins  in  the  pur- 
23* 


270  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

poses  of  their  institution ;  and  when  General  Wash 
ington  entered  upon  his  administration,  all  hope  of 
relief  in  that  quarter  had  vanished. 

The  policy  of  Algiers,  moreover,  was  to  be  at  peace 
only  with  a  certain  proportion  of  the  nations  trading  in 
the  Mediterranean  at  one  time,  in  order  that  their 
cruisers  might  always  have  sufficient  employment,  and 
their  piratical  revenue  never  be  altogether  suspended. 
They  were  now  at  peace  with  France,  Spain,  England, 
Venice,  the  United  Netherlands,  Sweden,  and  Den 
mark,  and  at  war  with  Russia,  Austria,  Portugal,  Na 
ples,  Sardinia,  Genoa,  and  Malta.  And  from  1786  to 
1790  the  ransoms  had  ranged  from  $1,200  to  $2,920  ; 
and  the  number  of  captives,  from  2,200  in  1786,  had 
been,  by  death  or  ransom,  reduced  in  1789  to  655. 

In  1792,  Congress  having  deliberated  upon  the  policy 
necessary  under  the  circumstances,  made  the  requisite 
appropriation  for  a  mission,  and  General  Washington 
appointed  Mr.  Barclay  agent  to  Morocco,  with  the  rank 
of  consul,  and  Admiral  Paul  Jones,  agent  to  Algiers. 
Admiral  Jones  died  before  his  instructions  reached  him, 
and  Mr.  Barclay's  presence  not  being  needed  at  Mo 
rocco  for  the  reasons  already  stated,  the  powers  of 
Admiral  Jones  were  transferred  to  him.  The  instruc 
tions  were  as  follows  :  — 

"  Since,  then,  no  ransom  is  to  take  place  without  a 
peace,  you  will,  of  course,  first  take  up  the  negotia 
tion  of  peace ;  or  if  you  find  it  better  that  peace  and 
ransom  should  be  treated  of  together,  you  will  take  care 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  271 

that  no  agreement  for  the  latter  be  concluded,  unless  the 
former  be  established  before  or  in  the  same  instant. 

"  As  to  the  conditions,  it  is  understood  that  no  peace 
can  be  made  with  that  government  but  for  a  larger 
sum  of  money,  to  be  paid  at  once,  for  the  whole  time  of 
its  duration,  or  for  a  smaller  one,  to  be  annually  paid. 
The  -former  plan  we  entirely  refuse,  and  adopt  the  lat 
ter.  We  have  also  understood  that  peace  might  be 
bought  cheaper  with  naval  stores  than  with  money; 
but  we  will  not  furnish  them  with  naval  stores,  because 
we  think  it  is  not  right  to  furnish  them  the  means 
which  we  know  they  will  employ  to  do  wrong,  and 
because  there  might  be  no  economy  in  it  as  to  our 
selves  in  the  end,  as  it  would  increase  the  expense  of 
that  coercion  which  we  may  in  future  be  obliged  to 
practise  towards  them.  The  only  question  then  is, 
what  sum  of  money  will  we  agree  to  pay  them  annually 
for  peace?  .  .  .  You  will,  of  course,  use  your  best 
endeavors  to  get  it  at  the  lowest  sum  practicable ; 
whereupon  I  shall  only  say,  that  we  should  be  pleased 
with  $10,000,  contented  with  $15,000,  think  $20,000  a 
very  hard  bargain  ;  yet  go  as  far  as  $25,000,  if  it  be 
impossible  to  get  it  for  less  ;  but  not  a  copper  further, 
this  being  fixed  by  law  as  the  utmost  limit.  These  are 
meant  as  annual  sums.  If  you  can  put  off  the  first 
annual  payment  to  the  end  of  the  first  year,  you  may 
employ  any  sums  not  exceeding  that  in  presents,  to 
be  paid  down ;  but  if  the  first  payment  is  to  be  made 


272  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

in  hand,  that  and  the  presents   cannot  by  law  exceed 
25,000  dollars." 

On  the  subject  of  the  ransom  of  the  prisoners,  thir 
teen  in  number,  the  Secretary  said  :  — 

"  It  has  been  a  fixed  principle  with  Congress  to 
establish  the  rate  of  ransom  of  American  captives  with 
the  Barbary  States  at  as  low  a  point  as  possible,  that 
it  may  not  be  the  interest  of  these  States  to  go  in  quest 
of  our  citizens  in  preference  to  those  of  other  countries. 
Had  it  not  been  for  the  danger  it  would  have  brought 
on  the  residue  of  our  seamen,  by  exciting  the  cupidity 
of  these  rovers  against  them,  our  citizens  now  in  Al 
giers  would  have  been  long  ago  redeemed,  without 
regard  to  price.  The  mere  money  for  this  particular 
redemption  neither  has  been,  nor  is,  an  object  with 
anybody  here.  It  is  from  the  same  regard  to  the  safety 
of  our  seamen  at  large,  that  they  have  now  restrained 
us  from  any  ransom  unaccompanied  with  peace;  this 
being  secured,  we  are  led  to  consent  to  terms  of  ransom 
to  which,  otherwise,  our  government  would  never  have 
consented.  .  .  .  You  will  consider  this  sum,  therefore, 
say  $27,000,  as  your  ultimate  limit,  including  ransom, 
duties,  and  gratifications  of  every  kind." 

Mr.  Barclay  had  scarcely  received  these  instructions, 
and  was  preparing  to  start  for  Algiers,  when  he  died  at 
Lisbon,  in  January,  1793.  Colonel  Humphreys,  the 
minister  of  the  United  States  resident  at  Lisbon,  was 
then  authorized  to  conduct  the  negotiation.  Before, 


DIPLOMATIC     HISTORY.  273 

however,  he  could  effect  any  thing,  a  truce  was  most 
unexpectedly  arranged  between  Portugal  and  Algiers, 
which,  by  withdrawing  the  Portuguese  fleet,  left  Ameri 
can  commerce  very  much  exposed ;  and  which  was  so 
sudden  that  it  gave  the  Algerines  an  opportunity, 
which  they  improved  so  well  that  the  number  of  Ameri 
can  captives  was  raised  from  thirteen  to  between  one 
and  two  hundred.*  Colonel  Humphreys  was  finally 

*  As  this  very  unexpected  truce  was  effected  through  the  agency 
of  the  British  consul  at  Algiers,  it  gave  rise  to  a  very  angry  sus 
picion,  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  that  it  was  a  deliberate 
effort  by  the  British  government  to  injure  our  commerce  by  with 
drawing  the  protection  of  the  Portuguese  fleet,  and  exposing  us  to 
the  Algerine  cruisers.  Mr.  Pinckney  communicated  these  suspicions 
to  Lord  Granville,  and  the  following  letter  records  their  conversa 
tion  :  — 

"  His  Lordship,  in  answer  to  what  I  had  advanced,  stated,  that 
with  respect  to  the  truce  between  the  Portuguese  and  Algerines,  this 
country  had  not  the  least  intention  or  a  thought  of  injuring  us 
thereby  ;  that  they  had  been  appealed  to  by  their  friend  and  ally,  the 
court  of  Portugal,  to  procure  a  peace  for  them  with  the  Algerines, 
and  that  Mr.  Logie  had  been  instructed  to  use  his  best  endeavors  to 
effect  this  purpose  ;  that  he,  finding  the  arrangements  for  a  peace 
could  not  immediately  take  place,  had  concluded  the  truce ;  that  in 
this  they  conceived  they  had  done  no  more  than  their  friendship  for 
a  good  ally  required  of  them  ;  but  that  the  measure  was  particularly 
advantageous  to  themselves,  as  they  wanted  the  cooperation  of  the 
Portuguese  fleet  to  act  against  their  common  enemy,  which  it  was  at 
liberty  to  do,  when  no  longer  employed  in  blocking  up  the  Algerine 
fleet.  As  I  had  stated  that  the  Court  of  Portugal  had  promised  a 
convoy  to  the  American  vessels  then  in  their  harbors,  he  assured  me 


274  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

authorized  to  purchase  peace  with  $800,000,  on  the 
same  principles  as  the  former  instructions,  if  possible  ; 
if  not,  he  was  to  arrange  the  distribution  of  the  money 
as  he  thought  best.  In  the  latter  part  of  1795,  he  suc 
ceeded,  through  the  agency  of  Mr.  Donaldson,  recently 
appointed  consul  to  Tunis  and  Tripoli,  and  the  Danish 
consul  at  Algiers,  in  effecting  a  treaty,  by  which  the 
prisoners  were  ransomed  and  a  peace  granted,  in  con 
sideration  of  the  further  sum  of  12,000  sequins,  to  be 
paid  annually  in  naval  stores.  The  ransom  money 
stipulated  not  having  been  paid  punctually  as  it  came 
due,  the  Dey  threatened  to  annul  the  treaty,  and  was 
only  induced  to  lengthen  the  time  for  payment  by  the 
offer  of  a  thirty-six  gun  ship.  The  annual  payment  in 
naval  stores,  as  stipulated  in  detail,  was  found  to  be 
considerably  larger  than  the  amount  specified  in  money, 
and  the  final  appropriation  for  this  treaty,  including  the 
annual  payment  for  two  years,  made  it  cost,  up  to  that 
date,  nine  hundred  and  ninety  odd  thousand  dollars. 

that  they  would  give  no  opposition  to  that  measure."  —  T.  P.  MSS. 
Letter  Book,  Vol.  I.  p.  474,  475. 


CHAPTER    V. 


CONCLUSION. 


THE  chief  feature  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United 
States  throughout  this  period  —  the  twelve  years  com 
prised  in  the  administrations  of  Washington  and  Adams 
—  was  its  negative  character.  Its  great  object  was  to 
prevent,  rather  than  to  accomplish.  It  is  true  that  it 
had  important  and  positive  results.  By  the  treaty  with 
England,  the  frontier  posts  were  restored,  and  the  ter 
ritory  of  the  United  States  freed  from  British  occupa 
tion  ;  by  the  treaty  with  Spain,  their  southern  boun 
daries  were  defined,  and  the  navigation  of  the  Missis 
sippi  secured ;  by  the  treaty  with  France,  they  were 
released  from  the  unprofitable  and  dangerous  guarantee 
of  the  French  possessions.  But  beyond  these  ques 
tions  —  indeed,  to  a  large  extent,  involving  them  in  a 
wider  and  more  general  decision  —  lay  the  perplexed 
field  of  our  foreign  relations.  Had  we  really  an  inde 
pendent  place  in  the  world's  history,  or  was  our  posi 
tion  in  the  political  system  of  Christendom  to  be  deter 
mined  by  the  logic  of  European  interests,  and  enforced 
by  the  power  of  European  arms  ? 


276  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

At  the  declaration  of  American  independence,  the 
European  balance  of  power  had  more  nearly  arrived  at 
perfection  in  its  details  than  at  any  period  since  the 
peace  of  Westphalia.  The  termination  of  the  Revolu 
tionary  war  had  restored  to  France  much  of  the  conse 
quence  which  had  been  diminished  by  the  peace  of 
1763,  while  neither  Russia  on  the  one  side,  nor  the 
immense  maritime  and  colonial  development  of  Eng 
land  on  the  other,  had  become  permanent  disturbers  of 
the  political  equation.  And  although  there  were,  as 
before  and  afterwards,  national  interests  and  national 
jealousies,  there  was  a  certain  dynastic  and  cabinet 
sympathy  among  the  monarchies  of  Europe,  which 
assimilated  their  policies  to  one  common  type.  When, 
therefore,  France  effectually  assisted  at  the  separation 
of  the  colonies  from  England,  and  introduced  a  new 
power  into  the  council-chamber  of  history,  few  realized 
the  full  consequences  of  this  action,  and  those  few  were 
rather  far-seeing  thinkers  than  active  politicians.  The 
European  statesmen  generally  considered  it  as  little 
more  than  the  substitution  of  one  influence  for  another, 
and  considered  it  rather  in  its  consequences  upon  the 
strength  of  an  European  power,  than  as  an  important 
and  independent  fact.  There  was,  therefore,  a  mani 
fest  intention  to  use  the  young  republic  as  one  of  the 
small  weights,  to  be  shifted,  by  diplomatic  manipula 
tion,  from  one  scale  to  the  other,  according  to  the  polit 
ical  necessities  of  the  European  balance.  And,  had  the 
general  condition  of  things  remained  as  before,  the 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  277 

United  States  could  scarcely  have  prevented  such  a 
destiny ;  for  against  the  united  diplomacy  and  strength 
of  Europe,  they  could  have  accomplished  nothing. 
But  before  the  various  interests  of  Europe  could  adjust 
themselves  for  this  new  relation,  the  French  Revolution 
broke  to  pieces  the  old  system,  scattered  the  elaborate 
calculations  of  the  old  diplomacy,  and,  by  involving  all 
Europe  in  a  war  for  existence,  left  the  United  States 
comparatively  undisturbed,  to  mature  their  own  inter 
ests  into  an  independent  system.  Washington  and 
Adams  found  themselves  just  in  this  transition  period, 
when  the  traditionary  policy  of  Europe  was  destroyed, 
and  every  state  was  in  the  uncertainty  of  panic,  seek 
ing  its  own  interests  and  safety,  and  before  the  strife 
had  been  concentrated  into  that  absorbing  struggle  for 
national  existence  which  lasted  through  the  first  fifteen 
years  of  the  present  century.  With  three  of  the  great 
European  powers  they  had  questions  of  direct  concern. 
Besides  this  complication,  they  had  endeavored,  in  such 
treaties  as  they  had  already  negotiated,  to  introduce  the 
mild  principles  of  a  humane  and  liberal  system  of 
neutral  rights,  and  they  had  succeeded  in  establishing 
stipulations  of  this  character  in  their  relations  with  sev 
eral  European  powers.  But  in  the  general  and  con 
fused  hostility  which  followed  upon  the  outbreak  of  the 
French  Revolution,  not  only  these  principles  could  not 
be  enforced,  but  their  existence  complicated  the  rela 
tions  of  the  United  States  with  those  allies  who,  as 
regarded  themselves,  were  mutual  and  bitter  enemies. 

24 


278  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

The  position  of  the  United  States,  therefore,  as  far  as 
their  immediate  interests  were  concerned,  was  most 
unfortunate.  They  could  not  obtain  an  impartial  hear 
ing  at  any  court  in  Europe ;  and  they  had  not  the 
strength  to  force  from  greater  powers  that  respect  to 
which  their  national  and  independent  interests  were 
fairly  entitled.  But  embarrassing  as  was  this  position, 
the  causes  that  produced  it,  corrected,  in  their  develop 
ment,  the  very  difficulties  which  they  had  created.  The 
uncertain  and  conflicting  interests  of  the  European 
powers  induced  a  jealous  watchfulness  of  each  other's 
policy ;  and,  by  a  skilful  use  of  their  various  and  chang 
ing  relations,  the  United  States  were  enabled  to  obtain, 
at  different  periods,  concessions  from  each,  granted,  it  is 
true,  rather  from  a  selfish  instinct  in  the  special  policy 
of  each  state,  but  not  the  less  important  on  that  ac 
count  in  their  results  upon  American  interests.  Thus, 
the  treaty  with  England  was  yielded  to  the  necessities 
of  the  condition  of  hostility  between  England  and 
France ;  the  treaty  with  Spain  was  the  result  of  the 
changed  attitude  of  that  power  toward  England  on  the 
one  side,  and  France  on  the  other ;  and  the  treaty  with 
France  depended  upon  the  special  relation  which 
France  at  the  moment  wished  to  assume,  for  her  own 
purposes,  towards  the  other  powers  of  Europe.  Not 
one  of  these  treaties  was  based  upon  any  honest  regard 
for  the  interests  or  rights  of  the  United  States  ;  and  it 
thus  literally  and  providentially  happened,  that  the 
French  Revolution,  which  at  one  time  threatened  to 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  279 

absorb  the  interests  of  the  .United  States  as  the  neces 
sary  but  inferior  consequences  of  European  policy,  did 
finally  play  a  most  important,  though  unforeseen,  part 
in  accomplishing  that  very  independence,  which,  at  the 
outset,  it  so  seriously  compromised. 

Another  embarrassment  under  which  the  government 
labored,  was  the  want  of  an  efficient  and  experienced 
diplomatic  corps.  The  character  and  ability  of  the 
diplomatic  representatives  of  the  United  States  were  of 
the  highest  class ;  but  no  natural  excellence  could  en 
tirely  supersede  the  necessity  of  that  familiarity  with  the 
details  of  European  policy,  which  was,  perhaps,  more 
important  at  this  period  than  at  any  other  in  our  his 
tory,  for  our  policy  was  in  great  measure  dependent  on 
the  contingent  relations  of  other  powers.  Added  to 
this,  the  time  necessary  for  communication,  at  that  day, 
between  Europe  and  America,  and  the  uncertainty  of 
even  this  dilatory  communication,  owing  to  the  chances 
of  capture  from  both  belligerents,  rendered  an  exchange 
of  despatches  almost  idle.  Months  elapsed  between 
the  most  important  letters ;  papers,  absolutely  necessary 
to  pending  negotiations,  wandered  away  from  their 
direction;  and  in  the  archives  of  that  period,  the  place 
of  more  than  one  important  document  is  supplied  by 
the  notice,  "  never  received."  The  critical  combination, 
in  the  midst  of  which  a  minister  wrote  for  instructions, 
was  passed  long  before  his  letters  reached  Philadelphia ; 
and  the  state  of  affairs  to  which  his  home  correspond- 


280  DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

ence  related  had  been  wellnigh  forgotten  before  he  fully 
comprehended  its  details.  Our  foreign  ministers,  there 
fore,  were  not  only  subjected  to  great  difficulty  in  the 
discharge  of  their  duties,  but  their  real  and  unaffected 
ignorance  of  what  was  going  on  at  home  diminished 
their  consideration  in  the  eyes  of  the  practised  diplo 
matists  with  whom  they  were  dealing. 

"  I  believe,"  says  one  of  them,  who  had  enjoyed  con 
siderable  experience,  "  that  the  members  of  no  corps 
diplomatique  whatever,  in  any  country  or  at  any  time, 
have  been  furnished  with  so  little  or  so  irregular  infor 
mation  of  the  important  occurrences  of  their  own  coun 
try,  or  of  others,  as  those  from  America  have  ever  been. 
I  know  not  how  this  may  affect  others,  but  as  to  myself, 
I  have  often  felt,  though  never  so  much  as  lately,  that 
it  adds  cruelly  to  the  distrust  and  embarrassment  which 
are  experienced  in  those  cases  which  are  inevitable,  and 
which  force  to  the  adoption  of  one  of  several  lines  of 
conduct,  which  may  lead  to  different,  and  even  to 
opposite,  ends.  Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  impos 
sible  not  to  be  subject  to  constant  error,  unless  one  is 
endowed  with  the  spirit  of  divination,  to  which  I  have 
no  pretensions.  I  have  been  led  to  these  reflections 
from  what  I  have  seen  myself,  and  learned  from  other 
foreign  agents  of  the  United  States,  and  which  would 
seem  to  show,  from  this  system  having  been  practised 
under  the  successive  administrations  of  our  country, 
that  it  was  considered  there  as  the  proper  one.  If 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  281 

so,  I  am  persuaded  time   and  experience  will  change 
it."  * 

But  not  only  had  the  government  to  contend  with 
difficulties  like  these  ;  it  had  to  meet  at  home  an  ex 
cited  and  powerful  opposition.  For,  unfortunately,  on 
the  foreign  policy  of  the  country,  public  opinion  was 
widely  and  passionately  divided.  Not  only  did  parties 
see  the  interests  of  the  country  in  different  lights,  but 
they  became,  as  the  controversy  grew  warmer,  active 
partisans  of  the  foreign  influences  which  attempted  to 
control  our  policy  for  their  own  ends.  The  contest  be 
came  one  of  sentiment  rather  than  opinion,  and  roused 
into  unscrupulous  activity  all  the  bitterness  that  had 
been  engendered  in  the  Seven  Years'  war.  Confounding 
the  principles  of  our  own  Revolution  with  the  elements 
of  civil  strife  at  work  in  France,  the  great  popular  mind 
was  deceived  by  its  own  highest  and  most  honest  sym 
pathies,  while  the  party  which  supported  the  adminis 
tration  became,  in  the  heat  of  the  long  and  angry  argu 
ment,  less  tolerant  of  opposition  than  was  either  just  or 
politic.  The  truest  patriots  mistrusted  each  other,  and, 
misinterpreting  each  other's  motives  with  the  acute- 
ness  of  excited  and  jealous  .suspicion,  their  opposition 
threatened  to  render  any  moderate  policy  impracti 
cable.  Without  a  fixed  policy,  with  a  limited  and 
enemy-bounded  territory,  and  enfeebled  by  radical  po 
litical  dissension  at  home,  it  is  now  almost  impos- 

i 
*  T.  P.  MSS.     Letter  from  Mr.  Short,  Oct.  12,  1793. 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY. 

sible  to  realize  the  extent  of  our  peril.  And  had  foreign 
powers  been  allowed  to  obtain  commanding  influence 
in  the  national  councils,  the  character  of  the  country 
would  have  been  diminished,  its  interests  mutilated, 
and  our  national  existence  must  have  dragged  its  slow 
way  from  a  crippled  and  sickly  infancy  to  a  maimed 
and  dependent  manhood.  Fortunately  for  us,  how 
ever,  sustained  by  wise,  informed,  and  firm  counsellors, 
Washington  succeeded,  even  against  a  strongly  excited 
popular  prejudice,  in  establishing  the  perfect  national 
independence  of  the  country.  And  to  have  effected 
this,  as  they  did,  without  war,  and  in  face  of  the  dif 
ficulties,  both  foreign  and  domestic,  of  the  new  govern 
ment,  is  the  crowning  glory  of  those  great  men,  whose 
arms  enfranchised  an  empire,  whose  wisdom  created  a 
constitution,  and  whose  steadfast  sagacity  inaugurated 
a  national  life  of  unbroken  and  almost  fabulous  pros 
perity.  They  differed,  as  men  will  do,  sometimes  in 
ignorance,  sometimes  in  passion;  but  in  their  labors, 
they  were  joined  together,  and  in  their  fame,  they  should 
not  be  divided.  Honored  be  their  memories,  —  the 
severe  simplicity  of  Jay's  antique  virtue,  the  subtle 
and  eloquent  reasoning  of  Jefferson's  wonderful  intel 
lect,  the  broad  and  ample  sweep  of  Hamilton's  na 
tional  pride,  the  impetuous  and  abounding  patriotism 
of  the  elder  Adams,  the  varied  excellency  of  Pinckney 
and  iMorris  and  Monroe,  but  above  all,  the  calm,  sure 
judgment  of  him  in  whose  majestic  presence  even  these 
men  bowed.  With  feeble  means,  they  achieved  great 


DIPLOMATIC    HISTORY.  283 

ends ;  in  doubt  and  difficulty,  they  never  faltered  in  a 
great  purpose.  They  were  men  true  and  brave  and 
elevated ;  their  tempers  chastened  by  a  long  and  patient 
experience,  their  ambitions  tempered  by  a  wise  forbear 
ance,  and  their  abilities  quickened  by  a  devoted  patriot 
ism,  which  gave  vigor  and  purpose  to  their  policy. 
But  the  student  of  the  world's  fortunes,  who  looks  down 
upon  this  mighty  empire,  with  its  tributary  oceans,  and 
sees  its  vast  extent  gemmed  with  the  civilized  beauty 
of  a  thousand  cities,  peopled  with  untiring  millions,  by 
whose  energy  its  rivers  roll  down  gold,  its  forests  van 
ish,  and  its  fields  burst  into  luxuriant  harvests,  while 
arts  and  science,  laws  and  commerce,  direct,  protect, 
and  refine  the  objects  of  their  unstinted  labors,  —  be 
holds  but  a  portion  of  their  work. 

For,  in  the  darkest  hours  of  their  perplexity,  they 
trusted  with  a  grave  and  beautiful  simplicity  to  Truth. 
And  the  success  of  their  policy  thus  afforded  to  the 
science  of  history  another  of  those  rare  observations,  by 
which  we  learn,  that,  beyond  our  obscure  and  cloudy 
prospect,  the  eternal  laws  of  a  Divine  morality  are  at 
work,  and  that  with  nations,  as  with  men,  the  law  of 
progress  is  the  rule  of  right. 


END  . 


/^— I 

&-ir-trtf~    ^/*zC<^-^^    y  *La~*^^-*~£    t^^^^^ 

&~u+~Y^££>     4»      C*-**       1~e-  s. 


^    J^ArfVft          '*&**&>&} 


^ryVTcr^^ 


XfiJL  — 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

RENEWALS  ONLY— TEL.  NO.  642-3405 
This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  rec 


LOAN 


• 


\989 


APR  12 


1989 


LD21A-60m-3,'70 
(N5382slO)476-A-32 


General  Library 

University  of  Californja 

Berkeley 


YG  50852 


B  V 

$&* 


V&  '     *  ^stett*? 


'        ^*          * 


